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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to investigate the possibility that the All China Federation of Trade 
Unions is capable of reform in the face of the development of capitalist employment 
relations. The thesis is centred on the examination of hitherto under-researched areas of 
ACFTU activity by researching the motivations, conditions and actors involved in 
three local-level pilot projects: collective bargaining, a trade union rights centre and 
enterprise-level trade union elections. The fieldwork is contextualised by historical 
summaries of the development of China‟s industrial relations and Party and trade union 
responses to labour unrest in both the state and private sectors since the establishment 
of the People‟s Republic in 1949. The results of my research demonstrate that it is no 
longer appropriate to refer to the ACFTU as a monolithic organisation. Furthermore, 
my argument departs from mainstream views of the organisation by locating the 
impetus for trade union reform in the challenge of increasingly sophisticated labour 
militancy from below, rather than reacting to orders from above. I conclude that while 
the pilot projects studied each have their own merits and qualifications, taken as a 
whole they prove that the ACFTU is capable of gradual reform from below. In the light 
of the improved relations between the ACFTU and the International Trade Union 
Confederation, this thesis speaks to this fact and aims to contribute to future 
engagements by expanding the knowledge on which dialogue and trade union 
exchanges must be based if they are to have any chance of success. 
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 Introduction 
Throughout the period of economic reform, mainstream opinion of the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has been largely negative in the developed 
countries. The most important criticism is that the ACFTU does not meet ILO 
standards of independence due to its constitutional and legally enshrined acceptance of 
Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership. Although the Chinese government signed 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997, it entered 
a reservation to the clause in Article Eight pertaining to freedom of association. Thus, 
the ACFTU‟s monopoly status has remained intact and its response to the transition 
from a command economy to a market economy has been largely top-down. It has 
played a key role in drafting laws and regulations that both construct and constrain the 
organisation‟s role in a still evolving industrial relations system based on labour law 
and contracts. The consequences of the absence of competition for membership and 
influence from alternative trade unions are seen in the slow rate of reform to its 
traditional modus operandi and weakness at enterprise level. The picture of an 
anaesthetised and compliant trade union is complemented by lingering stereotypes of 
passive Chinese workers stealing jobs from all and sundry in a global race to the 
bottom. 
 However beginning in 2003 – by my estimation – there has been a thaw in the 
relationship between the former International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) and the ACFTU. The defrosting continued following the merger between the 
ICFTU and the World Confederation of Labour to form the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) on 1 November 2006. Further impetus came after the Change 
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To Win federation‟s split from the AFL-CIO.  Even though Change To Win is not an 
affiliate of the ITUC, its initiative of dialogue with the ACFTU has encouraged a 
moderate rethink in the AFL-CIO itself. In December 2007, the ITUC voted to seek 
engagement with the ACFTU based, according to General Secretary Guy Ryder, on 
„clear policy objectives‟. Given that approximately one quarter of the global working 
class is Chinese and that China is the favoured destination of global foreign direct 
investment, the ITUC‟s change of direction is profoundly significant. At the research 
level, it opens up opportunities for research on Chinese trade unions and will add 
weight to the significance of the results. My thesis is among the first of what we hope 
will be many research projects that move beyond the traditional parameters of western 
research on the ACFTU.       
China‟s industrial relations policies between 1949 and the mid-eighties ensured 
stable employment for the urban working class (Pringle and Leung, 2006). Although 
the political environment was frequently rocked by campaigns such as the Anti-
Rightist Movement, the Hundred Flowers and the Great Leap Forward during the 
1950s and the Cultural Revolution of the sixties, the state went to considerable efforts 
to ensure that these campaigns did not impinge on industrial production.
1
 There is 
evidence to show that, at least in part, some of the aforementioned campaigns were 
either a response to labour militancy or a desire to forestall it in order to maintain 
industrial peace and ensure production targets were met (Leys, 1977; Harris, 1978; 
Gipouloux 1986).  
                                                 
1
 With the qualified exception of the Great Leap Forward, the stated aim of which was to increase 
production dramatically.  
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Nevertheless, working class militancy as expressed through strikes, the refusal 
to meet quotas and production targets, absenteeism, a disregard for factory rules and 
petty sabotage were an important and complex feature of pre-reform industrial relations 
(Sheehan, 1998: 2-3). While the demands raised by workers in these struggles often, 
but not always, resonated with the demands of industrial workers anywhere – for 
higher wages, improved safety etc. – their class character was muddied by the political 
environment in which they took place. All of China‟s four Constitutions to date have 
been based on the revolutionary notion that the working class, led by the CPC, is the 
leading class, in effect the ruling class. As „masters‟ of state-run enterprises, the nature 
of any collective class action by workers in pursuit of improved pay and working 
conditions was consequently far from straightforward.  
The economic reforms are officially recognised as beginning in 1978 when the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress gave approval to land distribution 
reforms pioneered in the provinces of Anhui and Sichuan on the initiative of farmers 
themselves. Since this historic decision, the economic reforms have had a profound 
effect on the structure, composition, geography and demography of the Chinese 
working class. As government policy edged the country into a period of transition from 
a command economy to a market-orientated economy – described by the CPC since 
1992 as a „socialist market economy‟ – the position and political influence workers 
have been able to impose collectively on society has been subject to contradictory 
pressures. On the one hand, state-owned enterprise (SOE) restructuring has put paid to 
the command economy status of urban workers as „masters of the enterprise‟ – despite 
constitutional reassurances to the contrary – along with the economic benefits and 
10 
 
privileges that came with this comparatively privileged political position. At the same 
time, the return of private capital, rapid urbanisation and China‟s now major role in the 
global economy has increased the potential collective power of workers exponentially. 
Since 2003, we have seen glimpses of this potential in the increasingly successful 
militancy of migrant workers in South and East China as they have pushed up the pay 
rates for skilled labour and government-fixed local minimum wage levels. And of 
course, as the ITUC‟s policy shift towards engagement with the ACFTU suggests, 
China‟s working class has not only increased in size; its influence on labour relations 
has an impact way beyond China‟s borders.  
Up until the mid-nineties, the changes descending on the urban working class 
were, generally speaking, of a gradual nature. Power over hire and fire, wages and 
contracts granted to the renamed SOE – previously referred to as state-operated 
(guoying) – managers during the 1980s were employed sparingly as local governments 
and industrial leaders sought to avoid labour unrest (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 86). As the 
influence of private capital grew, the resulting competition dictated a major 
restructuring that began with small- and medium-sized enterprises. Membership of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in late 2001 has propelled the restructuring process 
towards almost all SOEs.  
The resulting laying off of tens of millions of workers from SOEs was, and 
remains, a major political event in terms of evaluating the political and economic 
influence of China‟s working class in the period of transition. It came as a result of a 
number of different pressures but the most important were the migration of tens of 
millions of migrant workers into off-farm employment; and the continuation and 
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consolidation of the policy of encouraging foreign direct investment as a motor for 
development, especially in the manufacturing sector. The policy of mass redundancies 
from SOEs was known as xiagang in Chinese. Literally translated into English the term 
means „to step down from one‟s post‟ which awards it a voluntary inference that is not 
accurate in this case. Xiagang facilitated a still ongoing re-balancing of the relations of 
production in favour of private capital. The state has resorted to various euphemisms to 
encourage the traditional urban working class to accept the transformation. For its part, 
the ACFTU, through the pages of Workers‟ Daily, exhorted skilled workers and low 
level managers to „jump into the sea‟ of enterprise and commerce (xiahai) and blue 
collar workers to „liberate their thinking‟ (jiefang sixiang), reject irrational 
egalitarianism and practice self-reliance.  
As private and foreign capital became the engine of China‟s growth (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004: 43-44), the rural internal migrant workers who facilitated 
this realignment faced very high levels of exploitation. Known as nongmin gong or 
literally peasant workers, they retained their rural status and were excluded from many 
of the citizen rights enjoyed by urban workers. The practice of drafting in migrants 
from the countryside to work on urban infrastructure projects was not new in the 
People‟s Republic. But the migration of peasants to work in private enterprises in 
which they were subjected to capitalist labour relations was very new. The strangeness 
of the factory system to these new arrivals and the high degree of state management 
over their temporary transfer from the countryside acted as constraints on their capacity 
to defend their rights at work. And anyway, these rights weren‟t given full formal legal 
status until the national labour law was enacted in 1995. This was followed by an 
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increase in labour disputes between labour and private capital that has continued ever 
since. Indeed, by 2005, migrant workers‟ actions were providing the greatest incentive 
to the ACFTU to improve its representative performance and even beginning to win 
important hikes in both the minimum and average wages.     
The responses of both the traditional urban working class and their recently 
arrived, yet still separated, rural brothers and sisters to the issues confronting them in 
China‟s industrial workplaces have been determined by various factors. Structure, 
composition, history, geography and demography have all conditioned how workers 
react to exploitation. Of equal weight are the policies of the state itself: the absence of 
freedom of association, the state‟s decision to put employment creation before „decent 
work‟, restrictions on residential rights that have excluded off-farm workers from full 
urban citizen rights even as they have retained the right to land, an expanding but 
monitored and supervised civil society, an incomplete legal system for governing 
industrial relations, a restricted media and the fact that China remains a one-party state 
in which the organisation of class interests beyond the structures permitted by the CPC 
is still, to all intents and purposes, politically inconceivable. Combined with the 
country‟s sheer size and diversity, this array of objective and subjective factors suggest 
that it is not possible to speak of a unified working class response to either the 
restructuring of SOEs or the imposition of „primitive accumulation‟ on migrant 
workers from the countryside in the private sector (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 55). Some 
commentators have drawn the conclusion that Chinese workers – indeed Chinese 
society – are as disparate as „grains of sand‟ and that this by default precludes any 
effective collective influence on government and society. 
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 Yet, a growing body of research suggests that a generalised scenario of 
disempowerment is far too simplistic. The absence of independent trade unions does 
not automatically preclude working class influence on most aspects of the 
government‟s labour relations policies, including wages. Hobsbawm reminded us that 
„[M]en live surrounded by a vast accumulation of past devices‟ and over the last 
twenty-seven years of reform, but especially since the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, 
Chinese workers have drawn on „the most suitable of these, [and] to adapt them for 
their own (novel) purposes‟ (Hobsbawm, 1998: 44). In China workers have in the main 
pursued what are often referred to as „bread and butter‟ issues that by no means directly 
challenge the current political status quo: better wages, wages on time, pension rights, 
dole payments and health and safety issues. Very rarely, demands for union recognition 
have surfaced, more often than not cautiously couched in China‟s labour traditions.   
Over the past five years there have been two important developments: firstly 
there is a slight and ongoing shift in the labour market in favour of workers due chiefly 
to labour shortages, demographic trends, a discernible change in the central 
government‟s agricultural policies – itself due to farmer unrest over tax burdens and 
land access issues – and the consolidation of the rise of new geographic areas of 
economic growth such as the Yangzi River Delta. Crucially, there has been a growing 
sense of rights awareness and collective strength, particularly among migrant workers. 
Secondly, workers have been able to make use of the tension between central 
government laws and regulations and local government‟s need to maintain stability in 
an environment of increased rights awareness, labour shortages and higher expectations 
among the second generation of migrant workers. An interview with a trade union 
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official in Zhejiang province corroborated views from entrepreneurs in the same area 
that there was a quantitative and qualitative difference in the workplace attitudes 
among the younger migrant workers. The current generation is far more „aware of the 
labour law and the rights they should have under this law‟ (LNGO staff, interview, 
Shenzhen, 6 January 2006). Moreover, their long term ambitions have changed. Many 
have „no intentions of going back to the land if they can possibly avoid it‟ (LNGO staff, 
interview, Shenzhen, 6 January 2006). Changes in the labour market – at least until 
October 2008 and the onset of global recession – and the accumulated bank of 
knowledge of the factory system by migrant workers have produced improvements in 
wages, working conditions and general standard of living, as well as new strategy and 
tactics to pursue such goals. While China‟s „new factory proletarians, rural labourers, 
miners and others of the sort‟ have not yet fully learned „how to run a trade union‟ 
(Hobsbawm, 1998: 46) and the process of doing so is slowed by political restrictions, 
we can see how the myth that reduces Chinese migrant workers to unthinking 
workhorses „that don‟t need or want days off‟ is indeed just a myth.2   
 It is against this background that I posited my research question: „How does the 
traditional trade union respond to the changing complexities of industrial relations in 
general and labour unrest in particular?‟ The unions have been under considerable 
pressure to stabilise labour relations and slow the rise in collective labour disputes. The 
pressure has come from central and local governments as well as from investors 
(Howell, 2003; Taylor et al, 2003, Clarke and Pringle, 2009). In response, the ACFTU 
has embarked on a number of almost exclusively top-down strategies in attempts to 
                                                 
2
 I recently learnt from two experienced African labour researchers that this myth is currently 
widespread among African workers, some of who are faced with migrant workers from China on short-
term contracts and long working hours.  
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increase its credibility among workers by forging a direct link between labour rights, 
trade union activity and social harmony. These include: membership campaigns 
beginning in 1999; the theoretical inclusion of off-farm migrant workers in the formal 
working class since the Fourteenth Trade Union Conference in 2003; participation in 
law-drafting and trial implementation of regulations on collective bargaining and 
collective wage consultation; case intervention at the levels of mediation, arbitration 
and the courts; the direct election of trade union officials and committee members at 
enterprise level etc. As essentially a government institution, the ACFTU has played a 
major role in the field of labour law-drafting. In 1988, the organisation even made a 
serious attempt to have the right to strike included in the revision of the Trade Union 
Law being drafted at the time (Chen Feng, 2003b: 1018). Although in this instance its 
efforts failed, the impact of the ACFTU on law-drafting has continued and deepened as 
the relatively pro-worker Labour Contract Law (2008) has demonstrated. At the same 
time, these top-down policies do not exclude local initiatives and, some argue, even 
create space for them. This thesis uses three case studies to demonstrate that the 
ACFTU does not only engage in top-down strategies and that locally initiated pilots 
form an important part of its policy development, especially in the area of responding 
to labour unrest.  
 I have contextualised my narrative of labour unrest and trade union reform in 
three ways. The first is that constitutionally, China remains a „socialist state under the 
people‟s democratic dictatorship led by the working class‟ (Constitution, 1982). As far 
as the CPC is concerned the introduction of a „socialist market economy‟ and the social 
relations that have emerged have not altered this basic circumstance and, as a 
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consequence, it remains deeply concerned with its legitimacy. Despite the passage of 
time, the CPC remains keenly aware of modern Polish history and the role of 
Solidarność in bringing about the downfall of the previous regime. More recently, the 
role of foreign funded non-governmental organisations (NGO), labour-orientated and 
otherwise, in the so-called „colour‟ revolutions of Georgia and the Ukraine has caused 
concern in the Chinese leadership.  
The second context pertains to the nature of China‟s transition. The depth of the 
reforms was illustrated in speeches by the former President and Party Secretary 
General Jiang Zemin in 2000 and 2001 in which he awarded Chinese entrepreneurs and 
managers a dramatically expanded ideological space for the pursuit of profit. As 
decisive political moments in China‟s transition, the speeches recognised that the 
allocation of China‟s resources is no longer solely the prerogative of the state. 
Continuing political control was ensured in Jiang‟s exposition of his theory of the 
Three Represents, which argues that the CPC has the capacity to represent the interests 
of all the „progressive‟ actors in society.  
While my research is not intended as a transition study, least of all one that 
risks „presenting too laudatory a narrative of China‟s “successful” turn to capitalism‟ 
(Lee Ching-kwan, 2007: xi) both these contexts demand a thorough review of labour 
relations in the former command economy and how the working class influenced them. 
My review draws on recent research that has shed a questioning light on the view that 
workers remained largely passive players in the arrangements and relationships of pre-
reform industry. Following this necessarily lengthy exploration of the historical 
working class, its traditions and its more recent „unmaking‟, I review the development 
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of labour unrest in the private sector over the reform period. In all this, I use the role of 
the ACFTU as both an anchor and reference point for my research and to remain true 
to my research question.  
The third context is the emergence of „space‟ in which Chinese civil society 
currently operates and, more to the point, where it comes from. Globalisation has given 
increased impetus to the argument that representative parliamentary democracy is a 
„natural‟ result of trade and the engagements that trade brings. The argument is often 
cited by western governments and TNCs to justify doing business with states in which 
democratic institutions are either lacking or in their infancy. In the context of China, it 
is often assumed that the appearance of a prosperous middle class will lead to demands 
for democratic channels of participation in political life. While not a focus of my 
project, the authenticity – or lack of it – of this argument is rendered relevant by my 
contention that it has primarily been workers‟ self-activity that has pushed the barriers 
of social participation, not the market.  
Personal Note 
My interest in trade unions and industrial relations began as a twenty-year old 
imported British worker employed, via Dutch agents, on Germany‟s building sites – an 
arrangement made famous by the 1980s TV series Auf Wiedersehen Pet. On returning 
to the UK in late 1981, I found work as a nursing assistant and joined COHSE, the 
largest nurses‟ union at the time. I have been a union activist in all bar one of my 
workplaces since and spent three years as secretary of a Bakers Food and Allied 
Workers Union branch in the early nineties.   
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In the mid-eighties I enrolled as a mature student of Modern Chinese Studies at 
Leeds University and in 1996 began researching Chinese labour relations and trade 
unions while employed as a researcher and translator at a Hong Kong-based labour 
NGO. I remained in China until 2006, working on labour issues, undertaking primary 
research and fieldwork on projects for various labour organisations and also as an 
active participant in Hong Kong‟s labour movement – at least as far as my appalling 
Cantonese allowed me to do so!  
In 2000, I attended a lecture on Russian trade unions in transition given in Hong 
Kong by Professor Simon Clarke. The lecture inspired me to read Professor Clarke‟s 
and his colleagues‟ publications on industrial relations in Russia, Vietnam and China. 
This body of work seemed to give academic weight to arguments and ideas that I was 
forming as a researcher and practitioner in the field: That freedom of association is the 
crux of effective trade workplace representation, but the transition of traditional 
command economy trade unions into organisations that can meet – or not – the 
challenge of capitalist labour relations in the context of capitalist globalisation is 
equally important to improving the lives of workers. In 2005, after three years of 
intermittent correspondence with Professor Clarke and others, backed up by 
discussions at two labour conferences in Beijing, I submitted a successful proposal for 
PhD research at the University of Warwick.           
Note on Methodology 
Originally my thesis posed four research questions: the extent of working class unity in 
China; the extent of the development of labour protests; regional differences in labour 
relations; and the existence, or otherwise, of a correlation between workers‟ protests 
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and pay and conditions. During my first year of research, I realised that these questions 
were either too broad, too narrow, or paradoxically, both. Moreover, providing at least 
half-decent answers would require lines of enquiry at times too sensitive for a non-
Chinese to research in the field. Crucially, during the course of my early reading, 
discussions and conversations with trade unionists, workers and academics, there was 
invariably an „elephant in the room‟ that would sooner or later make its presence felt. 
The elephant‟s name is the All China Federation of Trade Unions.  
At the same time as I was becoming increasingly cognisant of the ACFTU‟s 
„warts and all‟ connection to all my original research questions, I also realised that 
while there are excellent studies on the structure and nature of this organisation, there 
is far less academic work available – at least in English – on the organisation‟s 
response to a rapidly evolving industrial relations map. I concluded that one reason for 
this dearth is the school of thought which holds that the absence of freedom of 
association and the political constraints on the ACFTU dictate that it has not responded, 
indeed cannot respond, to the transformation of China‟s economy. Yet my reading and 
research suggested otherwise. 
Fortunately, I was able to change tack while not abandoning my original 
research proposal. My new question was: „How does the ACFTU respond to the 
changing complexities of industrial relations in general and labour unrest in 
particular?‟ At the time – mid-2006 – I believed that this question distilled the four 
previous questions into a manageable and original field of inquiry. Three years later, I 
still do. I hope that the result of my work at least partially answers what remains by 
default an evolving issue.   
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Thus, my fieldwork tasks required on the one hand a general – rather than 
specifically ethnographic – investigation into labour unrest and its impact on trade 
union performance. And on the other, I required access to past and present trade union 
pilots that afforded insight into how the ACFTU responds to the challenges confronting 
it. A number of factors combined to make this possible:  my first year literature survey 
had already added depth to a basic understanding of both labour unrest and the ACFTU 
during a ten-year period as a Hong Kong-based labour researcher working with various 
labour organisations. My own background as an active trade unionist certainly helped 
me contextualise and analyse my data. Invaluably, at the same time as taking up my 
PhD research, I was employed as a research fellow on a three-year ESRC-funded 
project at the University of Warwick, working with local research teams to examine 
trade unions in three „post socialist‟ countries, including China. My resources were 
dramatically enriched as a result.  
Chapters One to Three are based on Chinese and English academic resources, 
literature surveys and Chinese media reports. These secondary sources are 
supplemented by my field work which includes twenty-two interviews with workers, 
trade union officials, labour NGO staffers, lawyers and journalists in Shenzhen, Hong 
Kong, Guangzhou, Beijing and Hangzhou during 2005-2006. During this time I was 
resident in Hong Kong and travelled to the mainland to conduct my fieldwork. These 
chapters also make use of interviews and research I conducted prior to embarking on a 
PhD in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Chapter Two concentrates on the 
response of SOE workers to restructuring and here I was able to call on seventeen 
interviews I conducted with laid-off workers in 2002 and 2003 in Shaanxi province and 
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Northeast China. Six of these interviews were in-depth and extended over a whole day 
and sometimes longer.   
 Chapters Four to Six are built around the results of supervised research in 
Zhejiang and Guangdong. Working with experienced labour academics who enjoy 
close links and excellent access to the ACFTU has been a profound learning experience 
to which this thesis is indebted. In the middle of 2005, I organised three formal 
research planning meetings. These meetings ensured that the research was carried out 
within the framework of my updated research questions, identified examples of trade 
union response to labour unrest and the related issue of trade union representation at 
the local level and fixed the methodologies, frameworks and parameters for the case 
studies. Apart from regular email contact – 285 emails in total – I received monthly 
progress reports, the content of which formed the basis for eight extended meetings 
with the researchers. Wherever possible I arranged, through my research colleagues, 
extended interviews with key informants. Six of these interviews were an important 
addition to my supervised research. From March 2007 onwards, these meetings 
concentrated on discussing the results of the research and ensuring that the conclusions 
I was drawing from them was backed up by evidence. I should stress that any mistakes 
in the interpretation of the data are mine and mine alone. The fieldwork itself involved 
in-depth interviews with enterprise-, county- and city-level trade union cadres, labour 
bureau officials, enterprise managers and workers. Also conducted was one survey of 
sixty Guangdong-based enterprise-level trade union cadres attending courses on labour 
and trade union law; and two surveys on employer and worker attitudes to the process 
and results of trade union elections. The latter surveys involved, respectively, 144 
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workers and twenty-three employers in a prosperous Zhejiang town. Prior to, during 
and following the research period, I supplemented the supervised research with in-
depth interviews with trade union officials and factory managers conducted by myself 
and triangulated by press reports and conference papers. I would be the first to admit 
that the conclusions I draw in Chapters Four, Five and Six are tentative and more 
research is required. At the same time, the research has enabled me to demonstrate that 
the underlying dynamic of these experiments in trade union innovation has been labour 
unrest and the search for industrial harmony rather than law and edicts from above. I 
believe that this conclusion, along with the evidence provided to support it, is of 
considerable value to the development of the labour movement in China and how 
external agencies might react to it.    
Ethical Consideration 
Experience has taught me that anonymity is of key importance to individuals and 
groups that do not enjoy the status required to afford protection against China‟s strict 
rules on censorship and social research. I have applied this lesson whenever I judged it 
necessary. My supervised research has deliberately avoided delving into the taboo 
topic of freedom of association in favour of concentrating on what is possible in 
actually existing conditions.  
Structure 
The central argument of this thesis departs from conventional assumptions about the 
ACFTU and Chinese labour in three respects. First: although the trade union maintains 
a monopoly on formal union organising in China, this does not equate to monolithic 
strategy and tactics with regard to workers‟ rights and interests. Second: the variety in 
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union approaches to its work is not a result of edicts and regulatory commands from 
the centre, but the product of pilot projects at the local level. Third: the stereotype of 
Chinese workers as passive victims of capitalist globalisation and authoritarian 
government does not fit the reality of industrial relations in China. In fact, it is 
increasingly sophisticated labour unrest that is providing the primary impetus for local 
pilots in trade union work.  
 I have structured my argument as follows. Chapter One provides an account of 
the historical development of Chinese industrial relations from 1949 to the present day. 
I identify two basic models spread over five periods. The command economy model is 
dominated by the concept of the danwei or work unit. Rooted in pre-liberation heavy 
industry, danwei authority was not limited to production alone but to the overall 
management of urban working lives and the spaces in which they were lived out. In 
this scenario, the traditional union encouraged workers to meet production targets, 
administered workplace benefits, arranged holiday functions, sporting and leisure 
events and occasionally represented individual workers in minor disputes with factory 
management. The heyday of the danwei dated from 1957 and the completion of 
nationalisation until 1986 when new regulations pertaining to labour contracts 
signalled the end of lifetime employment.  
The roots of the socialist market model can be found in the early years of the 
new republic when the CPC based its early urban reconstruction programmes on the 
coexistence of private capital and socialist labour. The underlying assumption that, in 
the right conditions, the two sides are compatible with industrial relations in a workers‟ 
state re-emerged in the reform era. I have divided – as far as possible – the post-
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command economy years into three stages: early reform, the post-Southern Tour period, 
and the years following WTO membership up to the present day. I trace the 
development of the socialist market model of industrial relations via regulatory 
expansion, contracts, formal dispute mechanisms based in law, and the changing role 
of the union as it recovered from its near collapse during the Cultural Revolution era.  
 Chapter Two is the first of two chapters on labour unrest. My intentions in these 
chapters are twofold. First, to shatter the myth of passivity equated with workers in the 
People‟s Republic of China (PRC) despite the work of Chen,Feng Yu Jianrong, Anita 
Chan, Chris Chan, Elizabeth Perry, Jackie Sheehan and others. Second, to demonstrate 
the impact of labour unrest on industrial relations in general and trade union policy in 
particular. Chapter Two is an historical survey of unrest in the republic‟s early years 
and its development in the state sector following full nationalisation. The large-scale 
workers‟ demonstrations in 2002 in northeast China are often seen as the climax of 
traditional state sector labour unrest. My explanation of the failure of SOE workers and 
their trade union to defend up to forty million jobs between 1997 and 2002 is based on 
their removal from the source of power and leverage: production. Unlike the private 
sector, there was very little political space for the ACFTU to organise any alternative to 
the huge job losses that came with SOE restructuring and privatisation. Politically, the 
union was hamstrung by its legal obligations to the Party. Practically, as witnessed by 
the dramatic rise in unemployment in the West during capitalism‟s current crisis, trade 
unions can do little to fight redundancies no matter where they occur.  
 Chapter Three shifts the focus to labour unrest in the private sector and how 
this has produced pressure on the ACFTU to improve its representative capacity. This 
25 
 
pressure comes from above and below. An increasingly militant workforce has 
concentrated senior Party minds on industrial relations and these leaders have 
consequently instructed the union to play its part in a wider project for social harmony. 
In this sense, we can see – perhaps somewhat ironically – how labour unrest has 
actually increased the political status of the ACFTU in the Chinese political system. 
 These chapters provide the backdrop for an array of union pilots and models 
and I devote the following three chapters to three examples. In Chapter Four I focus on 
an experiment in collective bargaining in a small town that was later held up as an 
example of how Chinese regulations on collective consultation can produce a „win-
win‟ situation. Our research demonstrates that while the conclusion of a sector-level 
collective wage table based on work processes in the garment sector was a remarkable 
achievement, it was not the result of a regulatory framework imposed from above. 
Instead it was a spontaneous reaction to local conditions led by „trailblazing‟ 
(chuangxin) individuals in the local union who were able to compel employers‟ 
accountability to their employees by drawing on state authority.  
 In Chapter Five I examine the establishment of the ACFTU‟s first labour rights 
centre. This was a contested process that owed its eventual success to the local trade 
union‟s strategy of forging alliances with a wide range of local players. Wider social 
resources were opened when the county-level city union went beyond the traditional 
union „fence‟ and registered its rights centre as a social group (shehui tuanti) with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. This breakthrough is conceptualised as the „socialisation‟ 
(shehuihua) of union work.  
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 In Chapter Six I examine the national experiment to improve the capacity of 
enterprise-level cadres via the direct election of trade union chairpersons and 
committees. The chapter examines the recent history of trade union direct elections 
prior to a detailed examination of two local case studies in which different electoral 
procedures were applied. The difference between the two experiments lies with the 
constraints or otherwise on candidature. I argue that while it is clear that the ACFTU 
remains averse to risking direct elections as an immediate response to labour unrest, 
elections are nevertheless both a response to militancy and the subsequent pressure on 
the union to become more representative.  
 In Chapter Seven I summarise the conclusions of my research in the light of 
changing global and national conditions such as the financial crisis and the 
International Trade Union Confederation‟s (ITUC) new policy towards is the ACFTU. 
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Chapter One 
Industrial Relations in the People’s Republic of China 
In this opening chapter I will summarise the history of China‟s labour relations since 
1949. This was the year when the CPC defeated the Guomindang (GMD), established a 
new government and embarked on a programme of economic reconstruction. In 
contrast to the land reform in the countryside, where enforced redistribution was 
deemed the most effective way of restoring production to a war-ravaged agriculture, 
urban areas were distinguished by a period of compromise in which the need to create 
jobs was prioritised over practically all other considerations. Thirty years later, the 
spectre of unemployment and accompanying economic stagnation was to play a similar 
role as the unemployment crisis of the late seventies and early eighties became „the 
initial impetus to labor policy change‟ (Ngok King-lun, 2008: 45).  
 If employment creation has been a major economic concern of the CPC since it 
won power, stability at work has been a consistent political concern. Although the 
addition of „Chinese characteristics‟ via the thoughts of Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu has 
at times made it difficult to perceive Marx‟s influence on CPC theory and practice, the 
Party has nevertheless remained cognisant of Marx‟s central idea on change: the 
potential power of the working class. This chapter examines how various industrial 
relations regimes in China have been developed on the basis of both exploiting and 
containing this power. It is an extraordinary journey imbued variously with 
revolutionary excitement, chaos, triumph and trauma. 
 The organisation of the chapter is relatively straightforward. I have employed 
labour and the unions as anchors to a basically historical approach split into four broad 
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sections: the danwei era, the early years of reform, the socialist market economy and 
developments since China became a member of the WTO in 2001.        
Industrial Relations under the Command Economy 
The Danwei 
The institutional core of industrial relations in pre-reform China was the urban work 
unit known as the danwei. Lü and Perry offer a useful five-part functional definition of 
this institution: power over hire, fire and transfer; communal facilities such as housing, 
dining halls, cars and health clinics; independent accounting; an urban purview; and 
existing in the public sector (Lü and Perry, 1997: 5-6). From an industrial relations 
perspective, I would add three main characteristics: stability via enforced low labour 
turnover rates; a top-down administrative remuneration system based on wages, 
bonuses and high levels of welfare; and the ideological integration of the interests of 
managers and managed.  
Individually, none of these characteristics is specific to a command economy, 
Chinese or otherwise. Dore conceptualised Japanese industrial relations as an 
„organisation-orientated system‟ that offered lifetime employment in exchange for 
workers‟ loyalty to a given enterprise (Dore, 1987: 30). In the circumstance of a 
developing country, the total remunerative packages in a large key (zhongdian) danwei 
were high (Lü and Perry, 1997: 3; Weil, 1996: 35). In fact „workers real wage levels in 
1970 represented a thirty-five per cent rise above those of 1952‟ (Lee Ching-kwan, 
2000: 42), permitting comparisons with the Scandinavian model, albeit cautious and 
qualified. In Soviet Russia, Clarke explained how the term „labour collective‟ (trudovoi 
kollektiv) was used to refer to „the whole workforce of the enterprise – from manager to 
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cleaner‟ (Clarke, 2006: 31). This ideologically-inspired integration of interests 
resonates with the Chinese word „zhigong‟ which, during the command economy era, 
generally referred to all the staff and workers of a work unit regardless of managerial 
authority or the lack of it. Indeed, continued use of the term zhigong in post-reform 
Chinese statistics has hampered the reliability of data on wages and working conditions.  
In the former Soviet Union, Clarke located a material basis for the common 
interest of managers and workers in the absence of capitalist-style compulsion on 
managers to reduce costs and intensify the rate of work. Thus, managers and workers at 
an enterprise had a shared interest in the negotiation of a slack production plan and 
ensuring that the targets contained therein were not overfulfilled (Clarke, 1993: 15-17, 
26). In the People‟s Republic of China, the picture was complicated by an 
overabundance of labour and the leverage over working conditions this allowed 
Chinese managers – especially during campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and 
in some phases of the Cultural Revolution – as opposed to the USSR‟s chronic lack of 
skilled workers that in turn awarded Soviet workers considerable advantage at 
enterprise level negotiations.   
  The danwei in China was as much a political and social undertaking as it was a 
productive unit. It has even been described as a „mini-society‟ (Lü and Perry, 1997: 9) 
or „small city‟ (O‟Leary, 1998: 54) able to meet all the basic social and welfare 
requirements of urban living and into which „individuals are born, live, work, and die‟ 
(Naughton, 1997: 170). The capacity to provide comparatively high standards of living 
in a developing economy, i.e. in conditions of scarcity, required the power of the state 
to ensure that the always-precarious integration of the interests of urban residents was 
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not upset by peasants moving to the cities and demanding a share of the metropolitan 
cake. To this end the state developed a rigorously implemented system of restrictions 
on residence known as hukou based on the division of town and country. Beginning in 
the late fifties, hukou regulations successfully underpinned danwei exclusivity until 
well into the reform era (see Chapter Two). Put another way, the danwei‟s durability 
relied on strictly enforced boundaries that kept peasants out of danwei membership and 
the privileges that came with it. Thus, state power and control became the mainstay of 
the danwei system, enabling it to fulfil comprehensive social, political and productive 
functions (Naughton, 1997: 167). The obvious agency to deliver this power and control 
was the CPC itself. The Party was directly involved in the administration of industrial 
relations in the danwei era and, as we shall see, its withdrawal presented the trade 
unions with a major crisis of legitimacy. 
  There is a range of views on the implications the Party‟s dominant role in 
danwei management and labour relations. Although You Ji premised his conceptual 
approach on the research of Walder‟s „communist neo-traditionalism‟ and Womack‟s 
„work unit socialism‟, both of whom argued that control in urban China could not be 
reduced to fear of a totalitarian state alone, he nevertheless characterised danwei 
relationships as a condition of totalitarianism that has since been undermined by the 
autonomy that market reforms and privatisation have brought to SOEs. You Ji‟s 
totalitarianism has its origins in the „Party‟s monistic control‟ (You Ji, 1998: 32) of 
enterprises developed during the political campaigns and worker recruitment drives of 
the early 1950s (You Ji, 1998: 33) during which „workers “active consent” gradually 
gave way to passive submission to a powerful “new class” of cadres‟ (You Ji, 1998: 
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17). He also traced a direct relationship between the increasing presence of party cells 
in enterprises and the decline in union power at primary level. Beginning in October 
1951, following a fierce debate over whether or not the state‟s interests were separate 
from those of trade unions, the ACFTU leadership was purged and „more direct party 
control started to take root in shopfloor politics in the wake of the clampdown on the 
unions‟ (You Ji, 1998: 35). 
As union autonomy began to fade, the danwei‟s capacity to provide access to 
consumer goods and welfare services in a time of general scarcity strengthened the 
hand of factory cadres over workers (You Ji, 1998: 13). In exchange, the urban 
working class apparently accepted political controls and monitoring by party cells in 
enterprises. It was this allocation of economic benefits in return for acceptance of 
political constraints which, according to some scholars, partially accounted for a 
„relatively high level of social order‟ (Lü and Perry, 1997: 3). Citing Korzec, Warner 
frames the arrangement as a deal, a „social contract‟ between the CPC and the working 
class that „fed, housed, hospitalised and generally cosseted the “vanguard” of the 
working class‟ (Warner, 2000: 3). On the other hand, Lee argues that the arrangement 
did not imply worker passivity in return for Party largesse. She points to blue collar 
wage hikes, the capping of enterprise managers‟ salaries at ten to thirty per cent above 
those of skilled workers and the requirement for them to participate periodically in 
shop floor labour as evidence of workers‟ enhanced position vis-à-vis managerial 
cadres (Lee Ching-Kwan 2000: 42). Moreover, Sheehan‟s new history of Chinese 
workers has demonstrated that intermittent outbreaks of working class militancy 
continually reinforced the CPC‟s anxiety over working class power (Sheehan, 1998). 
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She contends that, far from the existence of a „social contract‟, „conflict, often 
originating from economic grievances, but quickly developing into a political dispute 
as a result of the dominance of the Party within enterprises, has been a far more 
common feature of industrial life in China than is generally recognised‟ (Sheehan, 
1998: 2). I will return to the central question of labour unrest in Chapter Two.     
Walder‟s concept of „communist neo-traditionalism‟ emphasised the 
complexity of the relationships that workers formed within a danwei in order to survive 
and improve their lot. His definition of the term makes use of two descriptive elements. 
The first points to the absence of market forces and of bargaining between worker and 
danwei in determining wages and conditions. Under communist neo-traditionalism, 
employment in a danwei cannot be reduced to a purely economic activity solely for the 
extraction of surplus value in return for wages. It also carried a welfare role with a 
„value in itself‟ (Walder, 1986: 11). As such, the danwei is not just an economic entity 
but also a (state) agency for the delivery of a range of social services that, as we have 
already seen, were not available to those outside the danwei system. Walder‟s second 
descriptive element referred to the institutionalised dependency on which this 
arrangement rested. The absence of non-Party affiliated institutions within the danwei 
– and wider society – forced workers into a dependent relationship producing three 
characteristics that, in Walder‟s view, distinguished industrial relationships in the 
danwei from those of western enterprises: dependency on the enterprise for goods and 
services (including wages); on the Party and its auxiliary organisations – such as the 
trade unions – for representation; and on the supervisors for personal promotion and 
increased access to non-pecuniary forms of remuneration – a larger flat for example – 
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that came with it (Walder, 1986: 8-14). Xu also uses notions of dependency to 
conceptualise danwei relationships and designated the period from 1957 to 1978 as the 
second stage in the post-liberation development of industrial relations during which the 
danwei‟s „urban purview‟ and „public sector‟ attributes reigned supreme. He 
characterised the period as one in which „the capitalist class was abolished, labour-
capital relations were wiped out, and “labour” as a subjective entity lost all significance. 
The free independent labourer was extinguished as [China] entered [a period of] 
socialism‟ (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 15).   
But, as I have already suggested, theories that focus on the danwei as the source 
of complex relationships inducing layers of dependency and the disappearance of the 
„free labourer‟ have not gone unchallenged in the literature. While certainly important 
to our understanding of labour relations in the command economy, these theories tend 
to rely on somewhat stereotypical notions of received passivity and dependence 
resulting from „simple Leninist imposition from above‟ or even as the „reflection of 
any alleged cultural propensity toward an unquestioning obedience to authority‟ (Perry, 
1997: 43). In contrast, by homing in on the traditional Chinese concerns with 
geographical origins, Perry has argued that while household registration (hukou) 
certainly restricted a tradition of „urban sojourning‟, the victory of the CPC and 
consequent political campaigns did not miraculously replace native-place identity and 
affiliations with class identity and the dependency that Maoist interpretations of class 
interests tended to imply in practice. For Perry this was too clean and simplistic a break 
with the past and  
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[P]lace-based divisions of rural and urban residence or collective sector 
employment versus a job in a state-owned unit constituted equally significant 
socioeconomic distinctions in Maoist China. (Perry, 1997: 43-44)     
As we shall further explore in Chapter Two, the actions of danwei employees 
themselves demonstrated that it was hardly the case that China‟s urban working class 
was simply persuaded or repressed into acquiescence by a combination of welfare and 
state control. Indeed, as is currently the case, the ebb and flow of working class 
militancy was a major influence on the political status of trade unions, despite their 
overall subordination to Party leadership and near elimination during the Cultural 
Revolution.   
Danwei Stability 
Whether awarded, negotiated or won, the superior conditions enjoyed by the 
„privileged minority of the urban industrial workforce‟ (Perry, 1997: 44) were real and 
even had a colloquial name: the „iron rice bowl‟.3 Basically, this referred to the high 
level of job security and the absence of labour markets, both of which contributed to 
very low labour turnover rates. For example, in 1979 there were 22,000 „quits and 
fires‟ of state employees representing just 0.03 per cent of the labour force (White, 
1995: 44). Naughton emphasises the lack of general mobility – both geographical and 
occupational – as a characteristic of industrial relations during the command economy 
era. He points out that in 1978 „death was four times as important a cause of job-
leaving as were resignations or being fired‟ comparing this with much higher labour 
turnover in the former USSR where … „[I]n 1978 in the Russian Republic, sixteen per 
                                                 
3
 Workers sarcastically dubbed the security of tenure enjoyed by CPC cadres working in industry as the 
„golden rice bowl‟. 
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cent of all industrial manual workers quit their jobs during the year‟ (Naughton, 1997: 
173). In fact, by tracing the economic foundations rather than the political development 
of the danwei, Naughton argues that the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 
and subsequent famine (1958-1961) provided the economic conditions for a 
„completion‟ of the danwei system. The threat of hunger spreading from the rural areas 
to the cities and the dire need to reverse the flow of migrants into the latter as a result 
of the Great Leap induced the state to take full control of employment in urban areas, 
„allocating ninety-five per cent of first jobs in urban areas and taking away the hiring 
function from the individual enterprise‟ (Naughton, 1997: 172). 
The Danwei Wage System 
Following a post-liberation period in which the CPC accommodated private enterprise 
and, according to Harris, „inequality of income was a deliberate act of policy‟ (Harris, 
1978: 96), a major wage reform was introduced in 1956 when the Soviet-inspired 
eight-grade wage system was implemented and remained in place until 1985 (Warner, 
2000: 4). In a Chinese context, the system was perhaps symbolic of institutionalised 
inequalities lying at the heart of a remuneration system that was nevertheless far more 
egalitarian than wage systems in the West or the Soviet Union. As the name suggests, 
eight grades of pay were established with variations of about thirty per cent across 
different industries and eleven geographical areas (Harris, 1978: 97). It was a highly 
centralised system that left enterprises with „little or no autonomy in the distribution of 
wages which remained ineffective as an instrument of labour mobility‟ (O‟Leary, 1998: 
57). O‟Leary argues that the „one big pot‟ (da guo fan) was part of a three-factor 
industrial relations policy on wages, levels of employment and working conditions that 
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emerged out of a „complex interaction between state, managers and employees‟. 
However, this appears to contradict his assertion that enterprises – and by implication 
in a command economy, their employees – had hardly any say in the matter of wages 
(O‟Leary, 1998: 51-54). You Ji and White respectively bring clarity by explaining how 
the eight-grade system worked. At national level: 
First of all, an aggregate national wage bill was worked out by central planners 
on the basis of the State‟s financial situation. Then this wage bill was used to 
determine a national employment system quota specifying how many new 
workers to recruit. A central decision, taken each year, was also embodied in 
the bill as to whether and when wages were to be increased and by how much, 
and how many workers were to be promoted. (You Ji, 1998: 111) 
At municipal level the „labour plan‟ was  
based on an estimate of the needs of enterprises and offices within the city, each 
of which submits its labor requirements to the labor and wages office of its 
superior bureau which then communicates with the municipal labour bureau. 
The ensuing recruitment plan draws on three sources of labor: the strategic 
groups under centralized “unified allocation” who must be given priority; junior 
and middle school graduates from the city … and people with jobs who want to 
move. The actual process of assignment to a state enterprise is handled by three 
agencies in concert: the enterprise, the relevant bureau‟s labor office, and the 
city labour bureau.‟ (White, 1989: 162) 
The annual decision on the national wage bill would have taken into account factors 
such as commodity prices, production targets, the political atmosphere and the mood of 
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workers. This in turn would have involved factory managers, Party Secretaries and the 
trade unions, which is probably what O‟Leary meant in his description of three-way 
negotiations. Managers of large SOEs pulled as many strings as possible in order to 
channel resources to their work units yet there was no formal bargaining process 
(O‟Leary, 1998: 52). Working class input into the process was influential but, due to 
the absence of freedom of association, was politicised and indirect. It was expressed 
via the strike waves that invariably occurred when the political climate appeared to 
warrant taking the risks that such action involved. For example, the strike waves of 
1956-57, the Hundred Flowers movement, the first three years of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966-68 and workers‟ participation in the 1976 April Fifth Movement 
(Lee Ching-Kwan, 2000: 43; Sheehan, 1998: 10).  
A reward system ran parallel to the eight-grade wage system that linked 
material reward to ideological attitudes and its effective implementation proved it to be 
an effective tool of labour discipline (You Ji, 1998: 111) when „[T]he national range 
[of wage differentials] was not wide (3:1)‟ (Harris, 1978: 96).  
 There is general agreement that the wage system, along with non-pecuniary 
welfare entitlements, gave SOE workers a coveted social and material status. Lee 
maintains that in the danwei era „the working class as a whole made great strides vis-à-
vis the peasants, the bourgeoisie and intellectuals in terms of political status, wages, 
welfare and employment security‟ (Lee Ching-Kwan, 2000: 42). Weil argues that the 
material benefits urban workers enjoyed as a result were considerably beyond those of 
workers in other developing countries (Weil, 1998: 34). However, there is divergence 
with regard to the relative degree of workers‟ material benefits and wage levels. For 
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example, Hussain highlights „a combination of low wages with surplus labour and 
lifetime employment‟ as one of the three salient features „originally embedded in the 
post liberation economic and political structure‟ (Hussain, 2000: 58).4 For Harris, the 
confusion lay in the high proportion of non-pecuniary benefits in the overall 
remuneration system (Harris, 1978: 96), which was certainly the case on the eve of 
reform. In 1979, average annual take-home pay was 717 yuan while government and 
employer subsidies were worth 879 yuan, representing 122 per cent of remuneration. 
Subsidies covered subsidised housing,
5
 labour-related insurance, medical cover 
(including dependants), non-staple food allowances, winter heating and home-leave 
travel. On top of these state-employer obligations, the government also provided 
education, medicines, transportation and staple foods (Cieri et al., 1998). 
Managing the Danwei 
In the four years following Liberation, the new regime implemented a mixed economy 
policy. There was no immediate campaign for the nationalisation of industry. In the 
private sector, workers‟ expectations had been raised by the new political arrangements, 
producing a wave of strikes from workers and anti-capitalist rhetoric from some 
enterprise-level party and trade union cadres who were accustomed to working 
underground in confrontational circumstances. In Shanghai for example, the civil war 
period of 1946-1949 produced a politicisation of urban workers that apparently „eased 
the city‟s transition to the Communist era‟ (Yeh Wen-hsin, 1996: 62) and certainly 
helped to put capital on the back foot. However, the Party moved quickly to dampen 
                                                 
4
 The other two being the integration of government and enterprise budgets and profitability of the state 
sector as a whole; and the work unit as a locus of political organisation and social control (Hussain, 2000: 
58).   
5
 Real estate was owned by the enterprise, although ninety per cent of investment in public housing came 
from the state (Lü and Perry, 1997: 10).   
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workers‟ enthusiasm and declared an industrial relations strategy that was „of benefit to 
both labour and capital‟ (lao-zi liang li). This was aimed at restraining both sides in 
order to facilitate a period of reconstruction following Japanese occupation and the 
civil war. Nine months after the CPC took power, and facing a restive working class, 
Mao delivered a speech in which he emphasised a spirit of compromise. He spoke of 
the need to  
rationally coordinate the industry we already have, as well as practically and 
appropriately improve public-private relations and labour-capital relations … 
[and] improve relations with the national bourgeoisie and not be overly 
aggressive. (Mao Zedong, 1950)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The institutional expression of this policy was the „labour capital consultative 
conference‟ (lao-zi xieshang huiyi) that on the surface seemed to be „weighted in 
favour of labour‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 19). However, in almost eerie resonance with 
collective consultation of more recent years, it was not hard for employers to take 
advantage of trade union inexperience.  
During negotiations with private employers, the lack of experience of cadres 
representing workers‟ interests often showed. The capital side appears to have 
been much better prepared and more effective than were the cadres and 
workers‟ representatives on the labour side, who, for example, found 
themselves unable to dispute capitalists‟ assertions about their finances and 
what constituted a reasonable level of profit at an enterprise as they had not 
worked out their own figures beforehand. (Sheehan, 1998: 20) 
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In the existing nationalised enterprises, there was a mix of gradual political 
change and a continuation of management norms built up in republican China (Yeh 
Wen-hsin, 1996: 60-88; Perry, 1997: 46) and from the CPC-controlled liberated areas 
(Lü Xiaobo, 1997: 21-41). The Factory Management Committee (FMC) and the 
Workers‟ Representative Conference (WRC) were introduced via regulations aimed at 
improving management accountability and democratisation (Sheehan, 1998: 20). The 
WRC was the forerunner of the Staff and Workers Congress (zhigong daibiao dahui) 
run by the trade union (Sheehan, 1998: 21). These institutions were unable to head off 
workers‟ increased criticisms of management, party and union cadres (Sheehan, 1998: 
27) and the period from Liberation until 1953 was marked by strikes in both the private 
and public sectors.  
Meanwhile, the Party employed political movements and campaigns to cement 
its power and prepare the way for the First Five-Year Plan. These included the 
Democratic Reform Movement aimed at „changing bureaucratic capitalist enterprises 
into socialist (state) enterprises and changing old democratic – private – enterprises 
into new democratic ones‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 37); and the three- and five-anti campaigns 
aimed at corrupt tax-dodging capitalists, wasteful bureaucracy, gang bosses, counter-
revolutionaries etc. The plan was launched in 1953, and signalled that while politics 
remained central, production took precedence over all else – a strategy that contributed 
to the eruption of a massive strike wave in the mid-fifties taking the Party completely 
by surprise (see Chapter Two). 
 The period 1953-1957 witnessed almost total nationalisation in years of relative 
industrial calm following the ACFTU‟s Seventh Congress in 1953 – at least up to mid-
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1956. During this period, the FMCs and WRCs matured into permanent management 
committees as the danwei institution took up its position at the core of urban life. There 
was a brief experiment with Soviet-style one-man management, abandoned in 1955 in 
favour of the lao san hui or three committees that formed the „basic institutional 
structure at enterprise level‟ in a „dual system‟ of both Party and management control 
(Warner and Zhu, 2000: 23). Politically, Mao set a course for socialism, but proceeding 
at a steady clip: 
The general line or the general task of the Party for the transition period is 
basically to accomplish the industrialization of the country and the socialist 
transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce 
in ten to fifteen years, or a little longer. This general line is a beacon 
illuminating our work in all fields. Do not depart from this general line, 
otherwise Left or Right mistakes will occur. (Mao Zedong, 1953)  
 The „dual system of control‟ was a sometimes tense division of labour in which 
the Party Committee oversaw the danwei‟s political and ideological functions while a 
general manager chaired the FMC and ran production. Following earlier struggles over 
the role of trade unions, discussed in the next section, the representative role of the 
unions was dramatically curtailed, reducing union work to the not inconsiderable 
administrative task of overseeing social and welfare matters and encouraging 
production via socialist competition and exhortation (Clarke and Pringle, 2009: 87).   
In practice it was often the case that „the same person shared the positions of 
Party Secretary and General Manager at the same enterprise‟ (Warner and Zhu, 2000: 
23). Moreover, the failure of one-man-management and growing presence of 
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enterprise-level party cells and members meant that Party Secretaries „controlled the 
overall political and production agenda while directors carried out the daily 
administration of the decisions reached by party cells‟ (You Ji, 1998: 36). In short, the 
Party Committee was the committee that counted in most enterprises and Mao 
personally advocated „that all major issues must be first discussed by party committees 
and then executed by directors‟ (Zhang Zhanbin, 1988: 78-79 cited in You Ji, 1998: 
37).  
Role of Trade Unions 
The CPC had been instrumental in setting up China‟s first national trade union body in 
1925. In the years that followed, both the GMD and the CPC struggled for supremacy 
of Chinese labour by setting up their own unions and occasionally working together or 
with the few relatively independent occupation-based unions and associations. In the 
climate of the time both parties followed Sun Yatsen‟s thinking that the presence of 
foreign imperialists on Chinese soil made it imperative that trade unions were part of a 
wider political struggle for liberation. In 1927, the right wing of the GMD seized 
power and immediately set about destroying communist influence in the increasingly 
militant labour movement. Guillermaz states that 13,000 trade unionists were executed 
and a further 25,000 died in the fighting (Guillermaz, 1972: 226). This effectively 
ended collaboration between the CPC and GMD over labour issues at the national level 
as well as any systematic attempt by the CPC to rebuild effective trade unions on a 
national basis. This is not to say that communist organisers were entirely absent from 
the urban areas and indeed the ebb and flow of the urban labour movement between 
1927 and 1949 broadly reflected the wider national picture and balance of class forces 
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as a whole. Following the bloody events of 1927, labour organising entered what Perry 
calls a „conservative interregnum‟ (Perry, 1993: 88) that gave way to a „radical 
resurgence‟ from 1937 up to liberation in 1949 (Perry, 1993: 109) during which time 
labour protests became increasingly common and CPC influence grew accordingly. 
Nevertheless, the unions generally had a „skimpy industrial spread and a limited 
“proletarian” base‟ (Ng Sek-Hong and Warner, 1998: 17) and this „weakened their 
ability to make demands on the party‟ (Lee Lai To, 1986: 30 cited in Ng Sek-Hong and 
Warner, 1998: 17). The ACFTU‟s Sixth Congress in 1948 re-affirmed democratic 
centralism as its organisational principle (Ng Sek-Hong and Warner, 1998: 17) perhaps 
wary that a less severe approach to internal trade union decision making would lead to 
a repeat of past struggles and alliances with guilds and home-town organisations.  
At the Congress the ACFTU decreed that workers would be organised on an 
industrial and geographical basis rather than along occupational lines. Ng and Warner 
find that the one-way nature of the trade union transmission belt that consequently 
developed between party and class in post-liberation China has its roots in pre-
liberation conditions.   
The historical legacy of the pre-1949 period and the difficulties of organizing 
nationally led the CPC to use the ACFTU essentially as a one-way link between 
Party and „masses‟. (Ng Sek-Hong and Warner, 1998: 17) 
Thus we can identify a tradition of CPC-affiliated organisers in China‟s working class 
but their strategy and tactics especially with regard to workplace representation was 
never far from national politics. As such there was no practice of effective 
representation and indeed this trade union function actually declined once the danwei 
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system entrenched itself. This reductionist process was not confined to the realm of 
ideological debates at high level, though these did take place. Post-liberation labour 
unrest and worker militancy gave substance to the debates over the role of unions that 
were also accompanied by, on the one hand, ACFTU leadership purges and on the 
other, concessions to workers. Finally a wave of repression was introduced after 
temporary and contract workers spearheaded a strike wave during 1956-57 that gave 
vent to anger at being „left out of the new danwei system … [and being] denied the 
privileges that came with permanent employment at large state enterprises‟ (Perry, 
1997: 49).  
 As both minister of labour and acting head of the ACFTU, Li Lisan was given 
the responsibility of drafting labour policy and regulations for the new government 
(Perry, 1997: 45). Perry argues that the results of his work, which included a Trade 
Union Law (1950) and Labour Insurance Regulations (1951), „were a defining element 
of the emerging danwei‟ (Perry, 1997: 45) and as such Li and his comrades such as Liu 
Shaoqi, Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai (Perry, 1997: 45) deserve much of the credit for the 
generous provisions awarded to the new „masters of society‟, or at least some of them. 
This generosity, combined with his views on the need for trade union autonomy to 
defend it, no doubt helped get Li sacked as head of the ACFTU for „economism and 
syndicalism‟ (Perry, 1997: 46). Although an eccentric figure whose flamboyance 
tended to arouse the suspicions of party purists, Li was hardly an isolated figure. In fact, 
his reputation and popularity among skilled workers and the potential power base this 
represented probably hastened his departure from the union movement. Indeed, during 
his tenure, primary level union cadres in both state-owned and private enterprises took 
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a „more independent line, siding with workers in defence of their interests in the 
enterprise‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 36).  
 Nevertheless, despite two trade union crises in the first half of the 1950s, a 
combination of labour unrest, the regime‟s rhetoric and the state‟s policy of gradually 
moving towards „collectivist relations of production‟ (Maitan, 1976: 44; Xu Xiaohong, 
2004: 30-33) rendered the unions a definite force in labour relations at least up until the 
introduction of one-man-management. Sheehan cites union participation in 
management decisions as „mandated by workers‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 50 – emphasis added) 
being curtailed by the rolling out of one-man-management on a national scale in April 
1954 (You Ji, 1998: 36). As a consequence, there was widespread disappointment 
among workers following nationalisation and this sense of disappointment was fed by 
perceived and actual bureaucratization and dissatisfaction with the performance of both 
Party and union cadres at enterprise level. The strike wave of 1956-57 was the result. 
At the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 Li Lisan‟s successor, Lai Rouyu, outlined the 
confusion in the ranks, reinforced the parameters of the renewed debate over trade 
unions and spelt out the union position: 
Some people seem to think that because the working class wields state power, 
the State as a whole will safeguard the interests of the working class, and the 
trade unions have lost their function as protector of workers‟ interests. This 
view is wrong. The reason is that classes have not yet been completely 
eliminated in our country, while various bureaucracies continue to manifest 
themselves among us and it will take us time to overcome them. Under these 
circumstances, the material interests and political rights of the mass of workers 
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and employees are not safe from damage by the bureaucracy. (Lai Rouyu, 1956 
cited in Maitan, 1976: 38)       
Lai is clearly advocating a continued representative function for trade unions. His 
argument was both strengthened and weakened by the appearance of autonomous 
workers‟ organisations (Sheehan, 1998: 69). On the one hand, this expression of 
working class independence alarmed the Party into taking the unions seriously and, on 
the other hand, angered senior Party leaders fearful of a workers‟ power base beyond 
their control. The parallels with 1989 and the Workers Autonomous Federations (WAF) 
are clear. Perhaps a parallel with the 2003-2008 period may also be drawn as strikes 
have emerged as the workers‟ weapon of choice and the ACFTU has come under 
intense pressure to improve its representative performance. But to return to the mid-
fifties, the unrest led to a crackdown on expressions of autonomy outside the unions 
and the gradual clawing back of the financial gains extracted by workers from 
enterprises during the strike wave of late 1956 and early 1957. The Anti-Rightist 
Campaign was launched in the summer of 1957. Next came the Great Leap Forward, 
with its emphasis on reducing unit costs and dramatically improving production as 
epitomised by the „unthinking optimism of slogans like “produce more, more quickly, 
better and more economically”‟ (Maitan, 1976: 45). Lai and some in the unions 
continued to press for increased powers of worker participation and by implication 
union influence at danwei-level. Their efforts bore no fruit in the new political climate 
that was hardly conducive to further debate. Indeed, it is probably fortunate for Lai 
Rouyu that an early death from ill health prevented him from meeting the wrath of Red 
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Guards during the Cultural Revolution of the following decade. They proved too much 
for his predecessor Li Lisan, who committed suicide in 1967 (Perry, 1997: 46).  
 The years following the Eighth Congress saw the overall fortunes of the trade 
unions rise and fall – even skirting with total prohibition during one phase of the 
Cultural Revolution. But their role at the welfare rather than business end of the danwei 
and acceptance of Party leadership was cast pretty much in stone for the remainder of 
the command economy era. During the period 1957-1978, the primary functions of the 
trade unions were to maintain labour discipline, encourage production and administer a 
large part of the state‟s housing, social and welfare apparatus, the benefits of which 
were delivered via the danwei as a means of stimulating labour motivation and 
maintaining political control. As such, the trade unions were primarily an instrument 
for controlling the working class, although they did play some protective role in the 
workplace, representing individual workers in the event of disputes over such 
management failings as the miscalculation of wages, pension entitlements or illegal 
punishment by the employer. In theory they were also supposed to enforce the 
protective clauses of relevant labour regulations and to maintain minimal standards of 
health and safety at work. In practice these tasks were often sidelined as increasing 
production over-ruled all other considerations. Overall, the role of the trade unions was 
to harmonise the interests of labour and management rather than to represent the 
interests of their members in opposition to management. The traditions and practices 
built up as a consequence have profoundly constrained trade union work since the 
introduction of the market economy in the reform era.  
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Trade Unions and the „Ten Lost Years‟ 
The prohibition, to all intents and purposes, of formal trade union activity renders the 
Cultural Revolution period of 1966 to 1976, and the following two-year build up to the 
formal introduction of market-orientated reforms beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution was an important period for the Chinese working 
class. In essence, the event was a power struggle that focused on China‟s rate of 
progress towards „communism‟ and who should lead it. It began with Mao‟s 
astonishing appeal to students to „Bombard the Headquarters‟ 6  as he launched a 
struggle to regain control of the Party – lost following the Great Leap Forward –  and 
eradicate its leadership in the summer of 1966 (Karnow, 1972: 195). Less than a year 
later, growing and largely unforeseen working class participation in the Cultural 
Revolution prompted a response from the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) as „troops 
moved into factories and rural communes to supervise industrial and agricultural 
production‟ (Karnow, 1972: 297; Leys, 1977: 189-195). As the balance of power 
between armed „conservatives‟ and „rebels‟ ebbed and flowed, China edged towards 
civil war. Eventually Mao pulled back and threw his weight behind the army and 
tripartite Revolutionary Committees made up of cadres from the Party, army and 
leaders from Red Guard organisations. On the surface, the committees represented a 
compromise between struggling factions during the tumultuous and violent upheavals 
of 1966-68, and were established as new organs of power at all levels of society, 
including in the factories (Schram, 1973: 101; Howe, 1973: 245). The factions included 
provincial-level workers‟ organisations such as the Red Flag Army of Harbin whose 
members were drawn from „industrial and transport workers fighting for shorter hours 
                                                 
6
 This was the title of a big character poster written by Mao himself. 
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and a better wages system‟ (Maitan, 1976: 150). In practice, the Revolutionary 
Committees were, in the main, dominated by army personnel fluent in Maoist rhetoric 
but under orders to ensure that some sort of order was returned. Militancy was at least 
partially deflected by periodic participation in struggle meetings against individuals 
deemed as having capitalist sympathies or of supporting others who did (Leys, 1977: 
193). The army‟s response to autonomous workers‟ associations such as the Red Flag 
Army was „to dissolve these organisations and jail their leaders‟ (Maitan, 1976: 150) as 
the „more “economistic” aspects of the mass movement proved equally unacceptable to 
the central authorities‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 136). Despite the speechifying, the 
Revolutionary Committees were ultimately an expression of the army‟s authority, 
commitment to order and above all the maintenance of production (Karnow, 1972: 
277-278; Harris, 1978: 66; Maitan, 1976: 154). Although they sometimes included 
former union cadres, the committees rendered enterprise-level unions superfluous, even 
„reactionary‟, in the new stage of „socialism‟ and at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 a 
new party structure was established (Karnow, 1972: 277-278) that virtually ignored 
trade unions.  
These were grim times for the trade unions, their cadres, and sections of the 
working class in general. On the other hand, it was also at a time when, at least in the 
earlier phase of the Cultural Revolution, workers took „advantage of the unprecedented 
opportunity presented to them by the lifting of party controls on organizations‟ 
(Sheehan, 1998: 136). Indeed, the first three years of the Cultural Revolution was a 
period that „many workers retrospectively saw as a high point of democratization and 
freedom of expression and organization in enterprises and wider society‟ (Sheehan, 
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1998: 137-138). Like workers, the students whom Mao had originally turned to during 
the „opening salvos‟ of the Cultural Revolution (Karnow, 1972) also suffered a reverse 
in fortunes after enjoying exceptional initial freedoms. Millions of them had taken 
advantage of free travel and time off from class to „link up‟ (chuanlian) and exchange 
revolutionary experiences all over the country. Beginning in 1968, they were ordered 
to return home and their revolutionary fervour was subsequently redirected to rural 
areas where millions were sent to „learn from the peasants‟ whose poverty, and at times 
hostility, rendered the experience traumatic for many of the „sent down‟ youth (Leys, 
1977: 192). 
The Ninth Party Congress marked the end of the struggle phase of the Cultural 
Revolution and, on paper, set the stage for a „revolution in mass-management‟ 
(Sheehan, 1998: 138) in which there was no role for trade unions. In reality, the 
following years were marked by extreme Maoist rhetoric that heaped „ubiquitous praise 
for the superiority of the working class‟ while subjecting workers to the „same 
autocratic rule as the rest of Chinese society‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 138). Yet echoes of the 
early years of this extraordinary period still emerge in conversations with workers. For 
example, twenty-five years after the fall of the Gang of Four, the former Beijing WAF 
organiser Han Dongfang expressed opposition when SOE textile workers in Mianyang 
employed Cultural Revolution tactics and „air-planed‟ their factory director through the 
streets during a dispute over wage arrears (Han Dongfang, personal communication, 
Hong Kong, 22 July 1997). On the other hand, a laid-off miner in Shulan told me that 
he owed his position as a permanent worker to a strike at his mine in 1968 and went on 
to say, during a long bus journey over dreadful roads, that „another Cultural Revolution 
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would stop those bastards up there in the offices from shutting the place [mine] down – 
and improve these fucking roads!‟ (nong hao zhege ta ma de lu!). (Retired miner, 
personal communication, 15 November 2001).   
On the Eve of Reform 
By 1978, the Chinese economy was under severe strain with unemployment rapidly 
emerging – or rather re-emerging – as a major systemic challenge for both Party and 
government. Deng‟s return to power had added impetus to the movement of former 
Red Guards back to urban areas, putting further pressure on government to create jobs 
– in 1978 the official figure for urban unemployment was 5.3 per cent (White, 1989: 
154).
7
 Moreover, the reformers‟ case for the gradual opening up of urban labour 
markets was strengthened by the presence of „semi legal rural immigrants whose 
numbers have swelled in recent years‟ (White, 1989: 154). By 1982, Chinese experts 
were estimating rural surplus labour to be approximately thirty-five per cent of total 
rural labour (White, 1989: 154). Spurred on by rising unemployment and a stagnating 
economy, reformers‟ arguments crystallised on the need to introduce economic reforms 
in order to raise productivity (Rofel, 1989: 235). They argued that labour mobility was 
an essential component of policies aimed at revitalising Chinese industry which, 
according to China‟s reform economists, was 
too rigid and bureaucratic, constraining the flexibility of the economy, 
perpetuating poor labor production, and retarding technical change. Changes 
were necessary, they argued, to increase the flexibility of movement of the 
labor work- force, give management more power over their work-force labor, 
                                                 
7
 In 1978 the government formally allowed urban youths to return to the cities, facilitating the 
homecoming of twenty million youths (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth Li Hon-Ming, 1993: 156)    
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and to break the iron rice bowl of the state workers. Specifically, they have 
argued that the degree of direct administrative control over urban labor has 
been excessive, rendering the economic actors themselves – both managers and 
workers – inert. (White, 1989: 155)  
The programme for growth and development was originally labelled the „Four 
Modernisations‟, and formally announced in 1977. Aimed at industry, agriculture, 
science and technology and defence, this ambitious plan continued the Maoist habit of 
exaggerating China‟s capacities in order to achieve the unachievable. As Deng 
consolidated his return to power, he began scaling down the goals of the Four 
Modernisations (Hardt, 1982: 8) and shifted the emphasis to institutional reforms that 
would facilitate the „genuine process of economic transition‟ that was to unfurl during 
the eighties (Naughton, 1995: 5). Nevertheless, in the view of mainstream US capitalist 
economists, opportunities for US companies remained a long way off.  
The achievement of a modern, industrial, competitive economy by the People‟s 
Republic of China is not certain for any future particular year, certainly not for 
the year 2000. However, China has the resource potential, the skills and the will 
to change. A formidable task lies ahead, but success should not be ruled out. 
(Hardt, 1982: 11)  
The observation demonstrates both the scale of the task that reformers faced and the 
distance China has travelled since those early post-Cultural Revolution days – and 
perhaps how out of touch US economists and politicians were with the country despite 
seven years of „ping-pong diplomacy‟! 
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Industrial Reform Phase One: 1978-1992 
There was no blueprint for economic reform (Naughton, 1995: 5). The process 
progressed on a step-by-step approach that Deng summed up with the Chinese 
metaphor meaning „to cross the river by feeling for the stones‟, or, as Naughton put it, 
„the strategy of not having a strategy‟. Yet the process was far from „muddling 
through‟ (Lindblom, 1959: 79-88 cited by Naughton, 1995: 5). Once the political battle 
for a course of economic reform had been won, and announced at the landmark Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC in December 1978, the road ahead was 
signposted by a combination of pilot projects, provisional regulations and eventually 
the passing of an Enterprise Law (1988), a Trade Union Law (1992) and a Labour Law 
(1995).  
 The first phase of economic reform is generally referred to as the period of the 
„dual-track system‟ (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 77; Naughton, 1995: 8). Naughton emphasises the 
„co-existence of a traditional plan and a market channel for the allocation of a given 
good‟ and that dual-track refers to the „coexistence of two coordination mechanisms 
and not to two ownership systems‟ (Naughton, 1995: 8). Liu provides seven sub-
headings for her narrative of the period: expanding enterprise autonomy via profit 
retention and autonomy; tax reform; overall reform of pricing, finance, investment, 
banking, wages and foreign trade (gaige zhengti fangan); employment reform; wage 
reform; enterprise welfare reform; and enterprise leadership reform (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 
77-85). Space precludes a discussion of all Liu‟s categories. However, three are 
directly relevant to our discussion and I will use them as a guide to this section, 
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drawing on the relevant literature and my fieldwork – past and present – where 
appropriate.   
Expanding enterprise autonomy placed profit retention at the heart of the first 
stage of industrial reform (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 77). Beginning in 1978, the policy was 
piloted by Zhao Ziyang, who later became CPC General Secretary and famously wept 
when visiting hunger-striking students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 saying „we have 
come too late‟. The pilot initially focused on six enterprises in Sichuan province (Liu 
Aiyu, 2005: 77; Naughton, 1995: 98). Similar pilots were conducted in Yunnan 
province and Beijing (Yao Kaijian and Chen Yongqin, 2003: 223). The Sichuan pilot 
quickly expanded to cover one hundred enterprises which, at the time, transmitted 
ninety-two per cent of their profits to the central government, with the remainder 
ploughed back into the company (6.5 percent) and shared out among the workforce as 
an annual bonus (1.5 per cent) (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 77). „Marking the beginning of 
„nationwide urban reform‟ (Naughton, 1995: 99) the State Council issued five 
regulations that summed up the experience of these pilots and gave the go ahead for 
their wider application. By June 1980, 6,600 profitable SOEs were implementing a 
profit-retention system and exercising autonomy over production planning, marketing, 
capital utilisation (zijin yunyong) and employees‟ welfare and bonus funds (Liu Aiyu, 
2005: 78). Naughton argues that, following this initial push in the direction of 
autonomy, the state then pulled back and switched to a more conservative policy in 
1981 (Naughton, 1995: 97). Liu puts this down to concerns over fiscal shortages at the 
treasury arising from a decline in profits handed over to the state (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 78) 
while Naughton, pointing to the link between enterprise autonomy and the reliability of 
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the price system (Naughton, 1995: 102), argues that it was the reformers‟ unsuccessful 
attempt to „rationalize prices and financial relations‟ (Naughton, 1995: 97) that 
underpinned a fairly dramatic drop in the pace of reform. This led him to characterise 
the period 1979-1983 as a „classical policy cycle … in which a phase of energetic 
reform policy was followed by a phase of cautious retrenchment‟ (Naughton, 1995: 97). 
The upshot was that in spring 1981 an alternative system to profit retention was piloted 
entitled ying kui bao gan. Liu explains the difference: 
Enterprises taking responsibility for their profits and losses (ying kui bao gan) 
is profit retention (lirun liucheng) in another form, but the system underlying it 
is different. The ratio of profits retained under the profit retention system is 
based on the previous year‟s actual achievements. On the other hand, the 
system of taking full responsibility for profits and losses is on the basis of 
consultation and planning. The amount of profits handed over to the centre is 
the average sum of monies extracted by the central government over the 
previous three years. (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 78)    
A two-year period of wrangling followed as SOE managers sought to use the 
new regulations issued by the State Council to consolidate their position vis-à-vis Party 
basic units or cells in the enterprises. For workers, it initially seemed that the high 
expectations of reform, which the state had encouraged (Sheehan, 2000: 249), were 
real enough as wages climbed. By the winter of 1984 the Party‟s „powerful industrial 
organisations‟ (You Ji, 1998: 50) were blaming managers and the autonomy they had 
gained „for loss of control over wage increases and failures in investment decisions‟ 
(You Ji, 1991: 65). The power struggle between traditional management methods via 
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the aforementioned three committees (Party, management and recently reactivated 
trade unions) and the reformers‟ case for awarding increased autonomy to the factory 
director continued as the latter pushed wider application of the Director Responsibility 
System. By September 1986 reformers were back in the driving seat when, following 
fierce debates in the Politburo Standing Committee and the National People‟s Congress 
Standing Committee, the State Council and the Party‟s Central Organisation 
Department issued three documents that later became the basis for the Enterprise Law 
of 1988 (You Ji, 1998: 51). From now on the director was no longer under the 
leadership of the party committee and it was „confirmed that an enterprise is a legal 
entity with the managing director as its legal representative vested with all necessary 
powers‟ (You Ji, 1998: 51). Contracted labour was back – and the material conditions 
for a „new form of industrial relations in the state sector‟ were now in place (Chan, A. 
2000: 38).   
However caution, „crossing the river by feeling for stones‟, or the „strategy of 
not having a strategy‟ remained the name of the game. Although China‟s traditional 
employment system guaranteed permanent employment to a relatively small number of 
urban workers, these people had much to lose. The employment system had become 
entrenched to the degree that SOE workers‟ children were able to inherit the jobs of 
their parents via an arrangement known as dingti (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth Hon-
Ming Li, 1993: 157). The Party was sensitive to Maoist and/or conservative arguments 
that attempting to dismantle the „iron rice bowl‟ of permanent employment carried the 
risk of social unrest. A three-stage strategy of talking up the material gains that a 
labour market offered to workers while simultaneously introducing policies that would 
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inevitably undermine permanent employment was launched. The first stage involved 
loosening the state‟s grip on employment allocation procedures and substituting it with 
a three-in-one combination of channels for recruitment and job seeking known as san 
jie he or the three-in-one combination (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 80).
8
 The three avenues of 
employment now included: the labour bureaux that still allocated most jobs either 
directly or through newly-established labour service companies (LSC); through one‟s 
own efforts; or to become self-employed. LSCs also began to supply labour to 
enterprises „under new forms of ownership arrangements including private enterprises 
and joint ventures‟ (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth Hon-Ming Li, 1993: 157). This was 
crucial as eventually the dismantling of the iron rice bowl owed more to competition 
from the private sector and ensuing influx of cheaper migrant labour than 
administrative reforms emanating from Beijing. Beginning in 1980, labour contracts 
were piloted among skilled and experienced workers in Shanghai, gradually spreading 
across eight provinces. By early 1982, 1.6 million workers were on contracts, rising to 
6.5 million by early 1983 (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 81) when the policy was applied to newly 
recruited permanent workers hired on five-year contracts (Naughton, 1995: 210).  
Stage two no doubt deepened a growing sense of insecurity and loss of political 
status among many SOE employees (Sheehan, 2000: 250). The Central Committee 
released its „Decision on Economic Restructuring‟ allowing mines, building sites, 
transport and the ports to employ internal migrants from the countryside (Liu Aiyu, 
2005: 81). However, the pace remained cautious and, contrary to some newspaper 
reports, this was by no means a headlong rush for the cities – at least not yet. For 
                                                 
8
 The term was a somewhat ironic use of an expression that had previously applied to the tripartite 
Revolutionary Committees of the later Cultural Revolution period! 
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example, clauses in a contract between a Sichuanese migrant worker and the Jingyan 
County Employment Service Bureau demonstrate that even as late as 1992, migration 
from the countryside was very carefully managed. Clauses 4.1 and 4.2 refer to good 
health, age restrictions and gender – must be male – of the worker. Most tellingly, 
clause 4.4 states:  
The family (shall have) sufficient or even surplus manpower so that when the 
worker leaves his hometown, his family‟s production in the household 
responsibility system would not be affected. (Liu Kaiming, 2001: 31) 
In 1986, labour contracts were rolled out nationally via four sets of provisional 
regulations on hire and fire and unemployment insurance (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth 
Hon-Ming Li, 1993: 160). The same caution was widely exercised despite the fact that 
a „major effort was launched to restructure the employment system‟ to new state 
employees (Naughton, 1995, 210). Sectors with labour shortages were „granted a 
variance‟, permanent employment was still offered to technical school and college 
graduates, and a two-year period of grace was built into the new regulations (Wu Teh-
Wei. and Elizabeth Hon-Ming Li, 1993: 158-160).  
The third stage of reforming the new employment system was one of refining 
the existing changes and encouraging managers to make use of it via the „optimization 
of labour [force] composition‟ (youhua laodong zuhe). „Progress‟ continued to be too 
slow for reformers like Zhao Ziyang. On the one hand, moderates such as the 
economist Chen Yun wanted to keep the „bird in the cage‟ i.e. ensure that the market 
operated under the guidance of the plan. On the other hand, Zhao Ziyang was 
increasingly turning to „radical ideals‟ (Naughton, 1995: 123) that were only brought to 
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a – temporary – halt by the tanks rumbling towards Tiananmen Square in the early 
hours of 4 June 1989.    
Also central to the destruction of the iron rice bowl was wage reform. As early 
as 1977, the state began to widen wage differentials by awarding pay increases to 
workers in selected sectors and re-introducing the bonus system abolished during the 
Cultural Revolution (Korzec, 1992: 59). Bonuses increased as a percentage of overall 
wages throughout the eighties despite the ceilings imposed by planners on the ratio of 
basic wage to bonus (Naughton, 1995: 105). In fact the ratio leapt from 2.3 per cent in 
1978 to 17.2 per cent in 1988 (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth Hon-Ming Li, 1993: 164). 
The wage increases in this period improved workers‟ living standards – no doubt 
easing anxieties over contracts and rural migrant labour – with the average industrial 
wage in SOEs and collectively owned enterprises (COEs) rising from 615 yuan in 1978 
to 1,747 yuan in 1988 (Wu Teh-Wei and Elizabeth Hon-Ming Li, 1993: 164). However, 
neither differentials nor bonuses were able to weaken the traditional working class‟s 
attachment to egalitarian principles. Bonuses could be employed as a management tool 
to elicit more effort from workers but had little impact on average levels of 
compensation. Consequently, „workers tended to push for egalitarian distribution of 
bonuses‟ (Naughton, 1995: 105) especially when planners continued attempts to 
restrict bonus-basic wage ratios. Even when managers obtained the right to fire 
workers after 1986, thus ending on paper the institutionalised „long-term coexistence‟ 
of both sides, the former were as reluctant to threaten the occupational security of their 
employees as the latter were to „jump in the sea‟ (xiahai) of market forces and set up in 
business or get a job in the private sector and the change in policy simply passed many 
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enterprises by. Indeed Liu found that seventy-two per cent of workers in enterprises in 
Shenyang and Shanghai felt that their employment security had not been threatened by 
the introduction of contracts and increases in management autonomy (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 
86). Managers cited various constraints on dismissing workers including „prioritising 
stability‟, „pressure to create employment‟, and a feeling of solidarity even with newly 
hired contracted workers who „are our brothers and sisters‟ (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 86). These 
sentiments were sharpened by traditional geographic proximities when „managers and 
their families usually lived in the same factory-run residential quarters along with 
workers and their families, who thus had many informal ways to pressure managers 
(Naughton, 1995: 105).
9
  
In sum, while some workers and Party members may have seen the writing on 
the wall with the introduction of dramatic changes to industrial relations, the overall 
picture was not one of mass discontent in the workplace, despite the key roles workers 
played in the Democracy Wall movement at the beginning of the decade and the 
Democracy Movement at the end of it (Sheehan 1998). The formation of WAFs in 
major cities was of huge political significance and deeply alarmed the CPC. However, 
while working class anger at the representative inadequacies of the ACFTU, inflation 
and corruption undoubtedly induced millions of SOE workers and middle managers to 
join enormous marches for clean government in the spring of 1989, the calls issued by 
the Beijing WAF for a general strike largely fell on deaf ears (Han Dongfang, personal 
communication, London: 12 March 1993). The fact that the right to strike was removed 
                                                 
9
 Naughton footnotes one anecdote from 1984 in which a group of disgruntled workers turned up outside 
their manager‟s home every evening to discuss various workplace grievances. The workers succeeded in 
inducing the manager to agree to their demands by „at first delaying, and ultimately sharing in, the 
family dinner‟ (Naughton, 1995: 343).    
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from the Constitution in 1982 was not the reason why the strike calls were largely 
ignored. The reason was simply that the WAFs did not have a strategy or indeed a 
capacity effectively to organise workers in the workplace (Han Dongfang, personal 
communication, Hong Kong, 17 July 1999).  
The repression of the Democracy Movement was violent and thorough. It 
purged the ACFTU and arrested workers and supporters suspected of being involved in 
the WAFs. It also brought on efforts by „conservatives‟, led by Premier Li Peng, to 
slow down the pace of reform and even reverse the direction as China entered a period 
of relative isolation, despite the best efforts of some foreign governments to reassure 
the Chinese government and foreign capitalists that it was business as usual (Liang 
Guosheng, 1996). In truth the situation was something of a stalemate. Naughton 
dismisses the efforts of those wishing to roll back the reforms as little more than a 
hiccup. As the figures below demonstrate, foreign investment continued to increase 
before taking off in 1992/‟93 when Deng‟s Southern Tour indicated the stalemate was 
over.   
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Table 1 
FDI in China, 1983-2005 
Year  FDI   FDI 
(US$ billion) (RMB billion) 
1988  3.19   11.89  
1989  3.39   12.77 
1990  3.49   16.68  
1991  4.37   23.24  
1992  11.01   60.70  
1993  27.52   158.54  
1994  33.77   291.03  
1995  37.52   313.33 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbooks cited in Wei Kailei et al., 2008)  
The international trade union movement recoiled in horror from the violence, 
leaving the ACFTU isolated and with a new leadership vigorous in its commitment to 
Party leadership. On the other hand, SOE wages increased significantly in this period, 
indicating the willingness of the authorities to make concessions to workers as the price 
of social peace. Some observers have also attributed wage increases to workers actively 
taking advantage of the lull in reforms to push forward wage claims at a time when 
SOE managers were anxious to avoid labour disputes that brought unwanted attention 
to their enterprises (Hussain and Zhuang, 1998: 43-68). In 1993, Deng‟s Southern Tour 
brought the stalemate to a dramatic end. 
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Trade Unions in the Early Reform Period 
The reform policy was a double-edged sword for the trade unions. On the one hand, 
Deng Xiaoping‟s return to power symbolised that the dark days of attacks on the trade 
unions were finally off the ideological agenda. But on the other hand, the creeping 
commoditisation of labour power not only threatened the position of workers and trade 
unions in SOEs, it also heralded the return of a formalised divergence of interests 
across China‟s industrial relations map: between the managed and the managers and, in 
the new private sector, labour and capital itself. In other words the reforms put the 
trade unions back on the political agenda but with an as yet limited influence over 
events and no recent experience of handling opposing interests. Considering these 
dilemmas, Howell identified four implications that the opening up of the economy 
would have for the unions: First, they would need to become familiar with handling 
contract-based disputes chiefly by studying both national and international law; second, 
the unions would have to „reconsider the balance between representing the interests of 
the Party and those of the union [i.e. the workers]‟; third, they would have to become 
more confrontational if they were to defend workers against predatory, and often 
unrestrained, capital; fourth, they would have to learn to organise rural migrants 
(Howell, 1998: 156-157). Thompson argues that initially at least, the institution of the 
Staff and Workers Congress (SWC) was the chosen vehicle to bolster the union‟s 
backbone as it negotiated its way through the changing „web of interests‟ in China‟s 
enterprises and improve workers‟ participation in economic reforms (Thompson, 1992: 
233-235). Obviously anxious not to overstep the mark and risk reigniting past debates 
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over autonomy, the tried and tested SWCs facilitated workers‟ participation even as it 
blocked real influence at enterprise level. Thus, at the  
10
th
 National Congress in 1983 we find the head of the ACFTU, Ni Zhifu, 
calling for a stronger role for trade unions within the enterprise through a 
strengthening of the workers‟ congresses. (Howell, 1998: 159) 
 In fact, as early as 1978, Deng Xiaoping was strongly advocating that as the 
organisation in charge of both convening SWC meetings and running its day-to-day 
business, the ACFTU‟s primary branches were ideally placed to enable workers to 
„elect section heads and other junior management … [discuss] major issues … [and]  
suggest replacements of leading personnel‟ (Thompson, 1992: 236). As Thompson and 
many others have commented, whether or not the SWC‟s were – or are – capable of 
exercising control over management is a moot point. Certainly the institutions were to 
become a strategic focal point for SOE workers fighting the legality of bankruptcies 
and asset transfers during the period of deep restructuring that followed the Fifteenth 
Party Congress in 1997. The photograph below is from a demonstration in Hebei 
province where workers were calling for the „resolute implementation‟ of an SWC 
decision made on 28 October 1999 to oppose what amounted to privatisation. But what 
of the SWCs‟ influence where it counted: the pace, pay and conditions of production?  
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Workers in Zhengzhou demand the implementation of their factory‟s SWC decision 
made on 28 October 1999  
 
Source: Brian Keeley 
In 1986, the State Council passed the Regulations on Staff and Workers 
Congresses in Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People. This was the same 
year that enterprise managers were given dramatically expanded powers over hire and 
fire, wages and working conditions in SOEs. The new regulations were timed to 
provide a counterweight to the extension of management authority while neutralising 
shopfloor opposition to the new arrangements. On paper the rights of SWCs were 
impressive: Article Seven gave delegates the right to make suggestions on issues 
relating to production; examine, approve or veto company policy on wages and welfare 
issues; make suggestions on the allocations of housing stock; and even dismiss 
enterprise directors and senior management (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Moreover, Article Thirty-Three of the Labour Law (1995) appeared to open up an 
opportunity for staff and workers to make use of SWCs to initiate and approve 
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collective contracts even in the absence of trade unions. The article refers to private 
and foreign-owned enterprises in which both SWCs and trade unions were most 
notable for their absence. There is no evidence that this right has been exercised with 
any success.  
In retrospect, we can best interpret the emphasis on SWCs as an initiative 
aimed at heading off unrest in the state sector while presenting them as an institution 
that would help to strengthen unions in the private sector.
10
 Howell contends that this 
strategy had an international dimension. The rise of Solidarność in Poland gave added 
urgency to the debates on improving union capacity during the early reform era as CPC 
leaders fretted over the potential for an independent trade union movement to emerge 
in China. Indeed Howell refers to such challenges emerging in the cities of Wuhan and 
Taiyuan (Howell, 1998: 159). The pressure for more effective unions was intricately 
linked to the economic reforms as union cadres acknowledged that a new type of trade 
unionism not so closely tied to the state was required. The potential for unrest in the 
state sector and the gradual increase in labour disputes was at the root of these concerns, 
which even found expression at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 when Zhao 
Ziyang and other reformers supported moves for „greater autonomy for trade unions‟ 
(Howell, 1998: 159). 
At the landmark and now largely forgotten Eleventh Congress of the ACFTU 
matters came to a head when Ni Zhifu „called for a readjustment of the relationship 
                                                 
10
 Although SWCs have had little impact in the private sector, this remains the case in the state sector. In 
August 2008, the authorities in Henan conceded to protesting workers calling for a halt in the 
privatisation of the Linzhou Iron and Steel Company Limited. Practically on the eve of a hotly contested 
buyout by the Fengbao Iron and Steel Company Limited, officials announced after five days of protest 
that „[I]ssues regarding the future of Linzhou Iron and Steel and benefits for its workers should be 
decided by its workers' congress‟ (Shanghai Daily, 2009).  
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between the trade unions, Party and government‟ (Howell, 1998: 159). A Workers‟ 
Daily editorial described the event as a „reforming congress, a democratic congress and 
a unified congress‟ which would have been par for the course but for the editors then 
going on to add some substance: 
We must persevere in adding vitality to our primary level organisations and 
implement the policy of transforming the unions into democratised 
[organisations] of the working masses (qunzhonghua). (Workers‟ Daily, 1988)  
In the context of such a dramatic Congress – even more so in hindsight – this editorial 
was significant. Delegates agreed that when workers‟ rights and interests were 
infringed and normal democratic channels failed to fight the situation, trade unions had 
the „right to lead workers in exposing [malpractice], reporting [violations] and adopting 
other legal forms of struggle‟ to protect their members (ACFTU, 1988: 82). This ruled 
out strike action as the right to strike had been deleted from the Constitution in 1982. 
Nevertheless, the tone of determination was indicative of the debates that had gathered 
steam in union and Party circles during a decade of reform.  
 The momentum came to halt with the Democracy Movement of 1989 and the 
appearance of the WAFs, discussed in the previous section. While many union cadres 
privately agreed with the criticism that the ACFTU needed to distance itself from the 
Party and were genuinely frustrated with the slow pace of reform, the severity of the 
clampdown and the concomitant purge of the ACFTU leadership persuaded them that 
working within the system was the only option available. In the years immediately 
following the turmoil of 1989, SOE workers fared reasonably well as Party 
conservatives used the occasion to bring the economic reforms to a temporary halt and 
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enterprise leaders were given room to increase wages in the state sector in a bid to 
ward off labour unrest at a very sensitive time. The ACFTU was subjected to intense 
criticism from the international trade union movement and many national union 
federations followed the ICFTU in spurning all contact. Yet, as we have seen, FDI 
continued to arrive and pressure from the private sectors, including the TVEs, 
continued to build up. If the ACFTU was to survive with any credibility, union reform 
would very soon push its way back on to the agenda.     
Industrial Reform Phase Two: The Socialist Market Economy – On the Road to 
Capitalism 
Market forces had little direct impact on industrial relations in the urban sector during 
the first decade of reform. Senior figures such as Hu Yaobang and even Zhao Ziyang, 
who were arguing for a more rapid transformation, were frustrated by the influences of 
post-Cultural Revolution political caution and the endurance of traditional practices 
which, for the most part, acted as a constraint on the pace of reform. For example,  
[E]ven changes in SOE wage policies to improve productivity and material 
incentives were often implemented in traditional egalitarian fashion and were 
not linked directly to improvements in productivity. (Gallagher, 2005: 66)    
During the „dual track‟ period of 1978 to 1992 managers were reluctant to shed 
„excess‟ workers for fear of provoking unrest – although trends that indicated a decline 
in workers‟ status and authority (quanli) were also beginning to emerge (Liu Aiyu, 
2005: 76). Nevertheless, most people‟s economic situation had improved or at least 
remained static. Liu‟s data of the period demonstrates that 22.5 per cent of her working 
class respondents were financially richer, 21.4 per cent reported a drop in income, with 
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the remainder reporting no change (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 86). As SOE restructuring 
gradually deepened during the mid-nineties, workers and shopfloor management in 
medium and large SOEs sometimes combined in order to pressure senior factory 
managers as they negotiated with state bureaucrats over budgets. In contrast to thirty-
seven per cent of factory managers who prioritised market share, You Ji found that 
[A] much tighter alliance [was] formed between shop floor management and 
workers to protect their own interests … According to a national survey of 
2,765 factory managers in 1995, answers to the question „What is the most 
important thing in your management?‟ the biggest proportion of respondents 
(forty-eight per cent) answered that maximizing workers‟ income was their 
primary objective. (You Ji, 1998: 140) 
Liu also found that managers were reluctant to shed „excess‟ workers on account of 
fear of provoking unrest and pressure to keep unemployment under control. 
Although the contract system and the authority of managers to terminate 
contracts had a sound legal basis, the new power was used extremely carefully 
and in reality was subject to very real restraints. In recruiting new workers, 
managers would go through the motions of seeking employees on the open 
market. But in actual hiring, they continued the practice of fencing (nei zhao). 
Managers certainly didn‟t go looking to stir up trouble by ending employment 
contracts arbitrarily. The power to fire was tempered by a number of social 
considerations which they justified in phrases such as „stability above all else‟, 
„employment first and foremost‟. (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 86)    
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While direct Party intervention in the enterprises declined, social stability remained a 
key factor on SOE managers‟ agendas. As late as 2001, when the sheer scale of SOE 
lay-offs had become clear, the traditional social obligations of the „enterprise‟ lingered 
on – at least in the minds of trade union officials. One enterprise-level trade union 
chairman in a large brewery made reference to these obligations to visiting American 
students during a study trip organised by the author: 
The system in our state-owned enterprise is different from your factories in 
America. The machinery we have imported from Germany and Belgium has 
boosted production and we are now the third largest brewery in China, but such 
modernisation does not mean we will lay-off workers just to increase profits. 
[Large-scale] nationalised industry has to make money for sure, but we also 
have a responsibility to society and can‟t just lay people off – though this is also 
changing. (HRW [Pringle], 2002)  
As we shall see, it was not the laws and administrative regulations that paved the way 
for private enterprise that brought about the unmaking of the traditional working class 
and the securities it enjoyed. It was private enterprise itself.   
The Rise of Township and Village Enterprises 
Powerful entrepreneurial forces were developing alongside institutional change as 
private economic activity spread from the fields to rural factories in the form of 
township and village enterprises (TVE). Evolving out of the pre-Cultural Revolution 
commune brigade enterprises (shedui qiye) of the 1950s, TVEs expanded rapidly 
during the eighties (Greenfield and Leung, 1997). Formal parameters for their 
ownership and control were not in place until 1990 with the release of Regulations on 
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Township and Village Collective Enterprises of the People‟s Republic of China issued 
by the Ministry of Agriculture (State Council, 1990).
11
 These regulations placed the 
assets of TVEs under the ownership of „all rural residents of the township or village‟ 
(Article Eighteen). Enterprise management could be subcontracted out via a 
„managerial contract responsibility system, leasing or joint operations with enterprises 
of other types of ownership‟ (Article Eighteen). This facilitated an influx of private and 
foreign capital into TVEs that has increased ever since (Che Jiahua and Qian Yingyi, 
1998: 3). Essentially, the 1990 regulations on TVEs restricted „the use of revenue by 
community residents and government to two purposes: reinvestment and local public 
goods‟ (Che Jiahua and Qian Yingyi, 1998: 5) an apparent constraint that appeared to 
add gusto to the TVEs‟ capacity for exploitation as they quickly developed a reputation 
for appalling working conditions (Greenfield and Leung, 1997).  
Hussain and Stern argue that the explosive growth of China‟s TVEs was due, at 
least in part, to two „special features‟ of the pre-reform era. First, a high degree of 
decentralisation allowed local provinces considerable discretion in their economic 
administration which resulted in a large volume of transactions „outside the aegis of the 
state supply system‟ (Hussain and Stern, 1994: 10) and this tradition certainly seems to 
be true for the early development of private markets operating on the edge of national 
policy, as was the case of Zhejiang‟s Yiwu county, the location for a pilot in trade 
union innovation discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Second, the division of the 
command economy into „semi-autarkic cells‟ (Hussain and Stern, 1993: 10) facilitated 
the Chinese practice of running pilot projects in economic reform that avoided 
„disruption to the rest of the economy‟ (Hussain and Stern, 1993: 11). As Chapter 
                                                 
11
 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiangcun jiti suoyouzhi  qiye tiaoli 1990 
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Three on sector-level bargaining demonstrates, the same point can be applied to trade 
union experiments in improved representation. Despite the absence of competition 
from a „second trade union‟ (di‟erge gonghui) and continued commitment to 
democratic centralism, labour unrest has created the space for innovation that has not 
lead to wider disruption, or indeed, a second trade union. At least not so far!  
In 1978, township enterprises accounted for 5.05 per cent of industrial output, 
rising to 14.23 per cent by 1993. Industrial output for village enterprises – a smaller 
version of the TVE – went from 4.04 per cent to 12.25 per cent in the same period 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 1994: 393-394 cited in Che Jiahua and Qian Yingyi, 1998: 
2) and by 1993 TVEs were employing over 123 million rural workers (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1995: 363-364). The TVEs sparked debate inside and outside China over 
whether they constituted socialist enterprise or capitalist exploitation. On the one hand, 
they were dynamic, flexible and, crucially, demonstrated a capacity to soak up the 
large amounts of surplus rural labour that resulted from the dissolution of the 
communes. Conversely, they were much quicker to dismiss employees in times of 
austerity. As the government reined in access to credit in the late eighties TVE 
employment fell from 47.2 million in 1988 to 45.9 million in 1990 (Che Jiahua and 
Qian Yingyi, 1998: 18). Viewed in this light, TVEs were presented by some as a 
potential model that could be adapted to other developing countries (Field et al, 2006: 
21) and even as „the first indigenous and competitive form of socialist enterprise‟ that 
could save socialism itself (Roemer, 1994: 127). On the other hand, labour activists in 
Hong Kong regarded TVEs as the product of inappropriate alliances between local 
officials and nascent capitalists formed in order to take advantage of an unmonitored 
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and unregulated environment for capital accumulation, ostensibly in the name of 
economic development. Far from being the saviours of socialism, TVEs were pushing 
open the door to local and foreign capitalists whose capital was facilitating rapidly 
expanding private control of public or community assets (Greenfield and Leung, 1997). 
Indeed, SOE managers frequently cited them as a source of unfair competition, 
complaining that TVEs 
earned profits through unfair and underhanded business practices, such as 
disorderly competition, shoddy goods and exploitative labor practices that were 
often based on familial or clan relations. (Gallagher, 2005: 140)     
The Southern Tour 
Aside from generating employment and rural income, TVEs were instrumental in 
demonstrating that market forces were capable of producing economic growth and this 
added weight to the reformers‟ arguments. By 1992, Deng‟s post-‟89 patience with 
attempts to slow the pace of reform had run out. In February, he set off on his now 
famous tour of the southern boomtown of Shenzhen, taking in a number of other 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and export promotion zones as his entourage swept 
though South China. The paramount leader‟s well-publicised enthusiasm for private 
enterprise and its dramatic transformation of Shenzhen‟s economic status put paid to 
post-Tiananmen fiscal and political conservatism at the policy level. Later in the same 
year, the Fourteenth Party Congress formally sanctioned the „socialist market 
economy‟, a formulation that was first publicly used by Deng – as far as I have been 
able to ascertain – in an interview in the People‟s Daily as early as November 1979. In 
hindsight, this shift in the political landscape was of truly seismic proportions and its 
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implications for the future direction of industrial relations should not be underestimated. 
So much so that    
[B]y the mid-to-late 1990s a clearer picture of the Chinese state‟s conception of 
labor relations began to emerge as key labor legislation was promulgated and 
the Communist Party began to move on deep restructuring of the core public 
sector with the measures implemented in the wake of the Fifteenth Party 
Congress. (Gallagher, 2005: 76) 
Ironically, the socialist market economy was sanctioned just as the market economy 
was about to lose most of its „socialist‟ characteristics!        
Regulating Deregulation 
The emerging picture was framed by two important laws pertaining to industrial 
relations. A revised Trade Union Law (1992) replaced the original 1950 law and 
China‟s first national Labour Law (1995) combined various regulations pertaining to 
different types of enterprise – based on ownership and size – and codified them into 
one national law that applied to all industrial workers (Ng and Warner, 1998: 66).  
Essentially, the Labour Law plastered legal form and authority on to the 
institutional reforms that had signalled the state‟s desire to dismantle the iron rice bowl 
during the 1980s. It took ten years to write and involved over thirty drafts. Emulating 
the ILO format,
12
 it created a tripartite structure of industrial governance composed of 
the state (Ministry of Labour), employers, represented by the Chinese Enterprise 
Director‟s Association (CEDA), and the trade unions. The reformed Trade Union Law 
                                                 
12
 China rejoined the ILO in 1971, replacing Taiwan, and set up a tripartite delegation in 1983 (Ng and 
Warner, 1998: 74) in which CEDA was nominated as the employers‟ representative.  
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passed two years earlier in 1992 had already reconfirmed the ACFTU as the only legal 
representative of the working class.         
Perhaps the most striking feature of the new Labour Law was its emphasis on 
individual labour rights as opposed to collective class interests. For example, only three 
rather vague articles were devoted to collective contracts. Previously, labour relations 
had been guided by the „Model Outline of Intra-Enterprise Discipline‟ formulated soon 
after Liberation. Although the document has been criticised as a „foreman‟s charter‟ 
(Harris, 1978: 91) and was distinguished by a marked lack of labour rights, it did not 
prevent the Chinese urban working class from consolidating a collective form of job 
security via the danwei exclusivity discussed above. During the drawn out formulation 
of the Labour Law, the ACFTU lobbied to retain this collective identity. However, the 
final version devoted just three articles to that most viable institution for the expression 
of collective interests in the market economy – collective contracts. To be sure, the 
standards and range of individual labour rights covered in the law were high in 
comparison to other developing countries but actual existing conditions made their 
implementation an unlikely prospect. In the final analysis the law was a balancing act 
with policy aims on one side – the regulation of the private sector and downsizing of 
the public sector in order to increase efficiency – balanced against the political risks of 
social unrest that the new industrial relations framework undoubtedly carried. Minister 
of Labour Li Boyong made this clear when he presented a draft of the law to the NPC 
Standing Committee in March 1994. He argued that 
The rights of enterprises to dismiss workers for reasons other than workers‟ 
faults will guarantee the legal rights of employers to run business independently 
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and will give enterprises a certain edge in market competition … [with limits on 
redundancies] … necessary for China‟s social stability. (Cited in Ng and 
Warner, 1998: 62)     
With the benefit of hindsight, and the minister‟s reassurances notwithstanding, we can 
perceive in these words a preparation for the restructuring of SOEs and the gradual 
exchange of danwei exclusivity in favour of competition. As negotiations for WTO 
membership bubbled away on the back burner of the Chinese polity, we can now see 
that the „market competition‟ Li Boyong referred to was indeed global in scope. To 
achieve these bold goals – which, as we have seen, the US‟s senior mainstream 
economists regarded as decades away from fulfilment – the state needed an ideological 
bulwark – or bulldozer – in order to „liberate the thinking‟ of the urban working class. 
For the latter the time to „step down‟ was fast approaching.     
Five years after the CPC‟s Fourteenth Congress sanctioned the socialist market 
economy, the Fifteenth Congress in 1997 shifted the pace of reform up a gear. During 
the build up to the Congress Weil argued that China was at a crossroads in which the 
fate of the country would be decided. One direction led to the rolling back of market 
reforms and a „radical move forward – to a revolutionary socialist society‟. In the other 
direction lurked „full recapitalisation and privatisation of the economy‟ (Weil, 1996: 
12). He dismissed the possibilities of a continuation of the „“third way” between 
socialism and capitalism‟ due to the irreconcilable class forces that were an already 
existing consequence of the economic reforms. As China‟s WTO membership began to 
look increasingly probable, the likelihood of a rolling back of market reforms 
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disappeared. Premier Zhu Rongji argued that „only with fewer workers can they [SOEs] 
lower costs, increase efficiency and survive and develop‟ (Zhu Rongji, 1997).  
Xiagang 
The laying off of tens of millions of workers from SOEs during the late 1990s was a 
major political and economic event that represented perhaps the greatest challenge to 
Party credibility since the start of the reform era. The formal renunciation of the 
traditional social role of SOEs, consolidated over almost five decades of CPC rule, 
intensified the strong feelings of abandonment and betrayal that had been growing 
among middle-aged laid-off workers since the introduction of management autonomy 
during the mid-eighties (Pringle and Leung, 2006). As a consequence, anxiety about 
the potential for widespread urban social instability arising from the Party‟s decision to 
push ahead with SOE restructuring was very high. The CPC produced a state policy 
that facilitated the unprecedented wave of mass redundancies at the same time as 
attempting to ameliorate its effects. This policy was known as xiagang, literally „to step 
down from one‟s post‟ in English. From a policy perspective, the process was quite 
different from redundancy in advanced industrial economies. The crucial distinction 
was that the SOE retained a concrete set of obligations to laid-off employees, including 
a livelihood stipend that was between thirty and fifty per cent of their former wages 
and the reimbursement of medical costs as well as a formal – albeit pared down – 
labour relationship. Stood down workers remained – at least on paper – eligible for 
various benefits such as partial medical expenses reimbursement and heating 
allowances and retained their employment record. The xiagang policy first moved on 
to the political and economic agenda in 1993 as the implications of Deng‟s tour began 
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to make themselves felt. The State Council released the Regulations on the Placement 
of Surplus Staff and Workers of State-Owned Enterprises and the then Ministry of 
Labour launched pilot re-employment projects in thirty cities in 1994, prior to rolling 
out xiagang nationally. By the end of 1997, 11.5 million workers had been laid off. 
According to statistics published by the Information Office of the State Council, 25.5 
million more SOE workers were laid off between 1998 and 2001 (State Council, 2002). 
The redundancies were not evenly spread. The hardest hit areas were the pre-reform 
industrial powerhouse provinces of the North-East: Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang – 
which became centres of unrest. Further south, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi were also 
badly affected, as was Sichuan in the west. By the turn of the century, the ratio of 
unemployed and xiagang workers as a percentage of the urban workforce in these 
provinces ranged between eight and twelve per cent (China Labour Market Yearbook 
2002 cited in HKCTU, 2004: 12), although these percentages hid clusters of 
joblessness. By 2001 the city of Fushun in north east Liaoning province recorded 
396,596 people „at their post‟, but 305,128 were „not at their post‟, a forty-three per 
cent lay-off rate, while the registered unemployment rate was only 2.7 per cent 
(Liaoning Statistical Yearbook, 2001: 66-68 and 92). Definitions of xiagang varied 
considerably over time and place producing what Solinger called a „layering of 
statuses‟ into seven categories of xiagang (Solinger, 2001: 684-688) rendering a 
reliable count of unemployed and laid-off workers impossible due to „inconsistent state 
statistics, flexible, disaggregating definitions, and multi-layering of the laid-off and 
jobless‟ (Solinger, 2001: 688). 
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Acutely aware of the potential for the widespread but scattered resistance to 
xiagang to congeal into a national labour movement – or at least a movement of the 
unemployed – the state‟s xiagang policy also promoted re-employment (zai jiuye) by 
obliging restructuring SOEs to set up re-employment centres offering subsidised 
retraining courses, sometimes managed by the trade union. The government 
encouraged unemployed and laid-off workers to seek jobs for themselves, chiefly in the 
service industries and private sector. According to the State Council‟s „Notice on 
Securing Basic Living Standards and Re-employment of Laid-off SOE Workers‟ a 
laid-off worker could not remain registered at a re-employment service centre for more 
than three years and labour relations with the original enterprise were terminated after 
this period. If he or she was still out of work, registration as formally unemployed was 
the next step in order to qualify for welfare benefits. Research conducted in the late 
1990s demonstrated that it was the final termination of any labour relationship with the 
SOE – rather than unemployment itself – that laid-off employees feared most (Pringle 
and Leung, 2006).
13
 Profound pessimism with regard to job prospects within the three-
year time limit was part of an overall lack of confidence in the re-employment centres 
and many of these places were described by interviewees as „empty camps‟ (Pringle 
and Leung, 2006) as workers shunned them and their goal of acting as a conduit for 
severing the relationship with the danwei. In one survey carried out by the Beijing 
Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Sociology, only 52.5 per cent of laid-off 
                                                 
13
 The author co-wrote and presented a paper based on data from a joint research project on the effects 
of xiagang on workers conducted by the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Sociology and 
the Asia Monitor Resource Centre. The research included interviews with forty-two male workers and 
thirty-eight female workers in Beijing; and a further twenty workers in Wuhan and twenty in Mentougou. 
The paper entitled „Causes, Implementation and Consequences of xiagang‟ was presented at the 
International Conference on Labour Relations and Labour Standards under Globalisation, 1-2 April 2006 
held at Beijing University.   
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workers had found new jobs within three years (Pringle and Leung, 2006). The 
obligation for downsizing SOEs to establish re-employment centres formally ended in 
2003, although far fewer were set up after 2001, and the lifespan of most centres was 
from 1998 until 2001-2002.  
Trade Unions, SOE Workers and Xiagang 
At primary level, the ACFTU generally confined itself to managing re-employment 
centres and explaining government policy to workers, generally by placing it in the 
context of overall national development. The absence of active trade union support for 
resistance to restructuring heightened the sense of abandonment felt by workers. 
According to both the Trade Union Law and the ACFTU Constitution, Chinese trade 
unions had – and have – a duty to educate workers to support the government‟s reform 
policy. Thus, trade union cadres, many of whom were also facing xiagang, often found 
themselves insisting that union members „liberate‟ their thinking and accept the 
Thatcherite „there is no alternative‟ argument (Pringle and Leung, 2006). This 
institutional passivity spread into areas where trade unions could feasibly have played a 
more active role, such as in challenging management abuse of authority and the illegal 
asset-stripping of SOEs. The roots of union compliance lay in the union‟s dual role as a 
Party-led trade union. The trade union chairwoman of a large department store in 
Guangzhou proudly told me that her day job as a deputy personnel manager had 
allowed her to assist the company to meet its lay-off targets in the late nineties (Chen 
Miaomei, interview, Guangzhou, 12 December 2005).   
Despite the politically inspired attempts to soften the impact of redundancy, the 
effects on working class neighbourhoods were real enough and were in fact little 
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different from the effects of widespread unemployment in full-blown capitalist 
societies. Many enterprises were downsizing due to economic difficulties and this 
obviously had a negative impact on their ability to pay xiagang wages and allowances. 
Research in the city of Chengdu found that 17.9 per cent of the women workers 
surveyed received no livelihood allowance from their employers after being laid off 
and those that did survived on less than a third of the average monthly income for 
Chengdu citizens. The average income in 2001 – when the survey was conducted – was 
595 yuan per month while 11.6 per cent of the laid-off women received less than 100 
yuan and 56.5 per cent between 100-200 yuan (Zou Zhongzheng and Qin Wei, 2001: 
55-60). A survey conducted by the Organisation Department of Liaoning Provincial 
Party Committee in 2000 concluded that being selected for xiagang was often followed 
by a rapid descent into a „hard and bitter life‟ as divorce rates went up, crime rose and 
suicide rates showed a marked increase (CPCCC Research Group, 2001: 200-201). 
According to one ACFTU survey, workers aged between thirty-five and fifty-five were 
the first to be stood down and women before men was the general rule. Women made 
up between sixty and seventy per cent of all laid-off workers and their family 
responsibilities made it even more difficult for them to find new jobs. In Chengdu, Zou 
and Qin found that the introduction of contracts in the eighties had not prepared 
women workers for the poverty of unemployment that invariably followed xiagang.  
The social position of former SOE women workers was profoundly weakened 
by xiagang. This group differs from other vulnerable social groups, such as 
migrant workers from the farms, or those urban dwellers who have never been 
attached to any work unit or enterprise. Far from being on the margins of urban 
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society, these women were, prior to xiagang, at the core of the old production 
system – the masters of the country‟s [enterprises]‟. (Zou Zhongzheng and Qin 
Wei, 2001: 55-60) 
Not everyone understood the details of xiagang and the inevitable regional variations 
in policy that came with it. A series of interviews I conducted with laid-off workers in 
2001-2002 in the mining towns around Datong in Shaanxi province and Shulan in Jilin 
province demonstrated the challenges and, at times, confusion that xiagang visited on 
the working class. Most new jobs found via the re-employment centres offered inferior 
pay and conditions and taking one meant severing ties with the danwei and losing the 
social benefits that these had traditionally provided. In 2001, the manager of a re-
employment centre in Shulan assured me there was „no longer any such thing as an 
eight-hour day in China‟ (Zhang, interview, Shulan, 16 November 2001). In the coal 
capital of Datong I interviewed Mr. Zheng, a miner. He explained that he had been laid 
off and was now doing casual work – hauling goods on a tricycle. His rationale for not 
trying to get a job through his SOE‟s re-employment centre was that this would mean 
losing his xiagang status, which would not be in his interests. Firstly, it ruled out being 
prioritised for re-employment at the coal mine, a possibility that he had not yet 
excluded; secondly, he could supplement his xiagang wages with casual work; and 
thirdly, his current situation offered him more options than would a poorly paid, 
informal and likely part-time job „washing dishes‟ in the restaurants frequented by 
Datong‟s emerging parvenu class of village-level cadres and farmers turned mine 
bosses.
14
 For Mr. Zheng, the combination of the two irregular incomes exceeded the 
                                                 
14
 There are many fancy restaurants in Datong.  Occasionally I was invited to eat in some of them, which 
were often full of newly enriched mine bosses controlling newly sub-contracted or privatised mine shafts 
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wages on offer from the jobs at the re-employment centre. And, as he explained, his 
main goal at the time was to maintain a relationship with the mine.  
He (points to another tricycle driver) took a job [from the re-employment centre] 
and then he got sacked after complaining about the hours (laughter among the 
group in general). Serves him right, he is a mouthy bastard at the best of times 
(more light-hearted laughter). I want to work in the mine again. I‟ve registered 
at the re-employment centre but I will stick to this [tricycle work] to 
supplement what they give me. If there is work in the mine again, I will take 
that. (Zheng, interview, Datong, 10 April 2001) 
The man pointed out by Mr. Zheng later told me that aside from delivering goods with 
his tricycle, he also bred dogs to further supplement a means-tested state welfare 
payment [zui di shenghuo fei].
15
 He said that registering as formally unemployed would 
exclude him from this payment.
16
 After being laid off from the mine and then sacked 
from the job he got through the re-employment centre, his main concern was looking 
after his sick wife, a task rendered very difficult as he and his family no longer had 
access to medical services that the mine had previously provided. The black economy 
was his only option.   
                                                                                                                                             
who spent tens of thousands of yuan on exotic dishes and alcohol. To be fair, there is not much else to do 
in Datong. 
15
 I met a number of laid-off workers who had taken up dog breeding. The breeds were invariable large 
and fierce. During a visit to the dog market one breeder explained to me that some of the buyers were 
mine bosses who bought them to use as guards dogs. Or restaurant owners who kept them at the back 
ready to release into the dining room „if there was a fight‟. While he was probably exaggerating out of 
bravado and humour, Datong is nevertheless a tough mining city in which such a scenario was not 
altogether unlikely. I was also told that illegal dog fights were organised and well-attended by laid-off 
workers who enjoyed a flutter.  
16
 The interviewee said that being sacked from his job would have excluded him from unemployment 
benefit anyway. Moreover, as demonstrated by the next quotation, there was a reticence and confusion 
over what one was entitled to.   
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Is breeding dogs a job? If I say it is, then maybe I will lose the welfare payment. 
My wife is sick and can‟t work and needs me at home to look after her. How 
can I do a normal job? (Chen, personal communication, Datong, 10 April 2001)   
Confusion was rife over what one was entitled to, as another tricycle delivery driver 
and laid-off miner explained: 
I haven‟t registered with anyone. I wouldn‟t know much about that. Sure I‟ve 
read about it but if you actually try to register, it‟s a different story. I spent one 
morning in an office waiting to register but then they told me I was in the 
wrong office. That meant I earned no money that day. The mine doesn‟t do 
anything. They said we were being laid off (xiagang) but I am not sure what 
this means for us in practice. Nobody knows. (Interview, Datong, 11 April 2001) 
Resistance to restructuring is discussed in the next chapter. For now it is 
sufficient to state that by the summer of 2002, China‟s combined unemployment and 
redundancy figures were reaching the „critical point‟ (Deng, 2002) that the government 
feared. The authorities had been seriously alarmed by events of the spring of that year, 
notably the protests of laid-off oil workers in Daqing that even showed signs of 
spreading elsewhere in China (CLB, 2002) and delayed a major conference on 
employment in Beijing during the summer for fear of exacerbating negative public 
sentiment (Qiao, personal communication, Hong Kong, June 2002). Yet by the end of 
2002 it was becoming clear that in policy terms, xiagang had achieved its goals and 
allowed the Party and government to ride out the resistance to restructuring. In 2003, as 
a new pay-as-you-go social security system began to take shape, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) released guidelines stipulating that workers laid 
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off from their SOEs were to register directly as unemployed, a move that facilitated the 
growing practice of one-off redundancy payments known as (mai duan gongling).
17 
In 
early 2005, the MOLSS reported that twelve provinces and municipalities had closed 
all re-employment service centres managed by SOEs and former SOEs (MOLSS, 
2003).  
The New Deal: Employment, Global Integration and Capitalist Labour Relations 
Up until China‟s entry into the WTO, Party history, memories of the Cultural 
Revolution and the violent end to the 1989 Democracy Movement had combined to 
give the reform process a somewhat temporary air. Indeed, many felt that „crossing the 
river by feeling for the stones‟ didn‟t necessarily rule out stepping backwards to the 
safety of the original bank. However, by formally locking China into trading rules and 
facilitating further integration with the global economy, WTO membership 
considerably reduced the prospects of a policy volte-face. Further reassurance came 
early in the new century with two landmark speeches from President Jiang Zemin. In 
essence, the speeches recognised that membership of the country‟s ruling class and 
control of the nation‟s resources and wealth was no longer restricted to the upper 
echelons of the CPC and the army. Jiang‟s ideological staff developed the Theory of 
the Three Represents through which the CPC was deemed to represent all three 
advanced elements of production, including capital. The Party constitution was 
amended accordingly and capitalists were permitted to join the organisation despite 
opposition from the Maoist old guard.   
                                                 
17
 As we will see in the next chapter, the dramatic protests in Daqing were in fact induced not by 
xiagang but by one-off redundancy deals that the workers rejected when they realised the full 
consequences of their decision to sign redundancy deals.   
86 
 
WTO membership came during the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis as 
restructuring again picked up momentum and foreign investment increased 
significantly. In 2002 China knocked the US from its pole position as the favoured 
destination for FDI (OECD 2003). The last years of the twentieth century saw an 
expansion of labour markets, the completion of the dismantling of the iron rice bowl, 
and the consolidation of the role of private and foreign ownership in the economy.  
As I have already pointed out, these socio-economic developments were far 
from unregulated. If the chaos of the former USSR‟s transition was to be avoided, the 
state‟s withdrawal from direct management of industrial relations required the 
development of labour laws and regulations. Unlike the Russian ruling class, the 
Chinese Party leadership was not subject to the intense pressure of „Chicago School‟ 
economics and was aware that constraints on the behaviour of profit-seeking employers 
and local governments eager to generate income from investment were required, even 
if they were sporadically and unevenly applied. Indeed, although capitalist 
globalisation has a justified reputation for removing legal limitations on the behaviour 
of capitalists, the Chinese experience is somewhat more nuanced. Since the mid-
eighties Chinese labour legislation has flourished and between 1979 and 1994 alone 
over 160 labour regulations and rules were passed (Yuan Shouqi, 1994: 338 cited in 
Ngok King-lun, 2008: 49). Before we look in detail at the legal framework for 
industrial relations that was being – and continues to be – developed, I will briefly 
summarise the considerable changes that reform had brought to China‟s employment 
structure and this will give us an idea of what the state needed to regulate.  
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The bar chart below illustrates how these figures translated into equally 
significant changes in China‟s industrial demography as the tertiary sector grew in 
proportion to the decline in numbers employed in the primary sector. 
Graph 1 
Comparison of Employment Structure 1978 and 2006 in percentages 
Source: CLSY: 2007   
If we look at the entire reform period we can see the full extent of the changes.  In 
1978, 70.5 per cent of Chinese were employed in the primary sector, 17.3 per cent in 
the secondary and just 12.2 in the tertiary. By 2006, these statistics were 42.6 per cent, 
25.2 per cent and 32.2 per cent respectively (CLSY, 2007) In terms of urban 
employment structure by sector over the period 1990 to 2003, the number of state 
sector employees dropped by 34.7 million to 68.8 million whereas those employed in 
the private sector rose from 6.7 million to 42.7 million representing 46.5 per cent of the 
newly employed urbanites (State Council Information Office, 2004: 5). These figures 
do not include rural workers coming into the urban areas to work. As most of these 
people end up working in the private sector, the numbers actually working in private or 
foreign-invested industry is much larger. 
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Underpinning these transformations has been the reserve army of unemployed 
so familiar to capitalist economies. From both a political and economic perspective, 
management of the numbers was of crucial importance to the Party. On the one hand, 
capital required a pool of unemployed workers to maintain a downward pressure on 
wages. On the other hand, the state could not allow the reserve army numbers to climb 
too high and risk nationwide social unrest. We can see clearly here the importance of 
phased redundancy or xiagang policy and the hukou regulations in terms of managing 
the political perils that came with economic reform. Political considerations apart, the 
burdens of compiling reliable empirical data on the number of unemployed were not 
inconsiderable. Firstly, there was the inevitable confusion between formal 
unemployment, an entirely new concept to urban workers more familiar with the 
securities of the danwei, and those who were still in the process of phased redundancy 
– itself divided into up to eight different categories (Solinger, 2001: 671-688). 
Moreover, the informal sector was expanding rapidly, with all the usual grey areas. An 
ACFTU survey of re-employed former SOE workers found that 
18.6 per cent were odd-job manual workers, 10 per cent did various sorts of 
hourly work (which usually refers to activities such as picking up others‟ 
children from school); 5.2 per cent had seasonal jobs; 60 per cent were retailers 
operating stalls; and a mere 6.8 per cent had obtained formal, contracted 
employment. A worrying 45 per cent among the stall keepers were discovered 
to be highly vulnerable, mobile peddlers selling in shifting sites without a 
licence. (Labour Insurance Bulletin, 2000: 35 cited in Solinger, 2001: 682)  
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In 2003 when registration as a xiagang worker was being phased out in favour of 
formal unemployment in urban areas, the official rate of unemployment was 4.3 per 
cent. In 2006 this had dropped to 4.1 per cent (CLSY, 2007: 172). In December 2008 
the rate increased for the first time in five years to 4.2 per cent with a government 
projection of 4.6 per cent for 2009 (Tan Yingzi, 2009). However, the true figure for 
unemployment is likely to be considerably higher as the fan xiang or return to the 
countryside movement has illustrated. As a result of the global financial crisis, twenty 
million migrants have temporarily returned to their farms (Branigan, 2009). These 
people are not included in the official statistics for unemployment. 
Managing Capitalist Conflict: The Legal Development of an Industrial Relations 
System 
The State Council has described the regulation of China‟s emerging labour relations 
system as being based on „autonomous consultation by both parties and regulated by 
the government according to the law‟ (State Council Information Office, 2004: 16). 
The words are carefully chosen and the preference for „autonomous‟ over 
„independence‟ is not simply a matter of semantics. Nevertheless, the implicit 
subjectivity is a far cry from the command economy in which, according to Xu, the 
capitalist class was eliminated and the „independent, free labourer was purged in favour 
of socialism‟ (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 15). Indeed, the need to regulate „both parties‟ 
acknowledges the existence of separate interests. With the potential for conflict 
considerably expanded, the Party turned to „governing the country by relying on laws‟ 
(yifa zhiguo) to „complement the government‟s efforts at both political stability and 
economic reform‟ (Ying Zhu, 2002: 161). Thus, law moved centre stage, a result of  
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the paradigmatic shifts of China‟s labor policy in the reform era. Under the new 
labor policy paradigm, the role of law has been strengthened in governing labor 
relations and other labor-related affairs. (Ngok King-lun 2008, p.45) 
Summarizing the situation in the early nineties Ngok identifies the return of capitalist 
labour relations and attendant worker unrest as the significant, if not overriding, factor 
in the formulation of a national labour law.  
Both Chinese and overseas observers contended that the totally unregulated 
laissez-faire capitalist conditions of the early stages of capitalism were 
prevalent and that „sweatshops‟ were revived in China. The plight of laborers 
was drummed into the national consciousness by media stories. Labor abuses, 
especially in the non-state sector, caused increasing militant actions of the 
workers and invited wide criticism from international human rights groups and 
labor groups. There was a widespread sense that the country had some serious 
labor problems that would endanger social stability. Facing these pressures, the 
state was forced to take some active measures to pacify disgruntled workers, 
and the Labor Law was seen as an important and urgent issue on the legislative 
agenda. (Ngok King-lun, 2008: 51) 
  The 1995 Labour Law was China‟s first national labour law. Although the law 
devotes considerable space to the individual labour rights of employees, its principle 
aim was to give legal sanction to „two issues related to the role of the legal framework 
during this transition period‟: redefining the „relationship between the government and 
enterprises‟ and to „develop rules for enterprises with diversity of ownership to 
compete in the market‟ (Ying Zhu, 2002: 163). Contracts were the key weapon.     
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Contracts 
The individual labour contract became the starting point for the new employment 
relationship. Ngok argues that  
[T]he most significant break with the old employment system was, undoubtedly, 
the introduction of labor contracts, and this fundamentally changed the 
relationship between workers and the state. (Ngok King-lun, 2008: 46) 
Nichols et al.‟s research on the role of contracts in (Nichols et al., 2004) concurs with 
Ngok‟s view. One of their case studies involved a former mainland SOE that 
eventually reinvented itself as a fully foreign-owned enterprise following a brief spell 
as a joint venture. According to Wong, such transformations – and there were many – 
have been facilitated by WTO membership, the consequent „SOE privatisation project‟ 
and the „disintegration of China‟s protectionist policy‟ (Wong, M. 2006: 80). While 
Nichols‟ draws a direct link between China‟s legal enshrinement of contracted 
employment via the Labour Law (1995) and the unmaking („dismantling‟) of China‟s 
traditional („established‟) urban working class. Not that this process is unique to China. 
An international context is provided via Standing‟s identification of a global „trend 
toward more insecure irregular forms of employment‟ (Standing 1997 cited by Nichols 
et al., 2004: 667) „accentuated by pressures of globalization, privatization, of 
production and social policy, new technologies and the competitive pressures on 
managers‟ (Nichols et al., 2004: 667). 
 If contracts in the era of globalisation and Chinese economic reform were part 
of the process of dismantling the power and influence of China‟s established labour in 
the state sector, they were also the basis for the new relationship between employers 
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and employed in the private sector. Of course, millions of migrant workers were not 
given the opportunity to sign contracts with their employers. And many of those that 
did had little choice but to sign ones that did not meet legal standards. However, the 
point remains valid: contracts and the concomitant commoditisation of labour are now 
the legal basis of the relationship between labour and capital in China. The Labour Law 
(1995) devotes a whole chapter to employment contracts and of the nineteen articles 
therein, all but three are related to individual contracts. Article Twenty allows for three 
types of contract: fixed-term, permanent, and flexible all of which must contain clauses 
on terms, job description and duties, rights and protection, wages and salary, 
disciplinary procedures, termination and responsibility for violation. Since the law was 
passed, the overwhelming majority of contracts have been fixed-term and this fact has 
been crucial to China‟s emergence as a platform for exports via TNCs and global 
integration. Wong‟s research at the Tianjin branch of the Korean TNC Samsung found 
that China‟s emerging model dovetailed neatly with the  
„Samsungisation‟ of labour relations [which] is taking place along typical 
Samsung HRM lines such as merit-based bonus [and] one year contracts based 
on three month appraisal tied to a yearly five to seven per cent dismissal rate. 
[This] serves to replace socialist-styled worker collectivism with individual and 
irregular labour relations. (Wong, M. 2006: 87)  
It certainly did in the white goods factory – euphemistically referred to as ChinaCo – 
Nichols and his team researched. In 1994, the year the NPC passed the Labour Law, 
100 per cent of the company‟s workers were permanent workers. In 2002, this figure 
had dropped to under thirty-five per cent. About sixty per cent of the workforce was 
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employed on fixed two-year contracts and the remaining five per cent on three-month 
contracts employed to cover seasonal fluctuations. Echoing Wong and many others, 
Nichols et al. remind us of both the extent of the transformation and the role of 
contracts in bringing it about. 
During the planned economy period, the managers of SOEs had little right to 
select workers and workers were allocated jobs from which they could not be 
fired. At ChinaCo, the new labour contract system made it possible for the 
number of workers to be cut by half during the joint venture period. But the 
proportionate change in the types of contract is no less striking and has 
generally drawn less attention from outside China. (Nichols et al., 2004: 673)   
The promulgation of the Labour Law was followed by an extensive campaign to 
„implement the provisions relating to labour contracts‟ (Ying Zhu, 2002: 172). This did 
very little to persuade employers to move beyond superficially replicating minimum 
standards. The next thirteen years saw large numbers of press articles, activist reports 
and labour protests that symbolised the failure of contracts to hold employers to 
account in the absence of a strong integrated national labour movement capable of 
operating in the new environment. As the horror stories piled up and unrest reached a 
new level, the state, under the new and more socially concerned leadership of Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao, moved to strengthen the hand of unions and workers by 
introducing a Labour Contract Law (Ngok King-lun, 2008: 57). As with the original 
Labour Law, worker militancy was a major factor behind its formulation. Following 
2004, the capacity of workers to make their point was given an added weight by the 
advent of labour shortages in the Pearl River Delta and elsewhere as migrants 
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organised strikes, occasionally blocked roads and, most frequently, voted with their 
feet. Labour unrest again pushed its way up the national agenda. Not that it had ever 
really gone away. A survey of 9,500 urbanites‟ attitudes to labour conflict (lao-zi 
chongtu) in 2002 found that sixty-two per cent of those asked agreed that „labour 
conflict was increasingly serious‟. The various grades of answers are given in the table 
two below. 
Table 2:  
Urban citizens‟ response to the statement „the problem of labour-capital conflicts is 
increasingly serious‟  
Response 
category 
Individual 
responses 
Percentage 
of total 
 Response 
Category 
Individual 
responses 
Percentage 
of total 
Completely 
agree 
1074 11.4  Partially 
disagree 
1474 15.5 
Partially 
agree 
4811 50.6  Completely 
disagree 
285 3.0 
No opinion 1856 19.5  N 9500 100.0 
(Source: Li Peilin et al., 2005: 182) 
Prior to its final draft, the 2008 Labour Contract Law (LCL) was subject to an 
extensive process of public consultation that facilitated employers, workers, TNCs, 
agents of foreign capital such as AmCham, as well as literally tens of thousands of 
NGOs and individuals to send in their views. The process sparked a national debate 
over the role of labour standards and their impact on employment and development. 
The so-called „Beijing Faction‟ argued for a new law containing standards that fell into 
95 
 
line with those set by the ILO and was led by the well-known labour scholar Professor 
Chang Kai. On the other hand, the „Shanghai Faction‟, led by Professor Dong Baohua, 
put the case for lower standards that were more applicable to China‟s developing 
country status and therefore rendering the law more relevant to workers and employers. 
The new law was always going to be a compromise, yet the final version did give more 
workers more leeway to address some of the contract-related issues that the vaguer 
language of the original Labour Law had produced. For example, Li argues that 
contracts in China are based on the pro-employer model of „stability on the basis of 
labour market mobility‟ i.e. fixed-term contracts rather than the pro-employee model of 
„labour market mobility on the basis of stability‟ that would – in theory – have left 
more room for permanent employment (Li Kungang, 2000: 6 cited in Chang Kai, 2005: 
266). Under the previous legal regime, the high degree of labour market mobility that 
time-restricted contracts generally produce had made it very convenient for employers 
to resort to questionable and often illegal methods in order to retain workers in 
appalling conditions, delay wage payments or refuse work injury compensation. These 
included „job deposits‟, deductions for a „contract violation fund‟ (weiyue jin) and the 
substituting of labour supply contracts with labour dispatch companies for genuine 
employment contracts (Chang Kai, 2005: 266-267).  
 It remains to be seen if the LCL can improve the situation for workers. While 
falling well short of levelling the playing field, the LCL does go some way towards 
reining in employer hegemony over contracts and as such drew fierce opposition from 
US investors (Brown, 2006). Written contracts are now mandatory (Article Ten) and 
labour stability is encouraged by the law‟s stipulation that employers are obliged to 
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offer permanent employment to employees who have served two fixed-term contracts 
(Article Fourteen). Severance pay for those workers whose contracts are not renewed is 
now a legal right of employees (Article Forty-six), although this is subject to other 
conditions in the law being met. Equally important is that the Labour Contract Law 
stipulates penalties for employer violation of these new rights and there are fifteen 
articles in the law that stipulate the conditions for employers‟ legal liabilities (Articles 
Eighty-Ninety-five). For their part, some employers resorted to mass sackings in the 
run up to the promulgation of the law, weeding out those workers who were coming up 
for a third-term contract renewal and forcing those left over to sign new contracts that 
effectively cancelled out their employment history. This behaviour became so 
widespread that the ACFTU issued a nationwide notice instructing its branches to go 
after „employing units‟ who were „not only directly infringing the rights of workers and 
influencing harmonious labour relations but also producing a negative impact on 
socialist harmony‟ (ACFTU, 2007b). 
Collective Contracts 
The ACFTU began to push seriously for collective contracts in SOEs during the mid- 
nineties but these efforts were undermined by command economy traditions and 
inexperience in bargaining (Clarke et al., 2004: 251). First, the economy still bore 
many of the hallmarks of a command structure and the notion of opposing interests that 
required bargaining to reconcile was still unacceptable to most ACFTU cadres who had 
not yet grasped the nature of the changes that lay ahead. Second, employer 
organisations were weak and largely established by the Party itself. Third, up until 
1997, the restructuring of SOEs had proceeded with relative caution, especially after 
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the trauma of 1989. Fourth, while three clauses on collective contracts were 
successfully inserted into the final draft of the 1995 labour law as result of ACFTU 
lobbying, these hardly provided a sufficiently weighty counterbalance to an 
overwhelming individualistic law.  
There is still no distinct law on collective contracts in China. Following an 
updating of the „Regulations on Collective Contracts‟ undertaken jointly by the 
MOLSS, the ACFTU and the two national employers‟ organisations in January 2004, 
(MOLSS, 2004), the ACFTU convened a national conference in September of the same 
year aimed at adding impetus to its work of increasing the number of workers covered 
by collective contracts signed via a process of collective consultation rather than 
bargaining. By the end of the year the union was claiming that 628,819 enterprises and 
institutions had established a „collective contract system‟ based on „equal negotiation‟ 
(Chinese Trade Unions Statistics Yearbook 2005, 2006: 107). In its statistical yearbook 
for the following year, 2006, the ACFTU claimed that 529,749 enterprises were 
covered by regional (quyu xing) collective contracts and a further 111,736 enterprises 
covered by industrial (hangye xing) collective contracts (Chinese Trade Unions 
Statistics Yearbook 2006, 2007: 112). By the end of 2005, 413,706 enterprises had 
signed annual wage-only collective contracts for over 35.3 million workers (Chinese 
Trade Unions Statistics Yearbook 2006, 2007: 113). The relationship between these 
figures is not made clear. For example, it is not possible to ascertain from the statistics 
presented how many of the enterprises with wage-only collective contracts also had 
collective contracts covering non-wage related issues that are usually on a three-year 
basis. Previous research emphasises that these figures should be treated with caution 
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(Taylor et al. 2003: 191). In Chapter Four, I explain that the vast majority of these 
contracts were a result of top-down quota-driven targets resulting in agreements that at 
best met legal minimum standards and at worst undercut them! I believe these 
weaknesses give the case study in Chapter Four that examines a pioneering bottom-up 
collective wage-bargaining process covering seasonal migrant workers added 
significance.   
Labour Dispute Resolution 
Throughout the latter half of the fifties and for the following two decades China did not 
have a formal labour dispute resolution system. Its absence was based on the 
ideological assumption that workers‟ ownership of enterprises excluded the possibility 
of antagonistic labour disputes that were inevitable in capitalist property relations. A 
labour arbitration system had been established in 1950 when the Party signalled that it 
would initially prioritise national reconstruction over the wider political project of 
establishing socialism, but it was abolished in 1957 following the near complete 
nationalisation of industry. According to the CPC, the new property relations dictated 
that enterprise-level labour disputes „ought to be resolved through various 
administrative and political means for settling internal differences‟ (Mo, 2000: 21 cited 
in Shen Jie, 2007: 108).  
 The return of labour-capital disputes in the reform era dictated that a formal 
dispute resolution system was again required. In 1993, the Regulations Governing 
Resolutions of Enterprise Labour Disputes were released. This legally-binding 
document outlined a three-tier method of dispute resolution based on enterprise-level 
mediation, arbitration and finally the courts. Less than two years later, the system was 
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given full legal status by the Labour Law (1995). It remains a hierarchical single-track 
system, referred to in China as the „one mediation, one arbitration and two court cases‟ 
(yi tiao, yi cai, liang sheng). In practice the system works as follows: subsequent to the 
outbreak of a dispute at an enterprise, the parties involved can apply for enterprise-
level mediation. In large enterprises this is delivered by a committee but in smaller 
enterprises the job is generally the responsibility of the personnel manager who may 
well be union chair as well. If no agreement is reached either party can apply for 
arbitration but this must be within sixty days of the date of the original dispute, a time 
limit that has been an important constraint on workers making use of the system. Once 
a case has been accepted, the appropriate level of the labour dispute arbitration 
committee (LDAC) organises an arbitration tribunal to deal with specific disputes. The 
tribunal has up to three members depending on the complexity of the case. Finally, if 
either party is not satisfied with the LDAC tribunal decision, they have fifteen days to 
apply for a court hearing and the opportunity for one appeal following the decision of 
the first instance.    
Chinese workers have made use of this system despite its flaws. Past evidence 
suggests that they are likely to continue to do so in even greater numbers now that a 
specific Labour Mediation and Arbitration Law (LMAL) has come into force as of 1 
May 2008. Incomplete statistics for 2008 demonstrate this is the case. The Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security – formerly the MOLSS – announced on 8 May 
2009 that cases accepted by the LADCs increased by ninety-eight per cent on 2007. 
Out of a total of 693,000 cases involving 1.2 million workers, 22,000 were collective 
disputes (Guangdong Labour Arbitration Network, 2009).  
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Arbitration is at the heart of China‟s labour dispute resolution process for two 
reasons. Firstly, enterprise-level unions are too weak to defend workers at the initial 
mediation stage, and secondly, courts are not allowed to accept cases that have not 
previously been through mediation, although there are local exceptions to this rule (Jie 
Shen, 2007: 111-112) usually on the basis that the relevant LDAC is overwhelmed 
with work. The rather vague language and categorisation of disputes has been slightly 
improved upon in the LMAL. Article Two stipulates that LDACs may accept disputes 
arising from the confirmation of labour relations; contractual issues related to 
conclusion, performance, alteration or termination; dismissal or resignation; working 
hours and insurance; remuneration and injury compensation; and other labour disputes 
prescribed by laws and regulations (MOLSS, 2008). Other problems that have been 
partially addressed by the new LMAL include the stipulation that arbitration decisions 
are legally binding, abolishing fees for arbitration, and extending the time limit from 
sixty days from the date of the original dispute to one year. The new law has also 
extended the scope of arbitrable matters to cover nearly all labour-related disputes, 
including disputes arising from determining whether an employee-employer 
relationship exists. This has been a major source of frustration to workers, despite a 
pro-worker Supreme Court ruling on the matter in 2001 that allowed LDAC‟s to accept 
a case when there was no labour contract but sufficient evidence to prove a labour 
relationship existed (Huang Kun, 2004: 279).   
Nevertheless, more deep-rooted institutional obstacles remain, not least in the 
fact that although nominally tripartite and made up of representatives from the labour 
bureau, trade union and enterprise (Article Nineteen), the state still wields largely 
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unfettered influence over all these institutions. Despite this, LDACs and similar 
institutions of redress remain overburdened and under-resourced. The legal scholar He 
Weifang has been quoted as arguing that this has helped to render such institutions 
inefficient and unjust: 
originally meant to seek justice [but] have become institutions that dispense 
injustice. Institutions that were meant to resolve disputes have become 
institutions that create them and institutions that were meant to allay popular 
resentment have become institutions that stir it up. (He Weifang, 2004 cited in 
Liu Shang, 2004: 2-4)  
In January 2007, ten months before the LMAL was passed by the NPC in December, 
Renmin University‟s Institute of Labour Relations organised an „International 
Conference on Labour Dispute Resolution‟ at which the keynote Chinese speaker 
outlined the problems of labour dispute resolution in China. In his speech Professor 
Chang Kai argued that at the mediation level „the systemic conflicts and shortcomings 
of the enterprise level mediation committees has led to a decline in their effectiveness‟ 
and that the central position of arbitration in the resolution process was inappropriate in 
the current situation due to its „structural vacuity (jigou xuhua), lack of authority and 
the unsuitable quality of arbitrators‟. Moreover, the procedural rules governing the 
final court stage either failed to „dovetail with, or were contradictory to, the rules of 
arbitration and lacked independence‟ (Chang Kai, 2007: 32). The LMAL is a sign of 
progress but there is still work to be done in the area of facilitating workers‟ use of the 
law to uphold their legal rights and interests.  
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Health and Safety  
The early years of this century also saw the introduction of important laws pertaining 
to industrial health and safety. China‟s Law on Safety in Production was introduced in 
2001 and stipulated fourteen basic systems and/or measures which, on paper, are 
relatively strict, but implementation is constrained by a weak labour inspectorate and 
poor trade union participation (Pringle and Frost, 2003: 315). Article Sixteen stipulates 
that production units must abide by all the relevant laws, regulations, and industry-
specific laws prior to commencing production, construction, excavation etc. The law 
also provides for individual responsibility covering all aspects of safety (Articles 
Seventeen, Seventy-Four and Seventy-Seven) and that health and safety concerns must 
be systematically integrated into all aspects of production: planning, the construction of 
production units and spaces as well as the production process itself (Article Twenty-
Four). Article Forty-Six stipulates the rights and responsibilities of employees 
pertaining to occupational safety. They are built around six core rights (Pringle and 
Frost, 2003: 311): to safety information and training on prevention; to safety equipment 
that conforms to national standards; to criticize and make suggestions; to refuse to 
carry out instructions from management that violate laws or regulations; to stop work 
in life-threatening situations; and to receive compensation following an accident at 
work.  
The Law on the Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases (LPCOD) came 
into force on 1 May 2002 and stated the responsibilities of enterprises with regard to 
safe working conditions, industrial accident insurance, measures to prevent 
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occupational disease, and the provision of information to workers. Article Four 
stipulates that  
The workers enjoy the right to occupational health protection.  
The employer shall create the working environment and conditions that 
conform to the national norms for occupational health and requirements for 
public health and take measures to ensure that the workers receive occupational 
health protection. (LPCOD, ALII) 
Article Thirty further demonstrates the central role of contracts and the rights and 
responsibilities of both parties:  
When signing with the workers labor contracts (including contracts of 
employment), the employer shall truthfully inform the workers of potential 
occupational disease hazards, the consequences in the course of work, the 
measures for prevention of such diseases and the material benefits, and it shall 
have the same clearly put down in the contracts; it may not conceal the facts or 
deceive the workers.   
If, during the contracted period of time, a worker, because of change in work 
post or assignment, begins to engage in an operation with occupational disease 
hazards, which is not mentioned in the contact, the employer shall, in 
accordance with the provisions in the preceding paragraph, perform its 
obligation by informing the worker of the true situation and, through 
consultation with the worker, alter the related provisions in the original 
contract.  
If the employer violates the provisions in the preceding two paragraphs, the 
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worker shall have the right to reject the assignment where occupational disease 
hazards exist, and the employer may not thus cancel or terminate labor contract 
with the worker. (LPCOD, ALII) 
Writing in 2003, Pringle and Frost find in these laws potential opportunities to improve 
China‟s record on occupational safety and health, but pinpointed the absence of 
adequate representation as a key constraint to improved implementation of labour 
legislation in general and occupational health and safety law in particular.  
The new laws and standards provide a legal framework that could, if utilized, 
force enterprises to comply with adequate standards. There is more than 
adequate information available … The problems lie in the lack of confidence 
and experience among younger workers and managers. Workers are in general 
ignorant of the laws and the vast body of expertise on OHS, while younger 
managers often feel compelled to manage facilities more in line with profit than 
fairness. (Pringle and Frost, 2003: 315) 
To date, workplace inspections have not matched the levels of industrial 
development that economic reform has induced. There are more than 3,000 labour 
inspection agencies in China and around 40,000 inspectors (Cooney, 2007: 607), but 
the inspectorates are dependent on local government for their financing and managed 
by the local labour bureaux. As such, they are not inclined to offend powerful local 
interests, and they have very limited powers of enforcement. Article Seven of the 
Regulations on the Inspection of Labour Guarantees (laodong baozhang jiancha tiaoli) 
obliges these agencies to solicit the views of trade unions (State Council, 2004). The 
ACFTU has its own network of labour supervision and inspection committees at 
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various levels. It claims that almost a quarter of all enterprises and organisations had 
„labour protection supervision and examination committees‟, with 1.621 million labour 
protection inspectors in 2006, covering over forty per cent of the workforce, while a 
third of higher level trade union organisations also had „labour protection supervision 
and examination organisations‟. Overall, the trade unions at all levels participated in 
2.301 million safety production inspections in 2006 (ACFTU, 2007c). In practice these 
committees have no power over working conditions unless they have the backing of 
government departments. 
Thus we can see the steady development of labour legislation since the 
introduction of a first national labour law in 1995. While the recent LCL and LMAL 
are clearly important additions to the legislative framework, they do not address the 
structural concerns that simultaneously undermine and underpin China‟s current labour 
relations system: weak and employer-dependent primary trade unions and powerful 
and Party-dependent higher trade unions. Indeed, the history of labour relations in 
general suggests that individual and essentially individualist labour legislation is 
intrinsically incapable of solving the collective antagonisms that come with capitalist 
labour relations and the evidence to date demonstrates that the socialist market 
paradigm is no different. How then do China‟s trade unions and the Trade Union Law 
fit into the post-WTO membership picture in what remains, according to the 
Constitution, a workers‟ republic?  
Trade Union Law and Practice in the New Era 
It is appropriate to recognise the direct link between law and trade union activity in the 
current era. The ACFTU‟s attachment to traditional custom and practice from the 
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command economy have proved a powerful constraint on trade union activity in the 
transitional economy. The union has tied itself to a conservative interpretation of 
labour and trade union law and regulations that has hardly induced initiative and 
innovation in the new environment. One of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that, 
despite this background, there are examples of the union reacting to the changes in the 
industrial relations map, and in particular to the labour unrest that these changes have 
brought. However, in all of these examples the ACFTU always subordinated its 
protection of workers‟ rights and interests to its role as upholder of Party-state policies. 
These contradictory tasks are set out clearly in the latest version of the Trade Union 
Law. Article Four stipulates that unions must „take economic development as the 
central task‟ and „observe and safeguard … the leadership by the Communist Party of 
China‟ and its political canon, chiefly Marxist-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and 
Deng Xiaoping Theory (Trade Union Law 2001, Article Four). The first paragraph of 
the ACFTU Constitution reinforces Party leadership stating that Chinese trade unions 
are „mass organisations of the Chinese working class under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China and formed by the workers of their own free will‟ (ACFTU,  
2008b).  
 The constraints are not new. What is new is the economic environment and 
industrial relations system in which the union must operate. Not surprisingly it has 
devoted considerable effort to influencing the laws that are shaping these developments 
and indeed, this has been one of its chief functions during the reform era. Over the past 
twenty years the ACFTU has taken part in the debates and drafting processes of the 
Labour Law (1995), the Trade Union Law (1992), the Production Safety Law (2002), 
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the Regulations on Industrial Injury Insurance (2004), the Provisions on Collective 
Contracts (2004) and the Provisional Method for the Collective Consultation on Wages 
(2000). These laws, their subsequent amendments, and their local interpretations have 
formed a major part of the ACFTU‟s efforts to promote workers‟ rights and interests. 
This function reached a pinnacle in 2008 when three new laws were passed: the LCL, 
the Employment Law and the LMAL. The new laws put more emphasis on trade union 
representation of workers, as opposed to a mediating role between capital and labour, 
but at the same time make no concessions on Party leadership and upholding rapid 
economic development which, in practice, constrain the union from improving its 
representative capacity and credibility.  
 The revision of the Trade Union Law in 2001 nudged the union towards a more 
defined sense of its responsibilities. Article Two added the clause that the union and all 
its organisations „represent the interests of the workers and staff members and 
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff members 
according to law‟. In a somewhat vague reference to the problems thrown up by the 
ACFTU‟s parallel task of representing the „overall interests of the entire Chinese 
people‟ (Article Six) the revised law states that while protecting these wider interests 
the „basic duties and functions of trade unions are to safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of workers and staff members‟ even as they take heed of their wider role 
(Article Six). A third important addition was the strengthening of the union‟s role with 
regard to collective contracts. Article Six stipulates that the union shall take part in 
consultation over collective contracts on an equal footing with employers, a clause 
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which, as we shall see in Chapter Four, paved the way for stronger regulations on 
collective contracts in general.  
Apart from its acceptance of Party leadership, Chang illustrates the special 
characteristics of the Chinese trade unions as they operate in an authoritarian 
environment. Constitutionally they are obliged to mobilise workers in supporting the 
reform process, take part in the system of democratic management, improve the quality 
and education of workers as well as establish „workers‟ teams to construct [standards] 
of ideological, moral, cultural and disciplinary [behaviour]‟ (Chang Kai, 2005: 187). In 
practice, these legal stipulations mean that in the new era much of the ACFTU‟s efforts 
remain tied to government initiatives. In response to the poverty and insecurity that 
came with restructuring, the government encouraged the ACFTU to establish poverty 
relief centres for the laid-off SOE workers as part of an attempt to limit unrest rather 
than negotiate better terms for redundancy or indeed launch a campaign to defend jobs. 
These centres are discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. Likewise, following the 
onset of labour shortages in exporting zones in South China and the confidence this 
gave workers to demand higher wages from employers, the Shenzhen government 
announced increases in the minimum wage in July 2005 and February 2006 (Xu Shi, 
2006). These increases were rooted in workers‟ own activity rather than any public 
union campaign.
18
 The ACFTU also increased its charity work via the „deliver warmth‟ 
programme (song wennuan), that concentrates on cash and material gifts made to the 
urban poor at Chinese New Year and on National Day holidays. According to one 
senior trade union researcher, in 2005 the annual budget for this activity reached an 
                                                 
18
 Of course, senior union officials no doubt lobbied for such measures in private and occasionally 
sanctioned articles in the official workers‟ press pointing out the absence of real wage increases in 
Shenzhen for over a decade. But this is not the same as a proactive campaign.   
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historical high of approximately 40 million yuan (Fu Lin, interview, Beijing, 12 
February 2006). As the leadership is well aware, these activities are essentially outside 
the workplace. And despite calls issued from the centre for local trade unions to 
increase their efforts in the workplace, the tension between stability and economic 
development on the one hand and exacerbating already increasing unrest remains a 
constraint. In this scenario, the union tends to react after an incident i.e. a strike or 
more serious labour protest rather than take the risk of provoking an incident by raising 
demands on employers even as it establishes (zujian) primary unions rather than 
organises workers into them.  
Conclusion 
The ACFTU has played an important role in both the pre- and post- Cultural 
Revolution models of industrial relations. But its legally designated role and the 
absence of freedom of association have encouraged a culture of extreme caution. This 
is hardly surprising given the turbulent history of the last sixty years.  Moreover, under 
both command and market economy paradigms, the post-‟49 decades have been 
dominated by the Party‟s prioritisation of reconstruction, development and 
employment over all else. The consequent constraints on union activity have been 
illustrated in this chapter.  
The reform era has seen the Party – i.e. the state itself to all intents and 
purposes – gradually withdraw from direct management of labour relations. There were 
high hopes that the ACFTU had the capacity to fill this gap but the situation has proved 
more complicated than perhaps Deng imagined when he argued that between them 
SWCs and the unions could mount an effective constraint on capital. This has not been 
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the case. Indeed, during the early 1950s when reconstruction dictated an industrial 
relations policy of benefiting both labour and capital (lao-zi liang li), it was clear that 
the ACFTU was more adept at controlling workers than at constraining capital. The 
same contradiction has re-emerged in the present reform era.  
Yet the organisation remains far from the „dinosaur‟ that some sections of the 
Chinese media occasionally caricature. Throughout its history, the ACFTU has been at 
the forefront of debates on labour policy, even though its position was often defined by 
political factionalism within the Party itself. The factor that has highlighted the role of 
the ACFTU more than any other has been labour unrest. This has taken different forms 
according to which economic model has been in the ascendancy and the concomitant 
political risks of taking action. But it has been particularly marked over the last decade 
as the labour movement in China has moved to the forefront of global industrial 
relations. In Chapter Two we explore the history of labour unrest in the PRC and find a 
lively tradition which, in the new economic environment, is developing into a major 
social force. Indeed, if the liberation of the working class is to be the act of the working 
class, the process requires the liberation – or replacement – of its sole legal 
representative from the shackles of past practice. 
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Chapter Two 
Labour Unrest in the State Sector: The Rise and Demise of Decent Work with 
Chinese – and some Russian – Characteristics 
Chapter One summarised the development of industrial relations since 1949, paying 
special attention to the changes over the last three decades of economic reform. In the 
final section I discussed the challenges these changes presented to the trade union and 
the necessity of transforming into a more representative organisation of workers. In 
chapters two and three I discuss the consequences of the union‟s slow progress to date. 
In this chapter, the focus is on the state sector where the ACFTU‟s room to manoeuvre 
has been entirely constrained by its relationship with the Party. In Chapter Three, I 
examine growing militancy in the private sector where, in the current conditions, the 
consequences with regard to union activity are more nuanced.  Chapters Four, Five and 
Six investigate how the emerging „space‟ has been filled.  
The current chapter is organised along basically historical lines. In section one 
we take a tour of labour unrest up to the reform era, using the available literature as my 
chief source. In particular, I examine the first eight years following liberation and the 
relationship between labour unrest and the taming – or at least anaesthetization – of the 
ACFTU as the unions submitted to their new role of controlling an expanding and, at 
times, disappointed and frustrated working class, especially its younger members. 
During this period, the CPC successfully implemented the total nationalisation of 
industry and suppression of capitalist enterprise. By the end of the decade, labour-
capital relations no longer existed in the traditional capitalist sense and industrial 
relations were subject to administrative governance under conditions Chang Kai has 
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characterised as working people having „the absolute right to work‟ (Chang Kai, 2004: 
5), as opposed to the negotiation or bargaining between labour and capital over the 
allocation of resources that generally distinguishes a market economy. However, the 
„extermination‟ of private capital (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 15) did not preclude conflict on 
the shop floor, as I show in a brief examination of labour unrest in the command 
economy in this section.   
In section two I make use of primary and secondary sources to track state sector 
labour unrest in the reform era. The Fifteenth Party Congress in the autumn of 1997 
was a watershed moment in this narrative of defeat. Up until 1997, the state proceeded 
cautiously with the implementation of SOE reform and the emergence of autonomous 
workers‟ organisations during the 1989 protests suggests that it was right to do so. 
Indeed, following an historical pattern, as we shall see, the suppression of the protests 
was followed by politically-inspired concessions to the traditional working class that 
were brought to an end by Deng‟s Southern Tour in Spring 1992, an event that put the 
reformers back in the ascendancy and set the Party on the road to the Fifteenth 
Congress and its historic decision to continue, full steam ahead, with SOE restructuring. 
This unleashed a wave of resistance, the nature of which is discussed in full via a 
literature review and a close examination of its peak in the North-East in 2002.  My 
primary sources include interviews with workers and trade union officers conducted 
during the peak period of protest from 1997 to 2002, a wide variety of secondary 
sources, including local and national media, workers‟ pamphlets and interviews with 
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workers‟ leaders conducted by a journalist colleague for a video project on which I 
collaborated.
19
   
Labour Unrest in the New People’s Republic 
Between the years 1949-1997, China experienced a see-saw of economic paradigms 
that reflected its post-liberation political history. As a purely chronological approach to 
labour unrest would risk either oversimplification or involve too much detail for our 
purposes, I will instead concentrate on four distinct periods: Post-liberation „New 
Democracy‟, in which a spirit of reconstruction and compromise in the urban areas 
existed alongside the reform of property relations in the countryside; the First Five-
Year Plan and nationalisation of almost all urban industry; the Cultural Revolution and 
the ascendancy of what might be called Maoist economic fundamentalism; and finally 
the reform era, up until the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997. I use the evolving role of 
the ACFTU as an anchor during this stormy voyage.   
As we saw in Chapter One, writers such as Walder (1986) and You Ji (1998) 
focused on the capacity of the Party/state to control workers and close down the space 
to organise collectively. Others have stressed the existence of a voluntarist „social 
contract‟ between Party and class (Tang and Parish, 2000). More recent studies, such 
as Sheehan‟s new history of Chinese workers (1998) and, to a lesser extent, Chan‟s 
translations of media reports on the struggles of mainly Chinese migrant workers under 
„assault‟ from the forces of globalisation (Chan, A. 2001), have shed light on the 
considerable influence that the working class has been able to exercise over post-
                                                 
19
 The final product from this project was a film entitled „China: The View from Below‟ that 
documented the resistance of state enterprise workers to a foreign buy-out of their paper mill in a mid-
China city. The struggle was marked by corruption, state- and employer-directed violence, arrests and 
prison sentences.  
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liberation industrial relations throughout the various economic paradigm shifts. 
Sheehan‟s work demonstrated that the stereotype of a liberated working class being 
alternately pampered or frightened into passivity by Party largesse or authoritarianism 
is an undeserved caricature of a so-called labour aristocracy. Chan‟s newspaper 
translations allow English-language readers to explore – and hopefully reject – the 
stereotype of rural-to-urban migrant workers as low quality (suzhi di) „little people‟ 
from the sticks, incapable of standing up for themselves.
20
 
The Early Days: Liberation and New Democracy: „benefiting both labour and capital‟  
Following its victory over the Guomindang, the CPC found itself in the position of 
reconstructing a war-damaged economy while simultaneously reinventing China as a 
workers‟ republic – or at least as being on the road to one. The pre-liberation 
experiences of governance garnered from the Party‟s administration of „liberated areas‟ 
in the North had been skewed towards rural policy, developed, moreover, during 
wartime (Seldon, 1995: 169-213). Now in power in peacetime, the CPC had to govern 
large cities in the name of a working class with militant traditions – both real and 
imagined. This presented an entirely new set of challenges and objectives.  
In urban areas the Party embarked on a policy of compromise and reassurance 
towards capital. The „Common Programme‟ was adopted by the Chinese People‟s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at its first session in September 1949. 
Described by Liu Shaoqi as a „people‟s programme of revolutionary national 
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 Nevertheless, that stereotype has persisted in some circles and was employed by the AFL-CIO when it 
joined forces with US manufacturers to lobby the US government to investigate labour abuses in China 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act (1974). The goal was to persuade President Bush to, as AFL-CIO 
president Sweeney put it, „make a choice‟ and apply trade sanctions to China. The accompanying and 
quickly shelved report pandered unashamedly to the historical stereotype of Chinese workers 
undercutting wages and conditions in the US. 
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construction‟ (yi bu renmin geming jianguo gangling) (Bo Yibo, 1991: 28) the 
document was distinguished by the complete absence of the term „socialism‟ and 
instead concentrated on re-establishing industrial production under the „people‟s 
democratic dictatorship‟. In June 1949 Mao explained who was in and who was out. 
Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, 
the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These 
classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their 
own state and elect their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over 
the running dogs of imperialism -- the landlord class and bureaucrat-
bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of those classes, the Kuomintang 
reactionaries and their accomplices -- suppress them, allow them only to behave 
themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. (Mao Zedong, 1949) 
Promoting a spirit of cross-class alliance building, the Common Programme stated that 
the new government promote national-building and prosperity by  
taking into account both public and private interests, of benefiting both labour 
and capital, of mutual aid between the city and the countryside, and circulation 
of goods between and China. (CPPCC, 1949: 43) 
As we saw in Chapter One, in terms of industrial relations the policy that emerged 
from the programme became known as lao-zi liang li i.e. „benefiting both labour and 
capital‟. Xu dates this policy from 1949 until 1957, by which time the party had 
completed the „socialist transformation of the means of production‟ (Bo Yibo, 1991: 2), 
and maps three distinct phases: an initial period in which capital occupied a dominant 
position; a second period with labour in the ascendancy; and a third period in which 
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capital, as an expression of concrete class interests and power, was entirely eliminated 
(Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 15).  
Capital Rising – and Falling 
It is difficult to overestimate the seriousness of the economic situation of the early 
years. The weakening of central authority by war and warlordism had resulted in the 
wholesale neglect of vital elements of China‟s economy. Industry was paralysed by 
hyper-inflation and there was widespread chaos in the markets and trading (Harris, 
1978: 37; Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 16). On the other hand, a sense of optimism came from 
unexpected quarters. The Far Eastern Economic Review concluded in early January 
1950 that „private trade is doing well and profits are high‟ (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 12 January 1950 cited by Harris, 1978: 42). Such sanguinity was more likely 
an expression of editorial relief at the conciliatory noises towards industrialists coming 
from the CPC leadership rather than a measured economic assessment. It was also a 
little quick off the mark. Between January and April 1950, 2,945 factories across 
fourteen major cities closed down; 1,567 shut in Shanghai in the month of April 1950 
alone, and a further 2,948 in May. Between March and April of the same year, national 
unemployment increased by „hundreds of thousands‟ and production in key sectors 
dropped dramatically in the first five months of 1950: cotton by thirty-eight  per cent, 
silks and satins by forty-seven per cent, tobacco by fifty-nine per cent and paper by 
thirty-one per cent (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 16-17). Then, as now, creating jobs was a key 
issue for the Party and this meant „[W]e should introduce suitable readjustments in 
industry and commerce and in taxation to improve our relations with the national 
bourgeoisie rather than aggravate these relations‟ (Mao Zedong, 1950). The strategy of 
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allowing capital to gain the ascendancy on the industrial front was cranked up a gear. 
Thus, as the economy recovered  
[T]he number of businessmen in eight major cities increased by twenty-seven 
per cent by the end of 1951, and the average rate of profit was a remarkable 
twenty-nine per cent in 1951 and thirty one per cent in 1953. (Statistical Work 
Bulletin, 1956 cited by Gluckstein, 1957: 198) 
Capital‟s ascendancy did not go uncontested. Many workers found that the 
benefits of national liberation did not match their expectations for the new order. 
Throughout the period 1949-1957 it appeared to some workers – particularly young 
workers and apprentices – that the benefits of liberation seemed to diminish in inverse 
proportion to the degree that the increasingly state-controlled media talked up the role 
of the working class in bringing the CPC to power and keeping it there.  
Indeed, the role of the working class in China‟s revolutionary history remains a 
moot point. It has been argued that its distance from the revolutionary frontline, dating 
from the CPC‟s urban defeats by the Guomindang in 1927, was a key factor in the 
Party‟s labour policies once in power. Gluckstein, for example, argued that the „urban 
working class did not play any role in Mao‟s rise to power‟ and this contributed to the 
prohibition of the right to strike and „compulsory arbitration‟ introduced in the 1950 
Regulations Governing the Procedures for the Settlement of Labour Disputes 
(Gluckstein,  1957: 214). Four years later, as the Party entered the second stage of 
„benefiting both labour and capital‟ and embarked on a programme of nationalisation, 
it hardly endeared itself to workers with new laws on labour discipline. According to 
Harris the „Outline Regulations for State-Owned Enterprises‟ (1954) were little more 
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than a „foreman‟s charter‟ (Harris, 1978: 91) that concentrated on discipline and the 
determination of wages and conditions at the expense of worker participation in 
management.
21
 On the other hand, Perry has contended that the skilled urban working 
class background of individual CPC labour leaders such as Li Lisan was an important 
factor in their securing the lifetime employment policy for urban workers via danwei 
membership (Perry, 1997: 13). Nearer to the argument proposed in this thesis is the 
aforementioned view that it was – and remains – working class militancy, actual and 
the threat thereof, that has been a consistent and dominant influence on the labour 
policies of the CPC in general and the ACFTU in particular.    
Less problematic than determining the extent of the working class‟s 
participation in the revolutionary victory is the fact that workers were certainly quick to 
express their disappointment and opposition to the early compromises deemed 
necessary during the first stage of the aforementioned lao-zi liang li policy. The Party, 
principally acting through the unions, expended considerable efforts to restrain the 
daily fact of class struggle in urban areas by simultaneously trying to persuade workers 
to temper their demands and expanding employment. Thus the ACFTU was instructed 
to draft and ratify two temporary methods (banfa) – on collective contracts and labour 
relations – and a set of rules (guiding) on dispute resolution (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 18). 
In the private sector, the institutional manifestation of this regulatory regime was the 
Labour-Capital Consultative Conference (LCCC). LCCCs were established in factories 
and shops of more than fifty workers and were also permitted at industrial (chanye) and 
sectoral (hangye) level (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 19). They operated under 
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 Harris refers to these regulations as the Model Outline of Intra-Enterprise Discipline Rules (Harris, 
1978: 91).   
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guidelines/instructions (zhishi) issued by the Ministry of Labour in April 1950.
22
 The 
chairing of these meetings rotated between the labour side – usually the trade union – 
and owner of the enterprise, with both sides having power of veto. The result, 
according to the ACFTU Chairman of the time, Li Lisan, was a „genuinely equal, 
voluntary problem-solving‟ process of consultation over working conditions that 
included collective contracts, production bonuses and fines, factory rules, wages, 
working time, occupational safety, injury and disease, welfare and special conditions 
for women workers (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 20). We should note, however, that Li‟s 
qualifications to judge whether or not the LCCC was an institutional expression of 
industrial equality were somewhat marred by his simultaneous position as Minister of 
Labour. At least they were until he was sacked from his chairmanship of the ACFTU 
following accusations of economism in 1951. In fact it is difficult to ascertain how 
effective this institution was in advancing workers‟ rights, facilitating worker 
participation in management or indeed reassuring capitalists that their property and 
assets would remain safe for the foreseeable future. Harper holds that, at the end of the 
day, the LCCC was a „potent instrument for use by the Party or union against the 
capitalists‟ (Harper, 1971: 119 cited in Sheehan, 1998: 19) which may well have been 
the case by the mid-fifties as the institution approached the end of its shelf life.  
In keeping with Mao‟s relaxed attitude towards capitalists, Liu Shaoqi and, to a 
lesser extent, Li Lisan, made repeated calls to workers in the private sector to moderate 
their demands. First, workers needed to be educated that there were limits to the 
exercise of their new power and status. Somewhat disingenuously Li announced that, 
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 „Zai gedi siying qiye zhong sheli lao-zi xieshang huiyi de zhishi‟ (Guidelines for the establishment of 
labour-capital consultative conferences in private enterprises in all areas) cited in Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 
19-20. 
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unlike the land reform process, factories could not and should not be divided up for 
workers to manage themselves – this would only lead to unemployment (Xu Xiaohong, 
2003: 21; Sheehan, 1998: 16-17). In his famous Tianjin Speech in the late spring of 
1949, Liu had argued for cautious post-liberation industrial policies.  
Some people argue „if the capitalists don‟t open [or re-open] their factories then 
we [the workers] can open the factories ourselves.‟ Have there been 
cooperatively-managed factories opened up? Yes, many times, but not one has 
been successful. This is the reality and we have made this kind of mistake [too] 
many times in the past. Workers‟ cooperatives have not been well managed so 
we won‟t allow them. (Liu Shaoqi, 1988: 352-353)  
In the same speech Liu argued that the problem in China was not that there were too 
many capitalists but rather that there were too few and that to harm capitalists would, 
in effect, harm the workers themselves by causing more unemployment and slowing 
down the development of the economy (Liu Shaoqi, 1988: 350-351). It was perhaps no 
accident that Liu made these appeals in Tianjin which was liberated on 15 January 
1949. Despite his words of caution, Tianjin‟s workers heralded liberation with  
street-level committees [that] had been set up by rank-and-file cadres in the 
aftermath of liberation with district-level governments based on them; in June 
1949 the street-level committees were abolished and the district governments 
reduced to district offices of the municipal government set up by the Military 
Control Committee. (Maitan, 1976: 21) 
As was the case in other cities, workers and grassroots cadres often reacted to the new 
order with an enthusiasm that had the potential to manifest itself in new and militant 
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institutions of power – as was the case in Tianjin – that were not always overly 
concerned with the intricacies of the national Party line at the time. Although the Party 
acted quickly to demonstrate its political supremacy over capital, it was clear that some 
union activists and cadres in the liberated areas were nevertheless taking the side of 
militant workers anyway. So much so that in January 1949 Mao issued a directive 
aimed at newly liberated cites that pointed out the danger of emulating „agricultural 
socialism‟ in the cities, which led to the „mistake of too strongly advocating the one-
sided, temporary interests of the workers‟ (Mao Zedong, 1949 cited by Maitan, 1976: 
21).  
Turning towards the unions, Harris has argued that in the new People‟s 
Republic, unlike the Soviet Union, „there was no debate on the role of the trade unions‟ 
in the first years of CPC government (Harris, 1978: 104). The labour unrest that 
distinguished the first two post-liberation years and the debates it prompted 
demonstrates that this was an oversimplification. In fact, differences of opinion over 
the role of trade unions emerged at both ends of the labour movement. At the top, 
ACFTU chair Li Lisan argued strongly that the policy of mutual benefit was not the 
same as mutual „cooperation‟ between labour and capital and outlined three main 
differences. First, mutual cooperation was essentially a social democratic slogan that 
ignored the primacy of class struggle in the name of class cooperation. Second, labour-
capital cooperation did not permit strikes while the policy of mutual benefit implicitly 
recognised that strikes were a way of preventing the long-term consolidation of pro-
capital forces. Third, mutual benefit to both sides placed economic development over 
all other concerns, as opposed to labour-capital cooperation which, according to Li 
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Lisan, aimed to ensure the future of the capitalist system by „muddling the class 
consciousness of workers‟ (Li Lisan cited in Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 17-18). Given his 
lack of confidence in workers‟ capacity to run factories, it is hardly surprising that Liu 
Shaoqi took a rather more nuanced view on the question of strikes and whether or not 
trade unions should organise them as a way to bring capitalists into line. In his „Report 
on the Trade Union Question‟ he stated that strikes harmed capitalists and workers 
alike and, although they were not banned, the Party would not organise strikes and 
would go out of its way to ensure that they didn‟t happen.    
In cases where capitalists have mistreated workers there is a need to conduct 
appropriate [levels of] struggle and this struggle may take various forms. But 
we do not advocate strikes. All problems that arise can be solved without 
recourse to strike action. (Liu Shaoqi, 1988: 398-399)  
Such differences translated into frequent shifts of position among „the newly-
established official unions‟ from enthusiastic support for workers‟ demands to 
wholehearted backing of the Party against union autonomy or for the dismissal of 
workers‟ demands by enterprise management (Sheehan, 1998: 23). At the other end of 
the labour movement, workers in both the state and private sectors were resorting to 
strike action anyway as they „lost any chance of exerting influence through the formal 
channels of democratic management‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 23) such as the LCCC and its 
more robust equivalent in the state sector, the WRC.  
The Party‟s response to the rise in labour unrest was to purge the leadership of 
the ACFTU in order to stamp out the development of syndicalist tendencies and launch 
a series of campaigns – the Democratic Reform Movement, The Three-Anti and the 
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Five-Anti movements – that aimed to put capital on the back foot, institutionalise 
worker participation in management and, in effect, prepare industry for full 
nationalisation and the attendant industrial peace this would – hopefully – bring. These 
campaigns gave formal impetus to the labour movement even as they brought it firmly 
under state control via the ACFTU. At the Seventh ACFTU Congress in 1953 union 
cadres at primary level were heavily criticised for economism, while some workers 
pointed to this Congress as the point where the ACFTU „lost their guts‟ as it formally 
bowed to Party leadership (Workers‟ Daily, 21 May 1957, cited in Sheehan, 1998: 13).  
Workers Rising – and Falling 
The debate over the role of trade unions and their subsequent total incorporation into 
the state machinery cleared the path for the ACFTU to become an enthusiastic 
supporter and enterprise-level implementation agency for China‟s First Five-Year Plan. 
Launched in 1953, the Plan heralded a renewed emphasis on production and the further 
concentration of political power in the hands of the Party.  
At the time, there was an underlying feeling of disappointment as the „greatly 
stimulated class consciousness of the workers was prevented from developing into 
directly political forms but was channelled into the expansion of the trade unions‟ 
(Maitan, 1976: 21). Indeed, disappointment with the lack of political gains from the 
nationalisation of hitherto private enterprise – the „socialist transformation of the 
[private] means of production‟ no less – contributed to the strike wave of late 1956-
early 1957.  On the other hand, the working class had made collective social and 
economic gains under the first four years of CPC rule and this progress continued 
under the new plan. By 1957 there were almost nine million more workers than in 1952, 
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unemployment had decreased and „wages were about 30 per cent higher‟ (Maitan, 1976: 
25). Yet, as the plan reached its largely successful conclusion, strikes broke out in late 
1956 and rolled on through to spring of the following year as workers participated in 
the Hundred Flowers Movement, formally launched in May 1956 (Sheehan, 1998: 47). 
The campaign was initially sluggish, with few responding to the Party‟s invitation to 
free speech. But by May the following year even the People‟s Daily was publishing 
articles calling for the „right of the people to freely express differences in opinions‟ 
(Maitan, 1976: 39).  
The eradication of capitalist class interests was a process that began with the 
Three- and Five-Anti movements and ended with full-scale nationalisation during the 
first Plan. By 1957 it was deemed complete (Xu Xiaohong, 2003: 30-33). Yet labour 
unrest continued to influence state policy. The flush of success derived from 
nationalisation was qualified by the news of a major uprising in Hungary and huge 
strikes in the Polish city of Poznan. These factors combined to alarm the authorities 
into permitting a more open atmosphere in China during 1956-57. In his famous speech 
of February 1957, „On the correct handling of contradictions among the people‟ Mao 
argued that the period of „the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses 
characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end‟ (Mao Zedong, 
1957) and social relations and the contradictions that they threw up were henceforth of 
a non-antagonistic nature. Mao‟s speech also acknowledged the „possibility of mass 
unrest provoked by bureaucratism‟ (Maitan, 1976: 39), even as striking workers in 
Shanghai were employing the slogan „Let‟s create another Hungarian Incident‟ (Perry, 
1994: 11).    
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In fact, while intellectuals and social democrats initially displayed a reluctance 
to take up the Party‟s invitation to free debate and criticism in the early stages of the 
Hundred Flowers, workers showed much less reticence in airing their views. Indeed 
Gipouloux argues that Mao‟s „On Contradictions‟ speech was in part a response to 
worker unrest (Gipouloux, 1986:) although others point to a rapidly deteriorating 
relationship between rural cadres and peasants following collectivization and 
„movements away from the cooperatives‟ that had begun in 1955 (Maitan, 1978: 30), 
and continued throughout 1956 (Li et al, 2005: 2). While there are no publicly 
available completed statistics on strikes in this period, incomplete figures compiled by 
the ACFTU at the time give us a snapshot of the militancy unfurling. 
In the cities incidents of strikes and petitions occurred continuously. According 
to incomplete statistics from the ACFTU, in 1956 there were twenty-nine 
strikes and fifty-seven petitions amounting to eighty-six incidents in total. 
There were six in the first quarter, nineteen in the second, twenty in the third 
and forty-one in the fourth quarter … that involved between tens, hundreds and 
even thousands of people. Between October 1956 and June 1957 in the city of 
Tianjin there were 110 incidents of workers‟ disturbances that directly or 
indirectly involved 3,683 people. In Guangdong province there were 136 strikes 
during 1956. Incomplete statistics for the period from September 1956 until 
March 1957 record more than 10,000 workers taking strike action. (Li et al, 
2005: 3)   
While these figures represent only a small minority of workers in a rapidly expanding 
working class, the numbers are almost certainly conservative and represent no more 
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than what an only recently chastened and purged ACFTU was prepared to admit to 
Party leaders. At the same time, the Party itself appeared to be upping the stakes. On 7 
April 1957, the People‟s Daily denounced bureaucratism and blamed the strikes on 
„bureaucratic methods‟ (Maitan, 1976:39). This was followed by a „sensational 
interview‟ given by the literary intellectual and senior Party member Chou Yang in 
which  
he recognised the legitimacy of strikes and protest demonstrations and, declared 
that it was wrong forcibly to suppress such dissent and called for a 
redistribution of the national income so as to avoid marked inequalities. 
(Maitan, 1976: 39) 
Given the national and international situation, the strike wave was politically 
significant and to a large extent represented disappointment at the results of 
nationalisation, the new national wage structure (see Chapter One), the authoritarian 
methods of many enterprise cadres and exhaustion resulting from the Plan‟s emphasis 
on developing heavy industry and ensuring continued rapid accumulation (Harris, 1978: 
91-108; Sheehan, 1998: 54-63; Li et al, 2005: 3-4). Quoting Gipouloux (1986: 186) 
Sheehan found that the situation in 1957 reflected conditions in the previous year. 
Looking at disputes in 1957, we find that „[w]ages, authoritarian assignments, 
working and living conditions were at the centre of all demands‟ with 
inequality between workers‟ and cadres‟ households a particular cause of 
friction and the picture is similar in 1956. (Sheehan, 1998: 55) 
During the spring of 1957, as much as half of the workforce on the Guangzhou docks 
came out in an undeclared strike against a new shift system that reduced net monthly pay. 
More worrying still for the Party was that these complaints were beginning to take on a 
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political character that ran the risk of going beyond the non-antagonistic contradictions 
formulated by Mao in February 1957. For example, in the capital itself 
An embryonic form of workers‟ management grew up at the Peking Tram 
Company, where a workers‟ conference won the right to control management, 
set up plans for production and finance, elect the directors and his associates 
and decide on wage problems, social welfare etc. (Maitan, 1976: 39) 
As the Hundred Flowers reached its zenith and working class militancy continued to 
grow, autonomous unions began to make an appearance, mostly restricted to a single 
enterprise, although there was „some liaison and coordination between enterprises and 
districts‟ (Perry, 1994: 11 cited in Sheehan, 1998: 69). These were quickly suppressed 
in the Anti-Rightist movement that followed the Hundred Flowers Movement. Setting 
a precedent for future working class activists, the workers who were sent to labour 
camps during the Anti-Rightist clamp down were labelled „bad elements‟ rather than 
„rightists‟, a political tag reserved for intellectuals.            
  The ACFTU  had responded to the unrest with a cautious attempt to carve out a 
more autonomous role resulting in a second purge of the leadership. In an attempt to 
prevent the unrest building up yet more steam, the Party employed a strategy that was 
to be replicated during the early years of the reform period: Staff and Workers‟ 
Representative Congresses (SWRC).
23
 They were introduced in 1957 following six 
months of debate over their democratic character (Sheehan, 1998: 74-75). Citing 
Gipoloux (1986) and Perry (1994), Sheehan also states that there was an international 
dimension to the Party‟s measures following the events in Hungary earlier in the same 
                                                 
23
 Some scholars such as Sheehan use the term Workers‟ Representative Congress. The Chinese is the 
same: zhigong daibiao dahui.  
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year (Sheehan, 1998: 48). However, workers largely ignored the congresses as 
relations between workers and cadres continued to deteriorate (Sheehan, 1998: 75).  
The Cultural Revolution 
The first decade of CPC rule ended with a thoroughly domesticated trade union 
movement and a physically exhausted working class. The Great Leap Forward of 1958-
‟59 saw the CPC exhorting workers to „catch up with England‟ within fifteen years, 
largely on the basis of willpower and mostly disastrous technical „innovations‟ on the 
shop floor. Exhaustion turned to hunger in the cities and mass starvation in some rural 
areas as the most serious famine in human history descended on the countryside 
(Becker, 1996). The mistakes of the Great Leap and the tragedy of Three Years of 
Bitterness were traumatic enough to facilitate a swing in the balance of power away 
from Mao towards Party „technocrats‟ led by Liu Shaoqi (Karnow, 1984: 132-134). 
This in turn opened up the space for Deng and Liu to prosecute policies that allowed 
limited free enterprise in the countryside and a relaxation in the relentless pace of 
production in industry.  
 By 1963 a recovery of sorts hoved into view and Mao deemed the economy 
sufficiently buoyant to risk attempting a return to total power. In 1963, the Maoists 
launched the Socialist Education Campaign of 1963-1964. After this somewhat half-
hearted attempt to radicalise literary and artistic work petered out, Mao garnered his 
forces and, in September 1965, embarked on his plan to „storm the citadel‟ by 
launching the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, nothing less than an extraordinary 
and prolonged attack on the Party bureaucracy itself. As an arm of that bureaucracy, 
the following ten years were to prove a disaster for the ACFTU. Radical Red Guard 
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organisations targeted the unions as evidence of the continuing existence of capitalist 
relations of production. In late 1966, Jiang Qing – Mao‟s wife – supported the 
formation of a new trade union, the All China Red Workers General Rebellion Corps 
that „had taken over the Ministry of Labor and planned to dissolve the National 
Federation of Trade Unions‟ [ACFTU] (Karnow, 1984: 264). 
Trade union cadres were subjected to struggle campaigns conducted by 
contracted migrant workers and apprentices (Karnow, 1984: 264) angry at their 
exclusion from the full benefits of the danwei system described in Chapter One. As 
more and more workers took part in the Cultural Revolution, strikes spread through 
major cities and brought much of industry to a standstill. The strikes were inspired and 
partly led by the aforementioned young migrant workers from the countryside who 
employed Maoist rhetoric to „camouflage a basically economic labour revolt‟ that 
demanded improved wages, housing and medical care (Karnow, 1984: 265). Despite 
the material basis for the strikes, they were quickly politicised in the increasingly 
chaotic atmosphere. To a certain extent this was inevitable because wages, the intensity 
of labour and working conditions in general were all determined exclusively by the 
state. For their part, management was only too happy to oblige strikers‟ demands in 
order to deflect criticism, personal attacks or worse. The strikes spread from the ports 
to the railways and the mines, dramatically heightening the political tension as armed 
struggles broke out between „conservative‟ and „radical‟ Red Guard factions that both 
claimed to represent the proletariat.   
Mao‟s initial support for the working class‟s participation in the Cultural 
Revolution suggests that he had miscalculated. Radical leaders, including Mao, quickly 
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began to backtrack as panicky decrees from Beijing ordered workers to stay at their 
posts. Clearly, it was one thing for students to attack teachers and Party cadres, or for 
the trade unions, always a potential rival bureaucracy to the Party, to be brandished as 
relics of capitalism. But it was another matter entirely when a mobilised working class 
armed with at least the rudiments of Marxist analysis took advantage of a violent 
faction fight within the Party to push for higher wages and better working conditions. 
Within weeks of issuing instructions to Red Guards to „storm the positions‟ of Party 
power, Mao resorted to what ruling classes generally do when faced with social 
movements they deem out of their control: he called in the army and five days later, on 
28 January 1967, decreed that the „cultural revolution should be postponed for the time 
being‟ (Karnow, 1984: 283). This by no means brought an immediate end to the 
struggles and indeed during the following eighteen months China appeared on the edge 
of civil war on at least two occasions. However, Mao‟s confidence in the PLA to 
restore production and some sense of routine proved well-placed, although a number of 
senior PLA leaders were sacrificed on the radicals‟ altars in the process. Order was 
restored, as we saw in Chapter One, with the establishment of Revolutionary 
Committees. Formally, the committees represented a triple alliance between recalled 
Party officials – of whom many had previously been targets of radical factions and 
were taking great risks in resuming political responsibilities – Red Guard organisations 
– but only those approved by the army – and the PLA itself.  But it was the army that 
had the guns – or at least most of them – and as Zhou Enlai admitted in February 1967 
„the country was under military control‟ (Karnow, 1984: 297).  
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 The first three years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) left the unintended 
legacy of significant numbers of workers and young people with direct experience of 
organising as a result of their membership of Red Guard organisations. From mid-1966 
onwards, local governments‟ solution to this dilemma had been to send millions of 
university and high school youth down to the countryside to „learn from the peasants‟. 
This movement picked up pace once the call for order was established and its goal 
shifted away from encouraging political exchanges between urban youth and peasants 
to the more practical one of preventing organised groups of young people from stirring 
up trouble in urban areas and alleviating the growing problem of unemployment in the 
process. Perhaps somewhat ironically, some youngsters joined the army as a preferred 
option to „learning from the peasants‟.  
However, this was hardly a measure that could be applied across the working 
class – particularly skilled workers and technocrats – who were needed at the 
workbench and office.  From 1970 to 1976, a hectoring, Gang-of-Four driven emphasis 
on production and labour discipline, combined with the absence of significant wage 
rises, meant that the limited gains from the 1967 strikes were cancelled out. The 
resulting tensions were captured by the big-character poster written by four former Red 
Guard activists under the pseudonym of Li Yizhe that went up around Guangzhou 
during the autumn of 1974. The poster, entitled „On socialist democracy and the legal 
system‟ pointed out that, despite the speechifying and violence of the Cultural 
Revolution, China remained a country of great inequality. The poster pointed to the 
lack of material incentives for workers, the pay freeze and the special privileges 
enjoyed by Party cadres as well as referring to the lack of democracy and legality in 
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China (Chan, A. et al, 1985).  
As the Gang of Four lumbered from one political campaign to another it faced 
increasing labour unrest. In Hangzhou in 1975, over 30,000 PLA troops were deployed 
to bring an end to a „summer of unrest‟ (Sheehan, 1998: 146). This was immediately 
followed by dissident activity in Nanjing that spread throughout China and culminated 
in the „Tiananmen Incident of April Fifth‟, 1976. During the Chinese Qing Ming 
Festival – traditionally a day to remember the dead – up to half a million ordinary 
citizens travelled to Tiananmen Square to lay wreaths and poems in honour of Zhou 
Enlai whom many revered for saving China from descending into civil war during the 
Cultural Revolution. Correctly interpreting this outpouring of collective grief as direct 
criticism, the government removed the wreaths from the Square overnight, which led to 
violent and widespread unrest the day after, 5 April: the April Fifth Movement was 
born. It constituted a short „spontaneous, bottom-up‟ expression of ongoing disdain 
against leftist dogma (Sheehan, 1998: 148). The government‟s crackdown was 
correspondingly brutal as workers voiced dissenting opinions on the widespread 
existence of favouritism, cadres‟ hypocrisy and inequality. Although the dissent was 
quelled relatively quickly, the end of ten years of „fundamentalist Maoism‟ was now in 
sight. Within four weeks of Mao‟s death on 9 September 1976, the Gang of Four was 
under arrest. The „ten years of chaos‟ was over.    
Deng Xiaoping‟s long road back from manual work in the mid-sixties to 
„paramount‟ leader in 1978 was closely followed by an outbreak of open debate in 
Beijing that was emulated in other cities. The Democracy Wall Movement developed 
around a wall near the centre of Beijing on which a myriad of „big-character posters‟ 
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were pasted. Their content discussed not only the Chinese political system, but also 
systems and events taking part in other parts of the world as well – especially Poland 
and the rise of the Solidarność trade union. In many ways, the movement took up 
where the April Fifth Movement had been suppressed and indeed it was the reversal of 
the government‟s official verdict on the latter that sparked the flowering of posters, 
speeches and magazines that constituted such an important part of the Democracy Wall. 
While the movement did not constitute a mass, spontaneous working class movement 
in the vein of April Fifth (Sheehan, 1998: 157), it certainly provided workers with an 
opportunity to express their disappointments and grievances with the danwei system: 
wages falling behind inflation, the existence of a bureaucratic elite, and absence of 
effective democratic accountability. The journal Sailing Ship, based around the 
Taiyuan Iron and Steel works, was unequivocal about the need for better worker 
representation arguing that workers 
must begin to organise themselves, to rely on their own strength, and to elect 
their own representatives to speak for them, and if at any time their elected 
representatives do not represent them properly, they will be recalled and 
another election held. This sort of demand on the part of the broad popular 
masses is the social basis for China‟s democratic reform. (Sheehan, 1998: 187)  
The Democracy Wall Movement went beyond the parameters set for it by Deng 
Xiaoping and the party reformers, with whom it had a temporary collaboration. As we 
saw in Chapter One, the CPC tried to address the workers‟ grievances by stressing the 
democratic role of workers‟ congresses in the factories and playing up the role of a 
recently restored ACFTU.  The latter certainly helped to restore the careers and status 
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of union cadres but, as we shall see, it was not to save the working class from 
capitalism. 
The Early Reform Era: 1978-1997   
The role of workers during the Cultural Revolution only served to reinforce the 
experience of the fifties when two major strike waves had demonstrated the economic 
and political muscle of the working class and its capacity to influence state policies. As 
we saw in Chapter One, the government consequently proceeded with prudence in 
reforming China‟s industrial relations topography as it entered a period of sustained 
economic reform. Nevertheless, following pilots, industrial managers were given 
power over hire and fire in 1986 and the spectre of dismissal and joblessness returned 
as a topic of conversation in working class homes.  
During the 1980s there were scattered incidents of SOE worker unrest. 
Generally speaking, however, the reluctance of SOE directors to make use of their 
new-found autonomy in order to „avoid unrest‟ (Liu Aiyu, 2005: 86) combined with 
the Party‟s reluctance to commit to a dramatic rise in urban unemployment. 
Consequently, the destruction of the „iron rice bowl‟ was not a one-off event but a 
simmering combination of regulatory change, foreign capital, competition from TVEs 
and the removal of ideological constraints on the accumulation of wealth as urbanites 
were encouraged to leave their state jobs and „jump into the sea‟ (xiahai) of 
entrepreneurial activity. In short, the iron rice bowl‟s disappearance was a direct result 
of the return of capitalist labour relations rather than a deliberate state policy. 
 Alongside this transformation, economic tensions were building as the removal 
of price controls on the long-subsidized basics of urban living led to a rise in the cost of 
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living. While workers had seen a considerable increase in their wages, this was partly 
cancelled out by inflation. Frustration, both with reform and with the consequences of 
reform, resulted in student demonstrations, principally in Shanghai, during the mid-
eighties.  In retrospect, although these demonstrations were significant, they were a dry 
run for the unprecedented wave of popular revolt that engulfed the cities in the spring 
of 1989. In April of that year, students began to gather in Beijing‟s Tiananmen Square 
to discuss politics and organise demonstrations to demand an end to corruption and the 
introduction of open government. The protesting students emerged on the streets from 
democracy salons held on the university campuses that dated back to the previous 
demonstrations of 1986-‟87. As the crowds gathered on the Square increased in size, 
the students organised themselves into autonomous societies and associations, 
independent of the official student union.  
The activity in the Square began to attract the attention of Beijing citizens, 
including one of the founder members of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation 
(BWAF) and a so-called „black hand‟ of Beijing, Han Dongfang (Black and Munro, 
1993). Soon enough, Han and other workers were making speeches calling for an end 
to corruption and solidarity with the students. By the end of April, the BWAF was 
organised. According to founder members, the original core group was made up of 
mainly blue-collar workers from steel factories, the railways and the aviation industry, 
as well as shop assistants and casual workers. However, as Han later explained, most of 
the almost 20,000 plus workers who signed up to the BWAF did so as „individual 
citizens‟ rather than workplace-based organisers.24 Still, the WAFs spread to other 
                                                 
24
 Unless otherwise stated, references to BWAF activities are based on my discussions with Han 
Dongfang during the late nineties. 
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cities and there is little doubt that a sense of panic was enveloping Party leaders some 
of whom, such as Zhao Ziyang, even appeared to jump ship and side with the students 
– though pointedly, not with the workers. 
The BWAF initially concentrated its activity on signing up members and 
distributing leaflets critical of the official ACFTU. The organisers also set up a 
loudspeaker system and began broadcasting their opinions and demands. Both the 
leaflets and broadcasts proved popular with Beijingers who had come to see what was 
going on. This popularity translated into huge demonstrations in support of the students 
and their demands for cleaner government and democratic accountability. But while 
they had a strong presence on demonstrations, the BWAF failed to make inroads where 
it really mattered: in Beijing‟s offices and factories. Internally, and always aware of the 
state‟s potential to move against them, the BWAF concentrated on short-term capacity-
building such as consolidation, publicity, recruitment and development of resources 
and leadership skills. It also began to draft a constitution and develop a programme of 
demands that echoed workers‟ propaganda in previous episodes of labour unrest. 
BWAF leaflets offered critical assessments of cadre privilege, income gaps between 
workers and managers, lack of workplace democracy, poor safety standards and the 
deterioration in living standards. Implicit in all this was a recognition that workers 
were losing out in the reforms. Above all there was the demand for legal status and the 
right to organise outside the ACFTU, not, they stressed, to replace the official union, 
but to allow workers a choice that would ultimately be of benefit to all concerned – 
including the ACFTU itself!  
 The BWAF looked outwards throughout its short existence. Relations with the 
137 
 
students were initially very weak and throughout May its tents were restricted by the 
students to a far corner of the Square, despite the efforts of some worker organisers to 
forge links. The BWAF also had contacts with sympathetic sections within the ACFTU. 
Importantly, the organisers made it clear that they meant to build the union through 
constitutional means and, as an organisation, neither opposed nor supported the rule of 
the CPC. However, as student numbers on the Square dwindled and the balance of 
forces began to shift back towards the authorities, the official position of the ACFTU 
towards the WAFs hardened and on 2 June 1989 the Workers‟ Daily called for the 
banning of the WAFs as illegal organisations. Two days later troops fought their way 
into the Square, destroying BWAF tents in the process. In the repression that followed, 
hundreds of workers suspected of taking part in WAF organisations were imprisoned 
and the WAFs themselves disappeared.  
Yet, in the aftermath, workers‟ activism continued to make its mark on policy. 
Some have argued that SOE workers succeeded in using ostensibly reinvigorated 
channels of democratic management and the temporary halt to SOE reform that 
followed the events of spring 1989. Hussain and Zhuang claimed to have found 
evidence of enterprise-level collective bargaining developing in the early nineties and 
the Party‟s subsequent move to control this development by channelling the demands 
into revised regulations on collective consultation (Hussain and Zhuang, 1998: 43-68). 
However, as I stated in Chapter One, while wages did rise in the state sector, this was 
more likely a result of managers wishing to avoid attracting attention to their 
enterprises rather than overt labour unrest, especially given the restrictive political 
climate of the time. Nevertheless, the WAFs had deeply alarmed the Party and 
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concessions were on the table for a short time.  
Deng‟s Southern Tour revived the economic reform process and calmed post-
Tiananmen anxieties about stability. Four years later, as negotiations to enter the WTO 
gathered pace, the Fifteenth Party Congress came to an historic decision on the fate of 
the country‟s SOEs that was to have an irreversible impact on the Chinese working 
class: „holding on to the large and letting go of the small‟ (fang xiao zhua da) i.e. 
allowing smaller SOEs to go bankrupt or privatise but keeping medium and large SOEs 
under state control. In the event, it was a green light for many SOEs to shed huge 
numbers of workers regardless of their size. Not surprisingly this decision, which was 
accompanied by further expansion of the private sector, heralded a new and dramatic 
wave of labour unrest that climaxed with troops deployed on the outskirts of the north-
eastern oil town of Daqing.  
Prior to a discussion of these dramatic events, it would be timely to remind 
ourselves that the reintroduction of private capital and FDI as engines for economic 
growth and employment creation were already heralding profound changes in the 
demography of China‟s working class. Although new private- and joint-invested 
factories were at first restricted to four SEZs, these zones were expanded to a further 
fourteen coastal cities in 1984. To begin with, relatively small numbers of peasants 
were permitted to apply for permission to leave the land temporarily and work in 
factories established in the various SEZs. Guangdong province was one of the main 
recipients of investment and its number one attraction for migrants and investors alike 
was a former fishing village that was being rapidly transformed into an export platform 
– Shenzhen. Zhejiang province in East China was no slower off the mark but differed 
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from Guangdong in that it initially drew on home-grown entrepreneurial traditions and 
domestic investment rather than FDI to open up thousands of small- and medium-size 
enterprises (Economist, 1995: 39-40). But no matter whether it was foreign or domestic 
capital that was attracting peasants into off-farm work, the net result was the same: the 
remaking, in struggle, of the Chinese working class. We will return to the struggles of 
private sector workers in Chapter Three.   
Defending Decent Work and the Demise of the State Sector 
Despite the demands raised by workers in the sixties, seventies and eighties, Chinese 
urban workers‟ employment conditions compared favourably with those of other 
developing countries (Weil, 1996: 33-34). The absence of freedom of association 
notwithstanding, the danwei system had awarded workers with most of the ILO‟s 
current benchmarks for „decent work‟. It is therefore worth briefly revisiting the 
danwei theme – discussed in detail in Chapter One – but, in this instance, from a 
different perspective: its impact on workers‟ capacity to organise and defend it.  
In recalling the danwei from a labour unrest perspective, it is possible to extract 
from the literature two basic interpretations that I have termed respectively „the danwei 
as given‟ and „the danwei as won‟. Weighing in for the former, Walder viewed the 
danwei as a structure of complex, hierarchical but interdependent relationships of 
interests through which the Party was able to maintain control over the working class. 
He termed the organised dependency of workers (You Ji, 1998: 13) and clientelist 
relationships between workers and danwei management that emerged from it 
„communist neo-traditionalism‟ (Walder, 1986). This arrangement enabled the Party to 
exercise a „peaceful coercion‟ over the working class (You Ji, 1998: 12). In fact, You Ji 
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stiffens Walder‟s communist neo-traditionalist argument by reaching back to China‟s 
paternalistic, centralised past, describing the danwei as a  
tightly integrated mechanism of party/state control. Resembling China‟s 
traditional authoritarian state/family power structure, the system requires a high 
concentration of financial and remunerative power in the hands of the leaders.  
(You Ji, 1998: 135) 
One might easily conclude – as many capitalists have – from these studies that the 
Chinese working class had been reduced, in its last days, to a fading aristocracy 
rendered politically apathetic by, and economically dependent on, Party largesse. But 
such a formulation hardly stands up to the periodic expressions of militancy 
summarised above, and not surprisingly, there are alternative political interpretations of 
the danwei system. Championing „the danwei as won‟ faction, Weil contends that the 
comparatively high standard of living enjoyed by urban workers in SOEs and, to a 
lesser extent COEs, was the fruit of socialist revolution through which workers won not 
just job security but access to health care, housing, pensions, education for their 
children and recreational opportunities (Weil, 1996: 35). Moreover workers, already 
under assault from globalisation (Chan, A., 2001), made a political decision to defend 
these fruits of the revolution when economic reform threatened them (Philion, 2007: 
37-55). For some this was a response that put Chinese workers, at the forefront of the 
international struggle against the neo-liberal offensive on the danwei and its traditional 
securities (labour research, interview, Beijing, 28 September 2004).  
In an attempt to ameliorate the shock of restructuring and, no doubt, the 
potential fallout from unrest, the Party rolled out the xiagang policy, discussed in 
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Chapter One, on a national basis. Its essence was to retain laid-off workers on SOE 
books for up to three years, a policy that obviously carried the capacity to temper and 
defuse workers‟ resistance to restructuring as disputes retained a distinctly enterprise-
based character. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, this dictated that most resistance 
took the form of demonstrations ranging from the violent –  on one occasion I saw an 
SOE manager „air-planed‟ through the streets by furious laid-off workers – to more 
sedentary sit-ins by pensioners in front of government buildings.
25
  But no matter how 
radical or passive the forms of collective action taken, they rarely impacted on 
production itself and as a consequence the juggernaut of accumulation continued to 
build up steam. And although private capital was not yet driving the vehicle, it 
certainly had its hands on the map.   
Reviewing Unrest 
The literature on labour unrest in the state sector during the nineties, and especially 
during the period following the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, demonstrates not 
only the cathartic nature of the transition but also the powerful legacy of the command 
economy. We should start by remembering a powerful constraint on interpreting this 
phase of labour history: the unavailability of comprehensive nationwide statistics on 
the number and form of workers‟ actions, especially with regard to strikes.26 Without 
exception, scholars refer to the relatively rapid post-Congress build up of resistance to 
restructuring and mass lay-offs and point to official incomplete statistics, newspaper 
reports, academic papers and their own fieldwork as evidence. The absence of 
                                                 
25
 On this occasion being „air-planed‟ involves having one‟s arms outstretched sideways, legs tied 
together and being carried aloft through the air like an aeroplane. After fifteen minutes the pain in the 
arms becomes excruciating.  
26
 Composite nationwide strike statistics are treated as jimi or classified information by the government.  
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complete data renders it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Yet, if nothing else, 
the paucity of reliable statistics adds value to the scholarly interpretations in the 
literature.  
 Writing in 2002, Blecher argued that resistance in the state sector, though 
widespread, had „not yet produced significant strike waves and protest movements‟ 
(Blecher, 2002: 286). Somewhat despairingly, he asked 
why then has a class that was so well treated, mighty, confident and active in 
the recent past essentially rolled over, or better, allowed itself to be rolled over, 
in the past two decades? (Blecher, 2002: 287) 
His fieldwork was concentrated in Tianjin and to be sure Blecher goes out of his way 
to remind readers that the city was not subject to the economic deprivation that 
emerged elsewhere as a consequence of SOE restructuring – although, as we have seen, 
it definitely has a tradition of labour militancy dating back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century that was examined in detail by Hershatter (1986). Blecher notes that 
the relative prosperity of the city partially explains his interviewees‟ apparent 
acceptance of the market and the absence of resistance to it.
27
 Blecher argues that this 
represents acceptance of the state‟s dominant ideology, i.e. the market, and found that 
„workers are more easily saturated with the state‟s discursive and symbolic messages 
than peasants‟ (Blecher, 2002: 301). He develops his argument by reminding us of 
Burawoy‟s and Luckac‟s work in Hungary where transition from command economy 
and its shortages to the promised riches of the market atomized workers and 
encouraged individual rather than collective solutions (Blecher, 2002: 301).  
                                                 
27
 As noted below, Daqing too remains a wealthy city but this did not prevent large numbers of workers 
protesting their redundancy deals. 
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On the other hand, Cai approaches the question from the opposite perspective. 
Instead of asking why workers have „rolled over‟, he asks how workers in an 
authoritarian regime have been able to mount any forms of collective resistance at all! 
Focusing exclusively on laid-off workers, Cai finds answers primarily in the Chinese 
tradition of petition and that „the most important mechanism of mobilization, is not the 
issue itself, but the presence of organisers, or rather coordinators‟ (Cai Yongshun, 
2002 : 327-344). Cai argues that China‟s tradition of petitioning higher officials 
dovetails neatly with the system of administrative government that the CPC has relied 
upon. This, in turn, is particularly suited to laid-off workers who need to attract the 
intervention of government officials as opposed to direct negotiations with an employer. 
The point being that laid-off workers are located beyond the workplace and that their 
struggles are chiefly about subsistence rather than wages and conditions. Thus, when 
engaged in protest, this group of former workers strives to attract the intervention of 
higher officials in order to expose the failings of those below them. Faced with a risk of 
exposure, local lower-level officials have two choices: to meet, at least temporarily, the 
livelihood demands of the protestors by reallocating money from elsewhere, or 
deploying riot police and force to disperse laid-off workers who have no other option 
but to gather in public places. There would be no point in the protestors setting up 
factory picket lines as most of their factories were already idle.  While there are many 
examples of violence – we are hampered by the lack of data to construct an accurate 
picture across the nation – Cai argues that the general practice has been to disperse 
workers through peaceful means. He cites two interconnected reasons: first, protestors 
are keen to avoid giving the state a pretext for violence; and second, there are 
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administrative constraints on local governments‟ use of force, a point I will return to 
later. Thus, he argues, space opens up for „non-institutionalised action‟ by laid-off 
workers (Cai Yongshun, 2002: 343).    
 Turning to the „organisers, or rather, coordinators‟ Cai‟s research finds that 
such people act out of a combination of self-interest, community pressure and, 
occasionally, a sense of justice. These coordinators are essential to the dissemination of 
information and locating the physical spaces for the action. He found that out of forty-
one such coordinators, only nine were workers. Of the remainder, twelve were former 
enterprise leaders, nine were Party members, and seven were current enterprise leaders 
(Cai Yongshun, 2002: 335), results that cannot help but remind us of Clarke‟s work in 
transitional Russia – cited in Chapter One – in which he argued that there was a 
material basis for the common interest of the entire trudovoi kollektiv or collective 
workforce based on the economic negotiations over the „plan‟ (Clarke, 1993: 26) or in 
this case, the lack of it.  
Cai‟s work on protests by laid-off workers also refers to the importance of both 
the sequence and size of events. Where lay-offs are phased or, to use Cai‟s word, 
„sequenced‟, and in small or medium sized enterprises that do not house their workers 
in large concentrated estates, there is less chance of protests having a significant impact. 
This is explained by the challenge of forging solidarity between those still holding on 
to their jobs and those laid off, rendering the task of would-be coordinators in 
organising a cohesive response much more difficult. He predicted that restructuring 
larger SOEs with their concentration of housing and larger numbers of workers would 
be a more fraught process. As our discussion of widespread protests in 2002 in Daqing 
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will demonstrate, this argument was borne out by events, although in the final analysis 
the state was able to combine the use of limited force with fostering divisions in the 
workforce to manage the event and effectively hold the line. On the other hand, 
bankruptcy, according to Cai, is more likely to produce coherent and longer-lasting 
protests as it tends to descend on the workforce simultaneously, producing material 
conditions for effective solidarity. According to Cai, this is led, as often as not, by 
factory managers or senior technicians and engineers. Again, we are back with 
Clarke‟s common material interests (Clarke, 1993: 27). 
Chen‟s work on restructuring and privatisation demonstrates how actually 
existing conditions combined with traditional Maoist attitudes in determining the 
strategy and tactics of SOE workers if they chose – and choose – to resist what Lee 
refers to as the „whip of the market‟ (Lee Ching-kwan, 1999: 44-71 cited by Chen Feng, 
2003a: 238). Echoing Blecher, Chen concurs that „the majority of workers have been 
quiescent, passive‟ but also awards significant weight to the resistance of SOE workers 
still inside the industrial system whose acts „reflect the emerging economic conflict 
that define China‟s economic transition‟ (Chen Feng, 2003a: 238). For Chen, the 
crucial difference between this group and Cai‟s laid-off workers, or Hurst‟s and 
O‟Brien‟s „contentious‟ pensioners (Hurst and O‟Brien, 2002: 346-360), is that their 
factories are still in business and as such hold out the possibility of job retention for 
workers under new property relations. But it is just these new relations and the 
contracts they require that fly in the face of iron rice bowl traditions. Chen‟s 
conclusions are so close to my own, and so well presented, it would be disingenuous 
not to quote them in full. He states: 
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Many protests against restructuring, however, are motivated by what is called a 
„suddenly imposed grievance‟ (Walsh, 1981), as they often burst out 
immediately after a restructuring scheme, which usually entails collective 
layoffs, is made known to workers. Workers are fully aware of what their life 
will become if those measures are to be enforced. After all, the suffering caused 
by layoffs is already painfully visible in society and has been experienced and 
witnessed by too many people. Protesting workers are determined to prevent it 
from happening to them--or, at the very least, to ensure their basic wellbeing 
after restructuring has taken place. Thus, in this type of protest, strong 
subsistence anxiety translates into strong claims to firms‟ property and to a say 
in the restructuring process. Such claims derived from the old socialist precept 
of the nature of state property. SOE workers‟ protests, therefore, may be best 
viewed as either a refusal to enter new property relations disadvantageous to 
them or as an attempt at bargaining for some better treatment after restructuring. 
(Chen Feng, 2003a: 242) 
Chen‟s reference to Walsh‟s „suddenly imposed grievance‟ echoes Cai‟s identification 
of the „sequence‟ of events as being a major factor in the development and 
management of protests. Surveying the terrain of protest in China‟s reform-era 
industrial relations, Chen identifies three broad locations of resistance: those laid off or 
unemployed and already outside the sphere of production; SOE workers still at the 
bench but facing major changes to their working conditions as a result of restructuring 
or privatisation; and those in the private sector. He examines the differences and points 
of convergence and finds that workers resisting restructuring have commonalities with 
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the mainly migrant workers in the capitalist private sector, where protests concentrate 
on pay and conditions but do not challenge property relations. This is not the case with 
state sector workers who bring post-liberation traditions and practices to their 
opposition to restructuring. These traditions are manifested in demands for inclusion in 
the workplace decision making, especially on matters that have a direct impact on their 
employment and, as such, „may threaten their subsistence‟ (Chen Feng, 2003: 256). 
Anti-restructuring protests obviously cross over with the protests of laid-off workers, 
Chen‟s third category, but the parameters and demands of this category are impeded by 
the fact that such events take place „after workers had been laid off for months, even 
years‟ (Chen Feng, 2003: 241).  
  Differentiating between privatisation and „restructuring without privatization‟, 
Chen also found that SOE workers battling privatisation broadened the parameters still 
further as „moral economy demands are increasingly permeated by “class 
consciousness.” They are well organized, with claims framed in class language‟ (Chen 
Feng, 2006: 43). It is interesting to note that in 2003, when analysing data from 
protests against restructuring in the cities of Luoyang and Shanghai, that presumably 
did not involve privatisation, Chen considered the absence of „independent organizing, 
which is critical for the development of their class consciousness‟ (Chen Feng, 2003: 
258) as crucially important. On the other hand, in the battles against privatisation in a 
central Chinese city in 1998, 2000, and 2001, the presence of real live capitalists 
appeared to overcome legal and institutional restrictions on organising and class 
consciousness developed anyway (Chen Feng, 2006: 43). At the risk of over-
generalisation, we can summarise these arguments by stating that in the absence of 
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freedom of association xiagang did not produce any sense of confrontational class 
consciousness while privatisation did.  
Chen‟s distinguishing of protests between privatisation and „restructuring 
without privatization‟ is useful in understanding how workers at a factory in the city of 
Xianyang came to mount one of the longest strikes in the history of the PRC and 
certainly the longest in the struggle against restructuring with or without privatisation. 
In 2005, workers began a six-week strike against new working conditions imposed 
following a buy-out of the state-owned Xianyang Huarun Textiles Factory. As we have 
seen, the usual tactics of laid-off workers was to occupy public spaces and/or organise 
a demonstration outside government labour bureau offices for xiagang wages. But 
Huarun was still a working concern and this meant that the best way of securing the 
attention of both management and the city government was to strike and picket. 
Organisers from both the workforce and management quickly emerged and a twenty-
four-hour picket line was drawn up and successively blocked all three of the still-
producing factory‟s gates – for six weeks!  
The strike was sparked following the acquisition of Huarun Factory by the 
Hong Kong-based mainland conglomerate, China Resources. In autumn 2005, a 
restructuring plan was announced without prior consultation that included the mass 
dismissal of all workers and immediate rehiring of an unspecified number on inferior 
contracts that would not take into account seniority or pension contributions.  Workers 
responded by walking off the job. Demands were quickly formulated: long-term 
contracts, the cancellation of a six-month „probationary‟ work period, a central-
government inspection team to review the terms of the factory‟s merger with China 
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Resources, and compensation for the loss of SOE employee status (CLB, 2005). The 
workers‟ twenty-four-hour picket line at the factory gate prevented management from 
deploying scab labour (Han Dongfang, interview, Hong Kong, 12 March 2007). This 
action was complemented by the unauthorised establishment of a trade union, the 
election of representatives and the hiring of a Beijing-based lawyer to supervise the 
dispute through formal court proceedings.
28
 During the six weeks twenty workers‟ 
representatives were detained following a railway blockade and stone-throwing 
incidents at the director‟s house. They were released, apparently without charge, in 
January 2005. A combination of a threatened deployment by the police – who had 
already used water cannon against the strikers but to no avail – winter weather and 
rumours of a management compromise brought the strike to an end with major 
concessions from the company (Han Dongfang, interview, Hong Kong, 12 March 
2007).
29
 Two years after the strike was resolved Han noted the different material 
conditions of this dispute compared to many of the protests over restructuring that he 
had been involved in previously.   
The first thing to note was the degree of solidarity among the workers. They 
managed to stay together and were not divided by different types of xiagang or 
whatever. While management wanted to make cuts, the company still needed 
the majority of the workforce. This facilitated a strike by people in work rather 
                                                 
28
 A taxi driver dropped the lawyer at the wrong factory gate where only a few workers were posted. 
This enabled the police to detain him and send him back to Beijing. Nevertheless, the workers‟ intention 
of combining strike and legal action was now clear to the authorities (Han Dongfang, interview, Hong 
Kong, 12 March 2007).  
29
 These included the cancellation of the „probationary‟ period and the dropping of threats to cut wages 
(CLB, 2005).  
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than a protest by people without it. (Han Dongfang, interview, Hong Kong, 12 
March 2007) 
I have no evidence to argue that these workers were imbued with the same class 
consciousness that was so prominent in the turn-of-century protests that Chen 
described in the central China city. But it is hard to imagine that six weeks of strike 
action could take place without some degree of class consciousness developing, 
accompanied by a departure from some of the traditions of the past. As Chen explains:    
Thus, it is natural for workers to use the moral rhetoric of the past as a point of 
reference to assess their present conditions and frame their claim. Strategic 
though it might be, workers‟ efforts to base their demands on old official norms 
has actually prevented them from redefining their interests in the market 
economy, and trapped their struggle into a direction that will not produce any 
significant positive outcome for them, as a return to the old system has become 
impossible. (Chen Feng, 2006: 60) 
It seems safe to conclude that Xianyang workers were not significantly constrained by 
tradition. The workers did not demand their old status as masters of the enterprise back, 
but rather that they were compensated for the loss of this status as stipulated by the 
regulations. It still remains to be seen if this strike was the dying gasps of a past era or 
the birth pangs of the new stage for the labour movement as it converges with the 
private sector. It is likely that the scholarship will turn to this question in the near 
future. In the meantime, I believe that SOE resistance to restructuring – as opposed to 
full privatisation which is now the norm – and the policies that managed it, peaked 
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with the great unrest of spring 2002. Here was an outburst of anger that appeared to 
simultaneously defy and confirm all the arguments in the literature.   
Spring 2002: The Iron Rice Bowl is Broken  
Protests against phased redundancy and its gradual progression into one-off severance 
pay (mai duan gongling) appeared to peak in the spring of 2002. Very large-scale and 
well-organised street protests by unemployed oil workers in Daqing, laid-off metal 
workers in Liaoyang and laid-off or retired coal miners in Fushun emerged out of 
different conditions, but at more or less the same time. The course of these struggles 
attracted extensive attention from the international press and the trade union movement 
outside China.
30
   
Daqing was – and to some extent still is – a politically significant and 
economically important city. Its name translates into English as „big celebration‟, 
symbolising the relief which the discovery of oil there in 1958 brought to a government 
that was on the verge of bankruptcy (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 27). In 2002, even with 
reserves in the oilfield running low, Daqing still met almost thirty per cent of China‟s 
oil requirements (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 27). The opening up of the field in the late 
fifties occasioned a significant and still-remembered propaganda exercise as the 
commitment and sheer hard work of Daqing‟s first generation of oil workers were held 
up as examples of a superior socialist work ethic (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 27). Almost a 
quarter of a century into the reforms, Maoist icons such as Iron Man Wang and Lei 
Feng still carried huge symbolic weight among many of China‟s older workers, as the 
oilmen I talked to in Daqing were quick to point out.  
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 For example, the April 2002 meeting of the ICFTU‟s China Working Party was devoted in its entirety 
to the unrest, especially in Daqing.  
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Look! [Pointing to the riot police jogging in formation around Iron Man Square] 
Do you know what they‟re doing? They are repressing the spirit of Daqing – 
the spirit of Old Wang. Those country boys have no idea what we went through 
to build this town and, for that matter, to build socialism. (Interview, Daqing, 
28 March 2002) 
When more than 50,000 of the city‟s oil workers took to the streets around Iron 
Man Square in protest against a comparatively generous one-off redundancy deal 
(HRW [Pringle], 2002: 30), the state faced the most significant challenge to the 
direction announced five years earlier at the Fifteenth Party Congress. The Daqing 
protestors and the traditions they represented seemed to challenge not only SOE 
restructuring but by extension, the legitimacy of the Party‟s entire reform programme. 
Thus far, the authorities had successfully managed the dislocated protests of workers 
by employing a carrot and stick policy. This involved targeting, and if necessary, 
imprisoning coordinators and organisers while persuading the mass of workers to 
return home with a small pay out and promises of more later (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 
35). But conditions in Daqing were more serious:  First: the Daqing workers had signed 
up to a one-off agreement based on seniority, known as mai duan gongling. This 
arrangement had become increasingly common as the xiagang or phased redundancy 
policy reached the end of its political shelf life. At the stroke of a pen, all connections 
with PetroChina were severed and by spring of 2002 the workers began to question the 
legal validity of the deal. Second, the relative affluence of former key energy sector 
workers and the brief appearance of an independent provisional trade union committee 
meant that the protestors were in a position to reject any carrots from the government 
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and hold out for longer – more than six weeks. The Heilongjiang provincial 
government deemed the situation serious enough to deploy truckloads of troops to the 
outskirts of Daqing as both a precautionary and intimidating measure against the 
protesters.  
A few hundred kilometres south, a four-year campaign against the corrupt 
bankrupting of the Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory (LFF) in Liaoning province came to a 
head on 18 March when approximately 30,000 mainly laid-off workers from twenty of 
the city‟s SOEs marched in rare solidarity with 4,000 laid-off LFF workers (HRW 
[Pringle],  2002: 22).
31
 In Fushun, sustained protests began in mid-March 2002, when 
up to 10,000 laid-off workers, mainly from the coal mines, were joined by laid-off 
workers from cement, steel, and petrochemical factories and blocked the railroad and 
the main road into Fushun over inadequate severance payments (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 
34). 
These disputes received widespread attention from the international trade union 
movement. International Trade Secretariats such as ICEM, that had previously 
maintained good relations with the ACFTU, issued a press release pledging support to 
the short-lived provisional union committee in Daqing (ICEM, 2002). At a meeting of 
the ICFTU‟s China Working Party, one delegate expressed the view that „after Daqing, 
everything is different‟ (Interview, Hong Kong, 15 March 2002). However, 
international support for the protests underestimated the state‟s capacity to handle this 
unrest without resorting to violence on a 1989-scale and also – unlike the CPC 
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 The Liaoyang authorities admitted the bankruptcy process had been corrupt and the Director of the 
Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory, Fan Yicheng, was eventually arrested (HRW [Pringle], 2002).  
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leadership – failed to grasp the fact that material conditions for more effective 
resistance, such as strikes and solidarity strikes, remained largely absent.  
The state‟s response to the protests was basically to hold the line. Further 
politicisation of the situation was avoided by refraining from a massed physical attack 
on the workers involved while simultaneously targeting their leaders with snatch 
squads and detentions. In this respect, the basic policy to „seek progress while 
maintaining stability‟ was upheld (Hong Yung Lee, 2000: 914-937). 32  Two years 
earlier, in 2000, regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Security had instructed 
local police forces not to treat workers‟ protests as a political threat but rather as a 
result of the rapid pace of political and economic change. An accompanying circular 
stressed that in the main such incidents were to be handled as crowd control issues and 
not political incidents (Ministry of Public Security, 2000). Although there were dozens 
of temporary detentions, there were no reports of workers‟ representatives being 
arrested, formally charged and given prison sentences in Daqing.
33
 Even though a 
provisional trade union committee representing the laid-off oil workers was said to 
have been established (ICEM, 2002; HRW [Pringle], 2002: 30), there was still no 
Tiananmen-style attack on Iron Man Square as the security forces succeeded in driving 
the organisers sufficiently deep underground rendering them ineffective as an 
organising committee. The presence of troops on the outskirts of town and riot police 
in the Square itself was correctly deemed sufficiently intimidating. On the other hand, 
events in Liaoyang show the other side of this policy. Where workers‟ representatives 
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 Of course, at the level of actual implementation, there were mistakes, exceptions and degrees within 
this overarching policy of caution. 
33
 This is not to say there weren‟t any. A media blackout made it extremely difficult to obtain and verify 
information on arrests.  
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successfully organised sustained cross-enterprise demonstrations or contact with 
groups outside China, they could expect arrest and prison sentences, as was the case 
with the Liaoyang Two – Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang (HRW [Pringle], 2002:3).  
The Party‟s absolute priority was one of containment and avoiding actions that 
might result in solidarity protests beyond the immediate locality and even strikes. The 
potential for such a course of events to unfurl was briefly highlighted by the „learn 
from Daqing‟ slogans employed by protesting laid-off oil workers from the Shengli 
oilfield in Shandong province later in the same year (HRW [Pringle], 2002: 33). Back 
in Daqing government officials and PetroChina‟s directors went to great lengths to 
ensure that the protests did not spread to oil workers still in work i.e. were not 
transformed into strike action, a situation that would have added fuel to a fire already 
„permeated with class consciousness‟ (Chen Feng, 2006: 42) albeit looking back 
towards tradition, and sustained by Cai‟s well-educated organisers (Cai Yongshun, 
2002: 327-344). The presence of demonstrators in Iron Man Square was embarrassing 
and nerve-racking for the government, but handled correctly it needn‟t impact on 
production and for the most part it did not prevent the rest of the city from carrying on 
its business. Indeed, as the protestors‟ numbers gradually dwindled over the six weeks, 
local PetroChina officials grew in confidence. Towards the end of the movement, one 
labour activist reported that  
Right now the oil company is concentrating on public opinion and sowing 
discord among current and former employees. At the point of writing, the 
March bonus has not been issued and the company‟s explanation to all 
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employees has been, „this is a direct result of the demonstrations. Go ask the 
protesters‟. (Pioneer Monthly, 2002: 6)  
Earlier on in the dispute, not paying the March bonus would have risked escalating the 
dispute, but by mid-April the size of the gatherings in the Square had declined 
markedly and morale had dropped after nearly six weeks of tension. A shopkeeper on 
the edge of Iron Man Square told me that 
[I]t is more or less over now. It is hard to keep everyone together after all these 
weeks and some of the ordinary people (laobaixing) do not support them 
anyway. In my opinion, they should never have signed the redundancy deal in 
the first place. (Interview, Daqing, 28 March 2002)     
The people taking part in these protests included Cai‟s laid-off workers, Hurst and 
O‟Brien‟s pensioners and, albeit briefly, the employed workers facing an uncertain 
future who joined the LFF demonstration on 18 March. The scale and sustainability of 
the actions as well as their relative geographical proximity seemed to offer the prospect 
of a movement. But while it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions due to the 
constraints on fieldwork, the absence of strikes and the momentum that they 
necessarily produce was a key factor in the state‟s favour. Participants were, by and 
large, already laid off from the workplace itself. As we have discussed, production 
itself was rarely affected and as such enterprise leaders did not need to negotiate with 
their former employees, essentially reducing the protests to a matter of crowd control, 
albeit with significant political implications should they be badly managed. Apart from 
blocking roads and railway lines, a course of action that invariably drew forceful 
intervention and arrests from the People‟s Armed Police, the majority of state workers‟ 
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actions did not, in the final analysis, have the capacity to directly impact on production 
itself simply because, as one veteran labour academic observed, there was „no work to 
strike against‟ (wu gong ke ba!) in most cases.  
Perhaps ironically, the brief coming together of different categories of workers 
in Liaoyang, and the sheer size of the demonstrations in Daqing, actually demonstrated 
the capacity of phased redundancies – xiagang – to achieve its aim of strangling a 
potential labour protest movement at birth between 1997 and 2002. The different 
categories of laid-off workers such as early retirees, internally laid-off workers, 
workers placed on extended leave, external laid-off workers and, towards the end of the 
first phase of restructuring, those offered one-off redundancy deals (mai duan gongling) 
tended to dramatically reduce a sense of cohesion among different groups of laid-off 
workers.
34
  The 30,000-strong cross-enterprise demonstration in Liaoyang on 18 March 
2002 was the exception rather than the rule.  As Lee has noted, it was much more 
common for workers to confine their protests to their own specific group: 
Beneath the surface, variation in worker grievances is the common pattern of 
worker unrest organized around localized, bounded work units or their 
subgroups, whose boundaries are defined and fractured by state policies. (Lee 
Ching-kwan, 2007: 120)   
And the state‟s application of targeted repression and concession did nothing to break 
down these divisions within the working class.
35
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 The workers I spoke with in Daqing described themselves as laid off, although legally speaking they 
had signed away their relationship with PetroChina.  
35
 In a telephone conversation with Han Dongfang, a Daqing workers‟ representative was indeed highly 
critical of China Labour Bulletin‟s linking of the protests in Daqing and Liaoyang. As Han pointed out, 
the criticism was certainly not in the „spirit of solidarity‟ (tuanjie de jingshen).  Indeed on his radio show, 
Han went to considerable lengths to demonstrate the importance of worker-to-worker solidarity. On one 
occasion, he recorded Hong Kong trade union organisers attending a local protest against low wages 
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The Unions and Restructuring  
The role of the ACFTU in all this was marginal as far as workers were concerned. 
While it is notoriously difficult for trade unions to resist redundancies, the ACFTU at 
no point entertained an intention to resist them, at least not in public. And if unions are 
constrained by the objective realities of unemployment, the ACFTU was further 
handicapped by its subjective acceptance of Party leadership.  
The most important slogan that emerged from the Fifteenth Congress was 
„caiyuan zeng xiao‟ (shed jobs to increase efficiency). The response of the ACFTU to 
the job losses was naturally premised on its role of explaining Party policy, which 
deemed all except the very large SOEs inefficient and in dire need of downsizing or 
closing down altogether. As a consequence, the cities came under enormous pressure to 
provide employment opportunities. In 2002, the Ministry of Propaganda and the 
MOLSS released a joint document in which they estimated the period of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) would see an average annual urban shortfall between jobs 
available (between seven and eight million) and job-seekers (between twenty-two and 
twenty-three million) of fourteen-fifteen million (CPPCC Propaganda Department and 
MOLSS, 2002). Thus, the union found itself pincered by neo-liberal influenced 
policies on the one hand and state socialist models of trade unionism on the other. As 
we have seen, the ACFTU acquiescence to Party priorities has not always gone 
unchallenged, but opposing the mass lay-offs would have left the union politically 
isolated, barring the emergence of a sufficiently strong opposition from within the 
Party leadership. There was opposition from the Party old guard who wished to 
                                                                                                                                             
singing a Cantonese version of „Solidarity Forever‟. The rendition was broadcast into mainland China 
during a radio show.  
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preserve the SOEs as bastions of Chinese socialism, but the reformers‟ victory at the 
Fifteenth Congress along with China‟s entry into the WTO had reduced their voice to 
an echo of the past. The result was a Catch-22 situation that the ACFTU was ill-
equipped to resolve beyond attempting to alleviate the impact of unemployment on 
both its traditional membership and its own officials – which is precisely what it did.   
Between 1995 and 1999, ACFTU membership declined by sixteen million, 
from 103 million members to eighty-seven million members (Jiang Hong, 2002). As 
restructuring deepened, trade union branches were merged into enterprise-level Party 
cells and many full-time trade union officers were either laid off or had their union 
time cut as they were forced to take up non-union posts and/or work in the leftover 
Party cells on tasks unrelated to union business. Much of this new work was the 
complete opposite of their traditional task of promoting the welfare of their members. 
Meanwhile at the national level, union policy was increasingly focused on membership 
drives in the private sector as it followed the shifting terrain of labour unrest and the 
potential competition it faced from NGOs that were springing up in the private sector 
where the ACFTU was basically absent. The work of NGOs was considerably boosted 
by the space opened up following the Hu-Wen leadership‟s promise to improve the 
lives of the peasantry and migrant workers and the media focus on migrant workers. 
All this was in stark contrast to the paucity of reports on the plight of SOE workers and 
the success stories of laid-off workers transforming themselves into chirpy market 
traders, child minders, dog walkers, noodle stall holders and a whole host of 
occupations that made up an expanding eighty million strong informal sector (PLA 
Daily, 2004). 
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Up until 2003, the main thrust of ACFTU basic work was outside the actual 
workplace and focused on the establishment of support centres for „workers 
communities in need‟ (kunnan zhigong qunti). These centres were called Workers 
Support Centres (kunnan zhigong bangfu zhongxin) and targeted laid-off or 
unemployed workers whose basic livelihood needs were not being met. According to 
the Workers‟ Daily, many of those who received assistance were facing severe 
difficulties in finding re-employment and owed considerable amounts of money in 
unpaid wages and medical costs from bankrupted SOEs (Zhou Yuqing, 2002). Most of 
the Workers Support Centres (WSC) were established between 2002 and 2003 
following the Ninth Presidium Meeting (expanded) of the ACFTU Thirteenth Congress 
in September 2002, that included a discussion on the experience of WSCs in the city of 
Tianjin (Fu Lin, interview, Beijing, 12 February 2006). The conference ended with a 
call to set up 200 such centres within three years, a call that was quickly upgraded to an 
opinion when the union released the „ACFTU Opinion on the establishment of 
Workers Support Centres‟ in January 2003 (Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, 
2002).
36
 By November 2005, the union had established WSCs in ten provinces, 329 
cities and more than 1,600 counties. By June 2005, city-level WSCs had issued just 
under 1.5 billion yuan to workers (Pan Yue, 2005). In 2005, the Workers‟ Daily 
summed up the main tasks of the centres, some of which directly replaced the Re-
employment Centres (zai jiuye zhongxin) that SOEs were in theory meant to provide 
for laid-off workers, although in practice many of these centres were „ghost towns‟. 
First of all, the WSCs provided employment introductions and retraining and were an 
integral part of the union‟s „three-year three one and a half million‟ (san nian san ge 
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 „Zhonghua zong gonghui guanyu jianli kunnan zhigong bangfu zhongxin de yijian‟. 
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yibai wushi wan wan) employment project that aimed to provide training to 1.5 million 
laid-off or unemployed workers, employment introductions to another 1.5 million and 
re-employment to a further 1.5 million (Qiao Yu, 2005). Second, the centres were to 
provide livelihood assistance, including medical costs and children‟s education costs.  
Third, was the provision of advice and direct assistance to workers who had found 
work and came to the centres petitioning the union for help following rights‟ violations. 
The response included sending teams to relevant work unit (danwei) or government 
departments to negotiate a satisfactory outcome. Finally, the WSCs were to provide 
legal assistance and/or advice to workers who were pursuing claims through legal 
channels.   
The ACFTU‟s own statistics suggest that the WSCs had an impact, although as 
always caution is required when reviewing union statistics pertaining to the meeting of 
quotas. The Workers‟ Daily reported that by September 2004, the union at all levels 
had organised over 11.4 million job introductions;  provided over two million training 
sessions to laid-off or unemployed workers; and helped to find work for just over two 
million workers (Qiao Yu, 2005).  In 2004, the union issued over four billion yuan to 
over 3.5 million cases involving hardship, an increase of thirty-six per cent on 2003 
(ACFTU Trade Union Rights Bluebook, 2005). By the end of 2004, the ACFTU had 
set up 2,990 legal assistance services staffed by a total of 9,976 people, 766 of who 
were qualified lawyers (ACFTU Trade Union Rights Bluebook, 2005).  
As the first half of this chapter has demonstrated, there is little doubt that if 
ACFTU cadres had played a more active role in defending their members‟ jobs and 
direct interests, they would have been slapped down. In the fifties and perhaps even 
162 
 
more strikingly in the 1989 Democracy Movement, during which the trade union made 
a large financial contribution to hunger-striking students in Tiananmen Square, trade 
union expressions of support for protests or alternatives to state policies led to severe 
reprimands or dismissals of ACFTU cadres and purges at the top. Likewise, as 
restructuring deepened, the union lost tens of thousands of enterprise cadres. There are 
incidents of union cadres being involved in protests but rarely in an officially-
sanctioned capacity. It should not surprise us that the organisation concentrated on 
charity work outside the workplace as opposed to organising in it.  
Unlike the growth of the private sector, the restructuring provided few 
opportunities for trade unions to reform past practices. While the Party has encouraged 
the unions to improve representation in the private sector, this was not an issue in the 
former public sector. Indeed, better representation of workers who the Party was 
officially encouraging to „liberate [their] thinking‟ (jiefang sixiang), jump into the sea 
of society (xia hai) and basically swim for it, would have been an unsolicited and 
unwanted constraint on a central theme of the reform project. The resistance to 
restructuring at no point appeared strong enough to mount a coordinated challenge to 
ACFTU passivity and, by implication, restructuring itself. Indeed, the short-lived 
attempt to roll back economic reform by Party conservatives in the post-1989 climate 
(Naughton, 1995: 275) demonstrated that there were no powerful elements within the 
CPC who might have exploited worker activism to push through a political change of 
direction. 
In sum, the state‟s careful management ensured that it was in a position to sit 
out the protests during the period 1997-2002 and beyond. If laid-off workers had been 
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more successful in making common cause either with each other, or, even more 
effectively, with workers still in work, there is little doubt that the politics of the 
situation would have been much more potent. As it was, policy and the absence of 
freedom of association were sufficient to prevent a movement from emerging out of 
multiple instances of localised resistance. The state‟s priority of rapid economic 
development was not seriously challenged on the national or even provincial level.    
Positioning Resistance to State Sector Restructuring 
In general, the focus of collective labour actions against restructuring was not the 
workplace as such, but rather the social „spaces‟ around it. As we have seen from the 
literature, workers were very often very angry about the potentially volcanic issues of 
corruption (HRW [Pringle], 2002), pensions (Hurst and O‟Brien, 2002) and xiagang 
livelihood stipends (Solinger, 2001) all against a backdrop of loss of status and 
declining living standards (Zou Zhongzheng and Qin Wei, 2001). Demands almost 
always related to services previously delivered via the danwei: access to schools for 
workers‟ children, hospitals and medical care, housing and housing repair subsidies 
and heating allowances were demands that regularly featured on workers‟ home-made 
banners. One slogan – „we want to eat‟ – in particular epitomised the sense of 
abandonment, although my own conversations with laid-off workers suggest that it was 
widely misunderstood outside China. While a dramatic drop in living standards was all 
too often the result of xiagang, especially for those households with two laid-off 
breadwinners, this slogan was generally misinterpreted by the western media as a sign 
of pending starvation that simply was not the case. In fact it was a reference to the „iron 
rice bowl‟ and its livelihood-related subsidies that the danwei era had mostly provided.  
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The actions of these workers had an international significance. While some US 
unions were positioning all Chinese workers as helpless frontrunners in the „race to the 
bottom‟, others have argued that SOE workers resistance was widespread but 
constrained and dispersed (Chen Feng, 2003; Lee Ching-kwan, 2007; Philion, 2007; 
Clarke and Pringle, 2009). Writing on the successful struggle to reverse a takeover of 
the Zhengzhou City Paper Mill by organising around the factory‟s staff and workers‟ 
congress, Philion argues that the workers‟ leaders‟ policy of borrowing to reduce the 
mill‟s inherited debts was essentially a lost opportunity to develop a credible 
alternative to restructuring and privatisation by deepening the direct participation of 
rank and file workers in the management of the reacquired mill – and presumably 
cancelling the debts. Such a strategy could, Philion argues, have been held up as an 
example to other SOE workers struggling to hold on to – or retrieve – SOE factory 
property in the face of institutional financial constraints (Philion, 2007: 47). The mill 
workers had successfully used the staff and workers‟ congress to legitimise their 
protests – as they did in Daqing, Liaoyang and many other cases – and even regained 
ownership of the enterprise. The cost was high: four workers‟ representatives – the 
Zhengzhou Four – were imprisoned. Similar struggles against capital in the city led to 
battles with migrant workers hired to physically attack workers. 
This guy is a major capitalist and [he] promised a cash infusion and to 
modernize the plant‟s equipment, manufacture new products and start new 
projects. They promised jobs and higher wages but nothing came of it … and 
the government was silent … migrant workers were paid fifty yuan a day to 
beat up the workers. They hired hundreds of migrants. (Jiang Xueqin, 2005)    
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The struggles in Zhengzhou were framed in a Maoist egalitarian spirit directly 
inherited from the danwei. Although the course of events in the North-East was 
different, the same spirit infused the workers‟ handbills handed out in Iron Man Square 
and local neighbourhoods in Daqing in the spring of 2002 with titles such as 
„Retrenched Workers Cherish the Memory of Chairman Mao‟ (Pioneer Monthly, 2002: 
17). In Liaoyang too, workers marched through the streets carrying pictures of 
Chairman Mao (HRW [Pringle], 2002). And so we are back with Chen: „strategic 
though it might be, workers‟ efforts to base their demands on old official norms has 
actually prevented them from redefining their interests in the market economy‟ (Chen 
Feng, 2006: 60).  
In this context, the state‟s refusal to refer to restructuring as „privatisation‟, 
even when this was clearly the case, had an impact on the resistance. Privatisation was 
only one means employed to push through restructuring, alongside gufenzhi or 
„shareholderisation‟ whereby employees were „offered‟ – sometimes on pain of 
dismissal – to buy shares in their SOE, mergers with foreign or domestic capital, 
downsizing, partial sell-offs and bankruptcy. All the same, there was a general 
perception among critics and supporters alike that SOE restructuring was part of a 
political programme to reorganise and even transfer property rights. In the public 
spaces and working class neighbourhoods where most demonstrations took place, this 
translated into the perception that restructuring provided an opportunity for enterprise 
leaders and government officials to enrich themselves by teaming up with or 
transforming themselves into capitalists and grabbing state assets that legally belonged 
to the state, if not the workers themselves (CLB, 1998: 155-160). In this scenario the 
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state could, and did, go after corrupt enterprise leaders – usually known to workers by 
name – not the more anonymous forces of private and international capital, even as 
they waited in the wings. In short, „bad apples‟ were on the branches, but the overall 
health of the tree and its socialist roots remained sound.   
Legitimising the „p‟ word would have reduced the Party‟s room to manoeuvre 
and hamper its crackdowns on especially venal examples of asset grabbing. Such 
apparently semantic concerns can easily acquire more concrete ramifications when it 
comes to the political framing of state force. Politically, there was the contradiction of 
prosecuting a privatisation policy in what remains, constitutionally, a workers‟ state. 
The Party understood well that poor management of the mass lay-offs carried the 
potential for the spark for local resistance to transform into a prairie fire, as had been 
the case in 1989. But should force become necessary, justifying the application of state 
violence on a coordinated national scale as necessary to transforming China into a 
strong and influential country would be far more digestible by public opinion and Party 
„conservatives‟ than say, „upholding lawful privatisation‟.  
In my conversations with SOE workers during this era, the term „privatisation‟ 
(siyouhua) did occasionally come up, but it was rare for workers to make specific 
attacks on private capital as such. Even if they didn‟t always believe it, workers were 
nevertheless influenced by what they read in the state-run media and watched on the 
television, as well as by what enterprise directors told them, and privatisation was not a 
word either the media or the bosses employed. Blecher argued that Chinese workers 
were dazzled by the market, which was consequently able to impose its hegemony 
(Blecher, 2001: 167). But it was probably more the case that, as a collective entity, the 
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working class simply failed to grasp its consequences until it was too late. As a bitter 
laid-off worker clearly in need of hospital treatment told me „never in my wildest 
dreams did I think it would turn out like this‟ (interview, Wuhan, November 1998).   
On the other hand, Chen argues that, unlike the struggles of pensioners and 
workers laid off from loss-making enterprises in which participants were easily bought 
off, workers who succeeded in identifying a capitalist target at the local level and 
framed their struggle accordingly were more likely to develop a „them versus us‟ 
attitude (Chen Feng, 2006). Thus, a more class conscious form of organisation was 
likely to emerge in a struggle against the takeover of a still profitable SOE by private 
capital. In such a scenario workers can make use of the state‟s avoidance of a formal 
privatisation policy to „poach the rulers‟ ideology and theater of legitimation‟ 
(Thompson, 1991: 10 cited in Chen Feng, 2006: 48). And in Zhengzhou they did just 
that – to varying degrees over four separate struggles.  
Conclusion 
It is the case that a recasting of the iron rice bowl would have required a social 
movement on the scale not seen since the CPC‟s administration of the liberated areas 
prior to the revolution. Our discussion above demonstrates that while resistance to 
restructuring was widespread, the constraints preventing these components from 
combining into a labour movement were simply too great for a social movement to 
emerge. Moreover, there was the simple fact that the new economy was already up, 
running and moving towards the centre of the national and even international economy 
and that the old state sector was holding China back from the development path chosen 
by its leaders. Indeed, since the turn of the century, and especially since 2003, 
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collective labour protests in the private- and foreign-owned sectors had been growing 
in effectiveness. Sustained high levels of FDI, a marked shortage of skilled workers, 
and the adoption of increasingly sophisticated tactics by migrant workers dictated that 
the focus of protest and of trade union responses to it had already shifted to the non-
state sector. 
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Chapter Three 
From Victims to Subjects: the Long March of Migrant Labour 
In this chapter I examine the gradual rise in the capacity of migrant workers to confront 
their capitalist employers and the underlying constraints and opportunities that have 
produced this situation. My sources include information derived from many 
conversations with migrant workers between 1999 and 2006; from interviews 
conducted in 2001-2002 with workers hospitalised as a result of occupational disease 
and injury; interviews with labour activists, labour lawyers and labour NGO (LNGO) 
workers in Hong Kong and China between 2005 and 2007; and a supervised survey 
and follow up interviews with primary level trade union cadres. I also make use of 
interviews with workers in struggle, although I did not conduct all of them myself for 
obvious reasons.  
 We begin the chapter with the arrival of foreign and private capital and an 
examination of the constraints on the people working for it. I then focus on two major 
factors that constrained migrant workers from securing their rights in the factory 
system especially in the early years of reform – the hukou registration system and weak 
enterprise trade unions. We then move on to the factors that have contributed to 
improving workers‟ confidence. During the first years of the twenty-first century, we 
are – finally – able to identify at least some emerging factors that work to the 
advantage of migrant workers in general and skilled migrant workers in particular. 
These include labour shortages, an accumulated knowledge of the factory system, an 
improved legal environment, and the gradual acquisition of a collective bank of 
experience among migrant workers on how to squeeze concessions out of employers. A 
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change in the labour market, dating approximately from 2003, provided conditions in 
which the economic strike has emerged as the weapon of choice for migrants seeking 
to win immediate improvements in working conditions. This narrative of struggle has 
been helped along by the acceptance of such phenomena as „normal‟ by some leaders 
in trade union and party circles as both the ACFTU and the CPC have set great store on 
the creation of a formal system of labour dispute resolution. In the final section I 
examine the relationship between workers‟ informal action and these procedures.   
The core of my conclusion is as follows: the ongoing unrest demonstrates that 
the efforts by both the state and the ACFTU to direct labour unrest towards the 
juridical channels of dispute resolution discussed in Chapter One are insufficient – on 
their own – to bring industrial harmony, or at least a framework in which disputes can 
be properly addressed. The increase in strike activity has, in turn, led to significant 
pressure on the ACFTU from both above and below to be more active in representing 
its members at enterprise level. On the other hand, strict limits are set on how far the 
unions can go. The Party remains anxious that too many concessions to labour will 
exacerbate the situation and, in an echo of the arguments that raged during the fifties, 
may lead to a powerful autonomous labour bureaucracy, independent trade unions – or 
even both!  Thus labour unrest emerges as the key factor behind the case studies of 
union reform discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
Facilitating Capitalist Super-exploitation  
Indivisible from the destruction of decent work in the state sector has been the (re) 
construction of indecent work in the private sector. The establishment of a non-state 
labour regime has been premised on two major developments, one economic, the other 
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social.  Firstly, the re-entry of private capital into the Chinese economy and the diverse 
forms of enterprise ownership that came with it, including private ownership, foreign 
ownership, joint-venture companies and township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
Secondly, there has been a gradual but significant relaxation of the constraints on 
residential choice known as the hukou system. This has permitted large numbers of 
people to leave the countryside temporarily and seek work in off-farm employment 
both in the factories and in the construction and infrastructure projects that have 
smoothed their operation. The human migration that has ensued is possibly the largest 
rural-urban migration in human history (Zhang Honglin and Song Shunfeng, 2003: 
386). During the eighties and early nineties, over 150 people million found work either 
in special economic zones that concentrated on attracting foreign capital, or in TVEs 
nominally owned by the „people‟ but primarily managed by local Party Committees 
and their appointees. As the economic reforms deepened, most TVEs morphed into 
private enterprises (see Chapter One).  
The provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and, more recently, Zhejiang have, to date, 
attracted the largest amounts of foreign, Hong Kong and Taiwanese capital. Located on 
the south and east coasts, they have chiefly produced for the export market (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004: 13). As with local private capital, foreign capital has also 
acquired a reputation as being highly exploitative and well connected with relevant 
government departments that have provided protection for employers facing labour 
protests (Globalization Monitor, 2009: 34-35). Nevertheless, throughout the nineties 
and early part of the present century, the flow of rural migrants kept coming and the 
combined non-state sector has now overtaken the state sector in terms of numbers 
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employed. According to ACFTU figures, at the end of 2006 there were over 101 
million people employed in the non-state sector spanning various forms of private 
ownership compared to just under 73 million in the state- and collectively-owned 
sectors (ACFTU, 2007: 37).
37
 While many migrants and would-be migrants target the 
eastern and southern coastal regions „some migrants leave their homes to travel only a 
short distance to the nearest urban area‟ (Davin, 1999: 1). Published in 2009, a survey 
of 68,000 households in 7,100 villages across thirty-one provinces conducted in 2008 
revealed a total of over 235 million rural migrant workers – although thirty-eight per 
cent of these were working in enterprises within their own home towns (China Review, 
2009). This left 140.4 million working outside their home towns. ILO researcher Li Shi 
uses National Bureau of Statistics figures to show that in 2006 132 million migrant 
workers were working and living outside their home towns for more than three months. 
His chart, reprinted below, demonstrates how the numbers of rural to urban migrants 
have continued to increase since 1989. Li Shi also reminds us that the total number of 
rural migrants is even larger than the number of rural migrant workers. Eighty per cent 
of migrants stayed in cities with at least one member of their family and twenty per 
cent moved their whole family. He estimates that in 2006, „the total number of rural-
urban migrants can be estimated at about 160 million‟ (Li Shi, 2008: 5). The 
photograph below Li Shi‟s chart was taken by the author during fieldwork at a mine in 
Shaanxi province where miners from Sichuan had established a small community 
around more remote shafts.  
                                                 
37
 These figures do not include employees in institutions and government administrative organs (shiye 
danwei) 
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Rural poverty has been the main „push‟ factor in this process and despite the 
generally appalling working conditions it has ensured that these coastal zones attracted 
a continuous supply of cheap labour. Indeed it is the constant oversupply of labour that 
has acted as a major constraint on migrant workers‟ capacity to defend even their most 
basic legal rights and interests. On the other hand, migrant workers have not left the 
hardships they encountered entirely uncontested. For sure, the development of migrant 
worker self-activity and resistance to capital has been gradual, but from „scattered‟ 
beginnings we are now in a situation in which large collective strikes have become a 
daily occurrence. Perhaps taking their cue from Silver‟s argument that democratic 
labour movements develop in the wash of mobile capital (2003: 41-75), some left-wing 
US trade unionists are now ambitiously asking „[C]an the Chinese Labor 
Movement Reverse the “Race to the Bottom?”‟ (Left Forum, 2009) 
Chart 1: Rural-Urban Migrant Workers 1989-2006 
 
Source: Li Shi (2006) 
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Migrant workers escort their children home from school.  
 
Source: Tim Pringle, 2005 
Constraints on Private Sector Migrant Workers 
In her book charting migrant workers‟ conditions via translations from the Chinese 
media, Chan identifies three forms of workers‟ resistance in actions that she labels a 
„struggle for social justice‟ (Chan, A. 2001: 206) rather than a social movement. These 
are: „spontaneous‟38 outbursts of collective violence, street protests that generally take 
the form of a march down to the local labour bureau and, finally, recourse to legal 
action (Chan, A. 2001: 206). Despite one academic‟s recording of an „unprecedented 
strike wave in FIEs concentrated in South China‟ (Jiang Kaiwen, 1996: 139), Chan 
only provides two examples of strike action out of twenty-three case studies, and one 
of these involves SOE workers in Beijing. Although labour unrest was undoubtedly 
growing during the early nineties, strikes were still regarded by all the actors – 
including the workers themselves – as unusual phenomena, an exceptional form of 
                                                 
38
 I have placed this word in inverted commas as factory conditions dictate that even outbursts of 
collective violence require minimum planning of some sort. For mysterious reasons, some industrial 
relations commentators continue to employ the term.  
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protest rather than the rule. By default, strikes require some form of organisation if 
they are going to succeed and the material conditions on the ground were hardly 
conducive.  Local governments‟ determination to maintain an investor-friendly 
environment, restrictions on residence that allowed employers to replace striking 
workers with ease, inexperience with the factory system, and, above all, an 
overwhelming abundance of labour all combined to limit workers‟ confidence.39 
Outside the gates of every enterprise in our so-called Special Economic Zones, 
you can see small crowds of workers who are waiting to be hired even if the 
factory has no hiring policy at the time. When they do hire, this small crowd 
quickly turns into a crush of desperate migrant workers. (Han Deqiang, 
observation, 4 November 2002)
40
  
Announcing the „ending of socialism in a developing, labor-surplus state‟ Solinger‟s 
inquiry into the „floating population‟s‟ employment channels found an „extremely high 
level of competition to fill low-skill niches in many of the trades we examined‟ 
(Solinger, 1999: 5, my emphasis). Solinger shows first that access to the rural „reserve 
army‟ was not limited to the factories but also encompassed „construction; marketing 
and services; cottage-style garment processing; manufacturing in factories; 
nursemaiding; begging and scrap collecting‟ (Solinger, 1998: 4). And second, as my 
added italics emphasise, competition for jobs among migrants was intense and this in 
itself would have had a dampening impact on workers‟ opportunities to organise.   
                                                 
39
 When I first began working on Chinese labour relations in 1996, typing the Chinese word for „strike‟ 
in a search engine invariably produced no results. Using the less contentious terms of „labour-capital 
dispute‟ (laozi jiufen) or „labour dispute‟ (laodong jiufen) returned a few newspaper articles but nothing 
that might be called a trend. I have just typed „bagong‟ into Google and it came back with over four 
million references! Although hardly a scientific methodology, it is a measure of how times have changed!  
40
 Asia Pacific Research Network, China and the WTO conference, 4-6 November, Guangzhou 
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But the abundance of cheap labour was by no means the only constraint on 
migrant workers‟ challenging the status quo. There was, and is, the wider question of 
migrant worker rights. Labelling the managed migration from the countryside as a 
„social structure of lost entitlements‟ (Liu Kaiming, 2005: 7), the Institute of 
Contemporary Observation (ICO)‟s report on the protracted struggle of one hundred 
and eighty-eight migrant construction workers drew bleak conclusions. Noting the 
construction workers‟ tenacity in pursuing their claims across all three categories of 
contention listed by Chan, the ICO report argued that  
in the course of studying this case and the social, political and economic causes 
behind it, we found that the workers‟ loss of economic rights could find its 
source in the loss of their rights as citizens, their political rights as well as their 
social and cultural rights. (Liu Kaiming, 2005: 21) 
Accordingly Liu found this grim state of affairs dictated that „all their acts of protest 
[sic] were passive, economic-based and reactive‟ (Liu Kaiming, 2005: 18). Given the 
nature of the playing field described by Liu and others, it need not surprise us that the 
results of ethnographic studies conducted in the nineties by sociologists such as Lee 
Ching-kwan (1998) found an exhausted and sometimes cowed workforce „whose job 
security was conditional on the good will of their employers, enterprise requirements 
and profit margins, and their own productivity‟ (Sargeson, 1999: 3). While often angry 
at their lot, they were continually constrained from effectively confronting employers 
over poor working conditions by the discriminatory environment that governed their 
status as outsiders. Sargeson found that migrant workers looked to factors outside the 
workplace, such as the hukou system, to explain the exploitative conditions within it.  
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With few exceptions, workers believe that the conditions which necessitate 
their waged employment and facilitate their exploitation are established outside 
the work place, by regional disparities, place and guanxi networks, the power of 
officials, and the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities. (Sargeson, 
1999: 181) 
Although protests were documented (Sargeson, 1999; Chan, A. 1998), Leung‟s 
conclusion that the protests of these workers in the early 1990s were „scattered, 
spontaneous and unorganised‟ (Leung Wing-yuk, 1995: 44) should therefore not 
surprise us. Perhaps trawling for signs of hope, Sargeson tentatively points to an 
„increasingly restive ACFTU‟, the organisational savvy of cast-off SOE workers and 
migrant workers as a potentially potent alliance.  
If disaffected workers who have been shed from the state sector join together 
with the contract and temporary employees of non-state enterprises, China‟s 
proletariat may become extremely militant. (Sargeson, 1999: 226)   
Nearly ten years later this vision of convergence remains optimistic. 
Hukou zhidu: System of Residential Registration 
Without doubt the hukou system has been a major obstacle to the capacity of migrant 
workers to challenge employers (Liu Kaiming, 2005: 9-11). Originally a means of 
monitoring, managing and controlling the population that the CPC took over from the 
Guomindang, the system evolved according to economic and political priorities that 
privileged urban industry over rural agriculture. 
With food rations and numerous subsidies added later favoring urban residents, 
the PRC hukou system functioned in crucial ways in social stratification, 
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resource allocation, capital formation, agriculture collectivization, and the 
division of the urban from the rural. (Wang Fei-Ling, 2005: 45) 
The methodology was not subtle and involved nothing less than the forced exclusion of 
peasants from urban areas. In 1958, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) issued the 
„Regulations on Household Registration in the People‟s Republic of China‟ (Chan Kam 
Wing and Li Zhang, 1999: 818-855) that formally restricted peasants to their place of 
birth. Barring unlikely close connections with powerful officials in urban areas, the 
only way for a peasant to supplement income derived from an agrarian commune 
system of remuneration based on work points was to be included in an organised 
transfer of labour from the rural areas to work on industrial or infrastructure projects 
(Harris, 1978: 109-110).
41
  
In contrast, the post-reform era has seen hukou‟s function change from being an 
instrument of restriction – confining the peasantry to rural areas – to one of facilitating 
controlled migration to urban and semi-urban areas in order to provide a regulated 
(over-) supply of labour for the emerging private sector. Nevertheless, the right to 
urban residence remained – and for the most part, remains – temporary. This means 
that rural registration still excludes the majority of migrant workers from most of the 
welfare and insurance enjoyed by urban-registered citizens (CLNT, 2008).  On the 
other hand, the change in the method of delivery of hitherto urban privileges – from 
enterprise-based welfare to pay-as-you-earn insurance that relies on the large-scale 
pooling of insurance funds – has contributed to pressure to further relax and even 
abolish the system and the two-tier labour market it produces (Wu Zhong, 2007). There 
                                                 
41
 Depending on the Party faction in the ascendancy, the sale of produce from private plots was another 
method of income generation, although the latitude given to such entrepreneurial activity varied 
considerably in the pre-reform decades.   
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are currently in existence various pilot projects that further moderate hukou in order to 
keep pace with the changing labour market and the urbanization of large tracts of 
agricultural land. In 2005, eleven provinces announced plans to abolish administrative 
differences between town and country. In November of the same year, Ou Guangyang, 
deputy secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, announced that the 
province would „allow all farmers to register as urban residents in one or two years‟ 
(Zheng Caixiong, Wu Yong and Guo Nei, 2005). Since 2003-4 labour shortages and 
frequent human rights abuses have added stimulus to the anti-hukou lobby. In 2007, 
Cai Fang, the director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), stated that „obstacles in the labour 
market should be cleared‟ so that labour shortages did not contribute to inflationary 
pressure on prices (Cai Fang, 2007). For „prices‟ we can justifiably read „wages‟.  
Conversely, there has been an opposing argument that rural registration and the 
access to land-use rights that come with it are an essential component of China‟s rural 
welfare policy. While the countryside‟s social safety net remains inadequate, land-use 
rights are an important factor in reducing conflict between farmers, officials and 
developers (Yu Jianrong, 2007: 13), maintaining food security and avoiding large-scale 
landlessness on the scale of South America. It is likely that this argument will gain 
ground now that up to twenty-six million migrant workers are being forced back to the 
rural areas by the global recession.  
In the meantime, it is still the case that most migrant workers have to jump 
through administrative hoops in order to work legally outside their place of birth. 
These restrictions award both employers and local authorities a high degree of social 
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control over migrant workers‟ lives, especially women, who have to prove that they 
have abided by family planning regulations (Pun Ngai, 2005). The permits required 
include a „Temporary Residence Permit‟ for anyone living away from their place of 
registration for more than a month. This is issued by the PSB and must be renewed 
annually. Also needed is a „Migrant Employment Permit‟ – actually two permits. The 
first is issued by the migrant‟s home labour recruitment agency and the second by the 
receiving locality‟s labour bureau. For women a „Planned Reproduction Certificate‟ is 
necessary. This must be obtained from a migrant‟s home-town agency responsible for 
planned reproduction. On arrival in the receiving locale the certificate is approved by 
the local planned reproduction agency. Employers are not allowed to hire migrants 
without this certificate and none of the other relevant certificates required by migrant 
workers can be issued without it.  
Employers have gained advantage from this system in two main ways. Firstly, 
going through such a rigorous process to work away from home obviously has a 
somewhat numbing effect on workers‟ willingness to risk collective action (Chan, A. 
2001: 9-10). For those that have taken the risk, vengeful employers and local 
authorities were able to ensure their dismissal and, sometimes, detention by the 
authorities (People‟s Daily Online, 2008). Arranging replacement workers posed no 
particular difficulties for employers, at least not until the onset of serious labour 
shortages in 2004. In 2005 I stayed in a hostel (zhaodaisuo) that acted as the Shenzhen 
offices of the government of a mid-China city. It was also a shop and „entertainment‟ 
centre. The manager of this multi-functional and by no means uncommon 
establishment/agency was, as far as I could ascertain, a bona fide government official 
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from the city in question. His job put him in a good position to appraise the labour 
market.  
One of our functions was to compile data on factories and ensure that migrants 
from our area are sent to the higher-paying factories that require workers [i.e. 
before migrants from other regions get there – author]. Migrant workers hung 
round here using the phone and chatting if they couldn‟t find a job, but these 
days, they don‟t need us to help them find jobs any more. These days it has 
become easier for our people to find jobs with good wages and the workers 
have developed their own networks and guanxi. They know about vacancies 
before we do! (Government official, Interview, Shenzhen, 11 October 2005)     
The hukou system helped to keep wages down. In the Pearl River Delta wages 
remained effectively static throughout the nineties and in the early years of the present 
decade (Liu Kaiming, 2005: 211-212). It also facilitated unfair practices by companies 
concerned about having to compensate workers for ill health due to use of unsafe 
chemicals in the production process. One tactic was to implement mass dismissals, 
immediately followed by hiring fairs. I spoke with one former worker who was 
recovering from benzene poisoning in a hospital who said he had been part of such a 
process. 
It was a Taiwanese factory where I worked. The pay was slightly higher than 
others but we think now that this was meant to prevent workers from thinking 
seriously about their health. After the Spring Festival of 2004, they hung up a 
recruiting sign outside the factory. Three days later about fifty of us were 
dismissed „due to the orders‟. Since ending up in hospital I have tried to contact 
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the factory. I received a letter saying that there were no contractual relations 
between us. (Worker, interview, 12 September 2005)   
According to hukou regulations, a migrant worker has only a limited amount of time to 
find new employment when between jobs, a factor that has encouraged new hires not to 
pressure employers for contracts or to object to working for up to two months before 
receiving the first pay check. Apart from facilitating a general environment of unfair 
and often illegal labour practices such as the extraction of job deposits, confiscation of 
ID cards and the use of wage arrears as an instrument of control over labour turnover 
(Pringle and Greenfield, 2002), hukou has also enabled employers to scatter groups of 
workers who were able to mount a collective act of struggle. It has been especially 
effective in obstructing campaigns to win compensation for occupational disease or 
injury that are usually long and drawn out. The Asian TNC Gold Peak Limited, which 
has been the target of a five-year campaign to obtain adequate compensation for the ill-
effects of cadmium, appears to have made use of the opportunities provided by the 
hukou system to avoid paying adequate compensation. One workers‟ representative 
formerly a line manager at Gold Peak‟s Huizhou Advanced Factory explained how the 
policy of sending migrant workers back to their home towns when they were out of a 
job – and their permits were no longer valid – had been a major obstacle to solidarity as 
they tried to present a united front to the company in between arbitration and court 
hearings. 
Gold Peak initially gave us an option of either 3,000 or 8,000 yuan 
compensation depending on seniority and whether a worker was prepared to 
terminate their contract with the company. If you went for 8,000 yuan then it 
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was a one-off payment. Some of us with excess but not poisonous levels of 
cadmium in our blood took the 8,000 not realising that our cadmium count 
could go up as well as down. But once our contracts had been terminated, we 
either had to quickly get a new job or go home. Of course, Gold Peak wanted us 
to disperse and go home. But even when we didn‟t, word soon got round and as 
soon as prospective employers found out you were a former Gold Peak worker 
they would discriminate [i.e. not hire]. As a result many workers went home 
and keeping in touch with them has been a major problem for our struggle.  
(Jiang Xiaomei, interview, Hong Kong, 14 December 2005) 
It is interesting to note that the worker interviewed here was not personally subject to 
hukou constraints as she is a local of Huizhou, a point I will return to later. During a 
discussion with labour law experts in Guangzhou, there was general consensus that 
hukou placed a heavy burden on migrant workers pursuing claims through arbitration 
or the courts.  
Hukou works in favour of the employers. They know that a worker only has 
sixty days to get his or her case accepted by the arbitration committee and that 
if they can spin the process out by making false promises or even not turning up 
for the hearing, the pressure on the applicant to accept an inferior settlement 
grows with time. If there was no rule that forced these workers back, then our 
job [of assisting compensation cases] would be easier. (Lawyer, interview, 
Guangzhou, 12 June 2006) 
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While the new law on Labour Disputes Mediation and Arbitration (2008) has extended 
the time limit to one year, the continued, if weakened, impact of hukou will keep the 
ball in the employers‟ side of the court.    
Weak Enterprise-level Unions 
Union dependence on management at enterprise level has also acted as a severe 
constraint on unions‟ and workers‟ capacity to improve working conditions in the 
private sector. While the central leadership of the ACFTU has long recognised this 
problem, cautious attempts to initiate reform from above have been impeded by the 
dependence of primary trade unions on the local authorities, who have without 
exception prioritised rapid development over the rights and interests of temporary 
migrant workers. The situation is exacerbated by the limited leverage that higher trade 
union bodies have over their primary organisations, despite the fact that trade unions 
are still governed according to the principles of „democratic centralism‟ – at least in 
theory. This limited leverage makes the higher-level trade unions reluctant to risk 
activating their enterprise-level unions for fear that they will lose control of such 
organisations, so they continue to endorse management control as the lesser of two 
evils. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter Six, experiments with the direct election of 
enterprise-level trade union chairpersons and committees aimed at improving the 
credibility and independence of primary unions have been subject to this very caution.  
 The responses to a 2006 survey on trade union work by sixty enterprise-level 
union officials attending trade union classes in Guangdong province demonstrated the 
impotence felt by these officials in the face of their employers‟ control over union 
finances, appointments, and their own wages and career prospects. Consequently many 
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expressed a preference for adopting a mediation role over representation when 
grievances arose. Supporting collective action was off the radar of most – but 
interestingly not all – of these part-time union officers.  
The survey, followed up with interviews and group discussions, demonstrated a 
marked lack of enthusiasm for trade union work in general. Six of the respondents said 
they were directly elected, although two of these could not give any details of when or 
how this event had taken place. Eleven were appointed by the general manager or CEO 
and fifteen were in their posts as a result of negotiations between the next level of the 
union and the enterprise management. 
 Almost all said that their work for the company was more important than their 
union work, which took up time that could be better spent on personal advancement 
within the company. All the respondents pointed to the enterprise union‟s lack of 
financial independence. Enterprises are obliged to send two per cent of their wage bill 
to the higher-level trade union but negotiations for this transaction did not involve the 
enterprise-level union. The latter‟s annual budget was largely, if not entirely, 
dependent on enterprise funds. In one follow-up interview, a respondent explained the 
budgetary constraints on union activity. 
The annual budget for union finances is first approved by the deputy general 
manager and then the manager himself. Final ratification is also required from 
the CEO. Expenditure items that fall within the budget are reimbursed by the 
[company] finance people and anything that falls outside the budget needs 
special approval or can be placed under another item of expenditure already in 
the budget. (Interview, Guangzhou Case Study Report, 2006)      
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Employer power and the local government‟s prioritisation of an investor-
friendly environment was a key factor in determining the lack of confidence expressed 
by the respondents in carrying out union representational activities on behalf of their 
members. For example, twenty respondents claimed that attempting collective wage 
negotiations would not be possible under the current management and seventeen said 
that it would be possible but only if, and when, conditions became appropriate; just two 
respondents claimed it was possible to attempt such work – but as yet had not done so; 
nine people couldn‟t answer the question clearly (shuo bu qingchu) and the remainder 
left the question blank. In focus groups, the participants pointed out that management 
would not accept the idea of negotiating with workers and that „the boss was there to 
make money‟. If workers didn‟t like the wages „the boss can get someone else to do it‟. 
The dominant view on collective wage negotiations was that such a process would 
„make the employers feel threatened‟ and by implication harm the investment 
environment. 
The relationships between the union and the workers and their rights were not 
close. In focus groups, they acknowledged that collective action could produce limited 
results in terms of wages, but the general view was that this should be balanced against 
the price paid by the organisers of such action. Many of those attending the discussions 
could not say for sure if the law gave workers the right to pressure enterprises for 
higher wages. However, when asked what position they would take in the event of a 
dispute with management, twenty people (forty-two per cent of those attending) said 
that they were aware that they should represent the workers but given the current 
situation, they would adopt a neutral position and pass on the demands of the workers 
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to management. Only two people (four per cent) said they would stand by the workers 
in the event of a dispute and twenty-five people (fifty-two per cent) said they would 
„take an objective position and seek a fair resolution‟ to the dispute. In the survey 
question referring to cases of individual grievances, twenty-two out of sixty 
respondents said that workers would come to the union if they had a problem but 
thirty-eight per cent said that their members would not approach them if they had a 
problem.           
Two main points emerged in the follow up interviews and discussions, both of 
which emphasise union dependency on the employers. Firstly, that for an individual 
part-time trade union cadre employed in a small or medium size enterprise, spending 
more time on union work rather than company work would certainly invite 
management censure. In short, it would put the individual‟s job on the line. The 
employer‟s power over hire and fire remained, in their view, virtually unchallenged by 
the presence of the union. Secondly, the inability of trade union officers at enterprise 
level to intervene on behalf of their members created an atmosphere of distrust between 
members and trade union officers. This was not helped by the fact that the union 
officers were overwhelmingly part of the management structure prone to take into 
account the interests of the whole enterprise rather than the more specific interests of 
their members.  
Challenging Capitalist Super-exploitation 
At least until the advent of global recession in the last weeks of 2008, migrant labour 
had progressed from being a largely passive victim of capitalist globalisation to being a 
vital player in a scenario where Chinese labour relations have become the new 
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contesting ground between international capital and labour that holds out the 
„possibility of a new working class activism‟ (Chang Dae-oup and M. Wong, 2005: 
107-154). In the following section, I will demonstrate the rise in cases of unrest and 
examine the factors behind it: labour law and the rise of legal activism, labour 
shortages, home town associations and the role of skilled workers and supervisors.  
Labour Laws and Legal Activism  
The impact of labour law on labour unrest in the private sector has been more 
ambiguous than hukou. On paper at least, the development of a body of laws and 
regulations designed to govern industrial relations – as opposed to administrative 
regulations that managed state-owned work units in which workers were deemed the 
„masters‟ – has provided legal benchmarks against which workers can hold employers 
accountable. The evidence to date suggests that despite myriad restrictions ranging 
from the expenses involved in bringing an employer to court, to poor implementation 
of laws, workers‟ actions are influenced, if not guided, by the law and that this is a 
discernible trend. As new laws, such as the Labour Contract Law (LCL) and the 
Labour Mediation and Arbitration Law (LMAL), make it easier for workers to pursue 
claims against employers, the number of cases filed increases (Caijing, 2009). One 
Guangzhou-based ACFTU lawyer explained  
[T]here is an unmistakable connection between law and action in our labour 
relations system. It is probably quicker for workers to get a solution by going to 
the streets, but that by no means excludes using the law. And of course, the 
more comprehensive the law, the more likely workers are to use it. They are 
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most likely to take action after trying to use the law and not making any 
progress. (Interview, Guangzhou, 18 June 2009)    
This observation was backed up during conversations and interviews with LNGO 
staffers and labour activists between 2005 and 2008. Indeed, much of the contention 
that has marked Chinese industrial relations in the private sector during the reform era 
has been as much about the implementation of relatively high legal standards as about 
the absence of law itself. One reason is that the state and the ACFTU have responded 
to growing legal violations and unrest by drafting yet more laws. For example, while 
the unprecedented participatory process of formulating and passing the 2008 Labour 
Contract Law was an important departure from the traditional opaque practice of law-
making, it remains the case that had employers followed their contractual and legal 
obligations set out in spirit, if not the entire letter, of the original 1995 Labour Law and 
its subsequent modifications, the new law may not have been necessary at all! The 
same argument applies with regard to implementation. Had enterprise-level trade 
unions been strong enough, or at least sufficiently independent from the employers, in 
the private sector to enforce existing labour laws and negotiate binding collective 
contracts, the LCL would not have been such a contentious issue. Another reason the 
LCL was deemed necessary by the ACFTU and the MOLSS lies in the practice of 
watering down national laws via local level regulations ostensibly drafted to implement 
national law on the basis of local conditions, but in fact setting out reinterpretations 
that can neutralise the original intentions of the national law (Buhmann, 2005: 74). 
Thus a dynamic tension emerges in which the central authorities raise the bar via new 
legal standards on contracts and labour dispute resolution procedures – such as the 
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Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (2008) – and local governments bring 
it back down to what they deem a manageable height. This contradiction featured in the 
debates over the standards of the LCL. While employers were predictably vexed by the 
LCL, a less welcome argument broke out among labour advocates and academics, as 
we discussed in Chapter One. To recap, the Shanghai Faction opposed raising 
standards to what they felt were unrealistically high levels. This would render China‟s 
companies out of sync with the principles of human resource management and their 
preference for performance-based appraisal (CLB, 2007). The Beijing Faction disputed 
the direct linking of labour standards with economic efficiency on the grounds that 
labour relations were also social relations (Chang Kai, personal communication, 12 
October 2008).  
Returning to the relationship between laws and labour protest and whether or 
not laws encourage workers to pursue their rights and interests. In the decade following 
the promulgation of the national Labour Law in 1995, migrant workers increasingly 
challenged employers in arbitration and then in the courts. This trend was facilitated by 
both the state‟s and ACFTU‟s allocation of considerable resources to the development 
of a functioning system of labour dispute resolution discussed in Chapter One and, as 
Gallagher makes clear, the inadequacy of enterprise-level mediation procedures to 
resolve grievances (Gallagher, 2005: 115). As much of this inadequacy was down to 
union weakness in the private sector, it is hardly surprising that the unions took the 
view that a functioning arbitration system was vital.  
Another key goal of the ACFTU is to make efforts to build a sound system for 
labour arbitration. Because labour-management relations have become so much 
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more complicated in China, we are also seeing many more labour disputes than 
before. That makes the establishment of a labour arbitration system much more 
important. (Roberts, 2005) 
Indeed, arbitration and court cases have become important, if somewhat overwhelmed, 
institutions in the industrial relations system. Statistics released by the NPC show that 
between 1987 and the end of 2005, 1.72 million labour disputes went to arbitration, 
involving 5.32 million employees representing an average growth rate of twenty-seven 
per cent per year (China Daily, 2007). The figures below illustrate the growth of cases 
registered with arbitration committee since the national labour law came into force in 
1995.   
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Table 3 
Labour Disputes Registered for Arbitration 1996-2006  
Year Cases Accepted 
1996 48,121 
1997 71,524 
1998 93,649 
1999 120,191 
2000 135,206 
2001 154,621 
2002 184,116 
2003 226,391 
2004 260,471 
2005 313,773 
2006 317,162 
(Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2007: 515-516)  
In 2006, workers won forty-seven per cent of cases heard by arbitration committees, 
with employers winning just twelve per cent and the remainder partially won by both 
parties (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2007: 516). Collective labour disputes are 
defined as those involving three or more people and there were 13,977 registered 
collective labour disputes involving 348,714 workers in 2006. Non-collective cases 
involved 301,233 workers (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2007: 517). In 1995, 
China‟s courts handled 28,285 labour disputes but by 2004 that number had increased 
fourfold to 114,997 (Shen Jie, 2007: 130). However, as Shen points out, official figures 
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do not distinguish collective cases from individual cases or how many cases were filed 
by employers (Shen Jie, 2007: 130). There appears to be a wide regional variation on 
the results of labour cases dealt with by the courts. Composite nationwide statistics on 
the results of labour-related court cases are not made public although Shen has been 
able to fill some of the gaps with figures released by the Supreme People‟s Court. 
Between 1995 and 2001 labourers won more than sixty-two per cent of cases filed in 
Shandong,  fifty-five per cent in Guangdong and the same proportion in Heilongjiang 
(Shen Jie, 2007: 130). In some cities worker victories were very high: ninety per cent 
in Ningbo and Zhejiang and Zhongshan in Guangdong (Shen Jie, 2007: 130). On paper 
at least, for migrant workers with sufficient funds and time to take a case to arbitration 
and the courts, there is a good chance of winning. The combination of the Labour 
Contract Law – making it harder for employers to lay workers off – the Labour 
Mediation and Arbitration Law – making it easier and cheaper for workers to pursue 
claims – and the global financial crisis are already having a dramatic impact on the 
statistics. For example in Dongguan, a key manufacturing town in the Pearl River Delta, 
the courts dealt with a total of 23,044 cases in 2008 an increase of 159 per cent over 
2007! When a journalist from the respected Caijing (Finance and Economics) 
magazine asked the Dongguan Labour Bureau for figures on arbitration, he was 
informed that at present these statistics were „too sensitive‟ and remained secret 
(baomi). The last available statistics from the Shenzhen Labour Arbitration Court 
illustrated an increase in arbitrated cases in the first quarter of 2008 of 277 per cent 
with some arbitration committees in manufacturing areas of the city such as Bao‟an 
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and Longgang posting increases of 392 per cent and 360 per cent respectively! (Zhou 
Qiong, 2009). 
  At present the cursory breakdowns on the nature of labour disputes that go 
through the official resolution render it difficult to gauge the capacity of the system to 
deal with collective cases. State intervention in serious large scale disputes suggests 
there is a long way to go and there was, until the recent LMAL abolished the 
arbitration application fee it was in the interest of LDACs to divide collective cases 
into individual cases. Such behaviour generated income and looked good on an 
arbitrator‟s C.V. 
In the labour disputes arbitration procedure, a „collective labour dispute‟ is 
defined as „a dispute in which one party consists of three or more workers‟. 
Chapter Seven of the Procedural Rules for Labour Disputes Arbitration 
Committees sets out the rules for dealing with collective labour disputes 
arbitration. There are two kinds of collective labour disputes. A dispute arising 
from the performance of a collective agreement is one thing, while a dispute 
with one party of numerous persons is another thing. In Guangdong I have not 
heard of a dispute arising from a collective agreement. These days, labour 
arbitration committees do accept collective disputes according to the rules but 
this was not always the case. In 1998, I filed a case to an arbitration committee 
representing fifty-eight workers. But the committee insisted on the case being 
separated into fifty-eight individual cases. That caused me and my clients a lot 
of hassle. The reason was never expressly stated. But one can guess that fifty-
eight cases means fifty-eight filing fees rather than one, and when evaluating an 
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arbitrator‟s performance, fifty-eight cases looks better than one! (Lawyer, 
interview, University of Warwick, 18 December 2008)   
The state‟s emphasis on juridical channels of labour dispute resolution, which 
includes the aforementioned new law on arbitration that should alleviate the problem 
described above, relates to the growth of legal activism which in turn is fed by the 
ACFTU‟s cautious approach to getting involved in disputes. This legal activism is 
manifested in the emergence of so-called „black lawyers‟ – unqualified paralegals – 
and legal advice centres run by labour LNGOs in the boom towns of Guangdong 
province. LNGOs concentrate on labour law education, worker training, providing 
assistance to workers chasing compensation for injury via legal means, health and 
health education services and the provision of educational leisure facilities such as 
libraries, film shows and parties. They often offer legal advice in labour disputes, but 
generally avoid strikes as they can lead to accusations of subversion or organising 
alternative workers‟ associations from the authorities. At the same time most LNGO 
activists are well aware of the importance of workers‟ self-activity for levelling the 
labour relations playing field.  
Our aim is to assist workers to uphold their legal rights. We cannot become 
involved in militant actions such as strikes as the authorities will simply close 
us down. This has been proved in practice. At the same time, we foster 
workers‟ self-reliance and this requires workers to have knowledge of the law 
and its boundaries so that they can negotiate with the bosses or even take them 
to court. (LNGO staffer, interview, Hong Kong, 12 December 2005) 
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For other groups the emphasis on labour rights and engagement with corporate social 
responsibility projects form part of an overall strategy that avoids collective action.  
Of course, we think workers should have the right to strike and demonstrate, 
but this is a last resort. If only employers, workers, contractors and brands obey 
the law and international labour norms there will be no need to strike. (LNGO 
staffer, interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2006) 
Paralegal labour practitioners are known as „black lawyers‟ (hei lüshi). Their 
networks emerged at the turn of the century as an alternative to employer-dependent 
enterprise unions and nervous LNGOs. They have become a well-established part of 
the landscape and in 2007 an activist attached to a labour NGO familiar with such 
networks estimated that there were over 600 black lawyers in Shenzhen and Dongguan 
(Chan, C. personal communication, 18 November 2008). Most black lawyers are 
former workers who have been injured and have acquired knowledge of the law via 
personal experience of suing employers for compensation. They provide legal advice 
and even represent workers in arbitration and court appearances under the system of 
„civil agency‟ (gongmin daili).42 One former worker set up his network by helping 
workers successfully to resign from a factory with all the wages owed to them by the 
employer (Chan, C. personal communication, 18 November 2008). He charged 100 
yuan for each successful case. Some of the more successful black lawyers have moved 
towards formal registration as labour service centres (Chan, C. personal 
communication, 18 November 2008) and in doing so have elicited the attentions of the 
                                                 
42
 Civil agency in China recognises the lack of qualified lawyers and legal aid in China and therefore 
provides for non-qualified persons to represent „clients‟ in court. Wary of the impact that civil agency 
was having on investment, the Dongguan government effectively banned the practice in labour dispute 
cases involving more than three people in September 2009 (Dongguan [news] Net, 2009) 
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local authorities. In contrast with the more cautious approach of LNGOs, the reaction 
to unwanted interference and veiled threats has been more robust. In 2006, for example, 
one District Labour Bureau and the Department for Urban Administration (DUA) in 
Shenzhen confiscated documents and computers from a black lawyer‟s service centre 
on the grounds that it was an illegal operation. The response of the centre‟s owner was 
to gather his staff and march into the DUA director‟s office to demand a legal 
justification for his orders!  
Black lawyer networks have also campaigned against the „administrative 
dysfunction‟ (xingzheng buzuowei) as manifested by the Bao‟An District Labour 
Bureau in Shenzhen. Since 1999, at least six hundred cases had been brought against 
the bureau on the grounds that it did not perform its administrative duty to ensure 
workers obtain legal wages. Many of these cases were at least partially won.  The 
networks have also lobbied delegates to the Shenzhen People‟s Congress to submit a 
proposal prohibiting or lowering the labour dispute arbitration fee of 500 yuan. The 
lobbying was backed by a „ten thousand signature‟ campaign in the streets of Bao‟An. 
According to one „black lawyer‟, the central government sent a research team to 
Guangdong to listen to the legal grounds underpinning the campaign and in December 
2006 the Supreme Court issued a judicial explanation that restricted backdated 
overtime wage claims to two years. The explanation encouraged many workers to 
claim „forced resignation‟ on the grounds of unpaid overtime, which in turn opened up 
the path for them to claim the maximum two years of underpaid overtime wages as 
specified by the Supreme Court. Another black lawyer reported in December 2007 that 
his company had received 120 such cases, most of which involved middle-level 
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managers. In another incident, 606 workers resigned en masse (Chan, C. personal 
communication, 18 November 2008).  
Challenging Capitalist Social Relations: The ‘Normalisation’ of the Economic Strike  
The rise of legal activism also reflects growing rights awareness among migrant 
workers. However, it does not offer an adequate explanation for the scale of the growth 
of collective action by migrant workers. As experienced and second generation migrant 
workers have accumulated a better understanding of the factory system and the laws 
that are meant to protect them from its worst excesses there has been a concomitant 
shift in the occurrence and nature of their response to capitalist super-exploitation. And 
as labour unrest has climbed to an altogether higher level, workers‟ awareness of their 
collective strength has also grown. Strikes and picket lines have gradually replaced sit-
ins and marches to government labour bureaux. There has been a „normalisation‟ of 
strikes (Kessler, 2010; Nanfang Daily, 2008) and a concomitant recognition from the 
state that workers need representation at enterprise level if the situation is to be 
stabilised without resorting to blanket repression. Skilled migrant workers in particular 
have brought about a situation in which „strikes are by far the quickest and most 
effective way for workers to improve pay in particular and working conditions in 
general‟ (Lawyer, interview, 12 June 2007). Line supervisors‟ willingness to side with 
workers has also contributed. As Cao Menghua, a former employee turned activist 
from Gold Peak explains: 
That night we staged a general strike covering all the factory workshops. The 
workers in the milling shops and assembly workshops demanded the test results, 
while the others requested a health check-up. We were ready to fight for our 
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rights. In the initial period of our struggle, workers were not well organised and 
only a few line supervisors supported us. But this time the line supervisors took 
part in planning and how to make the strike successful. They appointed 
different batches of workers to block places, and they arranged shifts to 
guarantee the blockage was maintained around the clock. The strike was 
efficiently organised, similar to the organisation of production. The girl 
safeguarding the elevator told me: „Hua, I have locked up the elevator, and no 
one can take it now. You can relax!‟ Women workers in the assembly 
department got very excited when they noticed the success of their action – 
earlier in May their strikes were unsuccessful. Some commented „Hey, when 
line supervisors join us, it really makes a difference!‟ (Globalization Monitor, 
2009)  
 The growing success of these strikes by workers able to command higher than 
average wages has also impacted on unskilled line workers reliant on the minimum 
wage. Following a wave of strikes in 2004 and 2005, the Shenzhen city authorities 
increased the minimum wage dramatically in July 2005 and July 2006, by one-third 
over the two years for those employed inside the SEZ, and forty-six per cent for those 
employed outside the SEZ (Chan, C. 2009: 60-77). These significant increases aroused 
the workers‟ expectations, so that when the city government failed to increase the 
minimum wage in July 2007 a new round of strikes erupted (Chan, C.  2008). In short, 
„collective bargaining by riot‟ (Hobsbawm, 1964: 6-7) has gradually emerged as the 
most efficient method for workers to defend their rights and interests. Many have 
developed a very good idea of what they can get away with and how far they can go, so 
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that short sharp strikes and protests have become an extremely prompt and effective 
way of redressing their grievances. 
These developments are giving weight to the argument that migrant workers in 
China are no longer simply passive victims. Whereas in the past a collective strike was, 
generally speaking, a last resort to be used only after other forms of redress had been 
exhausted, it is increasingly the case that workers take strike action as a more efficient 
alternative to formal and crowded dispute resolution procedures. In other words, they 
have become more militant. The lack of a clearly protected right to strike in China and 
related restrictions on the official reporting of strikes means that there are no clear 
figures either on the number of strikes or the number of working days lost through 
strike activity. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to suggest both that strikes 
are rising in number and frequency and that there is a corresponding trend away from 
repression towards concession on the part of the state (Clarke and Pringle, 2009: 93). 
We can get an idea of their geographical distribution by looking at figures for 
arbitration and court cases. In the table below provinces and municipalities with high 
levels of FDI, Hong Kong and Taiwanese investment and private capital were topping 
the „disputes league table‟ at least as far as we can judge by statistics for cases 
registered for arbitration. These figures suggest that industrial disputes strikes are 
predominantly in the oldest zones, where labour shortages are most obvious.  
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Table 4 
Top six provinces for recorded labour disputes going to arbitration 
Province Cases Accepted 
Guangdong 54,855 
Jiangsu 43,984 
Shandong 23,625 
Shanghai 24,172 
Beijing 22,647 
Zhejiang  21,036 
(Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2007: 517)  
Migrant workers‟ capacity to organise collective disputes has been greatly 
enhanced by two factors: firstly, the impact of labour shortages and, secondly, the 
accumulation of experience in the factory system, especially among skilled workers. 
The Chinese media began running stories on labour shortages in Guangdong province 
following the Spring Festival in February 2004, when the annual return to work failed 
to meet employer demand in some areas (Barboza, 2006; Yuji Miora, 2007). These 
reports linked the shortages to low wages and poor working conditions as well as 
competition from other apparently better-regulated regions such as the Yangzi River 
Delta running inland from Shanghai. A report released at the end of December 2004 
pointed out that real wages in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) had risen just sixty-eight 
yuan in twelve years (Wen Dajun Dale, 2007: 30-35) and employers even began to 
worry that the flurry of press reports would encourage workers to demand better wages. 
An owner of a Shenzhen plastics factory whom I interviewed in Hong Kong in late 
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2005 illustrated how alarm bells were beginning to ring among employers used to 
dictating terms.  
We are short of workers and I cannot see any improvement in the situation in 
the foreseeable future. My father and I have raised wages but the newspaper 
reports have taken an anti-employer attitude and this is making workers more 
militant. I have prohibited workers from taking newspapers into their 
dormitories but this is not going to stop them getting angry. They can read them 
outside anyway. We haven‟t had to deal with strikes, but I can see it coming. 
They are happening all over the delta. (Factory owner, interview, Hong Kong, 
12 October 2005)  
The shortages continued through 2006 and 2007 but were not confined to the PRD as 
initial reports seemed to suggest. I interviewed a personnel manager at a large chemical 
factory in Hangzhou in spring 2007. His company‟s recent policy of hiring migrant 
workers on basically the same terms as local workers had been dictated by labour 
shortages. 
We no longer formally distinguish between local workers and migrant workers. 
Of course, local workers do not generally make use of the dormitories but they 
can if they want to. Likewise, a number of the skilled or older migrant workers 
on our books rent or have even bought homes nearby. You can hear if you walk 
around this district that there are accents from all over China. In fact, this is the 
second generation of migrants and they are totally different from the first 
generation that did not stay long and had different goals. Just look at the clothes 
they wear these days, you cannot tell them apart from local people. But to be 
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honest, our policy is ultimately determined by the need to retain skilled, 
experienced workers in a completely different labour market environment. 
(Personnel manager, interview, Hangzhou, 21 March 2007)  
Mid-term demographic factors also appear to weigh in favour of workers as ‘the 
number of fifteen-year olds steadily declines over the next fifteen years or so, this will 
translate into more bargaining power for those entering into the labour force in the 
future‟ (Dali L. Yang, 2005). 
The shift in the market has not been lost on migrant workers. Protests in the 
past had generally involved a march down to the local labour bureau with the aim of 
getting officials involved in order to bring pressure to bear on employers. The most 
common form of dispute was over wage arrears (Greenfield and Pringle, 2002; Lee 
Ching-kwan, 2007: 165). While arrears remain a major issue, especially in the 
construction sector, the spontaneous march to the labour office is being replaced by 
more sophisticated tactics directly targeting employers and usually led by skilled 
workers demanding higher wages.  
The skilled workers themselves also use the situation [labour shortages] to their 
own advantage by demanding higher wages, often for all the workers in a 
factory. If the bosses refuse, it is these workers who will call and lead a strike. 
In cases such as wage arrears, it is also the skilled workers who generally lead 
the other workers in demonstrations to the government offices with complaints 
against the factory managers. They also make sure the demonstrations are 
peaceful, often repeatedly whispering their demands. (Xu Xiaohong, 2004: 286)   
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Strikes often involve street protests. These can be an indirect way of getting workers 
from other factories to join in a strike or a deliberate attempt to up the stakes and force 
government officials to pressure employers to settle. The militancy of recent strikes is 
captured by Chan‟s research in Shenzhen. In doing so, he shows how spontaneity and 
organisation are far from mutually exclusive. 
Workers also prepared at least three amplifiers, several cameras and some fund-
raising boxes. They wrote „for our common interests, please put in your 
money!‟ on the boxes. They were soon full of money. The cameras were used 
to take pictures when workers were beaten by policemen. More and more 
workers from other factories joined in. At 1:00 pm the protesters, whose 
number had reached as high as 7000 to 8000, arrived in the immigration control 
station.
43
 More than ten fire engines and over thirty water cannon stood in front 
of the station. The police used the water tap to drive away the workers, while 
the workers lobbed stones and bricks at police. The police attempted, but failed 
to move in as the stones kept raining down. But later on, the police sent out 
plainclothes to mix into the protesters. They strongly attacked workers suddenly. 
After the workers in the front fell down, those standing behind screamed and 
others retreated. Some workers were arrested during the day, but they were 
soon released. Thirty workers were sent to hospital and treated well. Their 
medical expenses were all paid by the police. The head of the district police 
bureau came to visit them, and gave each patient, workers and policemen alike, 
100 yuan. (Chan, C. personal communication, 18 November 2008)  
                                                 
43
 The station was built in 1979 to separate the inner SEZ from the outskirts. 
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Home town associations can be both a constraint on and a resource for workers and 
self-activity was crucial in transforming traditional native place organisations into 
more effective class-orientated groups.  
[A]lthough the native place boundary and its attached gangsters were usually 
exploited by management to divide and pacify workers, they could function in 
the interests of workers when their structural power was increased. In this case, 
the strike was a turning point. (Chan, C. 2009: 60-77) 
Informal strikes and formal dispute resolution 
In presenting her „protests against discrimination‟ analysis of migrant worker protests, 
Lee gives us a road map of labour action. 
These workers resort first to legal activism such as filing petitions and lawsuits 
for collective labor arbitration, mediation and litigation. Only when this 
institutionalized channel fails (which it often does) do they resort to public 
disruption. (Lee Ching-kwan, 2007: 9, author‟s italics)    
Lee goes on to draw quite distinct protest strategies between migrant workers and 
traditional urban workers‟ „protests of desperation‟ (Lee Ching-kwan, 2007: 11) in 
which the former emphasise  legal and bureaucratic channels and the latter street action 
(Lee Ching-kwan, 2007: 9). 
 In contrast, the evidence presented here demonstrates that Lee‟s analysis is at 
best out-of-date and at worst plain wrong. Especially since 2003 and the onset of 
labour shortages, migrant workers are as likely to take strike action and/or block the 
streets as they are to file for collective arbitration. To be sure, migrant workers do use 
official channels of dispute resolution and are encouraged to do so by the authorities, 
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including the trade union, but this does not exclude other tactics. On the other hand, if 
Lee‟s road map takes us down the wrong route, we can chart a development in the 
protest strategies of migrant workers from protests to well-organised strikes – both of 
which may or may not have included formal resolution procedures – in which actual 
existing conditions are the deciding factor no matter which „insurgent identity‟ the 
participants may adopt.  
Migrant workers‟ labour militancy presents us with three main issues: first, who 
is the target of worker activism; second, the relationship between militant action and 
legalistic appeals; and third, the efficacy of the dispute resolution system. Of course, 
the problem underpinning all these issues is how the ACFTU responds to labour unrest.   
Do migrant workers in China target employers or the state when they engage in 
labour actions? Migrant workers‟ actions in the nineties were generally directed at the 
local labour bureau (Chan, A. 1998).  However, during the last seven to eight years 
there appears to have been a gradual move away from targeting the state to confronting 
employers directly, with the aim of forcing them to negotiate. I believe this trend was 
first identified by experienced LNGO researchers and staffers. Parry Leung conducted 
a survey of newspaper reports on collective labour disputes in the PRD between 2002 
and 2005. Leung‟s data show that just short of a third of newspaper-reported collective 
actions by migrant workers took place at the manufacturing site and did not involve 
street protests. A majority of the sixty-seven protests involved street protests, but these 
were a collective extension of strikes rather than discreet petitions. In comparison with 
Chan‟s newspaper translations, the survey reflects a growing militancy: twenty-three 
strikes combined with road blocks; fourteen strikes and street demonstrations but 
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without road blocks; sixteen strikes with no street demonstration; nine demonstrations 
in or around the enterprise; two detentions of senior managers; one work-in; one 
hunger strike and one suicide protest. Of course, in organising strikes, the workers can 
be confident of attracting the attention of the state. This risks police intervention as 
well as that of the local labour bureau. But either way, by organising collective strikes 
rather than directly petitioning the state, the workers are openly targeting production 
and the employer. In fact Leung‟s survey found that migrants went to protest at 
government offices in only twelve protests (Kessler, 2009).  
  In April 2005, the IHLO office in Hong Kong – which featured a photograph 
of a dramatic factory gate picket line during 2005 and 2006 on its website‟s homepage 
– observed that the nature of disputes was changing as they were increasingly aimed at 
halting production to force bosses to concede rather than relying directly on 
government intervention. The weapon of choice was now the strike and the picket 
line.
44
 Until quite recently, the Hong Kong-based LNGO China Labour Bulletin was 
keen to emphasise that workers took militant action only as a last resort (CLB, 2000). 
However, in answering questions from the floor of an ITUC/GUF conference convened 
in Hong Kong in 2008 to discuss the emerging labour movement, CLB director Han 
Dongfang argued that strikes „have become the most effective method to improve 
wages and conditions‟ and that the wider trade union and NGO community should 
„catch up with Chinese workers‟. My interviews with Gold Peak workers suggest that 
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 During my time at China Labour Bulletin, former BWAF leader Han Dongfang and I frequently 
discussed strikes and picket lines in China. Han argued that they were not part of Chinese workers‟ 
history and that the conditions in China dictated they were not a feasible tactic, a position with which I 
disagreed.  Following the Xianyang strike and many other disputes, Han recently indicated to me that 
strikes had now become the most potent weapon among Chinese workers, and that they often included 
picket lines!  
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strikes were an initially preferred – if somewhat panicky – instrument of protest, 
effectively disabled by a combination of company tactics and, as we have seen, by the 
constraints of hukou.  The reaction of milling shop workers at Gold Peak‟s Huizhou PP 
factory to the news that fellow workers had tested positive for excess and poisonous 
levels of cadmium in their blood was to strike. They demanded that the company talk 
transparently about the dangers of cadmium and they urged government intervention in 
order to compel Gold Peak to accept their compensatory obligations. The company‟s 
response was to play down the effects of cadmium, offer limited compensation and set 
deadlines for agreement that effectively terminated the employment of the more 
militant workers. Clearly Gold Peak wished to avoid further strikes and channel the 
dispute into a drawn-out process of legal wrangling. On the other hand, events have 
since proved that the company certainly underestimated the workers‟ tenacity. 
The second issue concerns the relationship between militant action and 
legalistic appeals. While acknowledging that the state has been anxious to channel 
disputes into formal juridical channels, Chan states simply that „[A]t a certain point, 
workers‟ docility becomes transformed into collective protest and violence‟ (Chan, A. 
2001: 16) but does not expand on the relationship between official procedures and 
protest. However, Lee found that the state‟s effort to build formal dispute resolution 
procedures did not necessarily discourage militancy. They could have the opposite 
effect:  
Radicalisation of conflict may occur in any stage of the arbitration-litigation 
process. When workers with standing grievances find legal grounds for their 
case, they expect official attention. But bureaucratic red tape and political 
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pressure from the big companies or state firms may affect whether workers may 
even lodge a complaint. (Lee 2007: 188) 
On the other hand, some experienced Hong Kong-based labour activists who have been 
monitoring labour disputes in the PRD for many years have found that arbitration and 
litigation tended to rule out more militant forms of action as they risk incurring the 
anger of the arbitration committee or the courts. One activist with over ten years of 
experience explained that  
Sure, legal recourse is sometimes preceded by a strike or petition. However, in 
recent times there has been a rise in strikes that aim to damage the company 
economically [until such time as] it raises wages or cancels fees and fines. This 
course of action rarely involves arbitration or the courts. (LNGO staffer, 
interview, 17 January 2008) 
Pertinent here is the efficacy of the dispute resolution system as an institution 
through which workers can pursue their rights and interests even when they run counter 
to local government priorities. I have already documented the fact that, unlike the 
neighbouring transitional economy of Vietnam, workers do make use of formal 
procedures. However, both the courts and the arbitration committees have been 
reluctant to deal effectively with collective labour protests. Although there are political 
and financial aspects to this issue, the root of the problem lies with the largely 
unrepresentative role of the trade union during arbitration.  
Trade unions generally play a subordinate role in the dispute resolution 
procedure, acting as a mediator rather than as worker representative. On occasion trade 
unions have even appeared in arbitration hearings on behalf of the employer. In any 
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serious collective dispute the trade union is very unlikely to support the worker against 
the management, and there have been plenty of cases of victimisation of enterprise 
trade union leaders who have been so rash as to do so (Chen Feng, 2003: 1017). Thus 
union avoidance of disputes and its strategy of restricting its representation of workers 
to „cases where the violations are so bad that we will definitely win in court‟ (interview, 
Guangzhou, 2006) is a major constraint on effective dispute resolution. In the absence 
of trade union representation, labour NGOs and black lawyers have become very active 
in offering legal support to workers in dispute. The ACFTU has begun to sponsor the 
establishment of legal advice centres for workers on an experimental basis and the 
contested establishment of such a trade union centre is the focus of my case study in 
Chapter Five. In a significant development in late 2007, the Shenzhen Federation of 
Trade Unions (SFTU) even approached labour NGOs and black lawyers with a view to 
collaboration, on condition that the labour NGOs severed any links with foreign 
sponsors (Chan, C. personal communication, 18 November 2008).  
Conclusion 
 The Primacy of Trade Unions in „actually existing conditions‟  
On the hitherto sensitive question of strikes, the deputy chair of the SFTU said in a 
speech to the People‟s Congress that regulations on the conduct of strikes need to be 
drawn up and that society should not be oversensitive about their existence. 
Strikes are inevitable in the market economy and perfectly acceptable in today‟s 
society. Shenzhen needs to discard its oversensitive approach to strikes as this 
attitude has become an ideological millstone round our necks. (Wang Tongxin, 
2008) 
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While it is hard to avoid recalling senior Party official Chou Yang‟s somewhat 
ill-conceived public acceptance of strikes in the spring of 1957 (see Chapter Two), the 
nature of global capitalism itself would appear to rule out history repeating itself. 
Perhaps more than ever, the behaviour of workers in the reform era is central to the 
future development, pace and direction of trade union reform. Indeed the latter is now 
the key question for the future of China‟s industrial relations and the wider social 
harmony project. On the one hand, it has highlighted the potential role of the trade 
unions in developing institutionalised channels of conflict resolution; on the other hand, 
it has inhibited the trade unions from actively engaging with workers‟ grievances for 
fear of intensifying conflict. The development of sophisticated industrial militancy, 
especially in the private sector, has led to increased social and political pressure on the 
ACFTU to anticipate, and at times represent, workers‟ grievances. 
The source of political pressure resulting from worker protest in the private 
sector is the CPC, which is keen to avoid too many instances of collective protest. The 
Party appears to have accepted that labour disputes are an inevitable consequence of 
private enterprise. Taking the view that the juridical resolution of disputes will 
discourage workers from taking more militant action, the ACFTU is therefore required 
to channel this unrest into constitutional, juridical and/or bureaucratic forms of dispute 
resolution, a strategy that to date has been hampered by union inexperience in 
responding to apolitical shop-floor militancy, a lack of capacity in bargaining skills and 
a corresponding fear that mismanaging its intervention may render matters even more 
tense.  
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On the other hand, the union has been successful, on paper, in rebuilding the 
membership base that was devastated during the years of SOE restructuring. Efforts to 
recruit private sector workers had been sluggish and inevitably constrained by the fact 
that up until its Fourteenth Congress in 2003 migrant workers from the countryside 
were not recognised as part of the working class. In January 2001, the ACFTU 
launched a branch-building campaign that targeted all workers under the slogan: 
„Trade union organisations (branches) must be established wherever there are staff and 
workers‟ (nar li you zhigong, nar li jiu bixu jianli gonghui zuzhi). The wording is 
important and gives us more semantic insights into the habitual mores of the ACFTU 
even at a time of crisis. The term „staff and workers‟ is preferred over the term 
„workers‟ and its implications of confrontational class consciousness. More important 
however is that the slogan does not call on cadres to go forth and „organise‟ (zuzhi) 
staff and workers, but rather that trade union branches should be set up wherever staff 
and workers are to be found i.e. the private sector. Thus, despite the acknowledgement 
of migrants as workers, traditional methods of establishing unions via the trade union‟s 
status as a government organisation to secure employer agreement rather than directly 
approaching workers remained the dominant method of expanding membership. For 
many new recruits, the first sign that they had joined the union arrived with a deduction 
for union dues on their pay slip.  Not that this quota-driven approach to expansion 
didn‟t produce spectacular statistics. By the end of 2004, the union had over a million 
primary level organisations and 137 million members, of whom thirty-five million 
were newly-recruited migrant workers (Wang Qiaoping, 2005). In a sign of further 
relaxation of hukou restrictions, existing union members working away from home 
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were permitted to transfer their membership to their place of work rather than their 
place of residence.   
A well-publicised exception to this practice has been the long struggle of the 
ACFTU to establish a union organisation in Wal-Mart, where resistance from Wal-
Mart management persuaded the ACFTU to adopt an organising approach, recruiting 
individual employees to the union outside the workplace to provide the basis of a union 
branch. Nevertheless, even in this case the ACFTU has been hesitant about moving 
beyond its traditional collaborationist model. Although the Wal-Mart case has been 
widely proclaimed as a breakthrough in the ACFTU‟s organising strategy, after the 
first union branches were established Wal-Mart signed a recognition agreement with 
the ACFTU under which new branches would be established in the traditional way, in 
collaboration with management, although the preparatory committees would include 
employee representatives and the agreement provided for the election of the trade 
union committee. Asked why Wal-Mart had agreed to allow unions a Wal-Mart 
spokesman reportedly said: „The union in China is fundamentally different from unions 
in the West … The union has made it clear that its goal is to work with employers, not 
promote confrontation‟ (China Daily, 2006). It remains to be seen how effective Wal-
Mart‟s workplace trade unions will prove to be. 
The combination of striking skilled workers and Party pressure on the union 
was apparent in a strike by 220 gantry and tower crane operators at the Yantian 
International Container Terminals Limited (YICT). The YICT is a joint venture 
established by Hutchison Port Holdings and Shenzhen Yantian Port Group in 1994 and 
is responsible for port services at Shenzhen‟s Yantian port, now one of the busiest 
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harbours in the world. Much better paid than Shenzhen‟s factory workers, the crane 
operators were nevertheless fed up with management arrogance and sleight-of-hand 
deductions from their pay packets. They were also angry at the absence of a trade 
union, calling the company-sponsored Staff Association a „white collar club‟. 
Following successful strikes by workers at nearby ports that had a powerful impact on 
the YICT crane operators, they struck for improved wages, reduced working time and 
the organisation of a trade union in April 2007. The reaction from the Shenzhen 
government and the SFTU was immediate. A high-level delegation that included a 
deputy chair of the SFTU descended on the port in the early hours of the morning. It 
made rapid progress and by breakfast time the group had established contact with 
management; assured the strikers that a union would be established on the basis of 
Chinese law; promised that the SFTU would assist in the selection of worker 
representatives; and assured strikers that it would compel management to come to the 
negotiating table, a promise it was able to make due to the backing of the Shenzhen 
government and Party Committee.  
It is interesting to note that, while the city-level union and indeed government 
intervention in such strikes has traditionally been limited to a fire-fighting role, the 
nature of the workers‟ demands at the Yantian port terminal dictated a more thorough 
response. The SFTU‟s intervention was based on three premises: ensuring that the 
dispute did not spread and that a return to work took place as soon as possible; finding 
common ground between the two sides and supervising subsequent negotiations; and, 
most important of all, ensuring that the dispute was placed firmly within the parameters 
of the Chinese labour relations and trade union system in order to avoid any chance of 
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a „second trade union‟ being set up outside the control of the ACFTU.  As a result, all 
the workers‟ financial demands were basically met even as their aspirations for an 
independently elected union committee were effectively squashed by management bad 
faith and the SFTU‟s unwillingness to challenge the company over election procedures. 
Negotiations ended with a three per cent pay rise, half an hour off the working day plus 
significant bonuses for working at height.  
The pressure on trade unions to stabilise labour relations is heaviest in areas 
where private and foreign capital has made the most significant inroads – chiefly 
southern and eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Fujian. 
Although pilot projects have been conducted in Fujian – union elections in a Nike 
factory, for example, Guangdong and Zhejiang have been the main locations for union 
innovation. In the following three chapters I use case studies to examine critically three 
examples of union innovation at local level and their implications for overall progress 
in China‟s industrial relations system. 
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Chapter Four  
‘Experimental Pragmatism’ 1: Collective Consultation in Xinhe Town  
Introduction  
„Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti‟ - Follow your own course, and let people 
talk.
45
  
Despite a dramatically altered industrial relations landscape, the continued traditional 
practices of Chinese trade unions at the local level have been a major obstacle to 
reform at the national level. Consequently, the transformation into a more responsive 
and representative organisation of the working class is as dependent on local 
innovation, followed by the integration of successful projects into national trade union 
policy, as it is on Party edicts. In the main, the absence of a „second trade union‟ (di er 
ge gonghui) tends to lull the ACFTU into taking a passive approach to reform and this 
adds to the significance of dynamic local initiatives if, and when, they occur. 
Understanding these initiatives is important for three reasons. First, Chinese 
governance generally operates on a pilot study basis and the results of any given pilot 
are analysed at the centre prior to being applied provincially, nationally, put on hold or 
rejected.
46
 For example, China‟s national social security reforms were based on a large-
scale pilot reform in Liaoning province. Second, China‟s authoritarian political system 
is neither monolithic nor seamless and the unavoidable fractures leave room for local 
initiatives that are not entirely dictated by the restrictions and concerns of the central 
                                                 
45
 Karl Marx paraphrasing Dante in the preface to the first German edition of Capital, Volume One.  
46
 Dramatic policy shifts can also be reactive. The most famous being the Party‟s endorsement of the 
practices of peasant farmers in Anhui province who began selling their surplus produce at private market 
stalls in the mid-seventies. The consequent increase in production and productivity precipitated the sea 
change in agricultural policy represented by the household responsibility system introduced in 1978. A 
local government‟s pressing ahead with market practices and policies form part of the background to my 
second case study in union „experimental pragmatism‟ discussed in the next chapter.  
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government in Beijing. On the negative side, this can facilitate local protectionism, 
which has generally been a conservative force in Chinese politics. But on the positive 
side, it can provide the space for workers and union officials to pursue initiatives that 
might not be immediately acceptable closer to the centres of power. As the Chinese 
saying goes, „heaven is high and the emperor is far away‟. Third, China provides us 
with an example of combined and uneven development. Speaking of nation states, 
Marx argued that under a globally expanding capitalism „the country that is more 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future‟ 
(Marx, 1867: 1). The same applies to uneven development in China. For example, 
almost ninety per cent of the population of Guangdong province derives its primary 
income from non-agricultural activity; and yet a fifth of China‟s peasantry still lacks 
access to electricity. We should not be surprised, then, when traditionally-minded 
ACFTU officials in less developed and less open Guangxi province cast a chary eye at 
the SFTU‟s recent ground-breaking – if somewhat double-edged – proposal to join 
forces with paralegal lawyers and LNGOs in the city.
47
 But as the market economy 
develops in Guangxi, trailblazers in the SFTU could, if they knew their Marx, 
justifiably shoot back at their Guangxi counterparts that „it is of you that the story is 
told‟ (Marx, 1867: 1).  
Party pressure on the trade unions to improve their representation of workers 
emerged in the late nineties as SOE restructuring deepened and the private sector 
continued to acquire an international reputation for appalling working conditions, 
which stimulated growing protest from migrant workers. As the fourth most senior 
                                                 
47
 This information is derived from personal communication with a senior labour academic in Beijing. I 
use it solely to illustrate my point.  
218 
 
politician in China and chair of the ACFTU, Wei Jianxing was ideally placed to give 
voice to the Party‟s concerns.48 In a speech to senior trade union cadres in 2000 he 
made these concerns crystal clear.  
The problems at the moment are: on the one hand, following the structural 
adjustments and the restructuring of SOEs and COEs, a considerable number of 
trade union organisations [and branches] have collapsed and their members 
washed away. On the other hand, the organisation of trade unions in newly-
established enterprises has simply not happened. At the end of 1999, national 
trade union membership had dropped to eighty-seven million, leaving more 
than 100 million workers unorganised. When there is not even a trade union, 
what is the point of talking about unions upholding the legal rights of workers? 
Or being a transmission belt between the party and the masses? Or an important 
social pillar of state power? (Wei Jianxing, 2000) 
The CPC‟s anxiety was, in large part, rooted in the fear that passive trade 
unions would be unable „to prevent people from initiating self-organised and self-
controlled actions that challenge the status quo‟ (Wang Kan, 2008: 203). Thus, while 
the absence of competition from independent trade unions is hardly constructive to 
developing an internal dynamic driving ACFTU reform, there are times when the Party 
steps in to fill the void and encourage innovation. For example, the chair of the 
Shandong Federation of Trade Unions (and a member of the Provincial Party 
Committee‟s Standing Committee), Bai Xumin, has exhorted union cadres to work 
hard and „blaze new trails in the fields of trade union theory and work‟ (Bai Xumin, 
                                                 
48
 In 2000, Wei Jianxing led the CPC‟s Central Committee for Discipline and Inspection and was 
number four in the Politburo Standing Committee‟s hierarchy, the most powerful political body in the 
land. 
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2007). Of course, this can work in the reverse direction, as the ACFTU rediscovered 
following its decision to make a substantial financial contribution to the hunger striking 
students of Tiananmen Square during the 1989 Democracy Movement. The gesture led 
to a comprehensive leadership purge.   
On the other hand, Party pressure on the unions to reform is qualified by its 
anxiety that increased representation will lead to even higher levels of labour militancy. 
As a consequence the framing, presentation and „spin‟ of reform is particularly 
important and trade union innovation in the „the new era of trade union work‟ (Wang 
Lianxiang, 2005: 280) is often presented as having produced a win-win (shuangying) 
result or situation. The Wenling City Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) used the 
phrase to describe the wage consultation project discussed in this chapter (WFTU, 
2006) and has adopted a somewhat self-congratulatory tone ever since.     
Following several years of conscientious explorations and pilot practices, [the 
union] achieved the success we had anticipated. The enterprises were satisfied 
and the workers were delighted. It is a win-win situation. (WFTU, 2006)  
In fact, rather than anticipating success, the WFTU leaders must have had a pleasant 
surprise, as the innovative practices I discuss were specific to local conditions on the 
ground. 
Given that labour militancy is now the major underlying reason for trade union 
reform, its political aim is to neutralise antagonistic capital-labour relations and 
produce the less exploitative environment originally envisaged by the post-1978 
leadership. On the other hand, the consequence of the CPC‟s embrace of globalisation 
has been to cast aside Deng Xiaoping‟s insurance policy against contradictions 
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between „socialism and the market economy‟. Back in 1985, it seemed feasible enough 
that „the public sector of the economy is always predominant‟ and by fostering 
economic growth „we seek common prosperity, always trying to avoid polarisation‟ 
(Deng Xiaoping, 1985). The disappearance of these socialist market benchmarks has 
rendered the ACFTU‟s task yet more complex and urgent.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how localised class struggle encouraged local 
actors to move beyond the constraints of enterprise-based collective consultations – the 
original location of the goalposts – to a sector-wide agreement involving 116 
enterprises and over 12,000 workers. In the following chapter I examine the protracted, 
contentious and eventually successful struggle to establish a workers‟ legal rights 
centre under the management of the local city-level trade union. I have tried to capture 
the essence of these two examples of union innovation by referring to them as 
manifestations of „experimental pragmatism‟. More formal national trade union 
reforms – also based on pilot projects – such as the application of enterprise-level trade 
union elections  (see Chapter Six) have been positioned as attempts to democratise 
either the union, or indeed, China itself (Howell, 2008: 845-863). In contrast, the 
following examples are presented as local responses drawing on local resources, 
including individual initiatives to meet the challenges of labour violations and strikes 
that arose from the rapid expansion of capitalist relations of production in small-scale 
enterprises. In short, innovation that travelled up the transmission belt rather than 
orders coming down it.  
I have divided this chapter on collective consultation in the town of Xinhe, 
Zhejiang province into four sections. The first section summarises the development of 
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collective dialogue in industrial relations in China and highlights the major issues. The 
second briefly describes the economic and political backdrop against which the 
experiment in sector-level consultation took place. The third section narrates the 
process of collective consultation itself. And the final section analyses the events in the 
context of the research question: How can a local trade union act in defence of the 
interests and rights of its members and potential members? I.e. is bottom-up reform 
possible?  
Methodology 
This chapter is based on supervised field work in Wenling City and Xinhe town carried 
out in 2006 by senior labour researchers with excellent access to the Zhejiang 
Federation of Trade Unions at all levels. The conclusion of a collective wage table 
covering over 100 small enterprises in one town had originally been the subject of a 
short paper presented at a seminar I attended in 2004. Given the difficulties of the 
environment, the achievement interested me and gave rise to further discussions with a 
number of colleagues working in China. While the agreement did not constitute a fully 
participatory process of bargaining, it appeared to be sustainable and certainly 
warranted further inquiry, not least because it represented an innovative response to 
sophisticated labour militancy. After further background reading on the subject during 
the first year of my PhD, I asked my mainland colleague who had written the original 
paper if further research was possible. He agreed and we arranged to conduct 
interviews with the chairpersons of the main county-level trade union, the new sector-
level union and also with senior figures from the local city-level union in Wenling 
during May 2006. The research team on the ground was made up of four researchers 
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and led by my colleague. We discussed the data and prepared follow up interview 
questions that took place in September 2006. A full case study report was completed 
and this was subsequently the subject of discussion at four follow-up meetings as well 
as during my trips to Zhejiang on related fieldwork.     
The Development of Collective Consultation in the Reform Era  
Context 
Collective dialogue in China is informed by both the legacy of the command economy 
and the apparent durability of the transitional period. Officially, the current status of 
the transition is not contested. However, the Party‟s theoretical interpretations of actual 
existing social and economic relations are driven as much by political expediency as by 
intellectual rigour. On the one hand, China‟s revised Constitution still clings to 
socialist rhetoric even as the CPC has admitted capitalists into its ranks and private 
property has been awarded the same status as national assets. On the other hand, 
although the state still tries to play a directive role in the economy, there has been an 
explosion of capitalist social relations over the past twenty years and the state sector 
has been shrinking fast in relative, and in some sectors, even in absolute size (see 
Chapter One). In the field of collective dialogue, the return of the openly separate 
interests of labour and capital in the workplace has been treated with great caution by 
the Party and the trade union has hardly been left to its own devices. As we saw in 
Chapter One, during the command economy era, a triumvirate of committees known as 
the lao san hui (Hua et al., 2006: 405) „administered labour relations‟ in SOEs (Chang 
Kai, 2004: 87). The triumvirate was made up of the Party Committee, the Trade Union 
Committee and the Standing Committee of the Staff and Workers‟ Congress, with the 
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Party Committee having ultimate authority. While such clear manifestations of Party 
power are no longer visible on the shop or office floor, it remains virtually impossible 
to have a conversation with labour activists in the PRD without reference to the CPC 
and its authority. Against this background, the complexities of inherited practices and 
the durability of the transitional period influence activity in three aspects of activity 
related to the development of collective solutions to industrial conflict: conceptually, 
legally and in practical application.  
Conceptualising Consultation 
Conceptually, „labour relations‟ (laodong guanxi) is a politically correct term designed 
to fit the mixed realities of a socialist market economy. The term allows for the co-
existence of public and private capital and replaced the more problematic „labour-
capital relations‟ (laozi guanxi) initially adopted following the introduction of 
economic reforms and consequent restoration of an industrial relations system (Warner 
and Zhu, 2000: 24). For the Party-state, the term „labour-capital relations‟ implied that 
the transition period was a return to capitalism or, at the very least, a conceptual step in 
that direction. In keeping with this reasoning is the use of the term „collective 
consultation‟ (jiti xieshang) as opposed to „collective bargaining‟ (jiti tanpan). 
Consultation implicitly suggests that a „win-win‟ agreement between employer and 
employees can be achieved without serious contention, work stoppages, strikes and the 
like. There is no need, therefore, for the more aggressive „bargaining‟ often perceived 
as a characteristic of „western-style‟ trade unions. As one county level trade union 
cadre illustrated: 
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Our role is to explain to employers that trade unions in general and collective 
consultation in particular are in their interests. If an employer is especially 
nervous of trade unions – such as some of the Korean investors in Guangdong – 
we patiently explain that we are not like western trade unions or trade unions in 
their home country and certainly do not organise strikes or that kind of thing. 
(Union official, interview, Pingshan, 10 October 2005) 
Yet there is clearly an underlying suspicion within trade union circles, labour 
academia and the pro-reform sections of the media that „bargaining‟ might be a more 
appropriate conceptual approach. Increasingly reports in the press employ the term 
„collective bargaining‟ (Workers‟ Daily 2005a). At the policy development level, Liu 
Yufang draws a direct link between the use of the terms bargaining, legal development 
and China‟s integration into the world market. 
The key point is that collective contracts are concluded via collective 
bargaining. Following WTO entry, China must not only accept and meet 
international norms on enterprise regulations and trade rules; we must also 
gradually bring our labour laws up to the level of international labour standards. 
In the global economy, collective contracts are a principal legal system for 
labour relations universally adopted by countries with market economies and 
moreover are a basic right recognised by the ILO. As a WTO member, the 
status of collective contracts will shift from voluntary to compulsory, an 
obligation clearly stated in the revised Trade Union Law. (Liu Yufang, 2002: 
23) 
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Whether the process is called bargaining or consultation, there is always the danger of 
attaching too much importance to words alone. Perhaps the main point is that the 
ACFTU is at last beginning to accept that  
to bargain and negotiate requires not only recognition that the interests of 
workers and managers can be opposed, but also willingness, courage and skills 
to confront. To bring about such a change in behaviour demands therefore 
fundamental changes in the pattern of incentives to trade union leaders. (Howell, 
2003: 105) 
Legal Development 
Legally, the development of collective consultation has followed a gradual step by step 
approach to expanding the role of collective dialogue. A key issue arising out of legal 
constraints and ambiguities has been representation. Article Six of China‟s Trade 
Union Law (2001) stipulates that  
[W]hile protecting the overall interests of the entire Chinese people, trade 
unions shall represent and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of 
workers and staff members, the unions must represent the interests of the 
workforce. (ACFTU, 2001) 
Union representation is placed in a context so broad that it is even possible for a trade 
union chairperson to represent the „overall interests of the entire Chinese people‟ by 
negotiating a pay cut. I spoke with one trade union official in a Guangzhou enterprise 
department store who did just that and was proud of her efforts as it „saved jobs and 
gave a better deal to our customers‟ (enterprise-level union official, interview, 
Guangzhou, 21 October 2002).  
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The union cannot afford to be completely single-minded in its pursuit of 
members‟ interests at enterprise level as this would throw it open to accusations of 
economism i.e. exclusively representing workers‟ rights and interests at the enterprise 
level at the expense of the collective development of, say, a particular township. This 
constraint is particularly serious in the light of the Chinese model of enterprise-based 
trade unionism. In the meantime, the debate over whether the ACFTU is – or should be 
– „a multi-purposed institution to promote China‟s economic development and social 
stability‟ (Brown, 2006: 65) frequently leads to condemnation from potential members 
in the private sector. As a former employee of Gold Peak‟s Huizhou Advanced Factory 
plant struggling for compensation following occupational poisoning explained, the 
union was „useless at representing workers‟ interests at our workplace in Huizhou. 
They won‟t go after the employer for compensation as they want to protect Gold Peak 
and the local economy‟ (Jiang Xiaomei, interview, Hong Kong, 14 December 2005).  
At times the resulting schizophrenia degenerates into farce that is occasionally 
satirised in the media.  
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The cartoon shows a trade union official expressing his preference for sitting on the 
knee of a senior manager rather than in the chair representing workers (Southern 
Weekend, date unknown). 
Indeed, it is not unusual to find collective consultations in which the trade 
union negotiator is a senior manager in the enterprise. In theory, there is no reason why 
a senior manager cannot negotiate a collective contract that union members find 
acceptable. In practice, however, it need hardly surprise us that this has not been the 
case and most collective contracts have been little more – and often a little less – than a 
duplication of minimum legal standards that reflect a passive approach to negotiations 
by the trade unions. This passivity contrasts with the alacrity that senior unions can 
display in reporting back up the hierarchy the number of collective contracts completed 
on their patch as an indicator of their performance. There are many cases of the local 
MOLSS, as the authority that approves the legal status of a completed collective 
contract, rejecting the document on the grounds of the enterprise union „negotiating‟ 
standards that undercut the legal minimum (Taylor et al., 2003: 185). And of course 
there are long-term problems that arise from the coagulation of opposing interests. As 
Clarke et al. have put it:  
The identification of the trade union with management has important 
implications for the development of industrial relations and the responsibility of 
the trade union to represent the rights and interests of its members in the 
enterprise because it means that differences between the employer and the 
employees are reconciled within the trade union apparatus, rather than through 
negotiation between employer and employee on the basis of the trade union 
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representation of the rights and interests of its members. (Clarke et al., 2004: 
241)  
China‟s national Labour Law has just three articles devoted to collective 
consultation and contracts.
49
 They include stipulations that a signed draft contract must 
be put to the local labour bureau for approval and that the contract is effective within 
fifteen days if there are no objections. Standards set in a collective contract also serve 
as a minimum for those stipulated in individual contracts. With regard to the issues of 
interests and representation, Article Thirty-three is most relevant:  
The staff and workers of an enterprise as one party may conclude a collective 
contract with the enterprise on matters relating to labour remuneration, working 
hours, rest and vacations, occupational safety and health, and insurance and 
welfare. The draft collective contract shall be submitted to the congress of the 
staff and workers or to all the staff and workers for discussion and adoption. 
(ACFTU, 2001a) 
Interesting here is that in the absence of trade unions, the law allows for collective 
contracts to be „concluded by representatives elected by the staff and workers of the 
enterprise‟ but there are, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no public examples of 
such a course of action.  
More detailed procedures for collective consultation were originally mapped 
out in the Regulations on Collective Contracts (henceforth „Regulations‟) issued by the 
Department of Labour that came into force in January 1995.
50
 The Regulations were 
                                                 
49
 The Labour Contract Law (2008) has six articles on collective contracts (51-56). This law was not in 
force at the time of the experiment in Xinhe.   
50
 Such „Regulations‟ have an incomplete legal status and are meant as a reference for a court or 
arbitration committee dealing with a collective contract dispute. However, if a provincial people‟s 
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updated and expanded in 2004 by the MOLSS and included some important changes 
that may, in the future, impact on practice. Some researchers have seen reasons for 
optimism and identified a trend away from consultation towards bargaining, or at least 
improved representation. For example, Brown highlights Article Twenty-four in the 
new Regulations. This stipulates that, „negotiation representatives of the employing 
unit and those of the staff shall not act as each others‟ representatives‟ (Regulations on 
Collective Contracts, 2004) and suggests that this may at least temper the trend 
identified by Clarke and others with regard to trade union identification with 
management interests (Brown, 2006: 39). The MOLSS issued the Trial Method on 
Collective Wage Negotiation at the end of 2000, five years after the Regulations were 
promulgated. The WFTU referred to the Trial Method, also known as Document Nine, 
in articles posted on trade union websites and discussion boards in which it positioned 
the regulatory and legal environment as a component of the Xinhe collective 
consultation project discussed below (WFTU, 2006). In spirit and content, Document 
Nine does not differ from the Regulations and its trial implementation appears to have 
been motivated by the need for annual wage negotiations as opposed to three-year 
collective contracts. The main reason for the legal separation of collective wage 
agreements from collective contracts has been that wage agreements have generally 
been restricted to the size of the total wage bill and rarely included wage rates for 
specific posts or occupations (Clarke et al., 2004: 247). The increased detail with 
regard to wages included in the expanded 2004 Regulations may well render Document 
Nine superfluous over time. For example, Article Nine in the Regulations covers all 
                                                                                                                                             
congress – local parliament – has passed local regulations concerning collective contacts, these are 
legally enforceable. 
230 
 
aspects of wages: wage levels, system of wage distribution, wage standards and wage 
adjustments. This may give employers the impetus to lock wages down for up to three 
years.  
Practical Application 
At the practical level the twin factors of union dependence on management and the 
absence of alternative trade unions render a genuinely accountable dialogue on 
working conditions an extremely unlikely occurrence. As a consequence, collective 
consultations are generally organised to meet top-down quotas that allow the ACFTU 
to post spectacular statistics on paper that do not, generally speaking, reflect an 
improvement in pay and conditions on the ground. Neither are they participatory. As 
Liu points out, „[I]n many enterprises the equal consultation [between workers and 
employer] is a mere formality and genuine negotiations over labour relations do not 
exist‟ (Liu Yufang, 2002: 24). This mechanical approach epitomizes one of the central 
issues facing the ACFTU and gives rise to criticism that many aspects of its work at 
enterprise level are plagued by a formalistic approach (Clarke et al., 2004: 240). 
Formalism inevitably promotes the duplication of legal minimum standards or 
minimum model agreements provided by the MOLSS. If adhered to in practice, this 
may well constitute a significant improvement in pay and conditions, especially in the 
private sector. Much more common, however, is for this somewhat superficial 
duplication of minimum standards in collective contracts to act as a significant obstacle 
to the pursuit of more tangible and enforceable collective interests. In this scenario, the 
meeting of top-down quotas reigns supreme. At the end of 2002, sixteen provinces had 
set up collective contract systems. Approximately 308,600 individual enterprises with a 
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total of sixty-two million workers had signed collective contracts. At industrial (branch) 
level, there were 18,000 collective contracts in 218,000 in enterprises covering over 
112 million workers. There were also a further 65,300 cross-sector geographically-
based collective contracts in 743,000 enterprises that covered twenty-one million 
workers (Taylor and Li Qi, 2003: 701-715).
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 By the end of 2006, a total of 862,000 
collective contracts had been signed covering 1.538 million enterprises, 112.5 million 
workers or 59 per cent of all enterprise workers in China. The number of regional 
collective contracts signed across the country reached 66,000, with 753,000 enterprises 
and 29.6 million workers involved. Industry-specific collective contracts reached 
19,000, with 172,000 enterprises and 12.9 million workers covered (ACFTU, 2007).  
My own interviews and conversations about contracts and working conditions 
with workers in China suggest that most of the workers covered by these contracts 
would have little or no idea of their contents or even existence. As Taylor et al. (2003) 
argue, the figures merely reflect a formalistic implementation of the ACFTU‟s policy 
direction on collective consultation developed during the mid- to late nineties.  
From the beginning of the second phase [of implementing collective contracts] 
the ACFTU headquarters instituted a mechanistic quota system setting out 
targets for the number of contract signings per year, which are then allocated to 
provinces and industries and so on down the chain of command … The fact that 
in 1996, the implementation of the collective contract system could increase by 
more than 200 per cent should be attributed to the way the planned quota 
system is introduced. (Taylor et al., 2003: 190)  
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 Industrial-level collective contracts are notorious for simply regurgitating the law and are a reflection 
of the weakness of industrial unions and their formalistic practices.  
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Some observers have suggested that there was an outbreak of a more 
participatory, even confrontational collective „wage bargaining‟ in SOEs in the early 
nineties following the decentralization of wage controls (Hussain and Zhuang, 1998: 
50 cited in Ng and Warner, 2000: 106). However, as we saw in Chapter Two, it is more 
likely that this was a result of managers heading off dissatisfaction among SOE 
workers faced with disappearing certainties rather than trade union activism. 
To sum up, the development of collective consultation during the reform era 
has been characterised by the continued legacy of the command economy and the 
continued perceived integration of interests in the workplace. Consultation has been 
promoted as a Chinese alternative to bargaining and the trade union has concentrated 
on responding to the Party-state‟s anxiety to regulate industrial relations at enterprise 
level rather than bargain for class-based interests at a sectoral or even industrial 
(branch) level. Moreover, the trade union rarely goes beyond legally defined minimum 
standards in the name of furthering collective interests. Finally, there is minimum 
worker participation even in the state sector where the legacy of the past at least allows 
for a trade union presence, if not the exercise of trade union power. In the private 
sector unions are weak or non-existent. I now turn to an attempt to trail blaze through 
these constraints at the local level. The Xinhe case study described below involves a 
collective consultation exercise at sector level that covered mostly small-scale private 
enterprises in which labour relations were tense and competitive, labour turnover high, 
and in which almost all employees were internal migrant workers accustomed to voting 
with their feet. Using collective consultation to overcome these problems required the 
town trade union to experiment with a sector-level consultation process and agreement 
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that has since been accredited by the national leadership, as evidenced by positive 
articles reporting the agreement in the official labour media (Workers‟ Daily, 2003).  
Xinhe: Woollen Sweater Town 
Beginning in 1995, the once quiet Changyu area – now incorporated into Xinhe town – 
has gradually transformed into the location of the pillar (zhongdian) industry of Xinhe 
town. The kilometre-long main street is lined on both sides with 110 woollen sweater 
factories employing more than 10,000 people. From August to December every year, 
the street hums with the sound of knitting machines producing sweaters with a 
collective value of over one billion yuan (Yu Li, 2004). In 2003, the woollen sweater 
sector in Xinhe town was exporting much of this one billion yuan‟s worth of sweaters 
to America and Japan.
52
 The town‟s total of approximately 12,000 woollen sweater 
workers were employed in 116 private enterprises most of which were owned by local 
people: former farmers, officials turned entrepreneurs and former COE workers (Xinhe 
Case Study Report, 2006). Until 2001 most of the workers were locals but this 
demographic underwent a rapid change and by 2003 approximately 10,000 of the 
workers were migrants, mainly from Sichuan, Anhui and Hunan provinces (Xinhe Case 
Study Report, 2006). Over ninety per cent were female. The pie chart below shows the 
workforce according to size of enterprise and illustrates that three enterprises employed 
over 400 workers but the majority of the approximately 12,000 workers were spread 
across enterprises with between ten and 200 workers. The labour turnover and 
instability that originally acted as a catalyst for the consultation process also made it 
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 It is interesting to note that, despite the importance of the US market, corporate social responsibility 
does not appear to have played a role in the events in Xinhe.  
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very difficult to collate more accurate information on enterprise size by number of 
employees (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). 
Chart 2 
75
38
3
Number of enterprises by workers employed
10 - 20 workers
50 - 200 workers 
400 plus workers
 
Source: Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006 
Trade union organisation in Xinhe presented a familiar pattern for semi-urban 
areas characterised by small-scale private factory production. Just thirty of the 116 
enterprises had primary level trade unions. Five village-level trade union federations 
(cun lianhe gonghui hereinafter VTUF) covered sixteen villages. Enterprises in these 
villages had established trade union small groups (xiaozu) but these were not 
operational (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006).
53
 The VTUFs were dominated by village 
leaders and/or party secretaries and most of the workers were unaware that they were 
„members‟. Two out of the five union chairpersons owned factories „organised‟ by the 
VTUF they chaired. The VTUFs were not in a position to carry out their trade union 
duties and there were clear conflicts of interests even by the consensus-seeking norms 
of the socialist market economy.  
Xinhe‟s busiest season ran from August to October when orders were placed 
for the winter weather. The slack season – when many workers were stood down or 
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 A trade union small group is a trade union preparatory committee established to pave the way for a 
formal primary level union.  
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simply cleared out of their own accord – was between March and May. Although 
labour-intensive, production also required skilled and experienced workers, such as 
horizontal cross stitchers, who commanded considerably higher rates of pay and were 
able to use their skills to organise actions in pursuit of wage hikes or payment of wage 
arrears. Wages were generally calculated on a piece-rate basis and usually paid 
quarterly rather than monthly, a practice that violated Article Fifty of the Labour Law 
and caused considerable anger among workers. Employers deliberately used wage 
arrears as one of a variety of tactics to stop skilled workers from being lured away by 
higher pay. Others included illegal job deposits and keeping workers‟ ID cards. During 
the autumn busy season, labour relations in the smaller enterprises became extremely 
tense. Employers raised skilled workers‟ wages, in an attempt to avoid the latter 
cherry-picking jobs, and competition for experienced staff was fierce and at times had 
a disruptive impact on the production of woollen sweaters in the town (Xinhe Case 
Study Report, 2006). Skilled workers took advantage of their position in the labour 
market to demand still higher wages. Competition between employers for these 
workers was so strong that a voluntary cap on wages at 3,500 yuan a month unilaterally 
imposed by the Wenling City Woollen Manufacturers Association failed. Worker 
militancy was invariably led by the skilled workers. 
As soon as the busy season got going the skilled workers would start agitating 
in the workshops for across the board pay rises. A strike would start if the boss 
didn‟t agree. They would march to the township government offices using the 
already accumulated wage arrears to legitimate their actions. The main demand 
was for the government to intervene and sort out the wage arrears so that they 
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could „go home‟. This threat was aimed at getting the government involved. 
The marches were well organised and very peaceful. There was no shouting or 
scuffles, just a procession to the government buildings and then repeated 
whispering of slogans designed to attract government intervention: „We want 
our wages. We are not going to work here any more. We are going home. We 
want our wages and then we are going home.‟ The organisers were keen to 
avoid conflict with the police and concentrated on securing government 
intervention. (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006)  
By autumn 2002, local employers in Xinhe found themselves having to deal 
with migrant workers capable of taking advantage of the labour market to protect their 
own interests. Previously, most employees had been local.  
Many of the people we interviewed recalled that the labour disputes in the 
woollen sweater industry began to attract attention in 2001. Previously, most 
employees had been local people and the conflicts that arose were not so 
obvious. As more and more workers from outside arrived, they brought with 
them their experience gained from working in other places and they were much 
more skilled in looking after themselves. The number of disputes started rising 
and there were lots of strikes and petitions. (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006)  
At the start of the 2003 busy season, there were five such strikes, involving 
thirty to 100 people with the longest lasting for six days (Xinhe Case Study Report, 
2006). The organisers of these strikes were 
[A]ll skilled migrant workers from outside who had years of experience 
working in other areas. They were educated, knowledgeable about their work, 
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had considerable organising skills and were good negotiators as well as 
agitators. As soon as the busy season arrived, these workers began stirring up 
trouble, the employers got scared and the government became agitated. 
(Interview, labour researcher, Hangzhou, 20 March 2007)  
Migrant workers in Xinhe were employing tactics that went beyond the general 
lessons learned in the nineties by Chinese workers in both the state and private sectors. 
Lessons drawn from that era were summed up in the catchphrase „small protest, small 
solution; big protest, big solution‟ that became popular among migrant workers at the 
time. A worker interviewed by Kessler noted the increasingly confrontational tactics 
employed by migrant workers in the PRD. 
The entire workforce of 400 people went to walk in the streets. We blocked 
traffic and raised hell. It was not till then that people paid attention to us and 
workers received their wages. It‟s worth feeling gratified that the appropriate 
government offices are already paying more attention to the question of 
withheld wages. It‟s not like before when the government fully ignored the 
grievances workers filed. (Kessler, 2009) 
In contrast, the presence of skilled workers with the organising capacity to take 
advantage of the situation and – as far as I have been able to ascertain – avoid arrest 
was a crucial factor that led to the Xinhe experiment. 
In the spring of 2003, the leader of the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Manufacturers 
Association (XWSMA), who also owned one of the three larger enterprises, and the 
newly appointed chairperson of the Xinhe Federation of Trade Unions (XFTU) met to 
discuss the worsening situation and how to avoid another strike wave in the 
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approaching busy season. The result of the meeting between the XFTU and XWSMA 
was a decision to launch a sector-wide collective consultation on wages. The setting up 
of a sector-level trade union that would absorb the defunct VTUFs and cover workers 
across the smaller factories was also announced – the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Sector 
Trade Union (hereinafter XWSTU). The XFTU took the lead in the first consultation in 
2003 and the new union was formally registered immediately after the consultation 
process was completed and took the lead in negotiations the following year (Xinhe 
Case Study Report, 2006).  
Consultation 
On 13 June 2003, the XFTU convened a consultative meeting to discuss piece-rates for 
the woollen sweater sector. Chaired by Fu Nanbao, the XFTU chair, participants 
included officials from the nearby Wenling City MOLSS, the WFTU, eight factory 
owners from the XWSMA, mostly from the larger factories, and thirteen workers‟ 
representatives from various woollen sweater manufacturers, all of whom had been 
recommended by their various bosses (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). The XWSMA 
put forward rates for fifty-nine work processes in five separate areas of work. Workers‟ 
representatives gave their reaction to these rates and discussion followed. The thirteen 
workers‟ representatives then put forward alternative rates for the fifty-nine processes 
and these were compiled by the XFTU into an aggregate table with individual 
suggestions for each process recorded anonymously (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). 
The table was handed to the XWSMA by the XFTU. The XWSMA organised a 
meeting of 113 enterprises to discuss the table and, following extensive discussion, a 
revised wage-rate table was handed back to the XFTU. The union then compiled a 
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standard wage-rate table (jizhun gongjia biao) based on the respective tables put 
forward by the workers‟ representatives and the XWSMA that produced further 
internal discussion, meetings and counter-proposals from both sides prior to eventual 
agreement (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). A sector-wide meeting of management-
approved workers‟ representatives from 100 enterprises was convened, to which larger 
enterprises sent two or three representatives while smaller ones sent one. Following a 
show of hands, the new wage-rate table was agreed and a formal document drawn up 
and signed by both sides. This was entitled the Wenling City Xinhe Town Changyu 
Woollen Sweater Sector Workers Wage (wage rate) Consultation Agreement.
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The table was included in a more general collective contract, Article Three of 
which stated: 
Wages shall be issued on or before the 28
th 
of each month and shall not be less 
than 800 yuan per month. A lower rate may be negotiated with the trade union 
if an enterprise is in difficulty but this shall not be less than 560 yuan per month. 
Piece-rates shall be paid in accordance with the Wenling City Xinhe Town 
Changyu Woollen Sweater Sector Workers Wage (wage rate) Consultation 
Agreement. Rates shall only be adjusted upwards. (Xinhe Case Study Report, 
2006)  
The enterprises accepted responsibility for publicising the agreement in their 
factories via mass meetings at work and wall posters. The whole process took fifty-five 
days from 13 June until 8 August 2003 and involved six formal consultation sessions, 
ten meetings and over 500 documents containing suggestions and amendments from 
concerned parties, mostly workers. Three major adjustments were made to the standard 
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 Xinhezhen Changyu yangmaoshan hangye zhigong gongzi (gongjia) xieshang xieyishu 
240 
 
table before agreement was reached. The process I have described makes it clear that at 
least some bargaining, as opposed to mere consultation, took place. An exceptionally 
candid press report on the proceedings captured the atmosphere via interviews with 
some of the participants. Fu Nanbao recalled that, while the initial meeting was calm, 
tension increased after both sides withdrew to get feedback from their respective 
constituencies. 
The views of the workers and the bosses differed substantially with a gap of up 
to one yuan per piece on some work processes. The bosses accepted the 
workers‟ rates for top-quality goods but felt that they were too high for the mid-
range and bottom-end products. (Yu Li, 2004) 
Some of the factory bosses even argued that the whole process should be 
stopped, a threat that encouraged Fu to appeal to local Party-state leaders to apply 
pressure. 
We had no choice but to get the leaders involved. We had to get the bosses on 
board, even if they were reluctant to do so. Otherwise we would have been 
unable to push on with the consultation. (Yu Li, 2004) 
In 2004 and 2005, collective wage consultations again took place, with the 
XWSTU directly negotiating with the employers‟ association, albeit under the 
guidance of the XFTU. The deputy chair of the latter was appointed chairperson of the 
new sector union and held both posts simultaneously for some time. Following the 
same format as in 2003, three formal consultations took place over six meetings. Over 
800 standardised „opinion forms‟ were completed and the standard wage-rate table was 
adjusted twice during the two-month period of consultation and negotiation. One more 
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work area and six more work processes were included and increases of between five 
and ten per cent for sixteen work processes were agreed (Xinhe Case Study Report, 
2006). In July 2005, another round of consultation took place that saw over 1,000 
workers – almost ten per cent – completing an opinion form; three adjustments were 
made to the wage-rate table; and sixty-seven work processes were included with 
selected increases of between five and ten per cent agreed (Xinhe Case Study Report, 
2006). 
Results 
Institutions or systems to manage labour relations are often judged in relation to the 
degree of acceptance by workers and managers (Oakley, 2002: 102) and whether or not 
they can promote industrial peace (Roberts, 2005). The previous chapter on labour 
unrest discussed the reluctance of the ACFTU to take cases that have previously 
involved industrial action through formal dispute resolution procedures. The situation 
in Xinhe was one of sophisticated and powerful labour militancy in small-scale 
enterprises that would not have sat easily in these formal procedures, even if the union 
or workers had been prepared to use them.  
From the employers‟ point of view, competition to hire and retain skilled 
workers was rendering production unsustainable. Blunting this competition between 
employers was the carrot that encouraged them to agree to a standardised wage-rate 
table. Dealing with strikes that emerged from this situation was taking up an enormous 
amount of time.  
Li Zuqing, the CEO of Century Clothing (Shiji fushi youxian gongsi) claimed 
that  
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[I]n 2002 and 2003 there were strikes in almost all the factories, big, small, 
good, bad, they all had strikes and some of them suffered a number of strikes 
over the year. Some strikes lasted up twenty days. (Yu Li, 2004) 
Like most employers fretting about militant workers, Mr. Li was probably 
exaggerating to make his point. The longest strike we found was six days, although 
thus was still significant (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). Nevertheless the impact 
was clear and a formula was required that could satisfy the demands of militant and 
semi-organised workers but also allow employers to control their unit costs and plan 
for expansion as demand for Xinhe‟s woollen sweaters continued to increase.  
Underlying this situation were non-existent or weak and compromised trade 
unions at primary level. If another „strike season‟ was to be avoided, the unions would 
have to reach beyond individual enterprises or ineffective VTUFs. The workers‟ main 
complaint was wage arrears and the 2003 national government campaign against wage 
arrears only added to the pressure on the XFTU and therefore its senior, the WFTU. 
Between 27 August and 6 September 2002 – among the peak days for the busy season 
in the year preceding the consultation initiative – there were 168 people from eight 
enterprises involved in collective petitions for wage arrears to the Wenling Labour 
Bureau. One group of forty workers even hired a bus to take them to the bureau to 
present their case (Yu Li, 2004). The unrest was taking up most of the XFTU‟s time. 
Chairman Fu Nanbao recalled that in 2003 he dealt with eleven petitions involving 
between twenty and thirty workers each.  
Although wage arrears were a problem, this did not necessarily mean that 
wages were low. Indeed wages for skilled workers were relatively high, pushing up 
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costs for the employers. A skilled worker at the aforementioned Century Clothing with 
ten years of experience in the trade in both Guangdong and Zhejiang pointed out that 
„[W]ages here are at least twice as much as other places – up to 1,500 per month‟ (Yu 
Li, 2004). Ms. Bo Donghua worked at Xinhe‟s Tang Gu La company and was making 
good money at 1,800 yuan per month, whereas in Dongguan she had been earning „just 
700-800 per month‟ (Yu Li, 2004). Interestingly, neither the XFTU nor the higher up 
WFTU made much mention of this aspect of working conditions in Xinhe. For the 
XFTU, the key point was the relationship between unstable wages – paid out every 
three months rather than every month as the law required – unrest and consequent 
unsustainable development (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006).  
As far as relations in this sector were concerned, the root of the problem was 
wages. Due to the lack of [agreed] standards, as soon as the busy season started 
competition for experienced workers between the enterprises became intense 
and skilled workers frequently moved jobs for higher wages. This caused 
stoppages and petitions … and influenced production. The enterprises were 
unable to find a solution and the same went for local government organisations. 
The enterprise-based unions and village trade union federations were even more 
constrained by the circumstances. (Yu Li, 2004) 
The collective consultation does appear to have had an almost immediate 
stabilising effect on the situation. In the remaining months of 2003, following the 
announcement of the new piece-rate wage table in September, there were only two 
stoppages connected to wages that involved just seventeen people, compared with nine 
similar stoppages involving 103 people in the same period for the previous year (Xinhe 
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Case Study Report, 2006). From the end of 2003 until mid-2006, we found no strikes 
arising from wage arrears (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). At the same time, the 
annual consultations have seen rises in the piece-rates of between five and ten per cent 
for various work processes (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006). While workers 
interviewed appeared to be unaware of the details of the actual collective agreements, 
they were aware of the wage rates and improved environment (Yu Li, 2004) and that 
wages were stable in the quiet season and had remained high in the busy season (Case 
Study, 2006; Yu Li, 2004). According to Li Yunzi from Henan, the new standards 
guaranteed her a minimum of 800 yuan per month in the slack season and in January 
2005 she earned 2,500 yuan (Shao Xiaoyi, 2005: 5). Moreover, the agreement signed 
between the union and employers also stated that piece-rates can only go up not down. 
For the employers, the consultation was worth the extra effort and the compromises 
they felt they had made with regard to not dropping wage rates. Wang Xinfa, president 
of the XWSMA in 2005, said that the slack season did not see the usual exodus of 
workers and that „[E]mployers can concentrate their efforts on business management 
rather than fighting with other companies for skilled workers, or dealing with labour 
disputes‟ (Shao Xiaoyi, 2005: 5). 
Analysis 
How can a local trade union act in defence of the interests and rights of its members 
and potential members? I.e. is reform possible? The case study shows that, in the 
absence of freedom of association and legal protection of the right to strike, the 
XFTU‟s twin task of becalming labour relations to facilitate further economic growth 
and meet the demands of workers did indeed require innovation. Local law courts and 
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labour arbitration departments have reported that „collective contracts … have an 
important function in protecting workers rights and interests‟ (NPC Report, 2009). The 
experimental and pragmatic strategy of initiating and implementing a sectoral 
collective agreement at local level is likely to be replicated in the coming years. Indeed, 
Article Fifty-three of the new Labour Contract Law directly addresses this 
development and provides the legal space for further progress away from relying solely 
on enterprise-level agreements. 
The XFTU‟s departure from traditional practice was not in any sense a 
democratic or participatory process. This may have a negative impact on the 
sustainability of such initiatives, although the process appeared reasonably entrenched 
when our field work finished in 2006. Of course, there is a danger of seeing all trade 
union reform in China through democratic lenses that measure progress against an 
ideal of a democratic grass-roots participatory trade unionism that rarely exists in the 
real world. Nevertheless, while Xinhe‟s experiment did not blaze any trails in terms of 
worker representation and participation and in fact did not meet the standards of 
Chinese national law, far less ILO standards, this did not rule out a consultation 
process that included real bargaining. The XFTU‟s Fu Nanbao told reporters that direct 
elections for improved worker participation were now a priority for the newly formed 
XWSTU (Yu Li, 2004). As far as I have been able to ascertain, these have not yet 
taken place and the first chairman of the new sector-level union remains in his post. On 
the other hand, the process had an „organic‟ character to it, echoing Deng Xiaoping‟s 
pragmatic reform model of „crossing the river by feeling for each stone.‟ As the 
Chairman of the XFTU explained: 
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We were not aware of the details of Document Nine or the Regulations when 
we began these sector-level consultations. It was only after the inspections and 
visits by leaders from the relevant departments as well as the press coverage 
that we learnt about these laws and regulations in any detail. (Xinhe Case Study 
Report, 2006) 
This admission surprised experienced researchers conducting my supervised field work 
on the experiment. 
We were moved by what we found. These so called „peasants‟ – the town‟s 
trade union chair and prime mover of the experiment was a former infantry 
soldier – had established a successful experiment. They weren‟t implementing 
the law, they were ahead of it! (Xinhe Case Study Report, 2006)  
The process in Xinhe took on the form of a successful exercise in experimental 
pragmatism in its striking of agreements at the sector level across small enterprises, 
whereas at the time established law and practice concentrated on single enterprise-level 
agreements or vague regional and industrial (sector) agreements. The key was that the 
trade union recognised that enterprise-level agreements were inappropriate for existing 
conditions in the Xinhe woollen sector. Given that the lack of legal guidance is 
frequently employed by ACFTU officials as a justification for inertia, this was indeed a 
ground-breaking departure. Xinhe‟s union officials did not base their strategy on a 
systematic study of the relevant labour regulations – which they admitted they were 
unaware of – but via a detailed survey of existing local wage levels in the 116 
enterprises producing woollen sweaters. Hopefully representing a new work style 
(zuofeng) for a new generation of trade union officials, the chairperson of the WFTU, 
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Zhao Guofeng, was clear that this was about wages and benefits – an approach that 
may have earned him an accusation of economism just ten years previously.  
Based on the peculiarities of a given sector, carrying out sector-level 
consultations in a down-to-earth manner and effectively upholding the 
economic rights of workers allows the latter to obtain actual material benefits. 
(Xia Xiaoyin, 2005) 
When faced with reluctance from some employers to stay involved in the 
consultation, the XFTU – backed by the WFTU – was able to use its relationship with 
the local Party-state to part persuade part compel mostly small-scale employers to sign 
up to a sector-wide agreement that stipulated that workers must be paid monthly and 
that piece-rates can only go up.  
The experiment has since been identified as an example for possible future 
legal/institutional development and the local trade union press has reported similar 
exercises in the nearby towns. For example, the Zeguo Town Pump Makers Union was 
established in late 2004 and has since carried out three rounds of collective 
consultations (Xia Shaoyin, 2005; Liu Mingwei, 2007). The model is also being 
applied and adapted in other parts of China. Sector-level trade unions have been 
established in the single industry towns of Laomiao (producing fireworks) and Gongli 
(building materials). Agreements were concluded in late 2007 at Ducun (glass 
containers) and Meiyuan (building materials) in Shaanxi‟s Fuping county (Yi Ming, 
2007). As news of the Xinhe experiment has spread, approval from senior trade union 
officials and other government departments followed. In 2006, the MOLSS issued an 
„Opinion‟ encouraging experiments with similar agreements and processes. The 
248 
 
MOLSS contextualised its document in a manner that demonstrates the importance of 
events at Xinhe with regard to the future of collective bargaining in China.  
Following the development of the socialist market economy, the private sector 
has expanded rapidly. The majority of private enterprises are small in scale, and 
have a high labour turnover and very weak trade unions. Labour violations are 
frequent and labour relations extremely tense. The evidence from pilot projects‟ 
demonstrates that in areas where there is a concentration of small enterprises or 
enterprises engaged in similar production, sector-level or district-level 
collective contracts are able to protect the rights and interests of both the 
enterprise and workers and promote harmony. Such agreements are able to 
protect workers‟ legal rights, stabilise labour relations, ensure a good 
environment for continued and sustainable economic development … and 
uphold social stability. (MOLSS, 2006)  
Completing the process of rolling out a successful local project at national level, 
Article Fifty-three of the new Labour Contract Law makes legal provision for sector- 
and district-level collective contracts.  
Conclusion  
The experiment in Xinhe was essentially an exercise in grassroots innovation based on 
a pragmatic assessment of the problems faced – sophisticated labour militancy in a 
tight labour market. In a sign of the growing importance of the trade unions to social 
stability, the Party, local government and big employers used the trade union structure 
to get the information they needed to draw up an administrative solution to their 
problem. It is clear that the principal advantage of this experiment to both the Party and 
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employers was that it successfully damped down strikes. From the workers‟ point of 
view, it brought stable wages in the slack season and ensured that future wage levels 
only went up.  
The crucial point is that it was a response to sophisticated informal mobilisation 
of migrant workers, which, as we have seen, the authorities were not in a position to 
repress. The militancy suggested that formalistic traditional trade union practices were 
inappropriate and were demonstrably failing to provide stable labour relations in what 
was a difficult organising environment for any trade union, let alone a state-sponsored 
institution. New practices were required. In this case, it was the existence of militant 
skilled workers that prevented the experiment from degenerating into wage regulation 
by an employers‟ organisation. 
Politically, the agreement may have laid the groundwork for a collective 
bargaining framework that until very recently has been confined to the realm of the 
imagination (Brown, 2006: 36). Of course, it was by no means democratic or 
representative – far less participatory – but the structure in place provides room for the 
development of collective bargaining that some commentators see as a significant 
opportunity for the ACFTU. We may even be justified in speculating that the events in 
Zhejiang have encouraged breakthroughs in collective bargaining elsewhere, even in 
go-ahead Shenzhen. For example, the Shenzhen implementation measures for the 2006 
national regulation on collective consultation formulated by the SFTU refer to 
„collective bargaining‟ rather than the more neutral and traditional term „collective 
consultation‟. And in late October 2009, the Law Implementation Group of the 
National People‟s Congress Standing Committee released a national report on the 
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implementation of the Trade Union Law that gave an example from Shanghai of eight 
city-level sector trade unions forming a confederation that „smashed through all 
restrictions‟ on this aspect of trade union work (NPC, 2009). Of course, freedom of 
association was – and is – the core issue and in Xinhe we can see its impact on 
industrial relations as it emerges in embryonic form. 
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Chapter Five 
Experimental Pragmatism 2: Trade Union Rights Centre in Yiwu 
The rising tide of labour unrest is testament to the inability of trade unions to moderate 
employer power at enterprise level. This is the main constraint on the ACFTU‟s 
capacity to represent workers in a market economy. The root of this failure lies in the 
dependency of primary trade union cadres on employers which is in danger of 
becoming an institutionalised shortcoming. It is apparent that left to its own devices the 
ACFTU has little stomach to tackle this problem at the national level. Frustration at the 
passivity of union cadres in the private sector has, justifiably, reinforced the argument 
of those who claim that the ACFTU is incapable of reform.  
As we saw from the survey in Dongguan cited in Chapter Three, evidence of 
passivity is not hard to find. The follow-up interviews with enterprise union cadres 
revealed a profound lack of confidence in their ability to address individual or 
collective workers‟ rights violations at primary level. Most of the union officers held 
the view that where employers seriously violated labour laws – behaviour the 
interviewees described as including wage arrears, verbal and physical bullying and 
ignoring their responsibility for health and safety – the enterprise union did not have 
the power to redress the situation and that it was essentially a matter for local 
government to resolve. One interviewee was particularly blunt on the union‟s 
incapacity to address „excessive‟ (guofen) attitudes, stating simply that „the boss has 
money and power and the workers need to eat‟ (interview, Guangzhou Case Study 
Report, 2006). In the late nineties and early part of this century, numerous interviews 
with trade union cadres at enterprise level during or after disputes demonstrated that 
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union cadres tended to react in one of three ways, which my current research has 
reaffirmed.
55
 First, pass the problem on to the higher levels of the union; second ignore 
the problem and hope it will sort itself out without union intervention, a reaction to 
crisis known in Chinese as buliao liao zhi, i.e. to solve a problem by not taking steps to 
solve it. Third, simply side with the employer for fear of the threat to his/her own job 
and career prospects. In Yiwu city – a county-level city in the eastern province of 
Zhejiang – trade union cadres tended to react by passing disputes to the senior levels to 
deal with, an approach the chairperson of the Yiwu Federation of Trade Unions (YFTU) 
described to me as „generally too little too late‟ and as a consequence the possibilities 
of escalation become much higher. He added:  
By the time we got to hear of a dispute in a factory, it was often too late to 
avoid some kind of incident of some description – stopped production, road 
block, protest or even violent confrontation etc. (Interview, Chen Youde, Yiwu, 
21 March 2006)  
The other side of primary-level weakness has been the higher-level unions‟ lack 
of direct contact with enterprises and specifically with the workers employed in them. 
Higher-level unions are legally and politically obliged to work closely with the local 
government on economic development and scarce staff and resources are channelled in 
this direction rather than towards the enterprise shop floor. There are two reasons for 
this privileging of administrative work over building stronger unions: first, it is easier 
and second, building stronger unions from the bottom up has the potential to bring 
about conflict with both employers and the local administration. This has reinforced an 
                                                 
55
 The interviews were conducted by exiled labour leader Han Dongfang. I translated the interviews into 
English while I was employed at China Labour Bulletin as an editor and researcher from 1996 until 2002. 
See for example my translation of the book Reform or Revolution (Han, 2001). 
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administratively top-heavy approach by the higher trade unions that were – and 
generally still are – apt to spend their time on report writing, studying directives from 
the centre, attending meetings, compiling statistics sent up from the primary 
organisations and generally passing round pieces of paper to each other. These 
practices have been described in trade union circles in China as the xingzhenghua – 
literally the „administratisation‟ – of trade union work (Yi Ming, 2004).56  
Chapter Four demonstrated that it was possible for a town-level trade union 
(zhen gonghui) to go beyond the restrictions of historical tradition and practice, albeit 
with the powerful support of Party and local government. The experiment in local 
sector-wide collective consultation in Xinhe was based on identifying standardised 
cross-factory piece-rates as being in the interests of the workers employed in the 
factories and then persuading or cajoling employers that it was also in their interests to 
negotiate such rates. The main weakness I identified was the lack of direct worker 
participation in collective consultation. This in turn threatened the credibility and 
future sustainability of what was essentially an interest-based collective agreement 
negotiated from above. 
I will now examine an innovative rights-based experiment in trade union 
practice aimed at improving union capacity to both solve and reduce the number of 
enterprise-level labour disputes in the private sector. The Yiwu Workers‟ Legal Rights 
Centre (YWLRC) attempted to facilitate a more stable labour relations environment by 
opening up a new space in which workers could settle complaints and claims against 
employers. Established by the YFTU and its dynamic chairperson Chen Youde, the 
                                                 
56
 In English, the term used would more likely be „bureaucratic‟ – „guanliao‟ in Chinese. However, the 
word „guanliao‟ has serious political implications in Chinese, not least as a result of it being a term of 
accusation employed by red guards against union cadres during the Cultural Revolution.  
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YWLRC did not attempt to substitute the work of the union‟s organising department – 
understaffed as the latter clearly was – by attracting workers into the unions. Rather, it 
took a rights-based approach to tackling the gross labour rights violations that rapid 
capitalist economic expansion had brought to the city. The frequent petitions, strikes 
and presence of sometimes violent home-town associations in the city‟s industrial 
zones and villages had served sufficient notice to Chen and his team at the YFTU that 
the union was struggling to fulfil its designated function of channelling disputes into 
formal juridical procedures. The consequent break with traditional practice has become 
nationally and even internationally famous but little is known about how this 
innovation came into being and what barriers it had to overcome. As the process of 
innovation can often be as illuminating as the innovation itself, I decided to carry out 
an in-depth study. 
Nationally, a key problem with dispute resolution has been the ACFTU‟s 
unwillingness to take on cases that are either collective or not certain winners. As we 
saw in the chapter on labour unrest, this less than stalwart approach has been an 
important factor in the rise – especially in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta – of 
both „black lawyer‟ networks and labour NGOs that have set up rights or service 
centres as vehicles for their work. We might expect that, given its close contacts with 
both Party and government, it would be pretty straightforward for the ACFTU to 
follow their lead and set up legal rights centres of its own to support workers – a 
process that is starting to unfold nationally thanks largely to the YFTU‟s experiment. 
However, as a pioneer in this process, the YWLRC demonstrated the considerable 
contention involved. 
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YFTU chairman Chen Youde came to believe that a trailblazing (chuangxin) 
approach was required if the tense labour relations in Yiwu were to improve. However, 
the YFTU was constrained by limited trade union resources and an obligation to 
remain within the city government‟s authorised plan (bianzhi) for union work.57 Chen‟s 
vision was of a centre for tackling labour rights violations that would also raise the 
union‟s capacity to provide direct assistance to workers in dispute as well as offer a 
better service to the primary trade unions. However, equally important to this project 
was to experiment with areas of cooperation and work styles traditionally outside the 
union‟s modus operandi by employing a targeted strategy of resource borrowing and 
partnering with other actors relevant to labour relations such as the Justice Department, 
the local People‟s Congress and the media. This approach has been labelled the 
„socialisation‟ of union work (Luo Xiaojun and Zhou Songqiang, 2007: 25-30). As 
Chen explained: 
We wanted to try out an entirely new approach of working outside the trade 
union box. We proposed to take advantage of the practices, power and 
experiences available to us but as yet largely untapped. We dared to blaze a 
new trail and gradually socialise the practice of this work. This approach has 
since become known as a [key part of] the Yiwu Model. (Interview, Chen 
Youde, op.cit.) 
In this chapter I pose the same research question as in previous chapters: How 
can a local trade union respond to labour unrest and act in defence of the interests and 
rights of its members and potential members? Or in other words, is trade union reform 
                                                 
57
 Brødsgaard ingeniously translates „bianzhi‟ as the „establishment of posts‟ albeit ‛loosely‟ 
(Brødsgaard, 2002: 361). For the sake of clarity in the context of this chapter alone, I would add „at the 
expense of a government or government institution‟s formal budget‟.  
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possible? I have divided the chapter into four sections: The first section describes the 
developmental model of Yiwu city and the results this has brought. Section two briefly 
summarises the development of labour rights centres in China prior to narrating in 
detail the contentious process of setting up the centre in Yiwu. Section three looks at 
how the Yiwu centre works and uses statistics and specific case studies to describe its 
achievements. Section four analyses the significance of the YFTU‟s trailblazing in the 
light of its own aim to provide a new approach to an important aspect of trade union 
work and labour relations and returns to the research question itself – the application of 
experimental and pragmatic methods in union work. In conclusion, I summarise the 
Yiwu Model from three perspectives: specific innovation, general reform of the 
ACFTU and comparison with centres run by NGOs.  
Methodology 
This chapter is based on supervised research in the city of Yiwu undertaken in 2005 
and 2006, my own interviews with the principal actors involved in the Centre, 
including an entire day spent with Chen Youde the chair of the Yiwu Federation of 
Trade Unions, and extended discussions with academics involved in the establishment 
during my visits to Hangzhou and Yiwu during 2006 and 2007. Where possible I have 
triangulated the results of the research data with secondary sources and interviews with 
rights centre personnel in Zhejiang and Guangdong. 
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Sugar for Chicken Feathers: The Development of Yiwu City 
Yiwu city is on the eastern end of the Jin-Qu Basin in the centre of Zhejiang province. 
It is classed as a county-level city with fifteen towns and eight villages under its 
jurisdiction. It has a total population of 1.6 million people and a registered local 
population of approximately 680,000 (Yiwu Government Website, 2008). The 
remaining one million are mainly migrant workers from all over China, but also 
include comparatively large numbers of capitalists or agents of capital from Greater 
China, the US and the Middle East as well as almost 200,000 Japanese temporary 
residents. Of note is that at least a third of the migrant worker population is non-Han 
Chinese (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006).  
Yiwu was established as a county over 2,220 years ago and has enjoyed a 
reputation as a cultural hub producing famous sons, from patriotic generals during the 
Song dynasty to Cheng Wangdao, the first translator of the Communist Manifesto into 
Chinese. Since the reforms, the government has prioritised commercial trading as a 
keystone of development policy and has actively promoted and facilitated Yiwu‟s once 
small commodities market, which is now the largest in China. In 2004, the city‟s gross 
domestic product was 28.2 billion yuan (Ding Ke, 2006: 4-5).  
Generations of Yiwu farmers have passed on trading traditions based on the 
exploitation of local resources, particularly brown sugar (hongtang). „Exchanging 
sugar for chicken feathers‟ (jimao huan tang) is how Yiwu‟s commercial traditions 
have been described – literally (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). Farmers and 
merchants made simple sugar products from home-grown and manufactured sugar and 
exchanged these for chicken feathers which were then used for compost or to make 
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brooms and anything else that could be made out of the feathers. The brooms etc. were 
sold for cash which was reinvested. In post-liberation China these traditions earned 
Yiwu the sensitive reputation as being the „tail of capitalism‟ and, despite frequent 
clampdowns on such entrepreneurial activities, they kept re-emerging, partly as a result 
of the historical influence of a peddlers‟ organisation known as the Qiaotang Bang.  
Gradually, a peddler‟s organisation, which is called Qiaotang Bang, was formed. 
At its peak in the second decade of the twentieth century, Qiaotang Bang had 
7,000-8,000 members (Zhejiang Province Zhengxie Historical Data Committee, 
1997: 301-303). After the PRC was established, Qiaotang Bang was dissolved 
and their peddling activity was discontinued for a while. However, they started 
peddling again in 1963, at the latest. In the 1970s, these vendors spontaneously 
formed two periodic markets in Yiwu. (Zhang Wenxue et al., 1993: 35 cited in 
Ding Ke, 2006: 7) 
With the formal launch of the reforms in 1978, the Yiwu government by and 
large skirted the ongoing political debates of the time and moved quickly to take 
advantage of its trading traditions. In 1982, four years after the household 
responsibility system was implemented nationally, the Yiwu government took matters 
a step further by formulating the „four permissions‟, allowing farmers and pedlars‟ 
considerable room to trade in farm and off-farm produce (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006). The „permissions‟ were: to engage in business and trade; to transport goods over 
long distances for sale; to open up urban and rural markets; and to engage in 
competitive practices. In retrospect, these measures seem moderate but twenty-five 
years ago they were at the cutting edge of China‟s re-engagement with market forces. 
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They were the administrative foundation on which the subsequent substantial 
expansion in productive and trading activity took place. This growth was largely based 
on indigenous Chinese capital, as opposed to foreign direct investment (FDI) which, at 
the time, was largely heading towards the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. 
The chart below shows a dramatic shift – even by China‟s standards – that the reforms 
have brought to the city‟s economic structure. 
Graph 2  
Changes in the Industrial Structure of Yiwu city (per cent) 
Source: Liu, Bai and Wang (2003): Yiwu Statistical Yearbook (1978-2002) cited in Ding Ke 2006: 7 
Twenty-five years later, Yiwu is known as the „supermarket of the world‟ due 
to its reputation as the largest small commodities market on the planet. It is not a gentle 
place and gives the visitor a frontier-town experience.  
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Yiwu is a brash, gaudy and ugly place. The Century Shopping Centre is a 
perfect example. Selling the best Yiwu has to offer, it is carved into one of the 
city‟s main parks. It may not be pretty, but it has plenty of foreign visitors. 
Susan Ali has come from the United Arab Emirates looking for supplies for her 
clothing and export business. „We come here because it‟s the factory of all 
China‟, she says. „They‟ve got good quality, great variety and they‟re cheaper 
than any other country.‟ (Somerville, 2005)  
Staying in Yiwu is a cosmopolitan experience. Amongst the city‟s residents are 
traders and factory representatives from Pakistan, India, Russia, Europe, Africa and the 
US as well as every province in China, many of whom have representatives‟ offices in 
the city. By the end of 2007 Yiwu‟s famous small commodities market had more than 
50,000 stalls and reported a trade volume of 3.48 billion yuan (497 million US dollars) 
(Xinhua, 2008). Perhaps not surprisingly, due to its position at the low end of the 
production chain with goods initially aimed at the domestic and Asian markets, the 
city‟s dramatic transformation has also been noted for the proliferation of counterfeit 
goods.  
Each day about 200,000 people visit the market to purchase goods from among 
over 400,000 different varieties of items. About 8,000 foreign buyers visit the 
market each day. Each day two tons of goods are purchased. The highways and 
roads to and from Yiwu are heavily congested day and night with trucks 
coming from the South that deliver counterfeit goods to Yiwu and trucks 
leaving Yiwu loaded with counterfeits that have been purchased and are bound 
for locations throughout China. (Chow, Daniel C.K., 2006: 5-6) 
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The history of the Zhejiang China Commodities Cities Group Company 
Limited (ZCCC) gives us a dramatic illustration of the entrepreneurial energies 
unleashed in Yiwu back in the late seventies. During the last weeks of 1978, peasant 
farmers from two towns of Choucheng and Gansanli began setting up stalls and selling 
produce along the roadsides, which heralded official tolerance of the „sugar for chicken 
feathers‟ trade, gradually transforming itself into a small commodities market made up 
of small market traders. Trading times and stall places gradually became fixed at the 
„main road market‟. The nickname was changed to the „grass hat market‟ when the area 
was covered so as to facilitate trading during rainy weather (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006). After the „four permissions‟ awarded formal approval to the market in 1982, it 
began to grow rapidly. In 1982 there were 705 stalls with a total turnover of seven 
million yuan and by 1984 this had almost tripled to 1,887 stalls and shops trading 
twenty-four million yuan worth of goods. By 2004, the one-time illegal farmers‟ 
roadside market had become a large listed company enjoying trading relationships with 
over 1,500 companies all over China (Zhejiang China Commodities, 2007). CCC has 
also obtained an import and export license and trades directly with overseas buyers and 
outlets. This phenomenal growth has not been in isolation and has been accompanied 
by rapid development in the county of Yiwu itself. In 2003, it was ranked in the top 
twenty of China‟s 100 Robust Counties and also named by the provincial Zhejiang 
government as its most competitive county. The model of „trading city, industrial 
towns and specialist villages‟ (shangye cheng, gongye zhen and zhuanye cun – Yiwu 
Case Study Report, 2006) has also helped to produce some startling statistics. The town 
of Dazhen has over 500 factories producing half a million blouses and shirts every day 
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and has been nicknamed China‟s „shirt town‟ by the China National Garment 
Association (Zhongguo fuzhuang xiehui). Another of the towns under its jurisdiction, 
Datang, produces over thirty per cent of the world‟s socks. The Fenli underwear 
factory produced over three billion pairs of socks for Wal-Mart, Pringle and Disney in 
2004, helping to forge Datang‟s nickname as „sock town‟ (Somerville, 2005).  
Official statistics for average incomes in Yiwu are indicative of considerable 
growth patterns and give expression to Yiwu‟s transformation. In 2004, the average 
urban income was 16,383 yuan, three times the average rural income in the county of 
6,700 yuan, which is nevertheless at the top of the national scale for rural income. The 
minimum wage in Yiwu is 670 yuan (Wu Xiaoxian, 2006), which puts it at the top end 
of the mid-range for China‟s county-level cities.  
Contextualising the YFTU Experiment: The Growth of Labour Rights Centres  
The city-level trade union in Yiwu was no different from senior levels of unions all 
over China in finding itself hard-put to cope with the challenge of rapid economic 
transformation. As we saw in Chapter One, the state has gone to considerable lengths 
to devise and implement a formal procedure for the resolution of disputes via 
mediation, arbitration and the courts. But weak or non-existent trade unions at primary 
level have rendered mediation committees – which are rare in the private sector 
anyway – easily manipulated by employers. Consequently a large number of labour 
disputes go to arbitration and the courts, both of which were – and are – overwhelmed 
by the increase in their workloads. Despite the national emphasis on channelling 
disputes into juridical procedures, the union has remained cautious, and at times even 
reluctant to represent workers. On the one hand, support and representation is generally 
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restricted to cases where there have been flagrant legal violations, and a win can be 
guaranteed. On the other hand, the ACFTU is much more reluctant to provide support 
in the case of collective disputes and rarely provides legal advice to workers who have 
been involved in collective action (Chen Feng, 2003: 1014-6). This partially explains 
the mushrooming of legal advice centres run by NGOs that help workers to file and 
pursue the kinds of cases in court that the ACFTU avoids. The new law on labour 
dispute resolution has added impetus to trade union legal rights work and it is highly 
likely that the numbers of both trade union and LNGO-run centres will expand in the 
coming years. There are also significant examples of trade unions working with local 
LNGOs to establish labour service centres. For example, the New Citizens‟ Centre in 
Qingdao is the result of collaboration between the Xiao Chen Hotline and a district 
branch of the ACFTU with the approval of the Qingdao Federation of Trade Unions 
(Chen Yuming, interview, Detroit, 11-13 April 2008) 
Labour rights centres are mostly concentrated in export-orientated South China, 
especially Guangdong province. This is due chiefly to its links with Hong Kong that 
have facilitated a flood of investment into Guangdong followed by a somewhat smaller 
flow of people concerned at the labour rights violations this has given rise to. The 
cluster of centres in the South has shaped the development of the labour rights „scene‟ 
in the province, even if their actual impact on labour relations is harder to measure. 
These LNGOs have attempted to improve labour rights and labour rights awareness via 
various methods including corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, worker-
training projects, telephone hotlines and drop-in centres. There is no evidence of a 
direct link between these initiatives and the experiment in Yiwu, although there are 
264 
 
mutual indirect influences that stem from a common root: capitalist relations of 
production in a rapidly expanding private sector.  
There are three interconnected factors that have combined to produce the rise of 
labour rights centres, despite the not inconsiderable risks that accompany such 
enterprises – see photo below.58  Firstly, the transformation from a danwei-centred 
administratively controlled model of industrial production in which employment was 
preconditioned on formal urban status, to a law-based contractual framework that 
places the rights and obligations of both employer and employee at the heart of a 
labour relationship that is applicable to all workers regardless, in theory, of their 
residential status. Secondly, there are considerable conditions and restrictions to the 
new framework which are often explained as a result of a „still immature or imperfect 
market system‟ (Tao Junyi et al., 2003). For example, the relationship between the 
labour market and local government regulations and even factory rulebooks can render 
the legal rights that workers are supposed to enjoy very difficult to ascertain in theory 
and virtually non-existent in practice (interviews, LNGO staff, Hong Kong, 2005-
2008). Thirdly, the overwhelming power of the employer in the workplace, usually 
supported by the local administration, and the concomitant political constraints on 
independent organising seriously limit most workers‟ knowledge of their rights and 
their capacity to do anything to improve this situation. Confronting these three factors, 
rights centres – sometimes called „service centres‟ – have offered a wide and varying 
degree of services from classes and discussion groups on labour and trade union law to 
OSH and personal health awareness and even English classes. In essence they are a 
                                                 
58
 These include extensive security checks by the State and more recently physical attacks from thugs in 
the pay of bosses (Nanfang Ribao, 2007). 
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specific external response – i.e. initiated outside the workplace – to the hardships to 
which capitalist relations have given rise. It is of note that the target group of almost all 
China‟s rights centres has been migrant workers and not the traditional working class 
who have demonstrated – often literally – a more rigorous understanding of their class 
position and the changes being visited on it. Charting the progress of South China‟s 
LNGOs, Huang An‟s carefully chosen words echo the three factors described above – 
transformed employment relations, limited implementation of the law and the absence 
of freedom of association –  and are indicative of the challenges facing labour rights 
NGOs.
59
  
Migrant workers are a marginal group that has never enjoyed, as an 
independent social group, formal state protection. And their lack of urban 
residential permits has excluded them from the corporatist trade unions. 
Moreover, authoritarian government does not generally encourage workers to 
actively unite but instead focuses on the dissemination of ideology as opposed 
to offering support to workers‟ autonomous expressions of legal struggle. 
(Huang An, 2007)  
While labour rights centres are not „workers‟ autonomous expressions of legal 
struggle‟ their work highlights the ineffectiveness of primary-level trade unions.  
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 Huang An is a labour researcher and PhD candidate at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. 
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Huang Qingnan sits badly injured seconds after he was attacked by employer-organised thugs in revenge 
for his part in LNGO attempts to publicise the new Labour Contract Law (Photo: Dagongzhe, 20 
November 2007). 
Broadly speaking there are three types of labour NGOS operating in China. 
First, groups – occasionally member-based, or perhaps „member-enhanced‟ is the more 
appropriate term – that are managed by a state institution such as the All China 
Women‟s Federation (ACWF). Second are groups established and run by mainland 
Chinese activists. And third are Hong Kong-based groups active on the mainland via 
various project-based activities such as running a rights centre, service centre, „clinic‟, 
health and safety bus or the conducting of OSH and labour rights awareness training in 
mainland factories under the umbrella of TNCs attempting to improve their CSR score. 
LNGOs in the first two categories are increasingly taking part in these activities, which 
has at times given rise to mild competition with Hong Kong labour groups.
60
 All three 
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 At times this tension has been seized upon by TNCs in poorly disguised threats to Hong Kong-based 
LNGOs unwilling to toe the company line in CSR projects. For example, while I was responsible for 
drafting the Hong Kong LNGO response to an Ethical Trading Initiative (UK) proposal in 2002, there 
was considerable pressure from the employer members of the ETI board to limit the scope of proposed 
factory elections to a health and safety committee. When the Hong Kong groups refused to compromise 
on what they viewed as a point of democratic principle, the ETI response was to explore cooperation 
with „pure‟ mainland LNGOs who were deemed – mistakenly it turned out – to be more cooperative.  
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categories are legally obliged to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoC), 
although many groups get round this by registering as limited companies. While this 
tactical evasion of the formal registration process can lead to heightened surveillance 
from the authorities, it does allow a group slightly more independence.
61
 There are 
estimated to be seventy-one labour groups in China (Wang Kan, 2008: 202), the 
overwhelming majority of them in the South due to Guangdong‟s position as a leading 
export promoter and its proximity to Hong Kong, facilitating access to both 
international funding and solidarity.  
The China Labour Education Centre (CLEC) is a Hong Kong registered NGO 
that has established a centre in South China. Due to political restrictions the Centre is 
registered as a limited company.
62
 During its first two years of existence, it rented 
premises from the local Federation of Trade Unions. The aims of the centre were 
largely identical to those of other Hong Kong-assisted centres, although they all vary 
slightly in emphasis. For example, CLEC concentrated on OSH work, partly because 
this is perceived to be more neutral territory by the local authorities and the Centre‟s 
management. On the other hand, another Hong Kong-assisted group, Workers‟ Action, 
has encouraged workers attending its Centre to form their own committees and small 
groups and through them to participate in the direct management of the Centre.
63
 This 
was deemed useful for acquiring the skills to organise in the workplace. The CLEC‟s 
work principally involved: promoting OSH and labour rights awareness; assisting 
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 But in some ways the reverse is also true. Groups directly attached to a mass organisation may find 
that this affords them greater „cover‟ for their activities.  
62
 For security reasons, the name I have given this organisation is not its real name. The centre being 
discussed here is currently under close observation and its management has requested complete 
anonymity.  
63
 Again, the name is fictitious but the management strategy isn‟t. The danger of its more direct approach 
is shown by the fact that this group has attracted the attention of bosses‟ thugs who have carried out 
extremely violent attacks on their workers.  
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workers in identifying solutions to the problems and issues they face in the workplace; 
and training up peer educators and organisers in order to increase shop floor 
participation in OSH issues. A key factor in this work was securing an identity that 
justified the overall functionality. According to the CLEC‟s founder:  
One of the main difficulties in setting up the centre was ensuring that we had a 
legitimate function and, above all, identity (shenfen) so as to gain acceptance 
from the relevant authorities and the workers. There were two important 
qualifications: that we were not actively involved in trade union organising; and 
that we were meeting a need – in our case occupational health and safety – the 
fulfilling of which did not break any laws. (Interview, LNGO coordinator, 
Hong Kong 6 December, 2005)  
The main point here is that when a labour rights centre, clinic or even bus is set 
up, a chief requirement is clarity in identity and function. As the following narrative 
recounting the YFTU‟s experiment with setting up a rights centre demonstrates, the 
same clarity was required when a powerful state-backed agency – such as the YFTU – 
embarked on a rights centre project.  
The Rights Centre Initiative in Yiwu 
In response to high and rising levels of industrial conflict, in 1999 the YFTU organised 
a major survey of working conditions and migrant workers‟ demands. They concluded 
from the results that there were three main problems confronting the official dispute 
resolution system and by implication, the YFTU. First, that migrant workers‟ legal 
rights were violated on a huge scale and that many migrant workers themselves 
expressed the need for an organisation capable of speaking out on their behalf. Second, 
269 
 
that labour relations in the city were entering a new phase of multiple labour disputes 
in which the enterprises‟ bosses preferred to reach out-of-court settlements which, 
according to the research, usually led to temporary and unsustainable results. On the 
other hand, the research also showed that migrant workers were willing to use labour 
dispute resolution procedures but did not have the resources to make use of these 
channels. Third, the city did not have a sufficient number of lawyers to address the 
demands of migrant workers to take their claims to the courts. Moreover, the cases that 
were accepted by lawyers involved a huge amount of effort for very little financial 
reward (Luo Xiaojun and Zhou Songqiang, 2007: 25-30).  
The research also demonstrated the depth of the challenge facing the YFTU. 
They were working in an environment in which ninety per cent of the enterprises were 
small-scale and privately-owned. Since 1997, these enterprises were between them 
averaging more than 10,000 disputes per year with at least „thirty per cent proving, for 
one reason or another, difficult to solve in a prompt manner‟ (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006).
64
 Many had been tinged with „acts of violence, collective protests and even 
involved threats [by workers] to jump off high buildings, the kidnapping of bosses, as 
well as collective petitions to government authorities demanding intervention‟ 
(interview Chen Youde, op.cit.).  
According to Chen, the situation had been further complicated by the 
emergence of „place-of-origin gangs such as the “Anhui Gang”, the “Jiangxi Gang” or 
the “Kaihua Gang” who had a negative impact on the morale of the migrants and often 
led to inter-gang violence‟ (interview Chen Youde, op.cit.; Yiwu Case Study Report, 
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 I was told this figure was taken from YFTU records that attempt to cover all reported disputes no 
matter how minor. Luo and Zhou reported 1,210 „labour contradictions‟ among which seventeen cases 
involved one or more violent deaths (Luo Xiaojun and Zhou Songqiang, 2006: 26). 
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2006). The home-town associations (tongxianghui) to which Chen was referring 
sometimes offer a questionable form of protection to migrant workers, usually in return 
for a compulsory fee. Luo and Zhou described a typical scenario in the town of Suxi, 
which falls under Yiwu administration. 
The two hamlets of Hu and Jiang had over 8,000 migrant workers each, far 
outnumbering the local population. Most of these workers had arrived in large 
groups from the same villages outside the province and, as such, had recourse 
to powerful hometown „forces‟ (shili) through which they protected their 
interests. Some … paid a „protection fee‟ of ten yuan per month to the 
hometown association which … engaged in organised criminal activities 
including violent bullying [of other people] and even terrorizing employers. 
(Luo Xiaojun and Zhou Songqiang, 2007: 27)  
As we have discussed in Chapter Three, Chan came to the same conclusions on 
home-town associations but, crucially, also acknowledged their capacity to organise 
strikes and pursue class-based interests that cut across home-town loyalties – at least 
temporarily (Chan C. 2009: 60-77). However, while competent at frightening 
employers to the point of extracting short-term concessions, their organisational 
structures and norms of operation are, by default, based on home-town loyalties, 
reinforced through the threat of violence, rather than appeals to class solidarity. As far 
as the YFTU was concerned, they represented „a threat to social stability‟ and the 
management of large numbers of migrants. As such they constituted an unwelcome 
extra dimension to extremely tense labour relations (interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.). 
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Apart from this unsanctioned and ad hoc competition to their work, the YFTU‟s 
most basic problem was the lack of union staff and cadres at all levels. By way of 
historical example, at the beginning of the 1950s there were over 6,000 employees in 
Yiwu county serviced by eight full-time county level cadres (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006). Half a century later, in 2006, there were approximately 600,000 workers in 
Yiwu city but the number of full-time county-level ACFTU cadres had actually gone 
down to seven. The YFTU had an overall staff of just thirty people, many of whom 
were town and village cadres doubling up on their posts (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006).  
Secondly, there was the problem of the weakness of trade union organisation at 
township, neighbourhood and enterprise levels, which was often further complicated 
by officials‟ multiplicity of roles and interests. Although trade union committees were 
gradually being established in locales where industry was developing fast, they nearly 
all lacked – and still lack – full-time trained staff. Moreover, the committees‟ 
chairpersons were often local government or party leaders with neither time nor 
inclination to put union work before the more pressing priorities of job creation and 
capital accumulation. Where they did exist, primary level unions suffered from a lack 
of financial independence that placed serious limits on their ability to hold employers 
to the law. Even when committees at any of these levels showed an interest in carrying 
out some kind of union-related protection work, there was limited cash available to 
fund it (interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.). Financial and administrative impotence was 
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accompanied by the phenomenon of primary-level unions led by managers or even 
relatives of the boss.
65
  
Finally, the horizons of the union‟s approach to the task of upholding their 
members‟ rights were narrowed by the repetition of traditional working practices that 
concentrated on documentation, meetings and slogans rather than active engagement 
with the workforce and employers (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). The YFTU itself 
lacked legal specialists and looked inwards rather than drawing on wider social 
resources and „as a result, the union came up against structural and operational 
barriers‟ (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). Predictably, employers took advantage of 
the situation.  
We were faced with bosses displaying an extremely negative attitude to their 
employees. Refusing to pay wages and generally ignoring both the labour and 
trade union laws. Underlying this behaviour was the bad attitude of many 
employers towards their workers. (Interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.)  
Meanwhile „migrant workers were turning towards informal place-of-origin 
networks that operated on the basis of intimidation against employers and other 
workers‟ (interview, Chen Youde, op. cit). In the short- and mid-term, the YFTU did 
not have the capacity or accumulated experience to „organise‟ its constituency 
characterised, as it was, by a migrant workforce employed in scattered small 
enterprises. Instead a „rights-based‟ approach was deemed an effective strategy for 
addressing the multiple violations of workers‟ rights in the face of what the YFTU 
itself described as the „three lacks‟ (san wu): no specialist legal staff, no specific funds 
for rights work and no specific dedicated organisation for rights work (Yiwu Case 
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 Article Nine of the revised Trade Union Law (2001) made the latter illegal.  
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Study Report, 2006; interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.). However, once Chen made the 
pioneering decision to allocate funds and hire dedicated staff from beyond the usual 
trade union recruitment fence, the possibilities for an experimental approach opened up. 
Following the Spring Festival in 2000, the YFTU employed two labour law specialists 
and on 20 March the union set up the Yiwu City Trade Union Legal Advice Room 
(Yiwushi zong gonghui falü guwen shi) and Trade Union Legal Aid Centre (gonghui 
yuanzhu falü zhongxin). The next day the city‟s judicial department issued a notice 
stating that the use of the characters meaning law (falü) in the names of both the Centre 
and the Advice Room required prior approval from other departments.
66
 Moreover the 
trade union did not have the authority to establish a legal aid centre, which was the 
responsibility of the justice department. The YFTU came back with two alternative 
names that avoided the offending combination of „trade union‟ with „legal aid‟. These 
were: Yiwu City Labourers‟ Lawyer Office (Yiwushi laogong lüshi shiwusuo) or the 
Yiwu City Labourers‟ Law Service Office (Yiwushi laogong falü fuwusuo) but these 
too were rejected. Facing apparently intransigent opposition and with no other options 
available, the union switched tactics and successfully submitted an application to the 
Department of Civil Affairs to register the proposed centre as a „social organisation‟ 
(shehui tuanti zuzhi). On 12 October 2000, the Yiwu City Workers‟ Law and Rights 
Association (Yiwushi zhigong falü weiquan xiehui) was formally established, over six 
months after the original attempt. It was the first of its kind in China (Luo Xiaojun and 
Zhou Songqiang, 2007: 26). The name has since been changed to include the words 
trade union and is now known as the Yiwu Federation of Trade Unions Workers‟ Law 
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 The department was initially referred to anonymously as a „relevant department‟ but I was told during 
an interview with a contact in Hangzhou in 2006 that this was the Department of Justice (sifaju). 
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and Rights Centre (Yiwushi zong gonghui zhigong falü weiquan zhongxin) but the 
compromise was only successfully signed off after Chen and his supporters lobbied at 
the highest local level – the Jinhua City People‟s Congress (JCPC) under whose 
administrative authority the county city of Yiwu falls.  
 
Author with Chen Youde, Chairperson of the YFTU 21 March 2007 
After the YWLRC was registered under the authority of the Ministry for Civil 
Affairs, opposition to its existence continued. For those actors who had invested a 
political commitment in the Centre, especially the chair of the YFTU, it was essential 
to obtain the highest possible political backing for the project in order to neutralize 
opposition from both the justice department and powerful employers wary of a new 
channel of recourse opening up for their employees. It was in the light of this 
opposition that the YFTU chairperson, Chen, decided to use his status as a 
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representative deputy of the nearby JCPC to consolidate the Centre‟s status and head-
off new obstacles to its work. He wrote and submitted a proposal to be presented at the 
fourth plenum of the second session of the JCPC. The proposal – Document 206 – was 
entitled: „On establishing new workers‟ law and rights mechanism(s) in the trade union 
system‟.67 The motion was a clear attempt to foster closer cooperation between the 
YFTU and various government departments, especially the Department of Justice. 
Document 206 made a number of points. First, that the appropriate departments should 
permit the union to set up organisations such as the Centre in Yiwu city; and second, 
that the Department of Justice enter into consultation with the trade union in order to 
establish a baseline condition (jianli yi ge tiaojian) for the Department of Justice to 
formulate guiding rules. Document 206 also proposed that such centres be placed under 
the overall management and supervision of the Department of Justice but that 
individual cases should be the responsibility of the trade union. The document framed 
its suggestions by arguing that both institutions would then be in a position better to 
serve the workers and poorer sections of society and that the work would be socially 
and economically beneficial to the whole city. The JCPC Resolutions Department (yi 
an chengban bumen)
68
 of the JCPC took a different view: 
There is no basis in law for the establishment of a rights centre or office or 
similar organisation dedicated to the provision of legal services [specifically] 
upholding workers‟ rights. Moreover, the current situation is that the [existing] 
city-wide legal services have been able to meet the basic demand from society 
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 guanyu jianli gonghui xitong zhigong falü weiquan xin jizhi 
68
 This department has a mandate to monitor and enforce resolutions from the People‟s Congress. The 
implication here is that the Resolutions Department was challenging a motion that was accepted by the 
JCPC.  
276 
 
in general. The proposal will be retained on file for reference. (Yiwu Case 
Study Report, 2006)  
Clearly not one to give up without a fight, Chairman Chen next garnered the 
support of twelve People‟s Congress deputies and issued a response that restated the 
original arguments for the Centre. On 4 September 2001, they received a second reply 
from the Department for Congress Motions and Resolutions which stated that „the 
matter would be resolved when the right conditions were in place‟ (deng chuangzao 
tiaojian jiejue – Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). Chen and the supporting deputies 
again responded in writing, expressing their disagreement, but this time succeeded in 
attracting the attention of the leader of the JCPC. On 15 October 2001, a delegation 
from the JCPC Standing Committee, which included the director of Jinhua‟s 
Department of Justice, arrived in Yiwu to conduct an investigation into the work of the 
Centre. During subsequent meetings, representatives from Yiwu People‟s Congress 
Law Committee, daigongwei
69
 and courts expressed doubts about the credibility of the 
Yiwu Justice Department‟s objections to the Centre. Nevertheless, within three weeks, 
the JCPC Department for Motions and Resolutions issued a third veto. This time the 
trade union chair and supporting deputies forwarded their previous response to the 
JCPC Standing Committee and its daigongwei as well as the Jinhua City Inspection 
Bureau for Government News and Information (zhengfu xinxi duchake). The Standing 
Committee expressed its support for the Centre and also agreed to meet the proposal‟s 
suggestion formally to include its work in the work plan (bianzhi) of the Yiwu legal aid 
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The full name of this committee is renda changweihui daibiao xuanju lianluo ren shiren mian gongzuo 
weiyuanhui. Its basic job is to act as the secretariat of the standing committee of the local People‟s Congress. 
It supports, monitors the work of congress members and is responsible for the elections-related business.  
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system run by the Department of Justice. Following such a dramatic victory, the work 
of the Centre could now, finally, begin in earnest.   
Managing a Trade Union Rights Centre in China  
Chen instituted a management policy he dubbed the yi bu san ding which equates in 
English to „the one do not do and the three must dos‟. As stated already, one of the 
experiment‟s chief aims was to avoid further enlarging the union bureaucracy itself and 
to draw on wider social resources. Four professionally trained legal graduates were hired 
and signed individual labour contracts with the YFTU. The point here is that these 
employees were on labour contracts and, unlike their trade union colleagues, were not 
formal civil servants appointed from within the union bureaucracy. While the wages of 
these employees came out of a 300,000 yuan grant from the YFTU to the Centre, they 
were hired from „society‟ and as such part of the process of „socializing‟ union work, as 
opposed to enlarging the union bureaucracy itself. The second half of the yi bu san ding 
arrangement – „the three must dos‟ – was aimed at ensuring that new staff members 
would stay in the job. This meant providing training and ensuring the career 
development of the four new personnel, their basic pay and bonus, and the overall 
budget of the Centre. The first „must do‟ awarded them the same levels of privilege 
enjoyed by city-level union personnel. They were to receive the same level of „political 
treatment‟ (zhengzhi daiyu), „political study‟ (zhengzhi xuexi), and „vocational training‟ 
(yewu peixun). Second was the economic „must do‟ which stipulated that the trade union 
shoulder the responsibility of paying the new staffers 800 yuan per month plus an end-
of-year bonus based on performance and number of cases handled. Thus remuneration 
was based on market rates rather than the civil service salary scale that was considerably 
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higher. Excluding the annual bonus, the wages of the four new employees represented 
less than twelve per cent of the Centre‟s overall budget. The third „must do‟ capped the 
overall operating budget at 300,000 yuan per annum allocated, as mentioned above, 
from YFTU funds.  
Building on experience gained in the struggle to establish the Centre, the future 
political security of the Centre was strengthened by the YFTU‟s actively seeking the 
support and advice of leading city individuals and departments and locking this support 
into the system of work. As soon as it was formally established, Chen asked leaders 
from the City Party Committee – the most powerful body in the city – along with 
leading figures from the Judiciary, Police, Procuracy, Civil Affairs and Legal 
departments to form an advisory group to support and guide the Centre‟s work. 
Regular progress reports were sent to these leaders and they were consulted when 
major cases came before the Centre. 
Building a „socialised rights network‟  
Once Chen had won the political space and backing for the Centre‟s plans, the next 
step was to provide the appropriate physical space, supported by an effective process of 
upholding rights work within the aforementioned budgetary constraints. 
Once we were accepted as an idea, we then had to concentrate on making our 
Centre work in practice. This meant a process (guocheng) of rights protection 
that drew on resources in society rather than exacerbating confrontation in 
society. (Interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.)  
At first, the Centre operated on a membership basis in order to keep costs down 
and work units, institutions and even individuals could apply for membership 
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(interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.). Primary-level trade unions and their members were 
deemed as „natural members‟ and workers in enterprises that did not have unions could 
apply for membership on an individual or collective basis. Fees were paid in both these 
membership categories and, although I have been unable to determine what these were, 
they are likely to have been low as the Centre‟s status as a social organisation (shehui 
tuanti) dictated a non-profit status. If a work unit successfully gained membership, this 
automatically awarded all employees of the work unit free membership status. By the 
end of 2001, 275 work units had joined and brought with them 32,870 members. The 
following year, all union members were deemed members of the Centre, a move which 
facilitated the 2004 change of name to that by which the Centre is now known – the 
Yiwu Workers‟ Legal Rights Centre.  
The Centre itself was located on the ground floor of the YFTU building. It is 
interesting to note that when I took a taxi from the bus station, the driver said he did 
not know where the YFTU offices were, but he could take me to the YWLRC! Four 
rooms were set aside for dedicated activities based on a process of dispute and/or 
complaint resolution. On the left as one enters is a reception room for workers, who 
either phone with complaints and requests for help or arrive in person. This was staffed 
by one reception worker who explained: „The main task of this room is to register a 
case, get it on file and begin the process for dealing with it. We also try to get the 
workers who come to start thinking about a feasible (ke zuo de) settlement rather than 
just letting off steam (interview, YWLRC staff, Yiwu, 22 March 2007).  
The room consisted of one desk, a telephone and various forms for workers to 
complete. There were no computers and distractions were deliberately kept to a 
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minimum. Opposite this room was the investigation and procedures room (diaocha 
chulishi). As the name suggests, this room was for investigating the complaints from 
workers registered in the first room and trawling for supporting evidence from 
mediation of disputes either in the relevant enterprise or at the Centre itself. The third 
room was the Legal Service Room (falü fuwushi) where preparations were made for 
representing workers at arbitration or in court. It was designed to facilitate a formal 
arbitration hearing which the Centre had obtained the right to hold (see below) and 
slightly resembled an English courtroom. There was a high desk at the „head‟ of the 
room for the arbitrator(s) and in front of that two smaller „docks‟ and tables were 
arranged so that they faced each other and were designated for employee and employer 
respectively. Although I did not witness a hearing, this room did have a somewhat 
formal atmosphere to it. Opposite this room was an archive office. Detailed records of 
all cases were rigourously filed in clip box files and these filled shelving that extended 
twenty feet along the end wall of the room.  
External to the Centre itself, there were three initiatives aimed at building 
support for a socialised rights network: First, the union set about gaining the support of 
the Department of Telecommunications to establish a city-wide legal rights telephone 
hotline. The first two numbers of this phone line were „51‟, deliberately chosen by the 
union as they represent May Day in Chinese. The caller is greeted with a „brief, helpful 
and pleasant‟ recorded message offering help and encouraging him or her to follow up 
the complaint (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). In order to avoid an atmosphere of 
formality, which can be intimidating for migrant workers who often lack confidence 
when confronted with the official language of government, the caller is initially greeted 
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in the local dialect – which is sufficiently close to standard putonghua to be 
understandable to most Chinese.
70
  
Second, a great deal of emphasis was placed on mediation at enterprise or local 
level. Acknowledging that enterprise-based mediation committees were not working 
effectively, the YFTU lobbied the Department of Justice for permission to set up the 
YFTU People‟s Mediation Committee which, in enterprises with more than 100 
employees, was to merge with any existing mediation committees under the leadership 
of the enterprise union chairperson or deputy. In enterprises with no mediation 
facilities, mediation was organised by staff from the YWLRC representing the YFTU 
and this usually took place in the Legal Service Room of the YFTU. In smaller but 
important towns such as nearby Fantang, the Party-government liaison committee 
(gong wei) was asked to act as an outreach office of the Centre itself and assist with 
mediation cases wherever possible.  
Third, the Centre organised a major rights awareness campaign in local 
townships which involved seminars in trade union law as well as the writing, printing 
and distribution of rights awareness materials. It also organised well-known local 
lawyers and legal specialists to attend question-and-answer and education sessions on 
labour rights at various public and semi-public venues, including street level, 
residential neighbourhoods, migrants‟ dormitories, enterprises and various community 
centres and gathering places. A popular slogan for this activity was coined: „know the 
law, respect the law and use the law to protect yourself‟ (zhi fa, shou fa, yi fa shishi 
ziwo baohu) (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2007).  
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 One government-sponsored survey across China found that fifty-one per cent of Chinese people were 
not comfortable speaking formal putonghua. See „Greater Numbers Speak Mandarin‟, China Daily, 26 
December 2004. 
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In keeping with the suggestions in Document 206, on 27 February 2002, the 
YFTU and the Yiwu Department of Justice issued a joint document that effectively met 
Chen‟s goal of coordinating the YFTU legal work with that of the city-wide legal aid 
system under the administration of the Department of Justice. As such, the Yiwu City 
Legal Aid Centre (Staff and Workers‟ Section) 71  was formally established and 
immediately increased the opportunities for workers – especially migrant workers – to 
finance cases against their employers. Where the reorganised channels of mediation 
failed and a case went on to court – via arbitration – the union strove to speed up the 
process by persuading court judges to establish a fast track „green channel‟ for cases 
being assisted by the YWLRC personnel. This was centred on a pre-trial mediation 
session, a service that, according to official figures, has achieved a ninety per cent 
success rate.
72
 The YFTU used the information gained from the Centre‟s casework to 
get involved with MOLSS labour inspections wherever possible. 
One of the YFTU‟s most innovative measures in building a socialised rights 
network was to seek out the involvement of the media in order to publicise violations 
and pressurise all parties to resolve a dispute. Almost from the outset in 2001, the 
YFTU and the local provincial edition of the Workers‟ Daily cooperated in setting up a 
„rights work station‟. In practice this pro-media policy meant that as soon as a serious 
dispute emerged, reporters from local TV stations and newspapers were invited to 
cover the story, as opposed to the usual practice of keeping reporters away. This 
developed into a regular TV slot called Trade Union March (gonghui zongzheng), 
which used YWLRC case studies to highlight trade union law and also encourage 
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 Yiwushi falü yuanzhu zhongxin zhigong gongzuobu 
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 It has not been possible to verify this figure independently.  
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public discussion of labour rights. Early experience in one of the Centre‟s first cases 
demonstrated the power of the media in labour disputes in which the new Centre faced 
an intransigent employer. According to Chen:  
Yes, there was opposition from employers at first – and there are still 
challenges. In fact our first case centered on three women workers at a hotel in 
the city. The boss owed the girls wages but wouldn‟t pay so they came to the 
Rights Centre which they had seen advertised in the press. The boss had a „dark 
heart‟ (heixin) and his attitude was very negative, yet we couldn‟t let the Centre 
appear overtly confrontational as this was an early case. We decided to 
challenge the boss to discuss the details of the dispute on the local TV station 
and let the people decide. This suggestion was made after many hours of 
negotiation during which the boss showed no signs of compromising. Our 
challenge to him worked and he gave in. We drew two lessons from this: First, 
that use of the media is a very interesting yet in some ways quite a traditional 
approach. It is based on a public opinion approach to justice rather than entirely 
focusing on the fine detail of the legal points. It is also an effective negotiating 
tactic in that it put huge pressure on the boss. After all, he was running a hotel 
which needs good publicity, not bad. Second, we [the Centre] had to win this 
case but at the same time we could not afford to create more opposition from 
local enterprises to the Centre‟s activities. We had to think of our continuing 
development and take conditions into account. But in this case, owing to the 
exceptionally stubborn attitude adopted by the hotel boss, we had to suggest a 
public exchange. (Interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.)  
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The YFTU also cultivated working relationships with two law „offices‟, both of 
which employed lawyers who had experience of labour cases, in order to improve the 
quality of legal services provided to workers. These were the Tiandi Legal Services 
Office (fuwusuo) in Yiwu and the Zhejiang Siyuanhunlun Lawyers‟ Office (lüshi 
shiwusuo). Finally, the union worked closely with trade unions from other areas and 
counties that exported labour to Yiwu. For example, Kaihua County exported over 
23,000 migrant workers to Yiwu each year. On 13 October 2002, the YFTU and the 
Kaihua County Federation of Trade Unions established a work station aimed at dealing 
with complaints and cases involving migrants from Kaihua. By the end of December 
2004, this cooperation had dealt with thirty-six cases involving 506 migrants with wage 
and compensation claims totalling 1.2 million yuan. Over one million yuan in wage 
arrears had been successfully retrieved. The Centre, via the work station, had 
represented workers in one case of arbitration and dealt with three cases in court. A 
network was in place.  
Case Studies: The Centre in Action 
I have already discussed the ACFTU‟s cautious response to representing workers in 
court. I will begin this section by first returning to the issues around formal dispute 
resolution, prior to discussing details from the YWLRC‟s caseload. A senior trade 
union official in Guangzhou explained the union‟s reticence to take up difficult or 
sensitive cases. 
We can generally only take up cases in which the violations are so bad that the 
workers will definitely win. We know that this is not an ideal (lixiang) policy 
but it is the only policy that we can effectively employ in the period. At this 
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stage in our economic development it‟s not going to encourage migrant workers 
to join if we take up cases which, for one reason or another, we lose. (Interview, 
city-level union official, Guangzhou, 12 July 2001)  
In recent years, the union has certainly increased its caseload and this trend will 
continue following the enactment of the Labour Mediation and Arbitration Law on 1 
May 2008, but a cautious and constrained approach remains in place. Lawyers and 
migrant workers in Guangdong province have criticised this policy. A lawyer 
practicing in Guangzhou whose caseload included industrial disputes, sometimes for 
the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), told me that: 
Our office would take on more workers‟ cases if we could secure the formal 
backing of the union. It‟s not a question of organisation and everyone knows 
the union is compromised in the factory. It‟s more an issue of the higher levels 
throwing their weight behind specific cases – publicly and much more often – 
and being prepared to lose. The GFTU blacklist [of bad employers] is not such 
a good thing from this perspective. It ignores the fact that most employers break 
the law most of the time! (Interview, lawyer, Guangzhou, 6 June 2006)  
From a different angle, a worker recovering from benzene poisoning in 
Guangdong Hospital for Treatment and Prevention of Occupational Diseases told me 
that:  
The union won‟t take up our case as it‟s complicated. Half of us didn‟t have 
contracts and the workers like me who have been hit badly have been talking to 
the media already and this has not helped our cause with the union. Also the 
company‟s claim that the chemical was labelled is partly true. But I didn‟t even 
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know what benzene was when I started so what difference did a label make? 
(Interview, injured worker, Guangzhou, 7 September 2002)  
The YWLRC has taken a different approach. At the same time as cultivating 
contacts among relevant government departments and conducting labour law education 
and law propaganda exercises, it has also set out to take on as many cases as possible, 
encouraging mediation over arbitration and the courts, although these options are 
certainly not ruled out. This is going against the general direction of development, 
which has seen a decline in the relative use of mediation by workers and selective 
intervention by the unions. Chen explained that, even though unions remained weak at 
enterprise level, the advantage of the Centre was that it could react fast and carried the 
authority of the YFTU itself.  
Over ninety per cent of the cases we deal with involve a violation of workers‟ 
legal rights. Our Centre deals with cases irrespective of their size or degree of 
complexity. If you can get to a dispute early enough, there is always a way of 
finding a solution if you try hard enough. The Centre has been of immense help 
in this respect. Workers are beginning to come to us first and not as a last resort. 
(Interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.)  
Chen stressed that thorough investigation by the Centre‟s staffers was essential 
to successful prosecutions but that while the fast-track channel established with the 
courts was important in bringing pressure on the employers, the preferred approach of 
the „Yiwu Model‟ was compromise through mediation. At a conference on Labour 
Dispute Resolutions in 2007, a deputy director of the Centre, Chen Ji, explained the 
logic. 
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Workers are like anyone else, they are prepared to compromise. If we get a case 
that say involves 5,000 yuan in wage arrears but the boss, following our 
intervention, is only willing to pay 4,500 yuan, we have found that workers will 
accept the lower figure as long as it is reasonable rather then go for a long-
drawn-out case to get the full amount. At the end of the day, we believe it is in 
the workers‟ interests to compromise. We think arbitration and the delays it 
involves can be a waste of time so we encourage this spirit of compromise. 
(Chen Ji, observation, Beijing, 20 January 2007)
73
  
There is an irony to this argument in that a rights centre is spending as much 
time persuading workers to compromise and in effect to abandon their rights as it is 
helping workers pursue employers through arbitration and the courts. Yet perhaps even 
more ironic is the criticism that the Yiwu Model occasionally attracts from within the 
ACFTU, despite the fact that the ACFTU itself has made only limited progress in 
juridical resolution, as testified by the rise in the number of strikes described in Chapter 
Two. In a contribution at a seminar in Beijing organised by a Sino-British project on 
labour dispute settlement procedures, Chen Ji‟s comments in favour of compromise 
and mediation over arbitration and legal action was greeted with scepticism by 
attending academics and was even rebuffed by one participant as a step backwards. In 
the following section I narrate how the Centre solved three different disputes that were 
compiled during the research for this chapter. All three are representative of the 
Centre‟s work (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2007). 
Case Study One 
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 The International Symposium on the Legislation of The Labour Dispute Resolution Law, Renmin 
University, 19-20 January 2007 
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Hu XX was one of 112 carpenters employed on a new recreation park in Yiwu City. 
On 14 January 2005, Hu and three other representatives of the carpenters, all from the 
nearby Kaihua county, arrived at the Yiwu-Kaihua Rights Centre Work Station, part of 
the „rights network‟ established by the YFTU. The four representatives had been 
delegated by their workmates to ask the station for assistance in chasing 290,000 yuan 
in unpaid wages dating back to August 2004 when their work on the project was 
completed. The construction of the park was under the overall management of a major 
construction corporation (Group). Despite the fact that the arrears were over a year old, 
rendering the facts of the case more difficult to pin down, the Centre agreed to take the 
case and immediately contacted the project manager at the construction company. A 
staff member at the Centre embarked on a process of explaining the relevant labour law 
articles as well as a national government campaign which was prioritising the problem 
of wage arrears among construction workers. The Centre also explained that companies 
which violated these regulations were subject to fines. After claiming that the company 
was also owed money by the developers, the project manager of the company was 
persuaded to apply to a special guarantee fund established by the Ministry of 
Construction for an emergency payout of 300,000 yuan in order to cover the unpaid 
wages. An explanation for the company‟s initial reluctance to apply can be found in the 
sometimes political nature of contract bidding in China‟s construction industry, where 
companies applying for government contracts can be penalised if their management 
record is blemished by such applications that could suggest mismanagement (interview, 
lawyer, Guangzhou, 6 June 2006). Given the recent attempts by the government to 
stamp out wage arrears in the construction industry, the dispute would be taken into 
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account when the company put out future tenders in what the local provincial-level 
trade union has described as an „immature, unregulated and often chaotic construction 
market place in which payments to construction companies are delayed as a matter of 
course and “competition”‟ (Tao et al., 2003). That the Centre took just an afternoon to 
solve this case by negotiating on behalf of the workers, even though there was no direct 
evidence of an employment relationship, is testament to both the reputation of its rights 
network after just four years in full operation and the leverage a quasi-official body can 
exercise over an enterprise. From the YFTU‟s point of view, it also gives a certain 
amount of credence to the argument for mediation over more confrontational tactics.  
The second example is of a dispute involving former SOE workers employed at 
the now restructured and privatised national department store chain Baihuodalou.
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When the store began restructuring in 1998, it offered its employees the choice to 
purchase shares in a process known nationally as gufenhua or literally 
„shareholderisation‟. Sixty retired and „internally retired‟ employees were not included 
in the offer, even though they were still formal employees and/or pensioners of the 
company. By 2003, the shares had risen in value by more than 500 per cent. When 
former employees cashed in and sold their shares to a new corporate buyer, the sixty 
retirees realised the extent of their losses and launched a campaign of petitioning 
government up to and including provincial level for compensation for their original 
exclusion. These protests attracted a great deal of attention as news of the campaign 
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 I worked as a counter sales staffer in the Kunming branch of the Baihuodalou for six months in 1994. 
Wages for temporary workers were low at eight yuan for an eight hour day. However, conditions for 
permanent workers (zhigong) were comprehensively good and even included subsidised haircuts. I 
returned to the store to visit colleagues and friends in 1999 and found it had been divided up into 
franchised outlets. Some of my former colleagues were still there – though many had left or been laid off 
– and told me that contracts were now limited to one year and while wages had gone up, all subsidies 
had been cut and the previously excellent canteen shut down.  
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spread beyond Yiwu city. During December 2003, the retirees presented a collective 
complaint to the YFTU offices. Both YFTU officers and employees from the Centre 
were duly dispatched to organise dialogue between company managers and the 
protestors. Acting as mediators between the two sides and working to narrow the 
difference in opinion, the YFTU gradually edged itself towards a negotiating role on 
behalf of the workers by urging the company to consider the long years of service and 
contribution they had made to the store‟s successful development and eventual 
restructuring. The company agreed to make a one-off compensation payment of 5,000 
yuan to each former employee. This represented approximately eight months‟ wages, 
based on 1998 wage rates. 
These two cases involved mediation and limited representation in which neither 
courts nor arbitration committees were involved. The third example is quite different 
and involved the Centre taking up a case of work injury compensation after due legal 
process failed to result in justice. Mr. Xu worked as a lift engineer for the Shanghai 
Express Elevator Company. In May 1997 Xu was seriously injured in a fall while 
installing a lift and was classified as having a Category Six injury by the local 
government-run occupational injury committee. Between 1998 and 2002, Xu took his 
employers to three arbitration courts and filed five legal appeals to obtain adequate 
compensation. Despite hiring a competent lawyer, these efforts did not lead to a fair 
settlement from Xu‟s point of view. Five years after the original injury and heavily in 
debt, he approached the YFTU on 30 May 2002. The case was passed to the Centre.  
The Centre organised a five-pronged strategy to win compensation for Xu: First, 
a thorough investigation into the case, which included gathering as much hard 
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information as possible in order to build up a critical mass of evidence that would stand 
up in negotiation, arbitration or in court. Second, the Centre compiled and sent reports, 
backed by supporting evidence, to the arbitration committee and the Department of 
Justice. This tactic also involved asking these bodies for further instructions (qingshi), 
keeping open channels of communication on the case and even lobbying for support. 
Third, Chen Youde personally wrote a document entitled „Award or revoke, long delay 
or speedy solution‟ which he submitted to the Jinhua People‟s Congress – in his 
capacity as a People‟s Congress deputy – as well as the senior judge of the People‟s 
Intermediate Court and various government leaders in Yiwu (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006). Fourth, the Centre drew on its contacts at law offices and appointed legal 
representatives to organise a sixth appeal. Finally, steps were taken to ensure that the 
case received widespread attention via the media. A year later, on 6 May 2003, the 
Yiwu City Intermediate Court awarded Xu damages of 106,835 yuan. This case 
demonstrated the multi-pronged strategy that the union had employed to win 
acceptance for the Centre‟s right to exist: a combination of lobbying, political appeals 
and tactical use of the media.  
Between 2002 and 2006, the Centre dealt with a large number of individual 
cases, collective protests and carried out educational activities. The following is a 
summary of these activities which, according to senior officials of the YFTU, have 
significantly contributed to improving labour relations in the city. These statistics are 
from the YFTU itself and I have been unable to verify them independently. Cases 
received: 3,112, of which 2,831 were solved; 266 collective petitions involving 4,337 
people; 2,278 enquiries to the legal rights telephone hotline answered; twenty-eight 
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serious incidents have been settled without „further escalation or conflict‟. The Centre 
has made 113 free representations in arbitration committees; 114 free representations – 
by lawyers – in court; fifty-two broadcasts of the Union Banner TV programme on 
Yiwu TV; thirty-two legal training sessions involving 16,770 workers; wages and 
losses retrieved for workers totalling 9.01 million yuan (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006).  
Significance of the YFTU Experiment  
Given the lack of competition from autonomous unions, it is almost impossible to 
conceive of the ACFTU behaving as an independent trade union whose power is rooted 
in the collective will of its members. Therefore much of the pressure to change must 
inevitably derive from external factors: namely, increasing working class militancy and 
the Party itself. By the same token, successful reforming initiatives that aim to improve 
workers‟ rights via union activity must also include external agencies. According to the 
Zhejiang Workers‟ Daily, this was one of the prime lessons of the Centre‟s initial 
achievements: 
In order to seriously undertake rights work [the union] must actively go after 
the support of both the Party Committee and the government. Only by blending 
in with the wider situation facing the Party and government, can the right kind 
of space for developing [rights work] be opened up. (ZJWD, 2005) 
Political constraints apart, restrictions on the YFTU‟s access to resources, as 
dictated by the local government‟s overall administrative plan (bianzhi), ruled out a 
full-blown legal assault on employers‟ violations. In this sense, the YFTU differed 
little from most county-level city trade union federations. The key weapon in the 
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struggle to establish the rights centre in Yiwu can be found in the fact that Chen Youde 
possessed the will to do something about the plight of migrant workers. Indeed, 
unusually for a local union official, Chen has become something of a local hero.  
In Yiwu city many migrant workers are aware that the trade union has a rights 
centre that specialises in speaking out for migrant workers and solving the 
difficult problems they face. The trade union Chairman is Chen Youde who 
migrant workers call „Old Uncle [Chen]‟. (Liu Shen, 2006)  
The experience of walking around the streets near the YFTU with Chen 
certainly backs up this approachable and down-to-earth image that this „peasant‟s son‟ 
(Liu Shen, 2006) has acquired. As we walked to a nearby restaurant for lunch, Chen 
stopped to talk to people he appeared to know – shopkeepers, a building security guard 
– and, astonishingly, the driver of a passing bus sounded his horn and waved in 
greeting when he saw Chen. After spending time with Chen, it became clear that he 
was the driving force behind the experiment and indeed this conclusion was backed up 
by interviews with some of the project‟s advisors (interview, labour researcher, 
Hangzhou, 21 March 2007). Once a leading union official – in this case at city (county) 
level – with the political will to innovate or „trail blaze‟ (chuangxin) was appointed, 
barriers to action were at least breached if not taken down.  
To demonstrate that their strategy would work to sceptical government officials, 
often hostile employers and victimised workers alike, the YFTU and its Centre had to 
be seen to make a difference to the general climate of industrial relations. Early 
intervention in disputes via rights work was prioritised and the „borrowing‟ of 
resources was the key strategy.  
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Faced with these problems, the YFTU put the upholding of rights at the 
forefront of its work and set out to achieve this by the concept of „carrying out 
trade union work outside the trade union‟. The road to [successfully] upholding 
rights was to „make use of policies, make use of external strengths and make 
use of logic and experience‟ (jie feng jie li jie li). (Yiwu Case Study Report, 
2006)  
This meant taking aspects of trade union work and „socializing‟ it by turning to 
wider social and governmental resources. At the same time, it should not surprise us 
that the YFTU did not deem it appropriate to „borrow‟ from their constituents‟ only 
available resource – collective class power! Such radical departures from policy and 
practice were off the radar even in the blazing of new trails. In the struggle to set up the 
YWLRC against sustained opposition, the YFTU made no attempt to break from its 
constitutional acceptance of Party leadership and guidance – indeed Chen Youde was – 
and is – a loyal servant of the Party and as such provided an important anchor of 
authority and continuity to the experiment. And while it attempted to improve the 
YFTU‟s capacity and reputation as a defender of workers, it did so by relying on 
China‟s trade union and labour laws, which can equally serve as a passport for trade 
union passivity simply due to their non-implementation. To his credit, Chen took these 
laws seriously and thought out a creative strategy for at least partially enforcing them. 
Thus the starting point for the YWLRC experiment was not Chen‟s close links with the 
„grassroots‟ or inspiration derived from the traditional trade union pantheon of class 
interests and solidarity. It was the law, specifically the Trade Union Law, Article 2 of 
which stipulates: 
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The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and all the trade union organisations 
under it represent the interests of the workers and staff members and safeguard 
the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff members according 
to law. (ACFTU, 2001) 
We can see that an important function of the Centre was to provide a channel 
through which workers could take grievances justified by trade union and labour law. 
The strategy and tactics adopted to achieve this aim were both experimental – the 
socialization of union work – and pragmatic – the emphasis on mediation over formal 
legal action. While the law served as an important reference point for developing the 
project against strong opposition, mediation, persuasion and garnering influence in 
high places was preferred to ruthless pursuit of the implementation of the law in the 
name of inalienable rights. As Chen Ji told me in Beijing: 
Our job is not to terrify employers with the law. Our job is to get the best 
possible deal for workers in a difficult labour relations environment. Before the 
Centre was set up, workers, migrants especially, had virtually no accessible 
channels of recourse and the union had very few full-timers! Remember our 
industrial areas are full of small companies where employees have no chance of 
actively influencing the boss, short of just leaving the job. We were not in a 
position to organise all these workers effectively. Our best option was to try and 
hold employers to their most basic obligations and remind them that these are 
the law. But this also requires workers to compromise. We cannot spend all our 
time and resources in the courts. We have to be more imaginative than that and 
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this is why we stress that effective mediation can still work. (Chen Ji, personal 
communication, Beijing, 20 January 2007)  
Part of this imaginative work came in the form of increased, flexible and 
improved mediation services. The YFTU set up the Yiwu City Federation of Trade 
Unions People‟s Mediation Committee with the – hard won – backing and authority of 
a „borrowed‟ resource, namely the Department of Justice. While there are no 
independent statistics available, it is interesting to document the results of this 
emphasis on mediation and compare it with trends in not-too-far-away Shanghai. 
Between October 2000 and autumn 2004, the Centre dealt with 3,112 cases and 
achieved a ninety-one per cent success rate via various channels of mediation (ZJWD, 
2005). In Shanghai enterprise-level mediated disputes dropped dramatically in foreign-
owned or invested enterprises between 1996-1997 from 55,000 to under 8,000 and flat-
lined in the first years of the new century (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 1997-
2002). Gallagher found a total of just 698 mediated disputes in the whole of Shanghai 
for the year 2000 (Gallagher, 2005b: 31-54). In 2004, the new mediation committee in 
Yiwu dealt with 425 cases and avoided ninety-three per cent of these going on to 
formal arbitration.
75
 In one case, involving a trade union chairperson dismissed early 
from his post, the YWLRC obtained his successful reinstatement after ten rounds of 
mediation (Yiwu Case Study Report, 2006). For Chen Ji, the compromise that 
mediation usually entailed was worthwhile if it meant avoiding „clogging up courts and 
arbitration committees‟ in drawn-out battles (Chen Ji, personal observation, op.cit.)  
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 It should be noted that Gallagher‟s figures refer to mediation in the enterprise whereas the figures 
from Yiwu refer to mediation conducted at the Centre and/or at enterprise level. However, they are valid 
here as Gallagher‟s point is to stress the decline in mediation due to weak representation whereas the 
YWLRC goal is to keep mediation alive by improving the overall environment in which mediation takes 
place, including representation.  
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On the other hand, the Centre did not exclude arbitration or court representation 
from its programme. As I have shown, it broke new ground in getting official backing 
from the Yiwu Labour Arbitration Committee for its mediated arbitration work as well 
as openly drawing on the experience of foreign trade unions in directly engaging the 
services and reputation of law firms, offices and centres.
76
 Again the emphasis was on 
drawing on wider social resources and official support and avoiding expanding the 
budget or work plan (bianzhi) of the YFTU itself. Indeed, Chen Youde was keen to 
point out that: 
The Centre‟s employees were all hired via the market. They are not civil 
servants. This is very important and in fact experimental. If our example is 
going to be applied elsewhere, it will simply not work if it is expensive or 
involves reassessing administrative work plans (bianzhi). This is all part of 
what we meant by „doing union work outside the union‟ – we are breaking out 
of traditional union practices and trying to adapt to the new conditions. 
(Interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.)  
The Zhejiang Workers‟ Daily reminded union cadres studying its discussion of 
the Yiwu Model of the experiment‟s limits. According to the newspaper, which is 
owned by the Zhejiang Federation of Trade Unions, going out on a limb and solely 
relying on the trade union to protect workers‟ rights was „far from enough‟ and the 
model demonstrated the centrality of government and Party support to the YFTU 
strategy – as well as „aid from all corners of society‟ (ZJWD, 2005). Indeed a legal 
advisor employed at the Centre pointed out to me that one of the challenges they had 
faced at the outset was persuading officials from „relevant government departments‟ to 
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 Chen Youde could not say from which countries the experience was drawn.  
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accept that they themselves should be part of a „socialized rights network‟, i.e. that 
their department was part of the process of upholding rights as well.
77
 The ZJWD 
article stated that „practice has demonstrated that the YFTU‟s socialization of rights 
work is in keeping with the trade unions becoming socio-political organisations‟ 
(ZJWD, 2005). One labour researcher interpreted this as meaning that unions are no 
longer restricted to serving as transmission belts for Party and government policies 
(Interview, labour researcher, Beijing, 23 January 2007).  
Political decision-making in China is an opaque process and as such it is a 
challenge – particularly at local level – to map clearly the arguments that inevitably lie 
behind the acceptance or rejection of a new strategy or policy initiative. But, as I have 
shown, the fieldwork in Yiwu did afford a reasonably detailed snapshot of the 
protracted struggle and lobbying campaign by the YFTU and its chairman to get the 
YWLRC up and running. Interestingly this contention has been entirely by-passed by 
both the senior leaders of the ACFTU and the media in their public discussions and 
endorsement of the Centre‟s work. In fact the contention offers us a clear example of 
how, as it edges towards a more representational role, the ACFTU‟s labour rights work 
can „upset people‟ (interview, Chen Youde, op. cit.). The „people‟ ranged from 
individual employers to government departments to heavies from home-town 
associations. In fact it is in the struggle to get the Centre accepted that the YFTU 
entered into truly experimental territory. This was characterised by two major decisions. 
First, by hiring staff outside the traditional channels of union employment, the YFTU 
was taking direct responsibility as an employer. And second, by placing these 
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 When I pressed the Centre employee to name the departments, he said „police‟ (gong‟an) and „justice‟ 
(sifa) but did not want to elaborate – not least because his boss was walking back towards us after a trip 
to the washroom!  
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employees in an organisation registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a non-
profit making group that fits into the first of three NGO categories I discussed in 
section two above, the YFTU was going well and truly „outside the union‟. The 
crossover of responsibilities and authority that these measures implied was initially too 
much for the related government departments to swallow, as we have seen by their 
reactions. The Department of Justice was especially „upset‟ by both the challenge to its 
turf over legal aid work and the implication that established legal mechanisms of 
labour dispute resolution were failing workers, not just on the grounds of union 
incapacity but by the procedures themselves.  
Conclusion 
To return to the research question: How can a local trade union act in defence of the 
interests and rights of its members and potential members? Or, more broadly, is trade 
union reform possible? The evidence suggests that we can judge the work of the 
YWLRC from three angles. First, as an example of changing union work practices; 
second, as an example of the changing nature of the ACFTU itself; and third in 
comparison with similar work carried out by civil society‟s new kids on the block: 
LNGOs.  
What the ACFTU does well is draft laws, carry out research and maintain 
contacts with government departments. More recently it has grown in influence in the 
international union world, reflecting an investment and upgrading of its international 
department that has facilitated its re-election to the Governing Body of the ILO in 2008. 
On the other hand, it is doing badly at negotiating effective collective contracts, 
organising from the bottom up and activating its primary levels to reduce violations of 
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workers‟ rights. These failures are a direct historical legacy from its role in the 
command economy and the work practices that this role produced over time. The 
YWLRC broke the mould. It used its own resources to go beyond the usual parameters 
and borrowed from other resources to ensure at least partial success in attempting to 
create a rights network serving not only migrant workers but also weak enterprise-level 
trade unions. In Chen Youde, the YFTU happened on a trade union official with 
empathy for the plight of workers and the initiative to draw up a workable and legal 
strategy (jie feng jie li jie li) to improve it. This translated into „political will‟ and as a 
result resources not normally associated with the trade union bureaucracy became 
available.  
The YWLRC also reflects the changing nature of the ACFTU itself, though 
progress is sometimes excruciatingly slow and erratic. The institution is being called on 
to stabilise labour relations in a market economy and yet it remains largely ineffective 
in the workplace, where the higher levels have little or no leverage. It is still too early 
to say if the YFTU has found an interim solution to this contradiction even if the 
results so far represent an improvement. Much more important to the bigger picture, 
however, is that the experiment was indicative of reform that eventually gained 
approval from the chairman of the ACFTU, Wang Zhaoguo (Workers‟ Daily, 2005b).  
Finally, the case study also shows how a state agency – albeit in transition – 
tasked with upholding workers‟ rights differs from non-state agencies – LNGOs – 
which are attempting to do the same thing. While the work of LNGOs is vital, results 
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are hard to measure except in terms of general influence.
78
 And in contrast with 
LNGOs, the YFTU was able to make use of its status as essentially a government 
agency in order to exercise political and administrative leverage to persuade employers 
to back down. For their part, LNGOs have to tread a sensitive path in which employers 
are under little obligation to accept their role as mediators and, as Huang Qingnan‟s 
injuries demonstrate, are occasionally prone to resorting to direct violence to 
discourage LNGOs from their work. On an optimistic note, recent developments in 
Guangdong province perhaps herald the next step in the evolution of labour rights 
centres in China – and one with the potential to widen the employers‟ goalposts in 
favour of workers. In the wake of the attacks on Huang and others, the SFTU made 
approaches to LNGOs in October of 2007 and convened a meeting with sixteen 
representatives of both LNGOs and so-called „black lawyers‟. At the meeting, the 
SFTU proposed working with these networks to establish a township-based system of 
rights centres throughout Guangdong. This important development has caused 
considerable debate in the NGO community, especially as the proposal ruled out those 
LNGOs with direct overseas funding – a constraint that is not insurmountable. The 
experiences, strategies and tactics of Yiwu are of great relevance to both the LNGOs 
and the SFTU, the differences between Zhejiang and Guangdong notwithstanding. 
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 Having edited activity reports for a number of Hong Kong-based LNGOs active in South China, I 
have personal experience of how difficult this can be, especially when faced with pressure from funders 
who want to see quantifiable returns on their investments.  
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Chapter Six 
Trade Union Elections: From Dependency to Democracy?  
This chapter examines the more sensitive issue of „direct‟ trade union elections at 
enterprise level. Using evidence from case studies, interviews and secondary sources, I 
will explore different procedures for candidate selection and voting to elect trade union 
chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and committee members at primary level.  
Traditional practice has been for the enterprise party committee to appoint trade union 
officials (Harris, 1978: 105; Richman, 1969: 268) via a generally non-competitive, 
consultative procedure that prioritised ideological commitment, class background, 
education level, administrative skills and an unblemished personal file as preferred 
qualities for such a post (Taylor et al., 2003: 117). The quandary that arose out of this 
system was not unique to China. Writing on the former Soviet Union, Ashwin and 
Clarke positioned unions as being strung between the Party and enterprise management 
(Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 18-19). Both Chinese and Russian union cadres were 
supposed to keep managers and workers to the Party line, but they were more likely to 
serve management, which did not necessarily represent Party or national interests. 
Traditional practice has continued into the reform era and in the more polarised 
environment of the private sector, the impotency of trade union cadres became far 
more apparent.  As far back as the early 1980s, protagonists of direct trade union 
elections advocated pilot projects as part of a long-term strategy to improve enterprise 
unions‟ capacity to meet the challenges of a new economic environment (Howell, 2006: 
11).  
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As we saw in Chapter Two, the ACFTU‟s room for manoeuvre during the 
restructuring of the state sector was constrained by its politically-defined institutional 
incapacity to mount a challenge to government policy. As the reforms deepened and 
began to impact on workers lives, feelings of abandonment and disappointment among 
those losing out were sometimes directed at the trade union and its cadres across the 
country:  
In Shulan:  
What the hell have you come here for? We‟ve got nothing here! The mines 
have shut down and those bastards in their offices [where the union office is 
housed] are corrupt to the bone! We had a strike, but there‟s no way of 
controlling them. It‟s not like the USA where everyone‟s rich and you've got 
democracy. Shulan Town? It‟s a joke. (Interview, miner, Shulan, October 22 
2001) 
In Daqing: 
The union did not explain the full consequences of the lay-off deal and that‟s 
been a big disappointment for us. I think the union should help us get our jobs 
back, not direct us to casual work in society. (Interview, laid-off oil worker, 
Daqing, 25 March 2002)  
In Liaoyang: 
Now our factory is bankrupt and the overwhelming majority of its workers have 
been reduced to the level of unemployed vagrants and we are furious. Most of 
us here have met with disaster and, as we have no other option, we address this 
open letter to you in order to recount the events leading up to, and since, the 
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bankruptcy. (Open Letter to President Jiang Zemin, 5 March, 2002 cited in 
HRW [Pringle], 2002: 38) 
The failures of representation in the state sector were also felt by workers who had 
transferred to the private sector. A former SOE worker who had found a new job in the 
Shenzhen Shangri La hotel explained that she saw no point in a union on the basis that 
there was nothing for it to do!   
There is no union here. I am not sure that management would allow it anyway. 
The guy who runs this place is a capitalist from Malaysia. It is different 
working here. The pay is better but the work is much harder and there are no 
benefits. If he [the Malaysian manager] won‟t talk to the unions and there are 
no benefits, what‟s the point in having one?  (Interview, hotel worker, 
Shenzhen, 11 February 2006) 
Against the background of increasing labour unrest, this mix of despair and 
apathy deeply worried Party leaders and has served as an impetus to strengthen senior 
Party and ACFTU leaders‟ motivation for union reform. Following the trauma of 1989, 
the momentum for reform began to gather speed in the mid to late nineties, continuing 
into the build up and aftermath of the ACFTU‟s Fourteenth Congress in 2003. In 
Chapter Four, we noted former ACFTU chairman Wei Jianxing‟s lambasting union 
cadres for their poor performance. Following the Congress, some in the leadership 
were beginning to interpret the challenges posed by the private sector as an opportunity 
to rebuild the legitimacy lost as a result of the ACFTU‟s inability to protect jobs and 
status during restructuring.  
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We must give China‟s unions a backbone. We must understand how to organise 
the working masses in unions within China‟s socialist market economy, and 
particular attention should be given to private sector workers and migrant 
workers. We must learn how to truly represent the working class masses, and 
staunchly uphold the legal rights of workers... We must transform the Party‟s 
leadership of unions, and allow for union workers to reflect their true conditions 
and engage in legal and proper struggle. (Liu Shi, 2003)  
Key to understanding the dynamic for reform, especially with regard to trade 
union elections, is that ACFTU and the Party remain profoundly concerned that trade 
unions should anticipate worker grievances and unrest in order to curb growing 
militancy (Clarke and Pringle, 2009: 85-101). As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, 
this militancy has been evolving since the mid-nineties as well-organised strikes and 
picket lines have replaced demonstrations outside government offices. Thus, the 
supporters of trade union elections in China have posited elections as a strategy aimed 
at strengthening primary unions by improving their representational credibility in a 
transformed environment. Guo Wencai, head of the ACFTU‟s Department for the 
Establishment of Primary Organisations (EPO), has argued: 
The degree of democratization and „massization‟ (qunzhonghua) of primary 
level trade unions determines their degree of vitality or weakness. Practice has 
shown that enterprise unions with high levels of democratization and close links 
with ordinary workers are more active and enjoy much higher levels of 
approval and satisfaction from their members. There are many reasons why 
some primary unions are weak and inactive, but the failure to prioritise 
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democratization and „massization‟ remains, universally, the crucial explanation. 
(Guo Wencai and Gao Jie, 2007) 
Primary-level union cadres in the market economy require different skills than those 
needed to survive the command economy and the argument that directly elected 
officials can provide the right people has gradually gained credibility. The risk for the 
Party is that more effective may well mean more outspoken cadres and this could have 
a detrimental effect on investment and social stability and the ACFTU‟s recent release 
of the Method on Election of Trade Union Chairpersons (2008) reflects these concerns.  
The Method excludes senior company administrators, business partners and their close 
relatives, employees responsible for human resource management, and foreign 
nationals from standing as candidates for chairpersons. Arguably it leaves enough 
space – just – for the type of local experiments in loosening and even removing 
constraints on candidature examined in this chapter.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section one briefly reviews the western 
literature on trade union elections as a background to discussion of some of the issues 
and social relations pertaining to elections. In Section two, I present and analyse two 
case studies involving different electoral procedures. I conclude while trade union 
elections are important, they are not sufficient on their own to make a radical 
difference to the ACFTU‟s overall operational effectiveness and credibility. This 
would require not just more accountable enterprise-level union chairpersons and 
committees but a more supportive, interactive and, at times, directive relationship 
between the higher trade unions and their enterprise level subordinates.  
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Methodology 
The main fieldwork for this chapter consists of two case studies that I supervised in late 
2005 and 2006, involving observation, questionnaires, interviews and informal group 
discussions with trade union researchers. I conducted follow-up interviews and 
discussions with trade union researchers and union officials in 2006 and 2007. Gaining 
access to sufficient data and materials to provide a full narrative of trade union 
elections was not a straightforward matter, and, as Howell has pointed out, evaluating 
trade union elections is a sensitive endeavour (Howell 2008: 845). In the event it was 
not possible, despite a number of attempts, to arrange my own interviews with workers 
involved in the pilot studies we researched. However, my colleagues were able to 
provide me with the data from surveys they conducted that I have used as part of a 
generalised evaluation. The first of these surveys was in the prosperous township of 
Langxia, where the local town-level trade union (zhen gonghui) had an exceptionally 
well-established network of enterprise-level trade unions. In 2002, the first elections 
were held in ten relatively large enterprises. In 2005, my colleagues distributed 300 
questionnaires to trade union members across the town and 144 were returned. The 
data was analysed and discussed during my trips to Zhejiang. When conditions allowed, 
my colleagues also distributed questionnaires to other trade union committee members 
and chairpersons during the course of the fieldwork in 2005-2006 and the data from 
these more recent pilots is included in the discussion. This chapter also draws on data – 
cited in previous chapters – from sixty completed questionnaires and twenty-four 
follow up interviews with enterprise-level trade union cadres attending a part-time 
course on trade union work in the summer of 2006.   
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Contextualising Trade Union Elections 
Literature Review 
For Taylor and Li, the continued practice of appointments is one of three factors that 
undermine the ACFTU‟s legitimacy as a trade union, the other two being its 
constitutional role as protector of the entire working class, i.e. „national‟ interests, and 
its monopolistic status. Acknowledging that the appointment of trade union officers is 
hardly unique to China, Taylor and Li nevertheless argue that the absence of an 
„effective electoral system for union office holders‟ makes too large a hole in the 
ACFTU‟s trade union credentials (Taylor and Li, 2007: 707).       
 Howell positions trade union direct elections as a component in a broader one-
step-forward-two-steps-backwards-one-step-forward-again trajectory of political 
reform and improved government accountability. The legal institutionalisation of the 
latter in 1987 via the enacting of the experimental Organic Law of Village Committees 
– reaffirmed in 1998 – has increased interest in „the idea of electing leaders from below 
rather than appointing them from above‟ (Howell, 2006: 853). Discussing the progress 
of elections in general and trade union elections in particular Howell argues that  
[A]nother aspect of the move towards more responsive and inclusionary 
governance is the widening spaces for citizens to articulate views, express 
interests, and form organisations with varying degrees of independence from 
government. (Howell 2006: 24) 
Discussing the success of village elections and the concepts of democracy and 
accountability in China, Schuter has cautioned against employing a western-centred 
„ideal type‟ democratic model. Instead, insights into Chinese modernity can be gleaned 
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„by carefully analysing the internal innovation potentials of this system – i.e. its 
institutional flexibility and adaptability – to generate elite accountability and regime 
legitimacy‟. For Schuter, Western democratic theory is not relevant here. Instead 
„Chinese Democracy‟ „assumes that democratic participation in the PRC at the lower 
administrative levels is possible without automatically putting the CPC‟s power 
monopoly into jeopardy, but even stabilising it‟ (Schuter, 2003). 
Schuter‟s observations notwithstanding, these scholars tend to approach the 
issue of trade union elections solely from the perspective of democratic credibility and 
accountability. Important though they are, democratisation is not the central issue per 
se. More important for the ACFTU is the creation of effective workplace trade unions 
that can forestall unrest and head off challenges to the ACFTU‟s monopolistic status. 
As such, elections are not simply a means to make unions more democratic. Equally 
valid is their potential to render their primary organisations more responsive to 
workers‟ grievances and more effective in negotiating a peaceful resolution of those 
grievances.   
Framing Representational Credibility  
In this light, Guo Wencai‟s case for democratic work practices as one of three essential 
requirements for effective unions is especially important to our inquiry. In fact, there is 
a political and regulatory history behind Guo‟s views that senior leaders have made use 
of to dampen down the expectations of reformers. At the watershed Eleventh Congress 
of the ACFTU in 1988, the official trade union work report outlined the need to 
improve the work of primary level unions (jiceng gonghui). Chairman Ni Zhifu‟s 
report on trade union work to the delegates emphasised the centrality of grassroots 
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work „if the ACFTU was to become a genuine workers‟ organisation‟ (Ni Zhifu, 1988: 
70). Ni argued, „that primary level trade unions do not exist to serve the higher levels, 
but rather leaders at all levels of the union are there to serve the primary levels‟ (Ni 
Zhifu, 1988: 70). Change was in the air and it appeared that many people in the unions 
could not wait for the law to catch up with the progress capital had been making since 
1978. Chairman Ni Zhifu, who had delivered the work report at the Eleventh Congress, 
was dismissed after Tiananmen, following the ACFTU‟s hesitancy in condemning the 
student protestors. Nevertheless, during an interview in Workers‟ Daily over fifteen 
years later, ACFTU Deputy Chairman Su Liqing returned to the theme of trade union 
elections by quoting from an important document from the same Eleventh Congress 
entitled „Tentative Plan for Trade Union Reform‟. 79  The tentative plan contained 
frequent references to democracy and transparency. In the interview, Su quoted Point 
Forty-three from the document. 
All levels of the trade union leadership should be elected via strict democratic 
procedures. Elections must be democratised (minzhuhua), opened up 
(gongkaihua) and give full play to the will of the voters. Candidates in primary 
level democratic elections can be proposed from grassroots level upwards and 
candidates [should] put their arguments directly to the workers. In the right 
conditions, primary level trade unions can gradually implement the direct 
election of leaders by the members. (Wang Jiaoping, 2003)         
However, Su also points to a complicated and as yet incomplete legal framework 
guiding elections that has done as much to restrict their expansion as to encourage it. It 
includes: Article Nine of the Trade Union Law (2001); Article Ten of the ACFTU 
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 „Gonghui gaige de jiben shexiang‟ 
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Constitution (2001); Article Forty-three of the „Tentative Plan for Trade Union 
Reform‟ quoted above; the „Provisional Regulations for Primary Level Trade Union 
Elections‟ (1992; Provisional Regulations); Article 15 of the ACFTU‟s „Opinion on 
Questions Arising from the Implementation of Trade Union Reform and Construction‟ 
(1997), which recommended that elections should be restricted to small and medium 
size enterprises; the „ACFTU Decision on the Further Strengthening of Primary Level 
Trade Unions‟ (2004) (Li Jianping, 2005), and finally the „Method on the Election of 
Trade Union Chairpersons‟ (2008). While the latter document, issued after Su‟s 
interview, does give more room for union innovation in general, the Method signals 
that „sea elections‟ (open candidacy) popularised in village elections and employed in 
one of our case studies are not appropriate. 
In practice, the ACFTU has not recommended elections in situations 
characterised by a high degree on industrial conflict, its main concern being to avoid 
the election of militant representatives prepared to go beyond the restrictions of the 
Party‟s social harmony project. In contrast to the two purely local and genuinely 
innovative initiatives discussed in the previous two chapters, direct elections are not 
regarded as an appropriate strategy for stabilising labour relations in areas of unrest in 
the short term, but rather as a tool for consolidating an existing stability.  
Union Cadres and Union Members 
The relationship between enterprise-level union cadres and their members is defined 
chiefly by social, political and economic disparities that in turn feed into doubts over 
representation and credibility. Although not institutional in themselves, traditional 
trade union practices carry the weight and characteristics of an institutional barrier to 
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improvements in these areas. While Wang overstates the extent of ACFTU 
rejuvenation in the private sector, his contrasting of the traditional appointments 
system in „official trade unions‟ in China‟s remaining SOEs with the „new direction of 
trade unions in private enterprises‟ illustrates the problem well (Wang Jinhong, 2005). 
He argues that the latter increasingly boast primary level officials who are able, ready 
and willing to respond to their members, while old style union officials in SOEs are 
better described as „responsible persons in mass organisations‟ who fall under the orbit 
and treatment of „leading cadres selected via a limited democracy directed by Party 
organisations‟ (Wang Jinhong, 2005). The implication is that the trade union agenda in 
SOEs is fixed by the Party-state and this is a major constraint on their representational 
credibility. While Wang is largely correct in his positioning of traditional SOE unions, 
the case studies I present – one of which was at the cutting edge of direct elections in 
terms of democratic credentials – will enable us to test Wang‟s assertion of an 
emerging „new direction‟ in the private sector.  
The term „treatment‟ (duidai) refers to the pay, conditions and a less 
measurable but equally important degree of political influence enjoyed by trade union 
cadres largely as a result of their civil servant status. Issued in 1981 by the ACFTU, 
Document Twenty-Four stated that enterprise-level trade union cadres should receive 
the same levels of treatment as a Deputy Party Secretary or Deputy Director in an SOE 
(Howell 2008: 859).
80
 At the time, this meant access to larger accommodation and 
occasional use of a company or Party car. But following the gradual dismantling of 
SOEs over the twenty-seven years since Document Twenty Four was issued, the 
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 This document was strengthened when the Central Committee of the CPC issued Document 12 
reasserting these conditions.  
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income gap between frontline workers and company deputy directors has grown 
dramatically, effectively separating trade union officials from the everyday financial 
concerns of their members. Article Nineteen of the 2008 Method shores up the 
privileges of primary level union chairpersons in SOEs by confirming they receive the 
same pay and conditions as a deputy manager and that in the private sector (gongsi zhi 
qiye) they are admitted to the board of directors. My reading of the Method is that it is 
unclear on the actual pay and conditions stipulated for private sector union 
chairpersons, but the privileges for their brothers and sisters in SOEs are sufficiently 
lucid to provide a material basis for opposition to direct elections. For example, one 
provincial trade union official interviewed by Howell argued that elections can threaten 
the status and conditions of appointed union officials in SOE enterprises who are paid 
as union cadres, having undergone the formal process of civil servant recruitment and 
training (Howell, 2008: 859). Thus a strategy for improved union intervention that at 
the very least facilitates the election of a growing corps of „untrained‟ workers as union 
officials inevitably implies that union officials at primary level need not be qualified 
civil servants and therefore need not be awarded the superior income and privileges 
concomitant with such status and qualifications. Basing his conclusions on a case study 
analysis of trade union direct elections, Wang concludes that two quite separate types 
of trade union function and operation have emerged.  
On the one hand there is the new type of trade union in the non-state sector. 
Basically, they do not have a governmental background, are set up under the 
initiative of workers themselves and their leaders are elected by workers‟ 
representatives to whom they are directly responsible. They do not have an 
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administrative grade and do not enjoy any political privileges [as civil servants 
do – author]. On the other hand are the traditional administrative state-managed 
(guan ban) trade unions in which [enterprise-level] union leaders are elected in 
a process that lacks a democratic component. These trade unions do not excel at 
upholding the rights and interests of workers and are excluded from their 
[traditional] right to participation in democratic management and democratic 
supervision [of enterprise leaders]. (Wang Jinhong, 2005) 
Not surprisingly, Wang concludes that the future of representative trade unionism in 
China lies in the private sector.  
Union Cadres and Management 
A second barrier to effective primary trade unions has been the relationship between 
enterprise-level union officials and their employers in the private sector and here my 
research suggests that Wang‟s conclusions are overstated. Most primary trade union 
leaders in the private sector are part-time, combining trade union work with a regular 
(usually managerial) job (or, if full-time, they are usually seconded from their regular 
job). They are dependent on, and identify with, management and the manner in which 
they find themselves in the job is not usually a factor.  Moreover, since the job of trade 
union president is a managerial job, workers think that it is appropriate for a manager 
to take the position and tend to vote for managers. Interviews with part-time primary 
level union cadres in Guangdong demonstrated how their managerial „day job‟ was 
much more important than their union work and that there was no incentive for them to 
take the side of workers in a dispute with management (interview, enterprise-level part-
time union cadre, Guangzhou Case Study, 2006). Moreover, there was little impetus 
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for them to prioritise union work as their income and future career was entirely 
dependent on the employer. Similar attitudes encouraged the pilot elections in Yuhang 
where 
most trade union chairpersons listened to the senior managers of an enterprise 
and were unenthusiastic about trade union work. They would not speak out on 
behalf of the workers and were not generally trusted by the workers and as such 
they could not adequately uphold the legal rights of workers. (Interview, Liang 
Shuigen, YHFTU deputy chairperson, 24 March 2007)  
Workers and Workers 
As we have discussed, Chinese migrant workers often join hometown or place-of-
origin organisations, usually operating outside formal state recognition, and indeed 
these organisations have a long history in China (Chan C. 2009; Perry 1993; Hershatter, 
1986). Some researchers have identified links between ACFTU‟s experimenting with 
elections and its fears of alternative organisations. Howell listed anxiety about them as 
the second reason why some provincial-level trade union leaders are prepared to 
tolerate elections, despite ambivalence at the top. 
Direct elections, too, can, they argue, increase workers‟ consciousness of being 
both a trade union member and part of the working class and so dilute the 
influence of a place-based identity that hinders the development of class 
consciousness. (Howell, 2008: 853)   
As we will see from the case studies, local trade union leaders take great care to 
identify appropriate conditions in which pilots can be conducted. Following 
identification of such enterprises, permission to proceed is still required from the next 
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level up in the union hierarchy, who instigate the process and carry responsibility for 
its results and consequences. This generally rules out large enterprises and enterprises 
or areas that have been prone to unrest simply because the consequences of anything 
going „wrong‟ would have a much greater impact. Thus in Yiwu (see Chapter Five), 
the activities of influential place-of-origin organisations was one of the factors that 
persuaded the chair of the YFTU of the urgent need for innovative action, but elections 
appeared to be ruled out as the risk of either gangsters or militants being elected was 
too high (interview, Liang Shuigen, op. cit.). Likewise in Xinhe, labour militancy, high 
labour turnover, and the presence of skilled workers with experience of organising for 
better wages ruled out the possibility of holding direct elections in what was deemed 
too unstable an environment. 
ACFTU, the Party and External Pressures 
The absence of democratically elected trade union representatives has been the focus of 
international campaigns and elections are often incorporated into CSR initiatives. 
These have provided a framework within which international NGOs have tried to press 
forward trade union elections independently of the ACFTU. For the most part, these 
have been isolated instances and there is no evidence that they have had any substantial 
impact on the overall progress of trade union elections, which are driven by different 
concerns. Chan has found that as well as being instrumental in the exploitation of 
Chinese workers, MNCs can provide fertile ground for improving the performance of 
trade unions at enterprise level. Citing experiments with elected trade union 
committees at two Reebok contract factories, Chan argues that the key problem was 
Reebok‟s failure to follow through a „pioneering‟ position by fully employing their 
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leverage over two supplier factories and by implication, the local government 
authorities. Above all, the newly elected committees needed time and nurturing. This 
should have come via further training from Hong Kong-based LNGOs (see Chapter 
Five) and support from Reebok. Chan concludes that the pilot program „could have 
worked had Reebok taken a stronger stand vis-à-vis the suppliers and had it continued 
to provide support to the fledgling union branches‟ (Chan, A. 2008: 314). 
Not surprisingly the ACFTU has been quick to reject foreign pressure on its 
trade unions, whether from capital, LNGOs or the international labour movement. In 
the field of trade union elections, progress has for the most part been presented as the 
logical outcome of legal reforms and regulations that the union itself was instrumental 
in bringing about. While not altogether rejecting the daring plans for democratising the 
union that emerged from the Eleventh Congress in 1988, the ACFTU leadership that 
emerged following the post-Tiananmen purge in 1989 has been far more at home with 
framing direct elections in a legally based step-by-step approach inspired by Deng‟s 
call to cross the river by feeling for the stepping stones. From this perspective, 
elections are not about democratisation as such, but about making primary trade union 
organisations more responsive to the grievances of their members. ACFTU Deputy 
Chairman Su Liqing encapsulated this approach in his aforementioned Workers‟ Daily 
interview in July 2003, following apparently heated debates on the subject at the five-
yearly union congress.   
The relevant trade union documents [provide] clear regulations for the direct 
election of primary level (jiceng) trade union chairpersons. As far back as the 
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1980s, some primary level trade unions started exploring and practicing such 
direct elections. (Wang Jiaoping, 2003)        
The point Su is really making is that the election pilots have a history and 
should be seen in a Chinese context, and not as a consequence of foreign pressure, as 
even some local level trade union cadres had stated in the media. Just a month before 
Su‟s interview, the Hangzhou Daily ran a report entitled „Yuhang leads the upsurge in 
trade union direct elections: Foreigners emphasis on labour rights leads to a change in 
Yuhang bosses‟ attitudes‟81  which stated that trade union elections in Yuhang, the 
location of one of the case studies presented below, were in part a consequence of 
foreign pressure. Chairman Mo of the Yuhang Federation of Trade Unions (YHFTU) 
backed this up.  
Mo Bingfo told us that Chinese enterprises were subject to two basic pressures 
regarding union elections: firstly from foreign companies, especially given new 
international regulations related to membership of the World Trade 
Organisation; and secondly from domestic regulations. (IHLO, 2004) 
During an interview with a senior YHFTU official who had been instrumental in 
promoting the elections in Yuhang (interview, YHFTU officer, Hangzhou, 15 April 
2006) I raised the question of foreign influence on the pilots, as suggested by the 
Hangzhou newspaper report. This elicited a robust answer which explained the 
elections in Yuhang as a continuing national experiment that had first surfaced in the 
mid-1980s and as such could not convincingly be attributed to foreign influence 
(interview, YHFTU officer, op. cit.). The alacrity of this response and its replication of 
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guannian zhuanbian 
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Su Liqing‟s line as expressed in Workers‟ Daily in 2003 further demonstrated the 
sensitive nature of elections and indeed, this nervousness is not entirely without cause. 
While CSR initiatives follow a different trajectory to the much more numerous 
ACFTU-sponsored direct elections, there is an indirect relationship between elected 
worker representatives and corporate social responsibility as evidenced by the 
inclusion of elected worker committees in many CSR initiatives. However, in the grand 
scheme of things, these have hardly had a direct impact on the ACFTU‟s reform path.   
 Summing up these arguments, we can say that the ACFTU is concerned about 
its position as a mass organisation in the Party-state hierarchy and this concern is 
heightened by its inability to head off industrial unrest. On a national scale, its 
solutions to date have been to reverse its membership decline and experiment with 
measures to contain conflict. Some see elections as a means to improve the quality of 
cadres – or at least get rid of dead wood – and so more effectively contain conflict. 
  The evidence presented in the two case studies that follow demonstrates that the 
goal of local union officials is to use elections as part of a long-term process of 
„massisation‟ (qunzhonghua) of the union i.e. to foster a more intimate and connected 
relationship between union cadres and their members. This in turn, it is expected, will 
lead to increased levels of commitment among primary level union cadres to upholding 
the legal rights of their members and consequently improve their record of curtailing 
the worst of employer abuses.  
Piloting Direct Elections 
By the turn of the century, both the Yuhang District of Hangzhou city and Yuyao city 
(county), which falls under the administration of Ningbo city, had succeeded in 
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establishing a comprehensive union presence in their respective private sectors. 
However, union dependency on management and a lack of trust between primary level 
union officials and their members remained key obstacles to union work (interview, 
Liang Shuigen, op. cit.). In 2000, the YHFTU began preparations to run pilot direct 
elections of trade union chairpersons and committee members in an attempt to improve 
the standards of union work at enterprise level. The success of these pilot projects 
facilitated a cautious spread of direct elections first in Yuhang and then across other 
selected districts in Zhejiang province. This progress was – and is – guided by 
„opinion‟ and „trial opinion‟ documents. In 2000, the YHFTU supervised elections in 
thirty-one enterprises, forty-eight in 2001, 175 in 2002, and 332 by mid-2003, 
representing forty per cent of trade union chairpersons in the district (Yuyao and 
Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). From 2001 to April 2005, 200 trade union 
chairpersons were directly elected in a pilot organised by the Yuyao (city) Federation 
of Trade Unions (YYFTU). On 4 December 2003, the Ningbo Federation of Trade 
Unions (NFTU) issued an „Opinion‟ entitled „Ningbo City Trial Opinion on the Direct 
Election of Enterprise-level Trade Union Chairpersons‟ based on Yuyao‟s experience 
(Ningbo Opinion).
82
 Article Three of the Ningbo Opinion recommended an expansion 
of the project to enterprises in Ningbo city in which trade union work was „relatively 
established, the workforce relatively stable, the cohesiveness of the enterprise 
relatively strong, and the democratic consciousness of managers and/or owners 
relatively robust‟ (Ningbo Opinion, 2003, Article Three, reproduced in Yuhang and 
Yuyao Case Study Report, 2006). In 2003 in Zhejiang‟s Tongxiang city seventy trade 
union chairpersons and committees were directly elected by the staff of the city‟s 
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seventy-five schools (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). In December 2003, 
the trade union chair of a major auto electrical components factory was directly elected 
in Wenzhou – the first of its kind in the city. Most of the employees were migrant 
workers from the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guizhou, Sichuan and Jiangsu and, 
according to a provincial trade union journal, over eleven trade union members stood 
as candidates (Zhejiang Gongyun, 2004). This gradual expansion of direct elections 
stems from the pilots described below (interview, YHFTU official, op. cit.)   
Yuhang District Federation of Trade Unions 
In March 2000, the Organising Department of the Yuhang District Party Committee 
and the YHFTU jointly issued the „Yuhang City Trial Implementation Opinion on the 
Direct Election of Enterprise-level Trade Union Chairpersons‟ (Yuhang Opinion 
hereon). The Yuhang Opinion excluded owners, managers and their relatives from 
standing in the elections and advocated enterprise-level Party committee leaders and 
members, where they existed, as ideal candidates. Article Two of the document stated 
the standard requirements of adherence to the Party line and acceptance of national 
laws. It also stipulated that candidates should be active supporters of reform and 
possess the „spirit of innovation‟ (you kaituo chuangxin jingshen) (Yuyao and Yuhang 
Case Study Report, 2006). Otherwise, the conditions of candidacy were based on the 
requirements for the post of trade union cadre as stipulated in Article Thirty-One of the 
ACFTU Constitution at the time (1998).  
The initiative for this document did not come from an enterprise-level union but 
from the YHFTU. In 1999 it presented a tentative proposal to the Yuhang Party 
Committee in which it argued for the piloting of direct elections in targeted enterprises 
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that demonstrated stability and relatively low levels of labour turnover. Having secured 
Party support, the YHFTU contacted the Yuhang Party Committee Department for 
Organising and together they drafted and issued the formal opinion.   
 The Yuhang Opinion lays down eight procedural steps to guide elections. First, 
the trade union at the pilot enterprise must request permission, in writing, to hold a 
direct election to the next level up in the union hierarchy, in this case, the YHFTU. 
Once permission has been granted, the primary union can go ahead and organise a 
preparatory meeting of trade union representatives, or all union members depending on 
the number of employees. This meeting elects – or confirms – trade union 
representatives on the basis of factory site, workshop and administrative or technical 
areas with worker-representative ratios that broadly reflect the employment structure of 
the enterprise, for example twenty-five percent of representatives being ordinary 
frontline workers; twenty per cent skilled workers or administrative staff; twenty per 
cent middle or senior managers and the remaining places taken by women or young 
workers. The third stage of the process requires vetting (shencha) the elected 
representatives in enterprises deemed too large for workers to vote directly. This is 
carried out by an unspecified small group of members known as the „representatives 
qualifications examination group‟ (daibiao zege shencha xiaozu), whose task is to 
check that all the workers‟ representatives meet the relevant conditions set out in the 
trade union constitution and the relevant regulations. It was hard to get an idea of what 
these checks entailed or how they compared to the standards set out in the ACFTU‟s 
„Certain Provisional Regulations of the System for Implementation of a System of 
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Primary Level Trade Union Representatives‟ Meetings‟ (1992).83 In a reference book 
recently published by the ACFTU‟s EPO, Li Jianping summarises Point 121 of this 
document that stipulates the following qualifications for representatives: union 
membership, support for the basic line of the Party, and to enjoy a degree of trust by 
fellow workers and demonstrate a willingness to speak out for them (Li Jianping, 2005: 
88-89). The actual process of checking appears to involve a „representatives‟ 
qualifications examination group‟ compiling a report confirming or rejecting 
representatives for the union‟s chairperson‟s group (zhuxi tuan) and recommends 
another vote for new representatives where necessary (Li Jianping, 2005: 88-89). In 
Yuhang, the process generally appeared to be aimed at weeding out managers, people 
with affiliation to home-town associations, people with a criminal record, and people 
without an understanding of union work as well as the political background checks 
(interview, Chen Xietong, ACFTU research officer, Hangzhou, 14 April 2006).  
The Yuhang Opinion stated that the names of all workers‟ representatives must 
then be posted in a public place in the workplace at least three days prior to the direct 
election. Stage four was to produce (chansheng) a list of candidates to stand for 
election to the trade union committee. The Yuhang Opinion stipulated that candidates 
for trade union committee election could be selected via four channels: as part of a 
slate presented by the trade union or trade union group for a factory site, workshop or 
technical/administrative office; a recommendation from the enterprise Party Committee 
or the next level up of the trade union and/or its standing committee; by putting oneself 
forward as a candidate; or by other methods of recommendation that are in keeping 
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 Guanyu jiceng gonghui huiyuan daibiao dahui daibiao shixing changrenzhi de ruogan zhanxing 
guiding 
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with the relevant regulations.
84
 There must be more candidates than committee places 
and when there are „comparatively too many‟ candidates, the opinion stipulated that a 
preliminary election meeting be held at which workers or workers‟ representatives vote 
and the least popular candidates are removed from the list. The fifth stage was to hold a 
secret ballot for the election of the trade union committee and also the union treasury 
committee (jingfei shencha weiyuanhui). This must be a multi-candidate election with 
the number of candidates for each committee being in accordance with the Provisional 
Regulations for Primary Level Trade Union Elections (1992). Once the trade union 
committee has been elected each new committee member willing to stand as trade 
union chair and/or a deputy chairperson must deliver a mandatory speech on why he or 
she is the best person for the job. Speeches are followed by questions from the floor. 
Votes are then cast and the chair and deputy chair(s) elected on a first-past-the-post 
basis. All voting is by secret ballot, the votes must be counted on the premises at the 
time of the meeting and the results announced at the meeting. Acceptance speeches are 
delivered by the new chairperson and deputy chairpersons. Finally, the results of the 
election must be passed on to the next level up of the trade union. The Yuhang Opinion 
also reminds employers that, in accordance with the CPC Central Committee‟s 
Document Twelve, issued in 1989, trade union chairpersons at enterprise level are 
entitled to pay, conditions and authority in parity with deputy party secretaries, deputy 
directors of government departments and middle managers in enterprises (Yuyao and 
Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006).    
Yuyao City Federation of Trade Unions  
                                                 
84
 Among other matters, this is a reference to the recent practice of appointing trade union chairpersons 
from outside the traditional trade union/civil service system – see Chapter Five. 
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Noting the developments in Yuhang, the YYFTU drafted its own independent pilot 
opinion at the end of 2001.
85
 The document was entitled: „Trial Opinion on the Step-
by-Step Practice of Democratic Direct Elections of Trade Union Chairpersons and  
Committees in Non State Sector Enterprise-level Trade Unions Across the Entire City‟ 
(Yuyao Opinion hereon).
86
 The title of the document and its addition of the word 
„democratic‟ suggested a more open process than the Yuhang Opinion. The Yuyao 
Opinion was followed up with a „Reference Opinion‟ (cankao yijian) which stressed 
that elected trade union chairpersons and committee members should possess the 
ability to respond to workers‟ demands and enthusiasm for union work. Entitled 
„Reference Opinion on Implementing the Democratic Direct Election of Trade Union 
Chairpersons and Committee Members at Enterprise Level‟ 87  (Yuyao Reference 
Opinion hereon) it stressed that the posts required 
enthusiasm for trade union work, dedication and a sense of responsibility. A 
strong empathy for the masses and [the courage] to dare to speak out for 
workers in order to get things done on their behalf as well as uphold their legal 
rights and interests. [The chairperson and committee members] should also 
have a relatively democratic working method and understanding of [democratic] 
concepts. They should be able to accept the collective critical supervision of the 
workers (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). 
The Yuyao Opinion stipulated that elections should follow one of three formats: 
Smaller enterprises with less than 100 union members could organise a plenary 
                                                 
85
 This appears to have been written independently i.e. not in conjunction with the local Party Committee. 
However, I have been unable to confirm this, or its significance.  
86
 „Guanyu zai quanshi fei gongyouzhi qiye gonghui zhong zhubu tuixing gonghui zhuxi, weiyuan minzhu 
zhixuan zhidu de shexing yijian 
87
 „Qiye gonghui tuixing minzhu zhixuan gonghui zhuxi, weiyuan zhidu de cankao yijian‟.  
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meeting (dahui) of all union members for the purpose of holding a direct vote. These 
plenary meetings should be organised by a previously established election preparatory 
group whose members were either appointed by the next level up of the trade union or, 
in the case of new union branches, the Party committee in the enterprise – if there was 
one – along with recommendations from the workers themselves. During the meeting 
two rounds of voting were to take place: the first to elect the trade union committee in 
which successful candidates – entirely nominated by the members themselves – were 
required to obtain at least fifty per cent of the vote. A second round of voting elected 
the union chairperson following mandatory speeches by the newly elected committee 
members who stood – if willing – as candidates. The second format was designed for 
larger enterprises with more than 100 union members, where candidates were elected 
by workers‟ representatives. The representatives themselves were elected and not 
subject to the post-election checks that are standard practice nationally and were 
applied in Yuhang. Their numbers were determined via a simple ratio to the number of 
employees. For example, by Yuyao‟s standards large enterprises with approximately 
2,000 employees had 200 representatives elected on the basis of ten workers for every 
representative. They then voted in a plenary meeting according to the same procedures 
outlined for smaller enterprises. The third method was used in split site or multi-site 
enterprises or those running twenty-four hour shifts.  A „roaming‟ ballot box was used 
to collect votes. At least three appointed election workers (xuanju gongzuoyuan) took 
the box to workshops and offices in order for workers to vote. To ensure that these 
voting procedures were both public and transparent, the YYFTU also announced that 
elections should be accompanied by five public announcements (zhangbian gongbu). 
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These were respectively: a notice informing workers of the formation of a democratic 
direct election preparatory committee (minzhu zhixuan choubei xiaozu) that named its 
members, the election procedures, the appointment conditions (renzhi tiaojian) for the 
post of trade union chairperson, the names of the election workers (xuanju renyuan), 
and the results of the election itself. 
Clearly, the title and language used in the YYFTU documents suggested a 
much greater emphasis on candidates‟ ability to represent workers‟ interests rather than 
ensuring a „safe‟ result. For example, candidates should ideally possess the courage to 
„dare to speak out‟ and to „be able to accept personally the collective critical 
supervision of the workers‟ as well as the „ability to organise and consult‟ (Yuyao and 
Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). This more relaxed approach crystallised into a 
much looser hold on candidacy, facilitating the sea elections (hai xuan) pioneered in 
rural village elections (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). Casting aside the 
pre-vote checks and vetting procedures that candidates had to go through prior to a 
vote in the Yuhang pilot, the Yuyao Opinion allowed for much more leeway and its 
practical application centered on „two direct election models‟ based on the procedures 
above. First, union members or representatives anonymously wrote the names of their 
preferred trade union chair and/or trade union committee members on the ballot paper. 
Those with the most votes were elected as chair and committee members (according to 
the number of selections), as long as they received over half the total number of votes 
cast. Second, union members or representatives wrote the names of their preferred 
trade union chair and trade union committee members on separate ballot papers in 
order to determine a candidate list. When necessary, union members or representatives 
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then voted again to decide on a chairperson and committee (Yuyao and Yuhang Case 
Study Report, 2006). One trade union researcher confirmed that „these are the people-
to-people sea elections. Period!‟ (jiu shi minjian suoshou de “hai xuan!”) (Interview, 
Chen Xietong, ACFTU research officer, 20 March 2007).  
Research in the field also involved observing two democratic direct elections in 
Yuyao. One in a small enterprise with sixty-seven union members involving two 
rounds of voting. The first round elected the trade union committee. Each worker wrote 
down his or her preferred slate of seven union members. The five people with the most 
votes formed the new committee and a second round of voting was held to decide 
which of these five should be chairperson.  
This produced forty-seven candidates in the first round! All those who took part 
in the meeting were very positive, fully participated in the process and felt this 
was the first genuinely democratic union election they had taken part in. 
(Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006) 
In the second example, there was some procedural confusion in which it appeared that 
at first voters could not grasp that there really was an open vote i.e. that there was no 
candidate list. Consequently the fifty-two union members mistakenly assumed that the 
election preparation committee members were the actual candidates and almost all the 
votes went to these people. Once the results were in and the misunderstanding became 
obvious, the committee immediately explained that there was no prearranged slate of 
candidates and workers could vote for whomever they liked. A new round of voting 
followed and a slate of sixteen members emerged, all of whom had been selected by at 
least fifty per cent of the members. These sixteen then stood for the post of trade union 
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chairperson on a first-past-the-post basis (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 
2006).  
These examples demonstrate that in practice voting procedures outlined in the 
Yuyao Opinion and Reference Opinion were flexible and also that the newness of the 
project gave rise to the confusion that the YYFTU was eager to avoid. The YYFTU 
also provided a template for competitive elections aimed at avoiding such confusion 
descending into chaos. The document was entitled „Main Work Points for Democratic 
Direct (competitive) Elections‟88 (Work Points hereon) and, apart from reiterating the 
main points from the Yuyao Opinion and Reference Opinion, it also included practical 
solutions for potential difficulties. The document concentrated on practicalities, 
including ensuring transparency and consensus in the formation of the election 
preparation committee and stating that the committee was only confirmed after all 
objections to its members had been smoothed out (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study 
Report, 2006).  With regard to voting and the absence of a candidate list (sea elections), 
Work Points recommended that union members write their preferences for committee 
members and chairperson either on two separate ballot papers or that one ballot paper 
may be used with the person getting the most votes automatically deemed chairperson. 
Members or members‟ representatives may not recommend the same person more than 
twice i.e. once for chairperson and once for committee membership. In cases where a 
second round of voting was required to decide the post of chairperson, Work Points 
stressed that speeches were required and gave guidelines for the format of speeches: 
personal background; views and visions of trade union work; question and answer 
sessions etc.  No personal attacks were permitted in the speeches and if the roaming 
                                                 
88
 „Minzhu zhixuan (jingxuan) gongzuo yaodian‟ 
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ballot box method was used, election preparation committee members must arrange an 
appropriate time and place for as many workers as possible to listen and ask questions. 
In the event of disputed results and related difficulties, discussion and another round of 
voting was stipulated.  
Elections at S Enterprise 
Round One: The Committee 
I obtained copies of the notices issued by a newly established enterprise trade union to 
its members. The notices served as guides to a two-round „sea election‟ for the trade 
union committee and chairperson at S Enterprise, a limited company in Yuyao.  
The first notice announced to the workers that, on the suggestion of the local 
township level trade union – itself galvanised by the YYFTU – the newly established 
enterprise trade union would hold a democratic direct election for the trade union 
committee and chairperson. The notice included the names of a four-person preparation 
committee and requested that any members who were not happy with the make-up of 
this committee contact the township level union. Mobile and landline telephone 
numbers were included in the notice, although the members were given just twenty-
four hours to make their views known. The second notice, released three days later on 
10 May 2004, announced the procedure for the election itself. The preparation 
committee decided that the number of employees merited a three-person union 
committee and a roaming ballot box to be taken round the various workshops. There 
would be no formal candidate list and each member was asked to write down his or her 
preferences for the three members. To be elected, committee members had to garner 
the votes of at least fifty per cent of the total number of employees. Once three 
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committee members had been elected, a second round of voting to elect the chairperson 
would take place within two days. The committee itself recommended three names for 
the committee: Zhu Renmu, Shao Zuda and Wang Yalian.  
On 12 May, ballot papers with voting guidelines on the back were distributed 
for the committee elections. Anyone who wrote down more than three names would 
immediately invalidate their vote. Members putting themselves forward for the 
committee were permitted to write their own name down three times. All union 
members had the right to vote except the enterprise manager/owner and his or her 
relatives. The third notice listed the results. Twenty nine members‟ names were 
submitted with Shao Zuda getting the most votes with seventy-seven nominations. 
Next was Wang Yalian with fifty-three nominations, then Chen Fuliang with forty-four 
votes and tied for fourth place were Zhu Renmu and Shao Duohua each with thirty-
nine nominations. Shao Zuda was duly declared a committee member but as neither 
Wang, Chen, Zhu or Shao obtained the minimum fifty per cent (sixty-eight votes) a 
second round of voting was held to elect the remaining two committee members. 
Members were asked to vote for two out of the four „runners up‟ from the first round, 
or alternatively put forward two new names. Fresh ballot papers with the four names on 
them plus two blank spaces were provided. Members were asked to write an „O‟ next 
to their first two preferences and an „X‟ next to the remaining two. If they were not 
happy with these candidates, they could use the blank spaces to write the names of up 
to two new choices adding the required „O‟ alongside each new name. The results were 
announced on 15 May and were as follows: Zhu Renmu obtained seventy-five votes, 
Wang Yalian seventy-three, Shao Duohua sixty-nine and Chen Fuliang fifty-three.  
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Zhu, Wang and Shao Zuda agreed to stand as candidates for the position of chairperson 
in a result that obviously pleased the senior township trade union and was testament to 
the caution with which enterprises are selected for pilots (Yuyao and Yuhang Case 
Study Report, 2006).        
Round Two: The Chairperson 
Apart from announcing the results of the run-off for the committee elections, the fifth 
notice from the union also provided more detailed background of the three candidates 
for trade union chairperson. This information included their respective age, educational 
level and a detailed employment history. Zhu Renmu was the most highly educated and 
the only member of the Party among the three candidates. He had worked as an 
accountant at the company for over a year and was forty-five years old.  Shao had 
previously worked at a nearby reed mats factory for eleven years and started work at 
this company in 2002. He was thirty-seven years old. Wang was the same age as Zhu 
and had previously worked in the same factory as he had – making latex products for 
hospitals from 1984 until 2001. Before that she had graduated from middle school in 
1975 and then worked the land. She started working at Enterprise S in 2002. The notice 
also gave details of the voting procedure for the next round. Members were only 
allowed to vote for one candidate by marking an „O‟ against his or her name on the 
ballot slip but also, to avoid accusations of tampering, add an „X‟ next to the names of 
the candidates they were not voting for. Shao Zuda won with ninety-three votes with 
Zhu and Wang garnering thirty-three and eleven respectively.  
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Evaluating Direct Elections  
The provincial Zhejiang Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) has been relatively 
pleased with the results of the elections to date (interview, Chen Xietong, 2006, op. 
cit.). However the relative lack of mainstream media coverage to what was obviously a 
successful pilot perhaps echoes similar reticence noted by others (Chan, A. 2008: 293-
317; Howell, 2008: 857). I believe that up until January 2008, when the first national 
Method on election candidature was released, this reflected wider uncertainties and 
ongoing debates about the strategy in general (Li Jianping 2005: 61). It is likely that we 
will see more press reports on trade union elections in the coming years.  
To date, I have not been able to interview voters in Yuyao and Yuhang on how 
the elections have impacted on pay and conditions and this is clearly an important next 
stage in the research on union reform. However, colleagues carried out limited surveys 
of workers and managers in Langxia and smaller townships in order to gauge the 
opinions of both workers and managers – see section above on methodology for details. 
I have analysed the results as follows.  
Replacing the bosses‟ relatives: the emergence of official „activism‟ 
It was clear that despite continuing constraints on local trade unions in particular the 
lack of financial independence and union dependency on employers to approve 
activities, the election of union chairpersons has raised the profile, status and 
effectiveness of trade unions in both Yuyao and Yuhang. In answer to the question: 
„Has a directly elected trade union chairperson proved to be any more effective in 
meeting your demands, promoting your democratic rights and protecting your 
interests?‟ 131 out of 144 respondents replied positively. When asked their views on 
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the legitimacy of the election, 138 said that they had taken the election and their 
participation in it very seriously (shenzhen di canyu xuanju); and when asked about 
future elections, 129 said that based on their experience of election they would stand as 
candidates in trade union committee should the opportunity arise (Yuyao and Yuhang 
Case Study Report, 2006). In Yuhang, a senior YHFTU official gave his judgment on 
the emergence of more proactive primary level chairpersons:  
A few of those elected were staff or workers who were more intimately 
connected to the feelings and wishes of the workers in general. Whether they 
were [frontline] workers or not, elected chairpersons and committee members 
have tended to be more courageous in speaking out, even disagreeing with the 
employer. We concluded that this was because they wanted to take part, and not 
because they had been told or appointed to do it. These guys had more 
influence (hao zhaoli) among the workers. (Interview, Liang Shuigen, op. cit.)  
Our surveys and interviews in Langxia and nearby townships reflected these sentiments, 
especially where the „sea election‟ method of candidacy had been applied. We found 
that these elections successfully jettisoned union chairpersons who were close relatives 
of the boss and that these people were being replaced by younger union committee 
members and chairpersons who took the view that „I was elected by the workers so I 
must try to work on their behalf‟ (Yuyao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). These 
words also mirror press reports of direct elections, although we should bear in mind 
that negative stories are unlikely to be published. In a brief article reporting „[O]ld 
Xia‟s‟ re-election to a second term as union chairman of a metal factory in Hangzhou, 
the reporter had asked workers why they voted for „Old Xia‟:  
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One worker replied enthusiastically that „[O]ld Xia speaks up for workers. Now 
we‟ve got accident insurance and pensions at our factory‟. Another worker 
named Ms. Zhang said that „the trade union negotiates on our behalf and 
because of this the average wage has hit 1,300 yuan. Frontline workers can earn 
as much as 2,800 yuan‟. (Shao and Luo 2003) 
In April 2008 – three months after the Method was released – the ACFTU website even 
carried an English language account of elections from Dalian that announced 
[T]he trade union chairperson of a joint venture company in Dalian Economic 
Development Zone in Northeast China‟s Liaoning Province sought a second 
term, but the trade union council in the development zone refused to confirm 
him in office. The reason: The majority of workers were dissatisfied with his 
performance during his tenure. It is reported that since direct elections were 
introduced [in Dalian] in 2003, thirteen trade union chairpersons have come up 
for re-election but not a single one of them got elected. (ACFTUb, 2008) 
The report does not specify so we must assume that the thirteen trade union 
chairpersons who lost their posts were previously appointed rather than elected! 
Nevertheless, the „back story‟ is clear: some current trade union cadres at primary level 
are not up to the job of negotiating with the employer. Although media reports on 
elections emphasise that a „win-win‟ scenario exists, in which both employers and 
employees benefit from proactive enterprise unions, the risks are nevertheless never far 
way. Our surveys of 200 workers participating in recent elections in Yuyao found that 
nearly a quarter of the respondents answered that elected representatives did lead to 
more fraught labour relations. For sure, most workers felt that this was not the case, but 
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a significant minority of workers believed that direct elections would produce more 
confrontations between union and employer, and, as the positive responses to the 
democratic elections in Yuyao made clear, were quite happy with this outcome. On the 
other hand, a separate survey of employers in Yuyao found that most of them were 
prepared to trade off the risk in the hope that elections would produce a more effective 
channel for everyday grievances.  
  Thus we can see, even from these admittedly limited surveys, how the debates 
on the advantages and risks of direct elections come to life in practice. On the one hand, 
this increased potential for militancy arising from elections is precisely why the 
ACFTU and the Party are proceeding with such caution. On the other hand, for the 
reformers who wish to use trade union elections as a long term strategy to improve the 
quality of the trade union officials the boldness and willingness to speak out was – and 
is – very important (interview, Liang Shuigen, op. cit).  
Qualified Accountability   
Practically all the post-Tiananmen trade union documentation (Opinions, Regulations, 
Methods etc.) emphasised that candidates for the election of a trade union committee – 
who in turn become candidates for chairperson – must be vetted prior to a vote. For 
example, Articles Ten and Eleven of the 1992 Provisional Regulations on Trade Union 
Elections stipulated that suggested candidates for the committee are named by trade 
union groups within the enterprise i.e. according to shop, office or other work area, and 
a slate is then compiled by the enterprise trade union election committee based on who 
gets the most selections. However, this slate must be approved by the equivalent level 
party committee and submitted to the higher level trade union for examination and 
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approval (shencha tongyi). Thus, the pilot elections conducted by the YHFTU are 
significant only insofar as they were a practical manifestation of the existing regulatory 
regime that places considerable constraints on union members‟ electoral choices. On 
the other hand, workers were permitted to self-nominate or nominate others. This 
option was not provided for in the 1992 regulations but is provided for in Article Eight 
of the new Method, subject to approval by the outgoing committee, the next level up of 
the trade union or the election committee who, in turn, must base their decision on the 
majority views of the workers. As noted, these procedures were not just about 
excluding militants, although that was clearly a consideration in Yuhang. 
The reforms have brought significant changes to the Chinese working class. 
Although we have a well-established union network in our private enterprises 
[in Yuhang], we have issues with unity due to the variation in the backgrounds 
of migrant workers. Some people exercise a disproportionate influence over 
others from their villages which may be enforced by threats of violence. We 
would like to see more frontline workers elected but it is also a question of 
finding the balance between development and the consciousness of the 
workforce. These are complex issues for us. In the short term we need to retain 
some influence over candidature in order to ensure stability. (Interview, Liang 
Shuigen, op. cit.)  
Despite these concerns over home-town associations, it is significant that the new 
Method clearly states that in the non state sector, non-local candidates (waiji zhigong) 
may stand as chairperson candidates.   
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In contrast to the traditional practice of opaque trade union appointments, the 
Yuhang elections were conducted in public and considerable efforts were made to 
publicise and generate enthusiasm for the event beforehand. Public notices were put up 
in the enterprises by the election preparatory group, broadcasts were made over factory 
loudspeaker systems, and it was made clear that the election was conducted by a secret 
ballot. The Yuhang Opinion also insisted that elected committee members who agreed 
to stand as candidates for the post of chairperson must deliver speeches in person to a 
workers‟ election meeting and that the voting that followed these speeches be 
competitive. For the YHFTU, improving representational accountability was a long 
term process that required both „debate, caution and transparency‟ (interview, Chen 
Xietong, 2006, op. cit.). At the time, the emphasis was on feeling for the proverbial 
stones in reasonably calm waters.  
We are just starting on a process and are not in a position to recommend „sea 
elections‟ at the current time. So far, our results have been impressive and 
although we deliberately selected enterprises that were basically stable, we have 
found that the elections have even reduced strikes, stoppages and incidents in 
general. (Interview, Liang Shuigen, op. cit.)  
Democratic Innovation 
„The key issue is not the staging of elections, but who members are permitted to elect, 
and, even more importantly, who they are not permitted to elect‟ (interview, Chen 
Xietong, op. cit.). In this light, if Yuhang was a significant step in openness and 
participation – as opposed to democratic practice – Yuyao was a daring and innovative 
democratic stride. While enterprises appear to have been carefully selected, the Yuyao 
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pilot was far more experimental in terms of improving representational credibility and 
pushing the democratic envelope. Moreover, the successes in Yuyao have led to the 
Ningbo Federation of Trade Unions (NFTU) drafting a city-wide „trial opinion‟ aimed 
at gradually rolling out the Yuyao pilot model across the city as a whole.
89
 The „Trial 
Opinion for the Direct Election of Primary Trade Union Chairpersons in Ningbo City‟ 
(Ningbo Opinion hereon) appears to have cast caution aside and „jumped into the sea‟ 
as well – even if the drafters donned a life-jacket in insisting that membership of an 
election preparation committee was approved by the Party and/or the next level up of 
the trade union based on the wishes of the members or their representatives (Ningbo 
Opinion, Article Two). On paper and in practice, the direct election pilots coming up 
the transmission belt from Yuyao and, beginning in 2004, Ningbo, are way ahead of 
the regulatory guidelines that were sent down the same belt back in 1992. This has 
turned out to be a „pilot project that is promoting the process of democratising the trade 
unions‟ (Yuayao and Yuhang Case Study Report, 2006). I will use both the Ningbo 
Opinion and the Yuyao Opinion to demonstrate how.
90
  
First, although Article Two of the Ningbo Opinion does not go further than 
existing regulations, it emphasises that the election of the trade union chairperson and 
deputy chairperson(s) is to be achieved via direct voting at a union meeting of workers 
or their representatives and that this method „is different from the method of electing a 
trade union chairperson and deputy chairpersons(s) via a full meeting of the trade union 
committee‟. Second, Clause Four of Article Eight in the Ningbo Opinion stated that 
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 Yuyao is a county-level city under the administration of Ningbo city, a major port.  
90
 On the matter of candidate vetting, the Yuyao and Ningbo documents do not reflect the Method 
released in 2008. Article Nine of the latter states that the enterprise Party organisation and the next level 
up of the trade union must carry out a check (kaocha) on the candidates and remove those who „do not 
meet the conditions for holding a post‟.     
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procedures for the election of a trade union chairperson can „also include a no 
candidate list‟ (ye ke bu she houxuanren) method. In Yuyao the YYFTU permitted „sea 
elections‟ and as a consequence of their success, the Ningbo Opinion has left room to 
emulate them. Article Nine of the Ningbo Opinion recommended that in small 
enterprises where the union does not present a candidate list, there should be two ballot 
papers, one in which the members write down their preferences for trade union 
committee members and on the second, their choice for chairperson. In larger 
enterprises adopting this „no candidate list‟ method, all the elected trade union 
committee members are automatically rendered candidates – if they are willing to stand 
– for the post of chairperson and a meeting of workers or workers‟ representatives casts 
their votes. The Yuyao Opinion stated that voting must be anonymous and the 
chairperson and committee members elected on a first-past-the-post basis. No matter 
whether there is a candidate list or members simply list their choices on ballot papers, 
neither the Yuyao Opinion nor the Ningbo Opinion made any mention of candidate 
checks or vetting procedures. Article Twelve simply states that „[A]ll candidates put 
forward are [treated on] an equal footing and only have to meet the conditions 
necessary for such a post (zhiyao jubei renzhi tiaojian)‟. On the other hand, Article 
Two states that the members of the election preparation committee must be agreed 
upon via negotiation between the enterprise and the next level up of the trade union. If 
the enterprise has a Party Committee i.e. it is an SOE or former SOE, this committee 
and the senior trade union must approve names of those on the election preparation 
committee and their decision based on the members or their representatives meeting 
and approval. Nevertheless, the space left by the absence of direct candidate vetting has 
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been described by one union researcher as „an important break with current practice‟ 
(interview, Chen Xietong, 2007, op. cit.).  
Conclusion 
Both the case studies and supporting secondary evidence demonstrate that direct 
elections possess considerable potential in bringing about a change in attitudes towards 
the union and even influencing its direction. While more conservative, the YHFTU 
nevertheless recognised and argued the need for elections with the Yuhang Party 
Committee, a policy that put it ahead of other areas of the country. There is no direct 
evidence, but it is highly likely that the Yuhang Opinion was consulted during the 
drafting of the nationwide Method (2008). Yuyao shows that if appropriate conditions 
prevail, there is the space within the current political system to push the boundaries of 
democratic participation and candidacy and that, as in Yuhang, this can produce a more 
active and effective layer of trade unionists as well as considerable enthusiasm from 
organisers, participants and even bosses – perhaps rather ominously! The case studies 
also indicate the extent of diversity in the ACFTU – even within a single provincial 
federation. They carry with them an implicit call for follow up research especially now 
we have a new national Method, the impact of which will require measuring.  
The research illustrates that the issue of direct elections is of profound 
importance to the ACFTU and the Party itself, namely due to the risk of increased 
labour militancy and foreign interference. The surveys in some of Yuyao‟s townships 
revealed a substantial number of people who thought that the more muscular trade 
union committees and chairpersons that had emerged from the pilots were likely to 
intensify conflict between labour and capital. Official announcements from the centre, 
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such as Su Liqing‟s interview in 2003, demonstrated how important „ownership‟ of the 
pilots is for the ACFTU. On the other hand, elections also create an internal dynamic. 
For example in 2004, the Hunan Workers‟ Daily complained that „in Hunan only 500 
union branches out of a total 80,000 primary level unions have directly elected 
officials‟ and cited, among other provinces, Zhejiang as being ahead of the game (Ceng 
Ying, 2004). Moreover, the material conditions of labour relations in SOEs and large 
joint ventures under local management possess the capacity to foster opposition to the 
new layer of unqualified „young Turks‟ that Wang claims has already emerged (Wang 
Jinhong, 2005). As we saw earlier in this chapter, Wang‟s argument, based on evidence 
from case studies of elections, is that the private sector provides the conditions in 
which a new type of democratic union representative can develop. Inevitably, this 
represents an implicit threat to the established cadre and their practices and privileges 
in the state sector.      
 Finally, I return to the wider themes of this thesis. At present, there is not 
enough evidence to support the argument that elections can make a radical difference 
to pay and working conditions, or indeed the overall effectiveness of the ACFTU. The 
chief issues remain dependency on the employers, inactive primary level unions and an 
unwillingness of the higher levels to mount a systematic challenge to employers either 
in support of workers already doing so or on their own initiative. Employers are 
certainly not going to be a source of inspiration for direct elections, despite Chan‟s 
admiration for Reebok‟s innovations (Chan, A. 2009: 309). Existing appointed union 
officers are hardly going to welcome elected rivals with open arms, given the 
privileges they may stand to loose. And while there are senior figures in the ACFTU 
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who argue for more elections and provincial leaders who tolerate them, fear of 
provoking further unrest is likely to see the current caution remain in place for some 
time to come.  
All this takes us back to the workers themselves. As labour militancy continues 
to develop, it is likely that this will increase pressure on the ACFTU to further improve 
its effectiveness in representing workers‟ legitimate rights and interests. Given the risks 
that open elections carry, it is by no means certain that more open direct trade union 
elections will be a central plank of the ACFTU‟s national response, as the caution in 
the 2008 Method suggests.  But at the same time, this same militancy will encourage 
more pilots in relatively stable areas to experiment with electoral procedures and the 
record demonstrates that these will contribute to the overall debate and direction of 
reform. Although nuanced and often not straightforward, these links are real and help 
us to understand the complexities of the ACFTU‟s response to the challenge of labour 
unrest. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
Our starting point for this thesis was an awareness that knowledge and understanding 
of the response of the ACFTU to dramatic changes in employment relations in China 
over the past quarter of a century is very limited. This is because of an excessive 
reliance on the examination of national policy and official statements and a failure to 
identify significant changes in trade union practice. I have therefore sought to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the changing character of trade unionism in 
China by carrying out a number of case studies of innovative reforms undertaken by 
ACFTU officers at local level in response to increasing worker unrest. Together these 
case studies suggest that, despite the flaws concomitant with state-sponsored trade 
unionism, the ACFTU does respond to labour unrest in ways that go beyond its 
traditional methods and practice.  
 In Chapter One I summarise the development of labour relations from 1949 
until the present day, charting the role of the danwei or work unit in both protecting 
and controlling China‟s working class. I show that by the mid-fifties the role of the 
ACFTU was fixed as a conduit for state policy and workers‟ reaction to it but that the 
former‟s prioritising of national reconstruction and development narrowed the 
organisation‟s potential to represent workers‟ interests. By 1957, following the more or 
less full nationalisation of the economy, the ACFTU had been thoroughly anaesthetised. 
At enterprise level its role was to administer the not inconsiderable welfare benefits of 
the danwei and organise campaigns to boost production, develop health and safety and 
occasionally intervene in administrative disputes between individual workers and 
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enterprise managers. The Cultural Revolution shattered this scenario and the unions 
shut down in the face of Red Guard violence, ideological attacks from the Centre and 
the emergence of army-dominated Revolutionary Committees to restore order and 
production in the enterprises. They were resurrected with the onset of economic 
reforms in 1978 when the ACFTU‟s rapid return to its former role was assisted by the 
revamping of the Staff and Workers‟ Congress and the Party‟s cautious step-by-step 
approach to withdrawing from direct intervention in industrial management. 
Nevertheless, as the state pulled back, pressure for reform gradually built up through 
the eighties and continued following a three-year lull in the aftermath of the traumatic 
events of 1989. In 1997, the CPC‟s historic decision to restructure, bankrupt or 
privatise SOEs and China‟s subsequent membership of the WTO dramatically upped 
the stakes for trade union reform chiefly because the return of capitalist labour relations 
elevated the potential of labour unrest directly to impede capital accumulation. The 
mass lay-offs of the late nineties and early years of the new century, combined with the 
emergence of labour shortages from 2003, set the stage for increasingly sophisticated 
workers‟ militancy that required a more proactive response from the trade unions if 
stability was to be maintained. 
 In Chapter Two, I follow the historical impact of labour unrest on policy and 
practice in China‟s industrial relations. The chapter demonstrates how the partial 
integration of interests between manager and managed during the command economy 
had the effect of politicising labour militancy into a contest between workers and the 
Party. The absence of freedom of association facilitated state control over workers‟ 
daily lives but only served to intensify conflict when it broke out – as it did on a major 
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scale at least four times during the first forty years of the PRC. In the face of 
increasingly dominant private and foreign sectors, the 1997 decision to go ahead with 
full-scale restructuring at the CPC‟s Fifteenth Congress removed the last vestiges of 
the „iron rice bowl‟ I described in Chapter One. I argue that the state‟s phased 
redundancy policy (xiagang), supplemented with targeted repression of workers‟ 
leaders, ensured that the widespread resistance remained largely atomised and rarely 
went beyond the boundaries of a single enterprise.  
In the non-state sector, literature and reports from the early years of the reform 
fretted about labour unrest in the SEZs. However, in Chapter Three, I argue that, 
compared with the present-day levels, protest was scattered, short and mostly 
spontaneous. The advent of a national labour law in 1995 and widespread reporting of 
labour violations heralded the gradual development of private and foreign sector 
protests into the sophisticated class struggles against employers that are commonplace 
in China today. In response, the state has pressured the ACFTU to channel unrest into 
juridical labour dispute resolution procedures that the union has helped to establish, 
while simultaneously acting as a constraint on the establishment of effective and 
representative primary unions for fear of exacerbating the unrest. These well-
documented tensions at policy level have set the scene for innovative union pilot 
projects on the ground that are the subject of the following chapters.  
 Chapter Four shows how the union responded when skilled garment workers 
took advantage of local labour shortages to organise strikes and marshal 
demonstrations that threatened collective labour flight. In the town of Xinhe, these 
actions had the potential to devastate the local economy that was heavily dependent on 
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116 private enterprises employing 12,000 seasonal migrant workers. Desperate to 
avoid another season of strikes, the town-level trade union, together with the local 
manufacturers‟ association and the labour bureau, launched China‟s first localised 
sector-level collective consultation that stabilised wages and reduced strikes. A sector-
level trade union specifically for woollen garment sector workers was established to 
ensure the process was sustainable, although workers‟ representatives were selected by 
management and not elected by workers. Following a contentious process of 
consultation, and even bargaining, the project produced a wage table for fifty-nine job 
specs. While the union mediated this process, rather than directly taking up the cudgel 
on behalf of the workers, our research demonstrates that it was willing to consult with 
workers‟ and back their views. Although the results were announced by the higher city-
level union as a „win-win‟ situation in keeping with legal guidelines, the clear conflict 
of interests between workers and employers, and between employers in urgent need of 
skilled workers, was more a testament to the organic, bottom-up nature of the initiative 
itself. Our research also demonstrates that the trade unions‟ access to state power can 
be a resource as well as a constraint. The Xinhe Federation of Trade Unions was able 
to use its relationship with the Party to keep employers at the table when many 
threatened to abandon talks over the rates for less skilled work specs. Here was an 
innovative response to sophisticated informal mobilisation of migrant workers that the 
authorities wanted to contain within bureaucratic channels. The high level of worker 
activism prevented the experiment from degenerating into wage regulation by an 
employers‟ organisation. Despite the lack of formal channels for worker participation, 
we can see initial stages of freedom of association developing in practice.  
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 In Yiwu, the city-level (county) trade union launched a research project to 
identify the reasons behind increasing and sometimes violent labour unrest. The results 
yielded evidence that migrant workers were willing to use formal channels of labour 
dispute resolution – as opposed to settling scores via home town associations – but that 
resources were scarce and costs were prohibitive. The chairman of the Yiwu City 
Federation of Trade Unions was also faced with budgetary constraints exacerbated by a 
shortfall in full-time staff able to exert an influence at enterprise level. On paper, 
federations of primary unions covered a third of the often rural enterprises scattered 
across Yiwu‟s complex supply chains but these were constrained by conflicts of 
interests – to the extent that the owner of an enterprise was sometimes the trade union 
chair – or a crippling dependency on the employers. As chairman of the YFTU, Chen 
Youde‟s innovative response was to go beyond the traditional parameters of the trade 
union bureaucracy. He forged alliances with other government departments, some of 
which were initially less-than-impressed with his goal of „socialising‟ trade union work. 
For Chen and his supporters this meant drawing on resources from society that were 
not normally associated with the trade union bureaucracy, including non-ACFTU 
media, lawyer offices, government departments and the courts. Hiring staff outside the 
traditional pool of civil service-trained graduates enabled the YFTU to keep within 
budget and at the same time provide legal services to migrant workers willing to pursue 
their claims via mediation, arbitration or the courts. The establishment of the Yiwu 
Workers‟ Legal Rights Centre registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a social 
group (shehui tuanti) broke new ground in that it demonstrated that trade unions could 
work with external partners. In Yiwu‟s case this was chiefly with government 
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departments and legal agencies, but there are already examples of trade unions dipping 
their toes into civil society itself and the YWLRC will surely be emulated elsewhere, 
albeit with regional variations suited to conditions on the ground. For example, the 
Qingdao city-level trade union has jointly set up a workers‟ legal advice centre with an 
LNGO already experienced in this work. And in the Pearl River Delta, the Shenzhen 
Federation of Trade Unions has acknowledged the contribution of para-legal networks 
to stabilising labour relations and even offered to work with them – albeit with strings 
attached. 
The tension between improved worker representation and the risk of 
exacerbating labour unrest has played a major part in the stop-start character of the 
policy of direct elections for trade union chairpersons and committee members rather 
then the traditional method of appointment of officials. In Chapter Six I survey the 
literature on this issue and unpack the politically sensitive arguments with regard to the 
development of trade union democracy. Despite various pilot projects, progress has 
been slow. The experiment was not deemed appropriate in enterprises recently the 
subject of strikes or other labour actions. Large enterprises were also excluded on the 
grounds that the repercussions of elections producing militant leaders were potentially 
too grave. Reformers have presented direct elections as a device to maintain stabilised 
labour relations – as opposed to producing them – by improving the quality of trade 
union officials. Elected officials are supposed to be likely to be more responsive to 
their members on account of their being elected and in turn members would – in theory 
– be more likely to trust elected representatives. Practice has shown that this has indeed 
been the case, with the caveat that more responsive enterprise-level union officials are 
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still prone to dependency on their employers and can always be sacked, transferred to 
more distant posts or bought off. There is also the central question of electoral 
procedures. As I illustrate in Chapter Six, the crux lies with the method of candidate 
selection and this is where the ACFTU is still performing a delicate balancing act. On 
the one hand, there is no point in going through the hassle of conducting elections if 
candidacy is not monitored in order to prevent employers from manipulating the event. 
On the other hand, completely free „sea elections‟ popularised in the countryside risk 
the election of militants who could easily bring about labour unrest. The Yuyao 
Federation of Trade Unions opted for „sea elections‟ that were then provided for – 
though hardly recommended – in guidelines for trade union elections in the important 
coastal city of Ningbo. Nationally, the ACFTU stepped back from permitting open 
candidature when it released its first national Method aimed at guiding such elections. 
On the other hand, management has been excluded from standing, a further recognition 
that capitalist labour relations are forcing a departure from long-held notions of 
integrated interests.    
 Taken together the case studies demonstrate four points. First, the ACFTU is 
not monolithic and the strategy of testing new policies via pilot projects provides fertile 
ground for innovation in trade union practice. Second, innovation is often specific to 
the concrete conditions in a given locality and the personalities that operate in it. Third, 
it is labour unrest that is the most serious challenge facing the ACFTU and providing 
the impetus for trade union reform especially in the private sector. Indeed, it is a sad 
irony that the myth of „victimhood‟ that surrounded Chinese migrant workers was, by 
the turn of the century, more appropriate to the laid-off SOE workers, despite militant 
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traditions and their adoption of class conscious language. Fourth, the rising level of 
worker unrest and independent worker organisation is nowhere near the stage at which 
we can speak of an organised challenge to ACFTU‟s monopoly of representation. The 
ACFTU has responded to this challenge at local level, where the challenge has been 
most acute, by developing structures and practices that by no means overcome the 
limitations of state-sponsored trade unionism, but which provide building blocks for 
the future.   
 How will these blocks be placed? On the one hand, the caution adopted by the 
leadership when promoting local innovation to national policy remains very important 
and is entirely in keeping with Deng Xiaoping‟s strategy of „crossing the river while 
feeling for the stones‟. On the other hand, the return of full-blooded capitalist labour 
relations and the concomitant rise in militancy continues to intensify the need for 
innovation. Apart from the case studies we present in this thesis, our central argument 
is supported by evidence from the first three chapters, including more worker-friendly 
labour laws, the „normalisation‟ of strikes, the gradual acceptance of LNGOs as players 
in Chinese industrial relations and the Wal-Mart episode.      
 The practical significance of the thesis lies with the international trade union 
movement‟s policy towards the ACFTU. The international trade union community has 
sharply criticised China and the ACFTU for the absence of freedom of association. 
However, since the Change To Win split from the AFL-CIO and the merger between 
the World Confederation of Labour and the ICFTU, the newly-formed ITUC has 
moved towards engagement with the Chinese unions. Whether by accident or design, 
they have begun to connect with ACFTU just at a time at which embryonic forms of 
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freedom of association are emerging in China and the ACFTU is responding to it. 
Although the possibilities of international solidarity actions remain a long way off, 
accusations of job-stealing and protectionism motivated by national rather than class 
interests are heard much less frequently, despite the advent of a global recession when 
one would expect the clamour arising from such prejudices to increase in volume. 
 Finally, it appears that the tsunami of job losses caused by the financial crisis 
has begun to recede. At the outset of the crisis, Chinese worker militancy transformed 
into a more defensive struggle for fair compensation for early dismissal as factories 
closed or reduced output and millions of migrant workers headed back to the 
countryside. However, China posted an 8.9 per cent growth in gross domestic produce 
for the third quarter of 2009 and as order books have filled up some areas are once 
again reporting labour shortages. This suggests that the material conditions for 
intensified labour militancy and concomitant trade union reform are again in place. Of 
course, the state may instead adopt a retrogressive policy of repression over 
concession. However, it is more likely to continue to build institutions that can resolve 
labour unrest peacefully. Taking the more optimistic scenario as our starting point, 
research on both the ACFTU and labour unrest needs to be developed in at least three 
areas. First, our knowledge of the process by which the ACFTU upgrades local pilot 
projects into national policy remains inadequate. Second, the constraints on effective 
collective bargaining are gradually loosening as strikes are normalised and the space 
for more varied agency – such as specialist negotiators – has widened. Unlike ten years 
ago, we can now envisage collective agreements in Chinese joint ventures that exceed 
legal minimum standards and even fall into line with regional framework agreements 
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negotiated between TNCs and regional GUFs. Third, the ability to provide relatively 
cheap labour remains a core reason for China‟s ability to attract foreign investment. To 
maintain its supply, restrictions on hukou are likely to continue to relax, and the slow 
convergence in the interests of private and state sector workers that Sargeson (1999) 
imagined in Hangzhou nearly two decades ago will inch closer to reality. The 
groundwork for these areas of research has already been done and the time is ripe to 
get to grips with the detail which promises to yield exciting new knowledge. 
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